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3ABSTRACTThroughout the ‘long eighteenth century’ Britain was heavily reliant upon soldiersfrom states within the Holy Roman Empire to augment British forces during times ofwar, especially in the repeated conflicts with Bourbon, Revolutionary, andNapoleonic France. The disparity in populations between these two rival powers,and the British public’s reluctance to maintain a large standing army, made thisexternal source of manpower of crucial importance. Whereas the majority of theseforces were acting in the capacity of allies, ‘auxiliary’ forces were hired as well, andfrom the mid-century onwards, a small but steadily increasing number of Germanmen would serve within British regiments or distinct formations referred to as‘Foreign Corps’. Employing or allying with these troops would result in these Anglo-German armies operating not only on the European continent but in the AmericanColonies, Caribbean and within the British Isles as well.Within these multinational coalitions, soldiers would encounter and interactwith one another in a variety of professional and informal venues, and manyparticipants recorded their opinions of these foreign ‘brother-soldiers’ in journals,private correspondence, or memoirs. These commentaries are an invaluable sourcefor understanding how individual Briton’s viewed some of their most valued andconsistent allies – discussions that are just as insightful as comparisons made withtheir French enemies. Although their impressions borrowed from many prevalentstereotypes, especially in analyses concerning national character, these soldier-authors had a unique perspective and their writings reflect this. These menbelonged to the soldiering profession, and this solidarity among military men wouldoften focus their attention away from national or cultural distinctions, and towardsdefining how their allies adhered to the common ideal of a good soldier. The resultwas that though the British public may have maintained a derogatory attitudetowards German soldiery, Britain’s own military men – due to shared identities andexperiences – viewed them far more favourably.
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7INTRODUCTION
‘Now every thing is so totally unlike England you cannot conceive & which hurriesone home to be absorbed in reflection’1
So wrote the English officer William Knollys in a letter to his mother while onmilitary campaign in Flanders in 1793. During his time in the Low Countries,Knollys, the self-styled Lord Wallingford, was every day encountering new placesand being immersed in an environment that – while not as foreign as he would haveus believe – nevertheless gave him a greater appreciation of his own Englishness.After one such evening of being ‘absorbed in reflection’, he confided to his family,‘the more I see of foreign customs, the more plainly I feel the sterling good sense ofour own Constitution.’2 Knollys, and so many other British officers and soldiers likehim, gained a better understanding of his own culture and nation by encounteringothers while on campaign, where they would not only interact with the localinhabitants, but also a whole variety of men from other nations with whom theBritish were so often allied. One of the most common subjects for such comparisonswere the German allies and auxiliaries fighting alongside the British Army, a point ofcommentary recurrent in Wallingford’s letters and with scores of other Britishsoldiers over the last century. Not only were these comparisons valuable in gaininginsight into their own Britishness, but these soldiers would also formulate opinionsof their fellow-soldiers within German armies, providing a unique perspective that,crucially, would be far different from the opinions of their countrymen back home.Utilizing the personal writings of the soldiers themselves, this thesis will examinethese deliberations and what they tell us will reveal a great deal about the
1 Hampshire Record Office (HRO) 1M44/110 fol. 66, Lord Wallingford to his mother, near Tournay,December 3rd 1793.2 Knollys went by Lord Wallingford while his father remained alive, and then became, unofficially, the8th Earl of Banbury. HRO 1M44/110 fol. 66, Lord Wallingford to his mother, near Tournay, December3rd, 1793.; Victor Stater, ‘Charles Knollys’, in Rev. Timothy J. McCann, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004).
8relationships between British and German soldiers in the long eighteenth century,the military associations of these two polities, the encounters of their individualsoldiers and the opinions born out of those interactions. Soldiers were some of themore well-travelled members of British society, and an examination of theirthoughts and experiences will shed greater light on the relations between theBritish and German polities and British opinions of Germany in the eighteenthcentury, which have been to this point dominated by studies of grand tourists,politics, foreign policy, and the press.In recent decades, scholars have tried to obtain a deeper appreciation of thelives of military men (and women), and their relationships with the nation at-large.We know more about the daily routines, experiences and motivations of eighteenthcentury soldiers due to these historical inquiries, but there has been very littlewritten about their relationships with their allies – a crucial aspect of military life,which has more often only been addressed, obliquely, by historians of politics andforeign policy. In wars, it hardly needs saying: enemies are made. But friendshipsare also created, and ‘strange-bedfellows’, here created by the spectre of ahegemonic French monarchy, were perhaps not as strange as they have beenportrayed. The seemingly ubiquitous presence of ‘Germans’ fighting alongside theBritish Army was no accident, for they were very much a part of the British way ofwarfare in the long eighteenth century, in Europe, and beyond. Had relationsbetween these two forces been untenable, this relationship would have never lastedas long as it did.
The aims of this thesis are two-fold. Firstly, and as a preface to the socialhistory of this relationship, this work seeks to highlight the evolving but consistentlyvaluable role that German manpower played in contributing to Britain’s European,imperial and domestic military struggles from the commencement of the Nine YearsWar to the Battle of Waterloo. The primary reason for such an introduction emergesfrom the fact that this subject, as a whole, has escaped the eyes of most militaryhistorians save for those observing a specific instance in this century-longassociation. In the last two centuries, much has been written on the history of
9German soldiers in and alongside the British army, but a comprehensive study of theentirety of this phenomenon has never been attempted. This is perhaps notsurprising given that the period which saw the most interest in the military historyof Britain, the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, also coincidedwith British nationalism in its strongest form, and certainly amidst two world warsand existential threats to the freedom of the British people and her armed forces,few would be willing to discuss the vital importance of German soldiery to Britain’smilitary successes in the previous two centuries. The same was true for thehistories by German soldiers and scholars, as unfortunately some of the mostextensive monographs on subjects such as the Germans in the AmericanRevolutionary War or the Hanoverians in the service of Britain in the Napoleonicera, are deeply mired in nationalistic bias. Furthermore, this period of multinationalarmies, filled with men showing very little national allegiance, was not popularamong the late-Victorian and early twentieth century soldier-scholars, in eithercountry. This is exemplified in the writings of authors such as Francis Henry Skrine,who wrote that ‘society in the eighteenth century was hasting to decay’, given thatwithin these armies, ‘racial ties were of small account.’3For much of the past two centuries, histories of Britain’s armed forces werewritten predominantly by active or retired servicemen and therefore were mostoften focused on military matters, tactics, dress, organization, and a handful of theera’s dramatis personae – topics of particular utility for those within the profession.As a result, much of the social history of the British Army was overlooked until thelatter decades of the twentieth century, particularly the social interactions withforeign foes and allies. Yet this prolonged interest in military histories, andespecially the personal histories and writings of soldiers themselves, have providedfor posterity an overwhelming number of published first-hand accounts, which havebeen of great benefit to this project.This is not to say that the subject at hand is bereft of scholarly attention.While there may be no comprehensive study arching this entire period, there is
3 Francis Henry Skrine, Fontenoy and Britain’s Share in the War of Austrian Succession, 1741-1748(London: Blackwood & Sons, 1906), p. 70.
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certainly a host of treatises that deal with the military and social history of thesetwo nations. For the military perspective, there have been several beneficial articlesand monographs on episodes of Anglo-German armies, alliances and coalitions, withperhaps the greatest single contributor being C.T. Atkinson, whose work in themiddle of the twentieth century has been a helpful gateway to archival resourcesand areas of inquiry. For the history of the British armies and their partnershipswith German allies, Sir John Fortescue’s extensive and invaluable studies are ofparticularly utility.4 More recently, Peter Wilson has made significant contributionsto our understanding of the militaries of the smaller absolutists states within theHoly Roman Empire, and his comprehensive treatise on the subject, German Armies:
War and German Politics, 1648-1806, is the best source for understanding thiscentury-long relationship from the German perspective, especially given that otherEuropean powers were similarly engaged in hiring auxiliaries and subsidy troopsfrom within the Reich, many of whom did so before Britain adopted the policy inpursuing her own interests.5 In subsequent chapters, there will be the introductionof further sources, as the various aspects or episodes of Anglo-German militaryrelationships are discussed, as indeed this work is the beneficiary of a whole host ofsecondary works and published first-hand accounts. Nevertheless, there are fewworks that encompass this whole period, and sadly, this thesis can only scratch thesurface of what is a compelling but sadly neglected military history.
The second objective for this thesis, which will receive the most emphasisthroughout, is examining the social and professional relationships between Britishand German soldiers. The aim is to explore these key themes: where theyencountered one another; how they interacted; and what comments they madeabout behaviour, manners, and their counterparts’ abilities as soldiers. This is donewith a view towards dispelling the impression that associations between thesepolities were unilaterally negative, adding another facet to the topic of Anglo-Hanoverian and Anglo-German relations which has become in vogue in the last two
4 Sir John William Fortescue, History of the British Army, 14 vols. (1899-1930).5 Peter Wilson, German Armies: War and German Politics, 1648-1806 (London: UCL Press, 1999).
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decades, but has centred around political and foreign policy concerns, and at times,cultural, philosophical, religious, and mercantile connections. For these links withthe Electorate of Hanover in particular, we are indebted to Brendan Simms andTorsten Riotte and the various contributors to The Hanoverian Dimension, and otherrecent studies that have sought to address key gaps in this subject.6 One particularlyrelevant work is Frauke Geyken’s monograph on British portrayals of Germany inpublic discourse and travel writings, and indeed, discussions of the grand tour arethe most valuable studies for finding British depictions of Germans and Germanyfrom which to contrast the accounts of soldier-authors.7 Jeremy Black andChristopher Hibbert have both made valuable additions to this particular subject,and this work hopes to contribute to this discussion of British impressions ofGermans and Germany formed from first hand experience.8 Yet the British view ofGermany in the eighteenth century has yet to be fully realized, and this thesis hopesto make some small contribution.Certainly, with the popularity in the past two decades of studies on anti-Hanoverianism and the Hanoverian element in British foreign and military policy,the characterizations of the Electorate by the British press are well covered. Thoselooking at perceptions of Hanover in works such as Bob Harris’ Patriot Press, or hisarticle, ‘Hanover in the Public Sphere’, would certainly maintain that theimpressions were by and large negative, yet the debates over subsidizing Germantroops were won by those who supported these policies, not their opponents.9Expanding beyond merely the 1740’s, where Gert Brauer has addressed many ofthese issues, a discussion of how these subsidy treaties were defended, justified, andmaintained is in desperate need of a work similar to that of Hannah Smith’s recent
6 Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte (eds.), The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714-1837(Cambridge: CUP, 2007).7 Frauke Geyken, Gentlemen auf Reisen: Das Britische Deutschlandbild im 18 Jahrhuntert (Frankfurt:Campus Verlag, 2002).8 Christopher Hibbert, The Grand Tour (London: Methuen, 1987).; Jeremy Black, The British and theGrand Tour (London: Croom Helm, 1985).; Jeremy Black, The British Abroad, The Grand Tour in the
Eighteenth Century (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992).9 Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-18th Century (Oxford: OUP, 2002).; Bob Harris,
A Patriot Press: National Politics and the London Press in the 1740’s (Oxford: OUP, 2003).; Bob Harris,‘Hanover in the Public Sphere’, in Simms and Riotte, The Hanoverian Dimension.
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publication on the supporters of the Georgian Monarchy.10 Nicholas Harding’sfascinating work Hanover and Empire on the philosophical role of Hanover and itsrelation with the British Empire has done this in part, and future scholarship shouldexpand such topics further to include the Hessians, who as frequent recipients offunds from the British government were in the crosshairs of the opposition press aswell, often at the same time. While the political debates and the impressions in the‘public sphere’ are indeed a fascinating aspect of this relationship, the opinionsexpressed there have a particular bias, and for this reason, those soldiers’ accountspublished as pamphlets or printed in magazines will for the most part beoverlooked.It should be noted that throughout this work the focus remains primarily –but not exclusively – on the opinions of British soldiers regarding their Germancounterparts. Nevertheless, where possible, the German accounts are utilized togain the best possible understanding of these relationships, and to reveal theiropinions in similar circumstances. Limited time and resources have prevented ahighly desirable comparative history, but that should not prevent myself, or others,from trying in the future.
**Methodology**
Before addressing the history of this particular subject, there are a few issues thatshould be addressed, non-the-least some definitions that need to be clarified. Thisthesis unashamedly employs terms such as ‘British’, ‘English’ and ‘German’throughout, to define the participants within these coalitions, with full awareness ofthe dangers in trying to suggest that these were perfectly homogenous or clearlydefinable groups in this period. Of course in the eighteenth century there was notrue German ‘nation’ in the modern sense of the word, and the majority of those
10 Gert Brauer, Die Hannoversch-englischen Subsidienverträge, 1702-1748 (Scientia Verlag Aalen,1962).; Hannah Smith, The Georgian Monarchy: Politics and Culture, 1714-1760 (Cambridge: CUP,2006).
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mentioned in this work herald from northern, protestant regions, leaving out asignificant proportion of the German-speaking world. This has resulted in theexclusion of some of the more prominent states of the Holy Roman Empire, such asSaxony, Bavaria, Württemberg and the many ecclesiastical territories, not tomention, non-German speaking regions such as Flanders and Bohemia. Equallydamning is that in examining the members of the British Army, there will be apaucity of references to the Irish, when certainly protestant Irish were ubiquitousthroughout this era, though many defined themselves as Englishmen. Yet, themethods used in defining these peoples are done in the interest of clarity and toavoid convoluting this discussion by trying to avoid every incongruity. Howeverthere are other justifications for doing so. A discussion of politics or foreign policywould require definite terms, but this work focuses on individual soldiers, who maycome from anywhere in British dominions or the German-speaking regions of theHoly Roman Empire, and the composition of armies in the eighteenth century didnot necessarily mirror the states which mobilized them. More importantly, ‘English’and ‘German’ were the most commonly used terms by the participants themselves,although the term ‘British’ is utilized with greater frequency here, as a means ofbeing more inclusive.11 Therefore, rightly or wrongly, this work, for coherency andlucidity, uses the terms utilized by the soldier-authors themselves, which is apropos,given that this is a dissertation about generalizations.There is one term however that has been invented here: that of the Anglo-German army. This entity never existed in any formal sense, nor was a term used byparticipants themselves, and is indeed created as a means of tying together thesevarious armies that were comprised largely (but of course not exclusively) ofEnglish and German speakers.12 Yet this is also representative of a conflux of twomilitary cultures, noticeable particularly to military theorists, however mollifiedthey may have been by the homogenizing nature of early modern European
11 For the use and significance of ‘British’ and ‘English’ in the writings of the soldiers themselves, seeStephen Conway, ‘War and National Identity in the Mid-Eighteenth-Century British Isles’, English
Historical Review, 116 (September 2001), pp. 863-893.12 The one exception to this being German references to the ‘English-German Legion’, which was analternative name for the King’s German Legion of 1803-1815.
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militaries. An Anglo-German army often incorporated or fought alongside othernations and nationalities, but throughout Britain’s great struggles with France,armies consisting largely of British and Germanic forces were the most prevalent.
The main trajectory of this work does not entail an exhaustive militaryhistory of this lengthy and impactful relationship, though there has been providedhere, and in later chapters, a brief narrative of British and German cooperationbetween the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Instead the focus willbe on the relations between British and German soldiers, and in particular, Britishopinions of their German counterparts. To this end, the first chapter focuses onpopular impressions of British and German ‘nationalities’, especially in theories ofnational character. This will be a point of embarkation for later chapters focusingon the soldier-authors who made and recorded their own impressions upon cominginto contact with their ‘brother-soldiers’. Chapter I will conclude with a discussionof the ways in which early modern European militaries were homogenizing agents,which brought together soldiers in a shared culture and professional fraternity thatwas surprisingly multi-national and transnational.Chapters II through VI will each highlight a specific relationship or instancein the history of Anglo-German military associations. The relationship betweenBritish and German soldiers in this period has been divided here between allies,auxiliaries, and integrated corps. The first of these groups, allies, refers to the majorpowers within the Holy Roman Empire who served alongside British forces asequals in the large multinational struggles on the European continent. For the sakeof clarity, this term will be used predominantly for Austrian and Prussian armies,although contemporaries used similar language to describe many other contingentsfighting alongside the British. While Parliament would often provide subsidies forboth of these two powers’ armed forces, they remained for the most partindependent entities, at times frustratingly so. While there are other minordistinctions, which will be outlined later, this is the main criterion used to delineate
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and define an ally, as they would remain throughout any war under the direction oftheir own sovereign.13This was not the case for the second group examined in this thesis:auxiliaries. A significant number of princes within the Holy Roman Empire, usuallythose with territories too small or too poor to sustain large standing armies, wouldfor a variety of motives hire out their forces to a wealthier state. Such armies, orcontingents from them, became ‘auxiliaries’ in Britain’s armies, although they were(and often still are) referred to as ‘mercenaries’. In the case of Great Britain, thoughthey acted at all times in concert with the British Army and under the direction ofBritish commanders, they would retain much of their organization, structure andcomposition, and would in almost every way remain an army within an army.In order to explore this relationship further, Chapter IV will be a lengthy casestudy of the ‘Hessians’ in the American War, following a broader examination ofrelations between Britons and their German auxiliaries in Chapter III. While thereare a number of good candidates for a case study of Britain’s German auxiliaries, theHessians were chosen due to the popularity and familiarity of the subject withinmodern historiography, and of course the quantity of first hand accounts whichilluminate this particular episode better than any other.Chapters V and VI discuss the last form Anglo-German association: theGermans integrated into British regiments or serving as ‘Foreign Corps’: i.e., foreigncontingents within the British Army. As in the case of auxiliaries, a chapter-longcase study will follow, which will highlight that exceptional entity known as theKing’s German Legion, which became a Hanoverian Army in exile during theNapoleonic Wars, and is the far and away the best source for examiningrelationships between British and German soldiers and their opinions of one
13 As late as 1794, Prussia was acting in the capacity of auxiliary to Britain, although they neverproperly mobilized their army or manoeuvred them in a way to assist the British, leading one Britishofficer to exclaim that the Prussian subsidy was ‘the most ruinous measure we could have adopted.’Sir Harry Calvert, The Journals and Correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert, Comprising the
Campaigns in Flanders and Holland in 1793-4 edited by Sir Harry Verney (London: Hurst and Blackett,1853), pp. 348, 350.
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another, and therefore their high profile in this thesis should hardly come as asurprise.The division between allies, auxiliaries and integrated soldiers, as will beshown in their respective chapters, is one that reflects the frequency and nature ofinteractions between the two groups of soldiers. This categorization does notreflect variations in the tenor of these relationships, as this was determined by otherexternal factors, such as the success of the current campaign or the politicalrelationship between the respective nations. Though it would be tempting to dividethis work along the lines of positive or negative impressions or interactions, in fact,such relations might have resulted from either prolonged exposure, or suchinfrequent encounters as to prevent the overturning of pre-established dispositions,or some other variable. In the end, the approach chosen was done so because eachform of association had recurrent themes that reflected the nature of eachrelationship.
Though these five chapters highlight the variety of associations and episodesof Anglo-German interaction between the Glorious Revolution and Waterloo, thereis one notable omission from this discussion, which itself is deserving of its ownparticular study: that of British soldiers serving in German armies. Horace Walpoleremarked of these Britons serving within the Reich: ‘we seem to flourish much whentransplanted to Germany – but Germans don’t make good manure here!’14 Given thenotoriety of several Britons in German armies, particularly the famed James Keith inthe Prussian service (amongst others), this would indeed be a valuable and populartheme. However, aside from the political refugees and Irish Catholics servingabroad, the numbers of Britons and Protestant Irish were never great, for a varietyof reasons, stemming from restrictions placed by the British government, to thedifficulties of foreign service, and that German forces usually received lower pay.15
14 Horace Walpole, Letters of Horace Walpole, Fourth Earl of Orford (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1906),vol. III, p. 37.15 While Frederick Wilhelm I of Prussia was ever eager to recruit within Britain, especially in order tofill the ranks of his ‘Giant Grenadiers’, there is very little evidence to suggest others German statesdeliberately sought after British soldiers. See: F.L Carsten, ‘British Diplomacy and the Giant
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This disparity can best be seen in the Hessen-Kassel forces sent to America in the1770’s: despite a relatively high frequency of foreigners within their infantrybattalions, aside from a handful of men in the officer class, fewer than two-dozenBritons were among more than 11,000 soldiers sent to the colonies and most ofthese were in the regimental bands.16 Contrasting this with the British regimentsserving in America, which contained more than 2,000 German-born men, not tomention the tens of thousands of auxiliaries, reveals that this would hardly make fora comparative history.17 Yet their story is an intriguing one, and the subject willhopefully receive some more attention in the future.
In order to best understand the opinions of British soldiers towards theirGerman counterparts, be they, allies, auxiliaries or integrated formations, thepersonal writings of soldiers and officers have been of the most utility. War Officeand Colonial Office papers have been utilized, but more often they have providedcontext and a greater appreciation of the organizational and bureaucraticrelationship, as opposed to the personal one. Instead, private letters to family andcolleagues, personal diaries, journals, and memoirs (published and unpublished),have all been the main sources for examining these relationships. There arecertainly pitfalls in relying so heavily upon such documents, especially memoirs,given the likelihood of inaccuracies and the prejudices of the author. For worksdesigned specifically for publication, there is always the concern that their accountswere merely pandering to an audience. Furthermore, many of these memoirs,especially after the Napoleonic Wars, were written with the help of histories, such asWilliam Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula, which many authors admittedusing in order to corroborate their own accounts or to refresh their memories.18
Grenadiers of Frederick William I’, History Today, [1:11] (1951: Nov.), pp. 55-60.; J.M. Bulloch, ‘ScotsSoldiers Under the Prussian Flag’, JSAHR, vol. 3 (1924), pp. 108-109.; for a letter explaining thedisadvantages of Prussian service, see: National Archives of Scotland (NAS) GD18/4198, John Christieto Sir John Clerk, January 10th, 1751.16 For published Hessian muster rolls, see: Eckhart G. Franz, Hessische Truppen im amerikanischen
Unabhängigkeitskrieg 6 vols. (Marburg : Archivschule, 1972-1987).17 For German soldiers in British regiments, especially ‘Scheither’s Recruits’, see Chapter V below.18 William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and the South of France, 6 vols. (London: 1828-1840).
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But in the vast majority of cases, these sources retain a great deal of consistency intheir recollections of their German allies, and only in the end of this period is thereany hint of bias – and this particular issue will be addressed in the final chapter.The greatest pitfall are those journals and memoirs which were createdsolely for public consumption, even going so far as to be completely invented.William Defoe is attributed – amongst other things – to creating a war journal of theconflicts in Catalonia during the War of Spanish Succession, but the definitiveexample of a fictional war-diary is the comically dubious account of SergeantMacleod.19 Certainly, if Macleod was the man that his journal would have us believe,he was truly a gifted individual, having fought in every conflict from the War ofSpanish Succession (1710’s) to his last campaign in America in the 1770’s, all thewhile siring enough children to create his own clan, with the oldest and youngestbeing separated by some 80 years!20 Most inaccuracies are not so easy to discover.Despite these outliers, published works include the most insightful materialsfor the pursuit of this subject, and the hundreds of published diaries, journals,correspondences and memoirs released in the last two centuries by historians andmilitary enthusiasts have made access to the opinions of British and Germansoldiers that much easier. Given that there are only a small number of these sourcefrom the Nine Years War and the War of Spanish Succession, particularly those thatmight include personal insights and opinions, the decision here has been made tofocus on the social history of British and German soldiers beginning in the 1740’s,with the War of Austrian Succession. Furthermore, by this time the concept of‘German’ had become more firmly established in Britain: referring to member-statesof the Holy Roman Empire to the exclusion of Habsburg dominions, whereas aroundthe turn of the eighteenth century ‘German’ was a term commonly used to describeImperial forces. When necessary, older sources are used in order to observecontinuities and changes over time, but in most cases the dates for determining theBritish perspective of Germany begin with the ‘Pragmatic Army’ of 1742-3. Yet, this
19 Capt. George Carleton, Memoirs of an English Officer, Who serv’d in the Dutch War in 1672 to the
Peace of Utrecht, in 1713 (London, 1728).20 William Thomson. Memoirs of the Life and Gallant Exploits of the Old Highland Soldier Serjeant
Donald Macleod: 1688-1791 (London: Blackie & Son, 1933), pp. 76-7.
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is not the case with the military history of this subject, which will address thehistory of Anglo-German armies beginning with the ‘Grand Alliance’ formed in 1689.
**History and Significance of Anglo-German Armies**
An Anglo-German military relationship extends far beyond the parameters of thisthesis, and stretches back certainly to Roman times, if not prehistory. Though thissurvey begins in 1689, following the invasion of England and Ireland by William ofOrange’s army and the outbreak of the Nine Years War, only a half-century beforethere had been a strong British – particularly Scottish – presence in German armieson the continent.21 At the same time, there were a number of German-speakingcombatants involved in the English civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century.22 TheNine Years War that engulfed Western Europe in 1689 would bring Britain intoclose partnerships with a number of German princes, including the AustrianHabsburgs, thereby forging relationships that would persist throughout thefollowing century. Crucially, it was in this conflict that Parliament would first makelarge subsidy agreements with smaller states within the Reich to augment England’sown military contributions, borrowing on the Dutch model – a theme withnumerous parallels to other aspects of British society in this period. Within twodecades of the first Anglo-Dutch subsidization of German auxiliaries, these two‘Maritime Powers’ would be supporting some 97,000 German soldiers annually.23 Itwas through such financial commitments that Britain was to help maintain acoalition army in Flanders large enough to meet Louis XIV’s forces in battles whereboth sides numbered more than 80,000 men, though the English contingent in the
21 Th. A. Fischer, The Scots in Germany: Being a Contribution Towards the History of the Scot Abroad(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1902), pp. 76-117.22 Mark Stoyle, Soldiers and Strangers: An Ethnic History of the English Civil War (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2005), esp. pp. 91-98, 101-105.23 Wilson, German Armies, pp. 108-9.
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Low Countries hovered between 20,000-30,000.24 Yet the war’s most importantlegacy was not the prolonged association of British and German forces, but thepolicies instigated by Parliament after its conclusion, which would make theseAnglo-German forces a seemingly inevitable feature of Britain’s wars for more thana century. The friction between English and Dutch military men, owing to WilliamIII’s favouritism towards Dutch and German commanders, would create a backlashamong the English military and the nation at-large. At the war’s conclusion, riding awave of anti-foreign sentiment, Parliament passed the Disbanding Act of 1699,forcing all remaining Dutch forces out of Britain and Ireland, and later placedprovisions within the Act of Settlement of 1701 with the aim of ethnically andreligiously anglicizing the army.25 These policies, alongside vast reductions aftereach successive war, prevented the British Army from becoming a menace to itsown people, but in doing so made it of little threat to their recurring enemies, theFrench. Moreover, this would entail that throughout the following century theBritish Army would contain comparatively few foreigners, and the prevention ofCatholics and foreign-born men from joining the army increased Britain’s relianceupon allies for cooperation, and auxiliaries for augmentation.As a result German manpower became of crucial importance to Britain’s warefforts. There were other allies and foreign contingents, especially the armies fromthe United Provinces, yet in scope and scale no other group was as valuable as theGerman-speaking men from within the Holy Roman Empire: there was a Germanpresence in each of Britain’s most important and extensive military operations inEurope between 1689 and 1815. On the continent, German armies made up the
24 The ‘English Army’ for much of this conflict was a mix of English and foreign. John Childs statesthat 10,000 British soldiers were sent to the Low Countries in 1689, and Fortescue places 23,000Britons in Flanders in 1692, out of a total of 40,000 which were paid for by Parliament for thetheatre. See Fortescue, History, vol. I, p. 360.; John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702(Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1987), p. 30.; John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the
British Army 1688-1697: Operations in the Low Countries (Manchester University Press: Manchester,1991), p.73.25 From Article III: ‘no person born out of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or thedominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or made a denizen, except such as areborn of English parents) shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a member of either House ofParliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military’, An Act for the further
Limitation of the Crown and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 12 & 13 Wm 3 c. 2.(1701)
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plurality, if not the majority of the forces fighting against France in north and centralEurope, and were particularly critical to those battles that have been rememberedpredominantly as British victories. The first such success would be at Blenheim in1704, the Duke of Marlborough’s complete defeat of French and Bavarian forcesalong the banks of the Danube in southern Germany. The battle will be forever tiedto the brilliant English commander, yet the English and Scottish forces within thearmy numbered perhaps no more than 15 percent of the total force, and Germanarmies, including Imperial troops, made up the vast majority.26This pattern would continue for each of these continental wars, where theBritish Army’s signal victories against the French were supported, if not facilitated,by partners from within the Holy Roman Empire. At the Battle of Dettingen alongthe Main River in 1743 the British forces represented merely 40 percent of thevictorious army under the command of George II, the last battle to be led by a Britishmonarch. They did, however, do most of the fighting. Sixteen years later, the Frenchwere again defeated in Germany, at the Battle of Minden, by a British-funded armywhose contingent of native-sons was even smaller (22 percent), though its presenceno less significant. These battles, important as they were, did little to deciding thewars, and it could be argued that in an age of attrition and manoeuvre the merepresence of these foreign contingents was just as important as their roles in battles.To this effect, ‘His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany’, as the continental army inthe Seven Years War was titled, lured France away from a purely colonial war,thereby helping to ‘win America in Germany’ for the Pitt-Newcastle ministry. TheBritish contribution in manpower stood between 10-22,000, out of a British-fundedarmy that normally numbered between 60,000 and 80,000.27During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Britain’s coalitionswith German states were far more disjointed, especially after 1794, when theAustrian forces let the French Army overrun the Austrian Netherlands. From that
26 The British contingent was 18 squadrons of Horse, and 14 battalions of foot, of a total of 196squadrons and 76 battalions. John Millner, A Compendious Journal of all the Marches, Famous Battles,
Sieges, and other most note-worthy, heroical, and ever memorable Actions of the Triumphant Armies of
the ever-glorious Confederate Allies… (London: 1712), p. 102.; Wilson, German Armies, p. 116.27 Fortescue, History, vol. II, p. 347, 486; Sir Reginald Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany
during the Seven Years War (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1966), p. 117.
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point on, the era of partnerships on the continent was over, only being resurrectedin the latter years of the Napoleonic Wars, particularly, the Waterloo Campaign. TheBattle of Waterloo is perhaps the most iconic example of a battle that has long beenreferred to as a British victory, but on the day of the battle, the 22,000 Britonspresent again made up only 40 percent of the forces involved. The number ofHanoverians present at the battle was roughly equal, and if the Brunswick andNassau forces are included, once again, Germans made up the majority. If the some50,000 Prussians that arrived later in the day are included, the British contributionwould figure to be roughly 20 percent.28 Furthermore, the most critical andcontested part of the battlefield, the farm-complex of La Haye Saint, was held formuch of the day by veteran Hanoverian troops, many of whom had long served inthe British Army. Yet this should not be interpreted as undervaluing the Britishinvolvement, at Waterloo or elsewhere, as indeed even if they made up a smallerproportion of the armed forces in such victories, they never-the-less endured themajority of the fighting, and the command and coordination of these disparateforces are in many ways attributable only to them. Indeed, over-emphasizing theGerman role would be as damning as ignoring it. Such is the key problem PeterHofshröer’s re-examination of the Battle of Waterloo, which postulated that it was a‘German Victory’ on account of the role the Prussians and other German forcesplayed in the battle and campaign.29 This is overcompensation. It was a Anglo-German victory, and posterity would have been better served had Wellingtonacquiesced to Marshal Blücher’s suggestion in having the battle named in honour ofa nearby inn: La Belle Alliance.
28 Writing of the Battle, Sergeant Thomas Morris wrote, ‘But while I thus contend that we could nothave been beaten, I feel bound, at the same time, to admit that the battle was decided by thePrussians; and but for their prompt arrival, and vigorous pursuit of the enemy, Napoleon wouldhave… been able to resume offensive operations against us.’ Thomas Morris, The Recollections of
Sergeant Morris edited by John Selby with an Introduction by Peter Young (Gloucestershire:Windrush Press, 1998), p. 85.29 Peter Hofschröer, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign Vol. 2 – The German Victory (London: GreenhillBooks, 1999)
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German manpower was not only crucial to these continental armies andBritain’s greatest victories in central Europe during the long eighteenth century, butthere were contributions of auxiliaries and integrated forces in the expansion andmaintenance of Britain’s ‘First Empire’. Gibraltar, captured from the Spanish in1704 was done so under the command of the charismatic but temperamental PrinceGeorge of Hessen-Darmstadt, who would command the garrison for the first year ofoccupation.30 During the American War of Independence, roughly 1,500 Hanoveriansoldiers were sent to Gibraltar, where they fought in and endured the ‘Great Siege’of 1781-3 under General George Elliot, who viewed these men as some of his mostcapable and best-behaved troops.31 Similar German forces, either auxiliaries orforeign corps, would help defend other British Mediterranean outposts, includingMinorca (1776-83), Sicily (1808-14) and Malta (1802-1814).A similar relationship is found in the Caribbean, which became a destinationfor foreign-born soldiers in Britain’s army beginning in the last quarter of theeighteenth century. Infantry battalions with significant numbers of German soldierswould often be counted upon to defend British sugar isles, and in the 1790’s severalhundred German troopers recruited from Northern Germany would be part of theoccupation of Saint Domingue. Even in far-flung corners of the globe, there was aGerman presence. Dozens of German men recruited from disbanded foreignregiments took part in military operations against Buenos Aires in 1806-7 andgarrisoned Cape Town a year later. Further afield, two regiments of Hanoverianswere hired out to the East India Company from 1782-92 to help maintain Britishpossessions in India during the wars against Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, while muchof Britain’s manpower had been redirected to the American Colonies.32It was the American Colonies that saw the greatest impact of Germanmanpower in the maintenance of the First British Empire. German-born men wererecruited for service in the Seven Years War to help bring up inadequate enlistment
30 For his conflicts with the British Naval commanders, see: A.D. Francis ‘Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt and the plans for the expedition to Spain of 1702’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical
Research, 42 (1969), pp. 66-68.31 T.H. McGuffie, The Siege of Gibraltar 1779-1783 (London: Batsford, 1965), pp. 45, 54.32 See: Niedersächsische Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (HSTAH), 325 Hann. 38 C.
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numbers, and in the American War, some 2,000 men from all corners of the HolyRoman Empire were placed directly into British line regiments for the same reasons.Even in the War of 1812, which is largely overlooked in this work, there was abattalion of men raised from Germany designed to contribute to the campaignsagainst the Americans. Regiments occupying outposts in the American hinterlandand Canada would contain large numbers of German men (primarily colonists), andthe port and base at Halifax would be continuously garrisoned by a largely Germanbattalion of the 60th Regiment throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Yet the mostsignificant, and memorable German military presence in the colonies was the 30,000auxiliary soldiers in the American War, known to posterity as ‘the Hessians’. Fromthe summer of 1776 to the end of the war, German soldiers made up roughly onethird of the forces in most armies, some times one half, and from 1777 onwards, thenumber of German-born soldiers fighting for George III in America was comparableto the number of Englishmen (particularly in Canada). While the defeat of theseAnglo-German armies resulted in the loss of Britain’s ‘First Empire’, nevertheless,without the ability to augment British forces with foreign manpower, thesecampaigns might not have been possible.
Lastly, we come to those German forces serving in the British Isles, helpingquell domestic unrest and rebellion, and contributing to the defence of Englandduring periods of vulnerability. Whereas William III, in 1688-90, secured his Britishdominions with the help of his Dutch subjects and Danish auxiliaries, theHanoverian monarchs, relied more upon German manpower, particularly Hessians,in handling internal conflicts. Though the Dutch were the first to lend soldiers tosecure the Hanoverian Dynasty in 1715 and 1745, some 6,000 Hessians were sent tohelp suppress the Jacobites in 1746. During the 1798 rebellion in Ireland, regimentscontaining large numbers of Germans were used to help quell the unrest, and
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Hanoverians serving within the British Army would be routinely garrisoned inIreland over the following decade.33Germans were used not only to put down rebellions, but also protect Britainfrom possible invasion. In 1756, 12,000 Hessians and Hanoverians, in roughly equalnumbers, arrived to protect the southeast coast from the threat of a French landing,much to the relief of the British Army and the dismay of the British public. In thefirst decade of the nineteenth century, Germans were once again stationed alongEngland’s eastern and southern coasts, this time in the shape of the King’s GermanLegion, a formation of refugee soldiers from the disbanded Hanoverian Army. By1807, there were more than 12,000 German men serving in this capacity, the largestcollection of foreign soldiers in Britain for over a century.Therefore, nearly all aspects of Britain’s military policy on land, gearedaround the augmentation of native soldiers with a significant number of Germantroops. While Germans provided additional numbers, they also performed certaintasks or filled key gaps in Britain’s own military force, a concept that will be coveredin greater detail in later chapters. Taken collectively, the scale and importance ofGermanic manpower to Britain’s military endeavours is indeed impressive, but itshould not be exaggerated. The highlighting of these contributions should notsuggest that the imperial advances and domestic tranquillity enjoyed by Britain forthe majority of the century was owed solely, or even primarily to the hiring ofGerman ‘mercenaries’, or the assistance of allies among the states of the Holy RomanEmpire. Yet these contributions deserve more attention than they have received to-date, and while this thesis looks to highlight some facets of this prolongedrelationship, comprehensive works on the various military, fiscal, political anddemographic characteristics are still needed.
33 For the Germans in the rebellion in Ireland, see: Eva Ó Cathaoir, ‘German Mercenaries in Ireland,1798-1807’, in The Irish Sword, vol. XXII (no. 90), pp. 406-426.
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CHAPTER I:
NATIONAL CHARACTER AND TRANSNATIONAL PROFESSIONALISM
Delving into the writings of British and German soldiers, one constant uniting allperiods and authors, is that commentaries regarding their foreign allies are almostalways couched in terms of their national or ethnic origin. Indeed, wheneverdescriptions are made of allied or auxiliary forces, be they regiments, armies, ormerely one or a handful of individuals, they are simply referred to as a collective: as‘Germans’ or ‘English’. The usage of this language reveals the degree to which menin these multinational armies saw the respective components in regards to theirnationality, and in doing so used terms that carried with them not only an indicationof their national origin, but a collection of characterizations and stereotypesprevalent in popular discourse. This chapter seeks to examine some of thesepopular conceptions, with the goal of providing a background and a point ofcomparison for the personal writings and opinions of soldier-authors. The focushere is on stereotypes, and particularly the discourse concerning ‘nationalcharacter’, a term common among the writings of soldiers, which entailed a set oftheories through which their accounts of foreign soldiery were often filtered. Thisemphasis on national character is relevant to the entire period under examination,but was especially pertinent in the quarter century of the French Revolutionary andNapoleonic Wars, an era of heightening nationalism that saw an increasing numberof soldier-authors trying to identify the peculiarities and characteristics unique totheir own soldiery – intermixing traditional characterizations with their experienceson campaign.This concentration on national character would, particularly in times of war,lead to discussions of the martial character of various peoples and their nationalarmies. This discourse impacted the retelling of interactions between British andGerman soldiers in this time period, however, the focus was not always onnationality. Within the writings of soldiers, an emphasis on military duties would
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inevitably alter or override many popular depictions, while others, owing to thehomogenizing effects of early-modern militaries, would not be addressed at all.Alongside elements that would create similarities between armies, there wereassociations, such as military professionalism and a gentlemanly culture amongofficers, which would transcend national boundaries. These were the multinationaland transnational elements that would shape or diminish distinctions of nationalcharacter, where professional or class-based solidarities would emerge as strongercommonalities than ethnicity. Therefore this chapter will begin with many of thechief attributes of British and German national characters, and conclude with someof the homogenizing aspects of early-modern European militaries, as the conflictbetween nationalism and professionalism would be the primary agents effecting theretelling of interactions and associations between British and German soldiery.
**The Dissemination of Stereotypes**
In his essay ‘National Prejudices’, the Irish author and historian Oliver Goldsmithaddressed, and hoped to curb, much of the negative characterizations of foreignershe heard during conversations amongst merchants and businessmen in London,lamenting somewhat rhetorically, ‘we are now become so much Englishmen,Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Spaniards, or Germans, that we are no longer citizens of theworld.’34 Goldsmith’s essay was a reaction to the unilaterally negative impressionshis countrymen had towards foreign peoples, and while Britain’s enemies receivedthe majority of these negative stereotypes, her allies were also recipients of aparticularly vitriolic brand of public scrutiny. These disapproving characterizationswere disseminated in a variety of mediums, which we can discuss here only briefly.Therefore, the focus here is on publications, in part due to the attention they havereceived from scholars focusing on the Anglo-German relations in the eighteenthcentury. Travel diaries, newspapers, magazines, books – usually histories of
34 Oliver Goldsmith, ‘Essay XII [National Prejudices]’, in Essays and Criticisms by Dr. Goldsmith with an
account of the author… (London: 1798). p. 130
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dubious credibility – and the new-fangled encyclopaedias, all dispensed concepts ofnational character, and were all sources familiar to our subjects at hand.35 However,this chapter will address those pamphlets and satirical prints which had a muchmore dramatic and wide reaching effect.Despite the theoretical reasons for explaining a nation’s character, most hadto be created or corroborated through experiences within German States, or withGerman people. Though this thesis will include a number of accounts of soldierstravelling through the Holy Roman Empire, they were by no means alone. The mostcommon were merchants, emigrants and tourists, but there were certainlynumerous other connections: envoys, scholars, students, musicians and artists toname a few.36 Of these, the British tourists have received the most attention inmodern scholarship, and indeed, did much to shape opinions of those back home inBritain. For many wealthy aristocratic young males, a ‘Grand Tour’ of Europe,which was so popular in Britain in the eighteenth century, at times included foraysinto the Holy Roman Empire, either to Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, Frankfort, and afterthe Dynastic Union, Hanover.37 Here impressions of Germany would share anumber of similarities to the accounts of soldiers themselves, in part because theinfluence of famous travel diaries would encourage soldiers to write accounts of thepeoples, places, and foods they encountered in a similar style, either for privatereflection or public consumption. In some instances, these journals or publishedletters were printed with the specific aim of describing the people met and placesvisited, more than the actual military campaigns themselves.38 Aside from traveldiaries, the other mediums for the dissemination of national stereotypes –
35 For more on impressions of Germany in British print, see: Frauke Geyken, Gentlemen auf Reisen,esp. chaps. 2-3.36 For Britons in Europe in general, see: Stephen Conway, Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in
the Eighteenth Century (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, 2011).37 Jeremy Black notes that Hanover was a way-point for military enthusiasts in particular but wasalso of interest to politicians or those connected, or aspiring to be connected, to the royal family.Brunswick, the seat of the Dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was another stop for those particularlyinterested in militaries. Jeremy Black, The British and the Grand Tour, p. 10.
38 The most prominent of such writings come from campaigns in Colonial America. See ThomasAnburey, Travels through the Interior Parts of America (Anro Press, 1969); For an example of this inthe German press, see: William L. Stone, Letters of Brunswick and Hessian officers during the American
Revolution. Translated from Schloezer's Briefwechsel (NY: Joe Munsell’s Sons, 1891).
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particularly for the reading public – were through encyclopaedias, histories,magazines and geographical gazettes. Unlike those mediums outlined above, theseparticular sources do not figure prominently in the writings of soldiers themselves,and therefore will be overlooked for the purposes of this chapter, though they wereno doubt quite influential in shaping the debate about English, British, and Germannational characters.Lastly, and crucially, given recent trends in historical scholarship:stereotypes were reiterated and magnified in satirical prints in the British press.Woodcuts and engravings reproduced for a mass – and barely literate – audiencewere powerful tools in shaping perception of the British nation and their continentalcounterparts, and are very much at the cornerstone for examinations of English orBritish identity by modern historians. These and other forms of ephemeraaddressing political situations or key events on the continent would commonlyshow the respective peoples (usually their monarch, prince or other symbolicfigure) in the trappings of their particular nation, further reinforcing the associationof certain nationalities with key characteristics, fashions, or demeanour. Yet thiswas a medium that was not only important for describing foreigners, but fordefining Englishness, usually in the guise of ‘John Bull’, or ‘Britannia’ as anembodiment of all British dominions. These were powerful symbolic tools, and gavea visual representation to many of their own and other stereotypedcharacteristics.39Just as they were an important aspect in creating a British self-image, theBritish press also had an important hand in shaping German character, particularlyin the case of the Hanoverians. Common throughout the century, political tractsdisparaging the people or soldiers of Hanover were especially numerous duringwars and major events in British and Imperial foreign policy. Bob Harris has writtenan exhaustive work on the manner in which attacks on the Electorate were part and
39 Tamara Hunt, Defining John Bull Political Caricature and National Identity in Late Georgian England(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003).; Michael Duffy, The Englishman and the Foreigner, The English Satirical
Print 1600-1832 (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), pp. 13-4.
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parcel of both Republican and Jacobitical opposition polemics in the 1740’s.40 Mostdepictions of Hanover emphasized its absolutist political structure, smallpopulation, few natural resources and, most importantly, its standing armymaintained in wartime only with financial assistance from Great Britain. During theWar of Austrian Succession (for Britain, 1742-1748), the Hanoverian forces thatwere serving as auxiliaries of the British Army were characterized as cowards leadby self-serving generals, and in the summer of 1743 especially, rhetorical attacks onHanover and her soldiers reached a fevered pitch.41 A letter from the HanoverianGeneral, Thomas Eberhard von Ilten in 1743, published under the title Popular
Prejudice, complained that the British Press and its ‘jealousy of Foreigners, sonatural to that selfish Nation, is of late confined to us H[anoverian]s: Their Rancourto the French, holds, at present but the second place.’42 Through the course of thefirst century of the Union, Hanoverians were the targets of vitriolic pamphlets bysome of the most famous or infamous polemicists of the age, including JohnShebbeare and William Cobbett, both of whom were imprisoned (1757 and 1810respectively) for criticisms of the Electorate and its troops.43 Therefore, there was astrong link between the stereotypes seen in public discourse, and the soldiers whowere often the target of them. But the characterization found within did not owetheir origins to war and diplomacy in the eighteenth century, but instead, borrowedfrom an older and further reaching discourse in which they merely played a part.
**National Character**
Ideas of national character – traits, behaviours and proclivities associative of theinhabitants of a particular nation – were long established by the time the major
40 Bob Harris, A Patriot Press, esp. pp. 109-110, 119-125, 154-167.41 Ibid. 122, 157.42 Officer at Hanover [Ilten] Popular prejudice concerning partiality to the interests of Hanover, to the
subjects of that Electorate, and particularly to the Hanoverian ... (London: [1743]), p. 3.43 John Shebbeare, Letters to the People of England, nos. 1-6 (London: 1755-8).; William Cobbett,
Political Register, vol. XV. No. 26 (1809).
31
states and territories of Europe began developing into the ‘modern nations’ wewould recognize today. Nationality might from time to time take a back seat toanother facet of identity, such as religious, political, regional or ethnicconsiderations, nevertheless national character was very much a part of the meansby which differences with ‘others’ were constructed or articulated. This theme wasintensifying as the century progressed, reaching new heights with the awakeningnationalisms following the French Revolution and the titanic military struggles thatbegan in its wake.
The equation of the character of a people to the political entity to which theybelong has been in vogue for centuries and was as popular in the early modernperiod as it is today. The philosphe Montesquieu in discussing ‘the spirit of nations’was particularly focused on classical accounts of national character, drawingexamples from ancient Rome and comparisons of the Spartans and Athenians in hisdiscussions.44 Eighteenth-century Britain’s most significant contributor towardsthis discourse was the philosopher David Hume, whose essay ‘On NationalCharacter’ aimed to address and in many ways refute some of the most widespreadand widely accepted theories on the subject, many of which had been around forgenerations.45 Although Hume and like-minded philosophers aimed to dismantlemany of the impressions of national character seen in popular discourse, hisarguments reveal the variety of ways that theories of national character wereconstructed, and in doing so, perpetuated other generalizations.46 This was in part,because discussions of national character in this period were not about creating orrejecting new distinctions, but modifying older ones. By the end of the seventeenthcentury, many of the stereotypes that had become synonymous with ‘English’ and‘German’ had long been developed, and for those discussing the natural inclinationsor traits of various nationalities or ethnicities, there were usually references to
44 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois [The Spirit of Laws] (1748), esp.Book XIX.45 David Hume, ‘On National Character’, Three Essays, Moral and Political (London: 1748).46 Roberto Romani, National Character and Public Spirit in Britain and France, 1750-1914 (Cambridge:CUP, 2002), pp. 159-60, 165-6.
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classical authors who first penned these dissimilarities in the preceding millennia.Among these classical sources, the Roman author Tacitus was a useful guide to earlyBritannic character, but particularly influential for Teutonic characteristics, wherethe ‘Tacitean model’ became a depiction of Germans that still has residues in themodern impressions of German national character. Tacitus’s accounts of Germanicand Britannic tribes would become the template for later depictions of Englishindividuality and bravery, or Germanic barbarity, dipsomania and martial ability.Yet there were other authors of antiquity including Julius Caesar and the VenerableBede, from whom eighteenth century writers could turn to for additionalprecedents.47 It was the humanists that had first uncovered and reintroduced manyof these ancient caricatures, and two centuries later, some of the great thinkers ofthe enlightenment still turned to these ancient accounts to spotlight thetimelessness of many of the characteristics of their own people.48 For thosediscussing British or English exceptionality, these hoary antecedents and the historyof the peoples of the island served as a means of establishing English nationalcharacter as a mixture of indigenous and foreign elements, including – quitecrucially – French and German. For the officer class of Britain’s army, these sameancient texts were very much a part of their military repertoire, to be read alongsidemilitary manuals and drill books – from foreign and domestic sources.49 Thisblending of philosophical works and military tracts manifested itself in thediscussion of martial character, whereby soldiers from each nation were seen todisplay certain characteristics unique to their land of origin.The martial character of a people would, according to eighteenth centurytheorists, be very much a part of their national character, and often times they wereone in the same. In many ways the nation represented the army, and the army wasrepresentative of the nation. Soldiers were well aware that their actions would be
47 F.K. Stanzel, ‘National Character as Literary Stereotype. An Analysis of the Image of the German inEnglish Literature before 1800’, in C.V. Bock (ed.), London German Studies I (1980), pp. 101-105.Hafia Fania Oz-Salzburger, ‘Exploring the Germanick Body – Eighteenth Century British Images ofGermany’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte 26 (1997), p. 17.48 F.K. Stanzel, ‘National Character as Literary Stereotype’, pp. 101-105.49 J.A. Houlding, Fit For Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1981), pp. 168-9.
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seen to reflect their ‘national character & that of the army’, and British soldiers tookpride in fighting for their ‘nation’, whether that meant Britain, or more commonly,for their respective homelands: England, Scotland, or Ireland.50 This direct link wasfelt by many within the army, growing stronger as the century progressed, and canbe seen in the remarks of the Duke of York in 1793 who fretted that the misdeeds ofa small number of his soldiers would ‘cast the most injurious stigma on the nationalcharacter in general.’51 By the end of the century, British troops were expected to beon their best behaviour and to reflect positively on the nation they fought for – a featthat they did not always successfully achieve. Throughout the long eighteenthcentury, there was a close relationship with national character and the image of thearmy, though not as strong in Britain as for highly militarized states such as Hessen-Kassel or Prussia.
**Origins of National Character**
There were numerous theories as to the origins and nature of national character.Montesquieu, in his Spirit of Laws, wrote of a ‘general spirit of nations’ forged by theclimate, religion, laws, governments and customs of a nation, to which others addedgeography, terrain and wealth.52 The preeminent portrayals of various peoplesusually incorporated a combination of several of these factors. The most commoninfluence on national character was climate.53 The customs and culture of a peoplewere not only drawn from the type of terrain, but their latitude and geographicallocation. In some cases, it was believed that the climate or type of weather impactedthe demeanour of the inhabitants enough to make them behave in a mannerexceptional to that particular region. Those peoples from warm climates were
50 SNA GD 51/1/605 fol. 2, J. H. Craig [?] to Henry Dundas, St. Amand, April 10th 1794.51 Quoted in: Lieut-Colonel Alfred H. Burne. The Noble Duke of York: The Military Life of Frederick
Duke of York and Albany (London: Staplehurst, 1949), p. 120.52 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, Book XIX, 4.53 This was the aspect of national character Hume argued the most adamantly against, in response topopular discourse, and perhaps an earlier treatise by Montesquieu. Hume, Essays, pp. 17-8.; Romani,
National Character and Public Spirit, pp. 165-171.
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purported to be vivacious, lively, and impassioned, and strong sexual desires andquick tempers were also indicative of those inhabiting such regions. To this end, theFrench, living in a warmer country than the British, were seen as the embodimentall of these characteristics. This was a point of contrast repeatedly recountedthroughout the century, and yet it was to be equally contrasted with the nature ofthe German people, who came from the colder ‘North’. Those coming from Europe’snorthern regions were seen as dour, dull, given to strong drink, and brutish, if notmilitant.54 This was the quintessential stereotype of Germanic demeanour, evenwhen people from even less hospitable realms, such as Muscovites or Cossacks werebelieved to display these traits to a greater degree. Nevertheless, Germans becamethe other extreme, and a contrast and antithesis of French character. In the middle,of course, was the Englishman, from a ‘mild’ climate, embodying all the positivetraits of each of these peoples and – perhaps not surprisingly – none of their flaws.As will be discussed later, this is why examinations of Englishness require not onlycontrasts with the French, but Germans as well. The English considered themselvessomewhere between the aggressive and the passive, the lively and the torpid,revealing that the English were as busy defining themselves in relation to otherpeoples as they were trying to find those unique traits peculiar to them alone.Climate also had a physical impact, which was a recurring theme in theBritish public sphere. One ‘topographic dictionary’ summarized Germans asphysically ‘pretty large, and… very strong and robust’, but lacking a ‘quicksilver intheir composition.’55 While most stereotypes dwelt little on the stature and pace ofthe people of various nations, as will be discussed in later chapters, these wereconcepts of particular interest to soldier-authors. The effects of climate, accordingto these theories, went beyond merely pace and demeanour. Peoples from northernclimates were also reportedly given to strong drink, which was recounted in avariety of elaborations on German national character. The stereotypes regarding
54 For more extensive discussion, see Geyken, Gentlemen auf Reisen, ch. 4; Geyken, ‘“The GermanLanguage is Spoken in Saxony with the Greatest Purity”: or English images and perceptions ofGermany in the Eighteenth Century’, p. 50.55 Andrew Brice, The grand gazetteer, or topographic dictionary, both general and special, and antient
as well as modern, &c... (Exeter: 1759), p. 621.
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drinking emerged with classical authors, and remained a popular meme in theeighteenth century. In attempting to slander the Europhilic Secretary of StateGeorge Carteret, one Jacobitical pamphlet declared that he ‘drank like a German,’ aterm that was used quite often for those who were given to drinking in excess.56 Acoffee-house patron’s declaration that all ‘Germans were drunken sots, and beastlygluttons’ prompted Oliver Goldsmith to compose his essay to dissuade his fellowcitizens of such inane stereotypes, though he could do little to curtail suchassertions.57 Despite his entreaties, the ‘Tacitean Model’ remained intact.
Tied into these theories pertaining to climate, were discussions of the impactof geography. The natural features of a region were considered to impart a varietyof characteristics on the people that dwelt there, and would dictate to some degreetheir behaviours and their martial ability. Life in rugged terrains lead to gruffdemeanours, and a temperate region was said to manifest itself in the disposition ofits people as well. A vivid example of this can be found during the upsurge inhostility towards Hanoverian auxiliary troops, where attacks on the Electorate (andthe Elector) often mentioned the physical characteristics of northern Germany.Being a relatively featureless region lacking many natural resources, the dull terrainsupposedly lent these qualities to its people. In one such print, An Actual Survey of
the Electorate, or the Face of the Country whereupon Hanover Stands (1743) theregion was depicted as the dreary and unkempt landscape of George II’s homeland,within which his profile was cleverly placed: the features of the land being reflectedin its people, and in this particular instance, its ruler.58 Given that the terrain of aregion dictated much of the lifestyle of its inhabitants, this would be considered oneof the primary means through which a division between English and Highland Scotswould be portrayed as well.The impact was equally strong in impressions of martial character. Herehowever, more favourable climes for living were seen as hindrances to the making
56 Anon., A True Dialogue between Thomas Jones, a Trooper, Lately Returned from Germany (1743), p.8.57 Oliver Goldsmith, ‘Essay XII [National Prejudices]’, p. 128.58 Duffy, The Englishman and the Foreigner, pp. 144-5.; Harris, A Patriot Press, p. 157.
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of a strong martial populace. Henry Lloyd, the famous and well-travelled soldierand author of The History of the Late War in Germany, prefaced his account of theSeven Years War with a discussion of – amongst other things – the nationalcharacter displayed in several western European armies, and indicated the effects ofclimate, terrain, and government on their martial character. Geography, accordingto Lloyd, played a key role.Those who inhabit the plains, and rich countries, are generallyeffeminate and bad soldiers, impatient under the least fatigue, are soonsick, require too much food, and are less active then those of themountains, and in every respect inferior to them. What did not the poorHighlanders do? What did they not suffer? They will live where anEnglishman, though animated with equal courage, and love of glory, willperish; merely from the difference of their situations before they becamesoldiers.59
Implicit in Lloyd’s comments (aside from Jacobitical sympathies) is a directconnection between desolate regions and martial ability and masculinity – the lattera universally admired trait in eighteenth century discourse, and a by-product of anupbringing in a harsh environment.60
A nation’s government was also a prime indicator of the character of itspeople, where the form of government would be an indication of their intelligence,creativity, vigour, and morality. Contrasting the government of Britain and themany states in Germany was the focus for countless pamphlets and philippics in themiddle of the eighteenth century, and here the divide between these polities seemedgreatest, owing to their clear differences in political structures and liberties. Britonspraised themselves as freedom-loving subjects of a balanced constitutionalmonarchy, while describing the Germans within the various states of the Empire aspeasants (‘boors’) resigned to a life of thraldom under the absolutist rule of petty
59 Henry Lloyd, The History of the Late War in Germany (London: 1766), p. xxxi.60 As Matthew McCormack has shown, the depictions of Hanoverian forces in England in 1756-7portrayed them as effeminate, particularly in contrast to Englishmen, linking them with imageryusually associated with depictions of the French, in part due to the purported Francophilia commonamong German states. Matthew MacCormack, ‘Citizenship, Nationhood, and Masculinity in the Affairof the Hanoverian Soldier, 1756’, Historical Journal, 49, 4 (2006), pp. 980, 991.
37
princes – a truth that was often lost in rhetoric.61 This glaring divide had aparticular impact on the views of the Electorate of Hanover, and the ‘Dynastic Union’with this absolutist state being pronounced as a direct threat to the liberties of theBritish people.62 Opposition authors – Tories, disgruntled Whigs and Jacobites inparticular – would use the Electorate as means of indirectly condemning theHanoverian monarchs or as a protest of current foreign policy, infusing theirarguments with many of the negative stereotypes of Hanover, her soldiery, andGermans in general. This phenomenon, dubbed ‘anti-Hanoverianism’, was a strongpart of eighteenth century political discourse, and those critical of assisting theElectorate, or opponents of the dynasty itself, would leave Hanover as a by-word forall things negative regarding German national character. With the accession of theHanoverian dynasty until the dissolution of the Dynastic Union 121 years later, theElectorate, manifested in the form of its standing army, would remain throughout aperceived threat to English liberties. To a disproportionally perturbed minority, thisthreat from Hanover rivalled France in all its monarchical, republican and imperialforms. Yet these denunciations are vital to this subject, not merely because theyhelped in the characterization of Germanness in the eighteenth century, but becausethey played a key role in developing a sense of Britishness through contrasts withtheir Hanoverian and German allies, not just with their French enemies. BrendanSimms in examining the partisan politics emerging from political debates over thesupport of Electoral troops, has suggested it was Hanover during certain periodsthroughout the century that stood as the antithesis in the construction of British orEnglish identities, not France alone.63 As will be discussed throughout this chapter
61 James Boswell’s account of the absolutists Prince of Zerbst and his army of several dozen soldiers,is an iconic example of the type of German ruler the British so often derided. Frauke Geyken,
Gentlemen auf Reisen, p. 121.62 This line of argumentation was first propounded vigorously by John Toland shortly after the Act ofSettlement, where he declared that this foreign Prince might bring his Hanoverian troops intoEngland, ‘which may prove as fatal to our liberty, as the German invasion did formerly to ourancestors.’ John Toland, Limitations for the Next Foreign Successor, or, New Saxon Race (London:1701), p. 10.; Nicholas Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 1700-1837 (Suffolk: Boydell Press,2007), pp. 18-19, 48, 11263 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-
1783 (London: Allen Lane, 2007), pp. 324-5.; Brendan Simms, ‘Hanover: the Missing Dimension’, in
The Hanoverian Dimension, p. 9.
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and others, it was not just this one Electorate, but Germany as a whole that stood asa point of contrast with France, from which grew a greater sense of a nationalcohesion.The political situations within France and Germany stood as antitheses ofBritain’s government, yet they could also be contrasted with one another, therebydefining alternative forms of absolutism, distinguished from one another, in part,through national character. As one Jacobitical tract by the Rev. William Harperdeclared,I love no arbitrary government; but… I would prefer the French to theGerman yoke. For the first has frankness and generosity to temper, toqualify and soften it: but a German despotism, being grafted on a stockof a sullen, sour, morose, bitter nature congenial to the nation, is by farthe more dangerous and dreadful of the two.64
In what will be a recurring theme, this Scottish clergyman describes a nation’scharacteristics in contrast to an ‘other’, and though this was more often France,images of German despotism were never far out of the picture. This is a themewhich will repeat itself in many of the other aspects of national character, wheredefining Englishness, or in the case of Linda Colley’s thesis, ‘Britishness’, should notonly incorporate contrasts with France but with Germany as well.65 In fact, as PaulLangford has shown, it was the Englishman Alan Taylor, a man with particularinterest in German culture and romanticism, who would first coin the term‘Englishness’ in its present usage.66In a military context, the fulcrum for this sense of difference or othernesschanged, where rather than being an extreme, Britons placed themselves directlybetween the methods and manners of Germans and Frenchmen. Colonel JohnBurgoyne’s advice regarding the drilling of British troops is indicative of suchsentiments: ‘There are two systems, which generally speaking, divide the
64 Rev. William Harper, The Advice of a Friend, to the Army and People of Scotland (Edinburgh: 1745),p. 21.65 For British identity in contrast to France, see: Linda Colley, Britons: The Forging of a Nation(London: Vintage, 1992).66 Paul Langford, Englishness Identified: Manner and Character 1650-1850 (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 1-2.
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disciplinarians’, the German model of ‘training men like spaniels, by the stick’, andthe other being the French model of appealing to the honour of soldiers. ‘TheGermans are best, the French, by the avowal of their own officers, the worstdisciplined troops in Europe’, to which Burgoyne conjectured, ‘I apprehend a justmedium between the two extremes to be the surest means to bring English soldiersto perfection.’67 Burgoyne and many of his fellow officers believed that Britishsoldiers were naturally unable to endure the ‘German system’ because of the senseof liberty known to them since childhood – a direct impact of government on apeoples’ national character.68 This was not so in German armies, where Henry Lloydstated that their upbringing within absolutist states gave them a tractabilitybeneficial to the military profession, given that they were ‘from their birth taughtobedience, and subordination, two essential qualities to form a good soldier.’69Other theorists would find that German soldiers were more readily trained, and thatalthough lacking the innate courage of English soldiers, could be sturdier in combatdue to a seemingly natural stubbornness in battle.70 British soldiers for their partwere widely praised by outsiders and insiders, a reputation made from a variety ofmilitary successes and owing in great part to their relationship with theirgovernment, whereby they were ‘animated by the enthusiastick fire of liberty’.71The government of a people was considered to permeate all facets of nationalcharacter, for good or ill, and could be seen in descriptions of soldiers’ dispositionsin battle and on campaign. This was an important distinction between concepts ofBritish and German martial ability, as it was seen as more complimentary to Britonsthat theirs was not something due to their race, but more owing to the benefits oftheir liberal government.
67 Edward Barrington de Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes in the Latter Half of the
Eighteenth Century Derived from the Correspondence of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, General,
Statesman, Dramatist (London: MacMillan and Co., 1876), p. 1768 Campbell Dalrymple, A military essay. Containing reflections on the raising, arming, cloathing, and
discipline of the British infantry and cavalry; with proposals… (London: 1761), pp. 44-5.69 Lloyd, History of the Late War in Germany, p. 3470 Friedrich von der Decken, Versuch über den englischen National-Character (Hanover: 1802), p. 34.71 Lloyd, ‘Preface’, History, p. 33
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The wealth and abundance of Great Britain (particularly, if we are to leaveout Ireland), was considered a by-product of a free society, and also contributed tothe capabilities of her soldiers. A prosperous homeland was a boon to Englishmartial character in part, according to the Anglo-Hanoverian officer, JohannFriedrich von der Decken, in providing them with a hardy diet, a concept very muchsynonymous with the British self-image as a productive and well-fed nation.72 This‘national diet’, which included a great deal of meat, was ultimately seen assomething that fortified British soldiery and implied a fair treatment of Britishsoldiers compared to their continental counterparts, exemplified in the image ofemaciated French soldiers found in William Hogarth’s painting The Gates of Calais,
or the Roast Beef of Old England.73 This theme was not only reserved for the Frenchsoldier, but Germans as well. Some of the most scathing critiques of Germanicsoldiery, especially the Hanoverian and Hessian mercenaries, showed them stealingprovisions or iconic foodstuffs from their British counterparts or the localinhabitants they were hired to protect.74 In condemning the Electorate of Hanoverduring the Seven Years War, their capital was given the title ‘Turnipolis’, and turnipsremained a vegetable associated with Hanover and Germany, to be contrasted withBritain’s roast beef.75 Food would remain throughout this period full of symbolism,and while used as a divisive tool in the public sphere, it might also serve as a unifierin the more private associations of individual soldiers.76 Governments, however,merely stood as a point of contrast, as the manner in which a nation was ruled waspurportedly exemplified in its soldiery: impacting their outlook, determining howthey should be drilled and disciplined, and informing whether they would becomerotund patriots or emaciated mercenaries.
72 Decken, Versüch, p. 3573 William Hogarth, The Gates of Calais, or the Roast Beef of Old England (London: 1748).74 Duffy, Englishman and the Foreigner, pp. 176-7, 190-91. Anon. Law for the Out-Laws (London:1756).75 Anon. The Terror of France (London: 1757).76 For stereotypes and symbolism in foreign food, see: Jeremy Black, ‘A Stereotyped Response? TheGrand Tour and Continental Cuisine', Durham University Journal, 83 (1991), esp. p. 151.
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Like governments, religion went hand in hand with discussions of nationalcharacter, and the beliefs and methods of devotion would ingrain themselves in thebehaviours of the faithful. Vitriolic depictions of Catholic priests, so much a part ofeighteenth century British caricatures of France and French people, were themanifestation of perceptions of the backwardness of their civilization, owing a greatdeal to the dominant religion within the monarchy. However, a single Germancharacterization was much harder to fabricate, owing primarily to the religiouslyheterogeneous nature of the Empire. As Andrew Thompson has recentlyhighlighted, there were strong connections between Britain and northern Germanyon behalf of the ‘Protestant Interest’, yet ‘Germany’ and ‘Protestant’ never becamesynonyms, even though few could ignore that Germany was where the Reformationbegan.77 Even after Frederick II ‘the Great’ of Prussia was given the mantle ofProtestant hero by the British press, this depiction did not last much longer than theSeven Years War – when the stars aligned briefly to divide Europe on a seeminglyreligious axis.78 His legacy in Britain would overwhelmingly be that of a militaryinnovator, not as a defender of the faith, and those good opinions of him were notextended to his subjects. In the end, British characterizations of the religious natureof Germany were confined to particular states or territories, and the noticeabledifferences from region to region commented upon by travellers and soldiers.79Throughout the following chapters, the issue of German religious character is onlyglimpsed at, as the soldiers themselves rarely commented upon the practices of
77 Andrew Thompson, ‘the Confessional Dimension’, in Simms and Riotte, the Hanoverian Dimension,pp. 164-166.78 In a rather unfavourable biography of the Prussian Monarch – unsurprising for 1919 – NorwoodYoung wrote that ‘In England he was, in the early part of the war, acclaimed a “Protestant Hero”,though he was neither Protestant, nor a Hero.’ Norwood Young, The Life of Frederick the Great (NewYork: Henry Holt & Co., 1919), p. 347.79 Mutual Protestantism was not always a source of unity, and some soldiers found their time pastmore pleasantly in Catholic regions, for one, due to the promiscuity of the local womenfolk. ‘In thesedamned Protestant villages’ wrote the British officer Major Richard Davenport, ‘there is a kind ofregularity of morals and a fear of their pastor among the young women, that is a great check tointrigue. They are never clear of the consequences of their sins. In Catholic villages, and especially intowns, they are “smoaky” and know that they can settle accounts once a month or so. They dread thetime a little as it approaches, but after Confession the heart is as light as feathers.’ Major RichardDavenport, ‘To Mr Davenport’ being Letters of Major Richard Davenport (1719-1760) to his brother
during service in the 4th Troop of Horse Guards and 10th Dragoons, 1742-1760 (London: Society forArmy Historical Research, 1968), p. 78.; Geyken, Gentlemen auf Reisen, pp. 206-7.
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their confederates, save for a few who admired their religiosity and expressions ofdevotion. Furthermore, stereotypes based in large part on their religious nature arealmost completely absent from their discussions.
Government and religion were seen as important determinants of the spirit ofthe people, but for many, race was equally crucial, especially for those who drewfrom classical authors to reinforce their arguments. Once again, this placed Britainin between France and Germany, as the history of the people of the British Isleswere a blending of Saxon, Norman, and indigenous Britons, each with its own effectson British national character. Tracing bloodlines back to ancient Saxon ancestorswas an important part of the consolidation of an English identity as well asestablishing ancient connections with the peoples of northern and central Germany.Throughout the previous two centuries, the ancient Saxons were looked upon asboth blessings and curses. For many, the Saxons became a canvass to project thosetraits that the English wanted to identify themselves by: their sense of order,courage, independent thinking, belief in fairness and law, and of course, militaryabilities. Norman, and by implication French, institutions and legacies were oftensubjects of condemnation and by the mid-century there was a particularly strongpreference for England’s Saxon connections.80 ‘T’is our original Country’, journaland gazetteer author Andrew Brice wrote of Germany,whence came our Ancestors, whose language, customs, laws, we in goodmeasure still retain, together with what constitutes the chief glory andhappiness of the British Island, viz. their form of Government. On theseAccounts no Englishman can call this Country foreign, nor its Nativesforeigners to him.81
The Hanoverian General Ilten, who fought alongside the British Army in Germanyand Flanders in the 1740’s, responded to the anti-Hanoverian rhetoric in the BritishPress with his own pamphlet, where he reminded the reading public that they owed
80 Jeremy Black, ‘Ideology, History, Xenophobia and the World of Print in the Eighteenth Century’ inJeremy Black (ed.), Knights Errant and True Englishmen, p. 187.81 Andrew Brice, The grand gazetteer, or topographic dictionary, both general and special, and antient
as well as modern, &c... (Exeter: 1759), p. 619.
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‘the best of their customs and laws and their very constitution to their Saxonancestors – that is to us [Hanoverians], who are the same people with the Saxons.’82There were negative connotations to a Saxon legacy, however, particularlyfrom those who felt that this denied them their true identities as Britons.83Furthermore, the history of the Saxon invasions could be used against militaryassociations with German states, as was seen in anti-Hanoverian and anti-Hessiandiscourse at the outbreak of the Seven Years War in 1756. The quasi-mythologicalSaxon chieftains Hengist and Horsa were refashioned as representations of twoother ‘H. & H.s’ – namely the Hanoverian and Hessian auxiliaries who weresummoned in 1756 as a means of protecting England from the threat of a Frenchinvasion.84 Here, wary pamphleteers recounted the story of these Dark-Age Saxonmercenaries seizing control of the country, paralleling it with contemporaneousevents to serve as a warning that Britain’s German auxiliaries stood as an existentialthreat to English liberty. Much of German national character in the minds ofBritain’s thinkers became integrated with these themes from their own past, wherethe ancient Saxons – ‘generous barbarians’ in the words of Hume – played a crucialrole in British history.85 This resulted in many characterizations handed down fromclassical sources being refashioned or perpetuated, particularly in descriptionsportraying Germans as a warlike people.86
Despite this wide array of characterizations and attributions of nationalcharacter, a monolithic stereotype of Germans was by no means in place, and there
82 [Ilten], Popular Prejudice, pp. 13-14.; Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, p. 142.83 This was another division between Briton and German, the former being an admitted mixture ofvarious races, which Hume proclaimed made it harder to ascertain their national character.Meanwhile, it was often repeated that the Germans had very little intermixing with other ethnicities,which was at the time recounted as a point of fact more than a point of pride. Quoting Tacitus’s fromhis work, On the Origin and Geography of Germany, he proclaimed, ‘I accept the view that the peoplesof Germany have never been tainted by intermarriage with other peoples and stand out as a nationpeculiar, pure and unique of its kind.’ Hume, Three Essays, pp. 16-7.; Hugh MacDoughall, Racial Myth
in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons (Montreal: Harvest House, 1982), p. 4384 Hengist & Horsa (London: Edwards & Darly, 1756).85 David Hume, The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688, 6vols. (London: 1757), vol. I, p. 141.86 R.J. Smith, The Gothic Bequest: Medieval Institutions in British Thought, 1688-1863 (Cambridge: CUP,1987), esp. chaps. 3-4.
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were certainly grey areas that did not have parallels in depictions of the French.Firstly, in the writings of British soldiers, the concept of Germany had changed (asdiscussed in the introductory chapter) from one that largely signified Habsburgpossessions within the Empire to a definition that was virtually anything but.Furthermore, the linguistic and cultural definitions were equally hazy, especially inthe beginning of the eighteenth century, when caricatures of German immigrantsarriving in England in 1709 used symbols normally synonymous with the Dutch toderide these new arrivals to the kingdom.87 The association with the Dutch wouldremain throughout the century, where ‘Dutch Dogs’ or ‘Dutch Bugger’ were insultsdirected at German soldiers.88 This confusion in outlining a German character isperhaps unsurprising given the fact that Germany did not exist as it does in itspresent form and the linguistic divide was not as apparent as it is today, given theprevalence of Plattdeutsch speakers in the northern lowlands. Nevertheless,Germany and Germans were still strongly defined concepts in the minds ofeighteenth century Britons, even if the peripheries of this definition remained hazy.By the time of the wars against Napoleon however, Germany had largely defineditself, and was clearly defined to outsiders as well.Though there was no cohesive characterization, there was however an imageof Germans and German soldiers common among the pamphlets, engravings andother ephemera in eighteenth century Britain – and a direct association with armiesand warfare was at the cornerstone of these depictions. That Germany lacked asingle government or dominant religion resulted in a greater emphasis being placedon this martial quality, and states, such as Hessen-Kassel, Hanover, Brunswick, andin particular, Prussia, became very much synonymous with their militaries,especially owing to the frequent hiring or subsidizing of their soldiery. This wouldresult in Germanic soldiers being seen not only as a threat to British liberty, but aroadblock to British martial self-reliance. This was a criticism that in particularaffected Hanoverians and Hessians, where in one print from the Seven Years War,
87 Anon. The Palatines Catechism, or, A True Description of their Camps at Black-Heath and
Camberwell. In a Pleasant Dialogue Between an English Tradesman and a High-Dutchman (London:1709), p.1.88 For the former insult, see: Law for the Out-laws (London: 1756), for the latter, see Chapter IV.
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The Two H. & H.s, they are shown discussing the good ‘Rosh Peef’ and beer of Britain,while her own soldiers lay in chains, destitute, and prevented from contributing totheir nation’s defence, and relegated to merely launching empty threats at theseGerman mercenaries.89 Four years later, another print depicted a cabal of Germansin British pay confessing to protracting the war on the continent in order to collectas much honour and British money as possible, to which the British Commander theMarquis of Granby is depicted, fretting, ‘I find these Leeches are sucking the bloodand brains of my countrymen’ – a statement at odds with the Marquis’ ownwritings.90 Nevertheless, it was the soldiers themselves, so susceptible to thesecharacterizations, which opponents of a Eurocentric foreign policy could harness todrive home their arguments, and these authors and artists could further dramatizethe issue by pitting British and German soldiers against one another. Opponents ofsubsidizing German auxiliaries found this infighting among soldiers an effective toolin persuading the public against such agreements, and pamphlets like A Trooper
lately returned from Germany (1743) recounted two disgruntled British soldiersdenouncing the actions of their Hanoverian allies, with one declaring ‘there’s nobearing this from such a parcel of scrubs’ – a statement with deliberate aims atgaining support for the termination of subsidies to Hanover.91 There was an equallyvociferous faction within British public discourse arguing on behalf of their Germanauxiliaries, yet most arguments in pamphlets, prints and speeches, couched theirsupport as one of reluctant necessity rather than countering their opponents withpraise for the good character and ability of the German troops. Therefore, thedebate helped define popular impressions of German national character, especially
89 Duffy, The Englishman and the Foreigner, pp. 176-7.; McCormack, 'Citizenship, nationhood, andmasculinity‘, pp. 985, 987, 989-991.90 ‘Old Time’s Advice to Britannia: Or English Reflections on G[er]m[a]n Connections’, in Duffy, The
Englishman and the Foreigner, pp. 190-1. In fact, the German allies and auxiliaries had little to do withthe expenses ‘beyond all comprehension’ incurred by the Seven Years War, and those that stood toprofit were in fact the Dutch Republic and the Free Cities in northern Germany, such as Bremen andHamburg, although there was price-gouging on the part of Hanoverian merchants as well. However,as Ferdinand of Brunswick continued to campaign through the winter of 1760, Granby confided toNewcastle, ‘I don’t see how the mines of Peru can defray the charges of this winters work’ BLNewcastle Papers MS Add. 32915, esp. fol. 341.91 Anon., A True Dialogue between Thomas Jones, a Trooper, Lately Returned from Germany (1743), p.6.
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in contributing to a perception of Germans as militant and mercenary. As MichaelDuffy has shown in his collection of eighteenth century British satirical prints, theGerman princes and their subjects were almost universally portrayed in militaryuniforms and often stealing money from their allies, which became synonymouswith Germany in the same way that a pipe was ever-present in visualrepresentations of the Dutch.92 Such descriptions among British sources werereinforced with each successive conflict in the eighteenth century, when the Britishgovernment called upon tens of thousands of German soldiers to augment Britisharmies. The result was that German soldiers, as potential enemies or current allies,were depicted in much the same manner – cohesiveness in what was altogether anunclear picture of Germanic national character.The search for a British national character in the eighteenth century was anequally difficult task, and regardless of its existence or the degree to which it wasperceived, such discussions were overwhelmed by a more prominent focus on thecharacter of the English, Highland-Scottish, and Catholic Irish. Of all the Britishpeoples, characterizations of the English were by far the most common and theircharacteristics most closely reflected the culture of the institution that was theBritish Army. Furthermore, Englishness was the point of reference from which the‘otherness’ of German national and martial character was most often articulatedwithin British public discourse. Though Englishness itself was far more tangible, itwas nevertheless filled with contradictions, especially to British authors who coulddiscern more differences with their own peoples than they could within othercultures.93 Yet while Britishness may be harder to fathom, clearly there were a widevariety of traits that were seen as inherently English, as outlined in Paul Langford’smeticulous study of the perspectives of foreigners and visitors to England.94 Thekey stereotypes of the English: their xenophobia and mistrust of foreigners, theirwealth and sense of superiority above other nations, their candour and fair dealings,
92 Duffy, Englishman and the Foreigner, p. 15.93 Hume, a Scotsman wrote that ‘the English, of any People in the Universe, have the least of anational character; unless this very singularity be made their national character.’ Hume, ‘OnNational Character’, p. 124.94 Langford, Englishness Identified.
47
their liberality, informality, openness, and industriousness – all are traits that wererecognized from English and foreign commentators. And as we have seen, it iscrucial to understand how the English, or the British defined themselves in contrastto not only France, but their allies as well. Subsequent chapters will elaborate onthe variety of ways in which a sense of difference was defined through associationswith Germanic soldiery, but so too will they reveal how there was a great deal ofcommonality between the soldiers of these respective polities.
**Professional Solidarities and Homogeneity**
Despite the emphasis on national character, there were a number of commonalitiesbetween British and German armies, far more so than their populations in general,and these bonds were largely shared with most fighting forces in central andwestern Europe. Being a soldier was, in fact, a strong bond with those who sharedmuch in the way of traditions, practices and experiences. Though in the aftermathof the Glorious Revolution professionalism was a divisive issue between theinexperienced but ambitious Britons and the foreign veteran officers in William’sservice, this was a brief exception, owing a great deal to the political climatefollowing the accession of a foreign prince to the thrown.95 In most cases, however,a professional attachment was often as strong as (and occasionally stronger than)other identities, such as nationality, ethnicity, or a gentlemanly culture.96Structural, organizational and philosophical similarities would create senses ofhomogeneity and professional solidarity, meanwhile widely accepted theoriesregarding the traits of an ideal soldier would create standards within these armiesthat were concurrent within those of neighbouring states. The notion of a modelsoldier was not particularly new, but was nevertheless a point of emphasis as a‘scientific’ approach to militaries became more common throughout Europe.
95 Childs, British Army of William III, pp. 42-3.96 Sometime, solidarities were formed not from association with the army as a whole, but amongsoldiers of a certain campaign, or theatre. One example, being the ‘American Army’ in the SevenYears War. Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats : the British soldier and war in the Americas, 1755-1763(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. chap. 9 and Conclusions.
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Though there were some differences in the manner of fighting and tactics of armies,most theoreticians or professional soldiers would find obedience, bravery, goodstamina, discipline, and proficiency in manoeuvres, marching and fighting, to be thechief priorities – and notions of these traits were largely equivalent. Furthermore,the technological similarities, and the parity in these advances among Europeanstates, became a homogenizing force as each nation sought parity with one anotherby adopting their innovations. One of the ways in which this concept of a ‘goodsoldier’ was disseminated, was though various military manuals and traditionswithin armies. Generally, most training manuals would be printed in severallanguages, and were read or taught by officers throughout Europe. The majority ofmanuals would merely recount the proper methods of drill and manoeuvre,especially in loading and firing weapons and marching, and though there werenevertheless some differences, most of these manuals covered the samefundamentals, and in some cases, merely plagiarized one another.97 In a broadercontext, innovations made by one army would often be quickly adopted by otherEuropean forces, and when a military tried to copy the improvements of another, itwas done not out of preference for that nation, but in the belief that it was thecorrect or more advanced procedure. This was particularly true for the militaryinnovations and approaches of Prussia’s methods of drill, manoeuvre and tactics.Following Frederick II’s striking victories in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years War (1756-1763), most armies quickly clamoured tocopy the Prussian way of warfare and the British Army would readily adopt many ofPrussia’s techniques and methods, and a quarter century later, this processcontinued under the Germanophilic sons of George III. This created an era,beginning at the middle of the century and extending to the last decade, in which theBritish Army (like many others) shared a great deal with this German model, furthercreating similarity and commonalities between these various armies, just as French
97 G. A. Steppler, ‘The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793’, (DPhil Thesis, Oxford,Unpublished, 1984), esp. Chap. 1.
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innovations had impacted Western Europe a century before.98 In this sense, thesecompeting armies were geared towards finding the one way to properly conductwarfare, as opposed to each nation finding an individual path or philosophy.99 Oftentimes resources, culture, politics or other factors would dictate the approaches onenation took to formulating or fighting a war, but there was a general consensusabout the ideal standards.Adherence to universal military principles would have its critics, especially ifthey seemed to conflict with real or perceived national propensities. Henry Lloyd,writing in 1766, discussed this conflict between martial and national characteristicsand a profession that was requiring greater degrees of uniformity in drill and action,enforced above all by harsh measures in their training and punishment.From… moral and physical principles are formed national characters,whose influence is seen, more or less, in every army, as it is more or lesssubject to military discipline. If this is strong, and founded only onprinciples of Fear, it destroys national characters, and does notsubstitute any thing that is equivalent to it. Discipline should befounded on national characters, and both are improved by it: but thosewho have the formation and conduct of armies, seem whollyunacquainted with human nature in general, and with its variousmodifications, according to the difference of countries and government,they find themselves incapable to form a code of military laws, foundedupon national characters; and are therefore forced to destroy these, andestablish it, on the weak, uncertain, and slavish principle of Fear; whichhas rendered our armies much inferior to those of the antients [sic], asappears evident from the history of mankind.100
Nearly four decades later, the Hanoverian, Johann Friedrich von der Decken echoedthese sentiments, while full of praise for the bravery of English troops, he showedsome hesitation towards over-training them for fear of losing their ‘natural courage’,contradicting the increasingly popular idea of Bildung often preached by his military
98 In the seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries, it was France that was the most influential, for‘during the reign of Lewis the 14th, [France] gave birth to most of the customs and fashions of Europe’and were ‘imitated by everybody’. Lloyd, History of the Late War in Germany, p. xxiv.99 Lloyd felt that the reforms in France after the Seven Years War would be detrimental, rather thanbeneficial for these same reasons: ‘The present ministry, endeavours to introduce the Germandiscipline among them, without considering the difference there is between their national characters;and I doubt whether it will produce the effects they expect from it: nature must be improved, notanhiliated.’ Lloyd, History, p. xxxvi.100 Henry Lloyd, History of the Late War in Germany, pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.
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colleagues, such as his close friend Gerhard Scharnhorst.101 Bildung, the pursuit oflearning with an emphasis on reason over superstition, was a large part of theGerman Enlightenment, and within a military context, sought to do away withantiquated traditions by focusing on, among other things, meritocracy and makinglearned men out of officers and soldiers. This was in effect to operate againstnational distinctions in favour of a scientific approach to soldiering, despite the factthat one of the key tenets among these teachers and writers of military science wasa call for national armies motivated by patriotic fervour.102 This would be one of themajor philosophical problems for these theorists in the eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries: the ‘military sciences’ were a homogenizing agent, and yettook hold in an era with a dramatic upsurge in nationalistic sentiments and anattention to national peculiarities. By the beginnings of the nineteenth century,there was a decreasing emphasis on catering to martial character within militarytreatises, and by the time of Carl von Clausewitz’s definitive work on the art ofwarfare, a discussion of national character is absent, and there is universality in theprinciples outlined in his famous treatise On War.103While the theories behind armies and warfare would unite European (orEuropean-style) armies, there were other factors that enhanced this sense ofcommunity. In terms of appearance, the majority of the armies of Western Europedressed in the same style, and often in similar colours, as seen in the white adorningthe soldiers of Spain, Bourbon France and Austria. Regiments sought their ownunique identity through alterations to these uniforms, yet, at times, this search fordistinction could in fact bring them closer in appearance to their enemies. Thoughthe British soldiers wore the iconic ‘Redcoat’, they shared this uniform with avariety of other European troops, including the Polish Commonwealth and quite
101 Decken, Versuch, pp. 36-7. See also: Gerhard v. Shornhorst, Schornhorst-Briefe an Friedrich von der
Decken 1803-1813, Herausgegeben von J. Niemeyer. (Bonn: Dümmler, 1987)102 Charles Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in
Berlin, 1801-1805 (Mishawaka IN: Better World Books, 1988), esp. chaps. 1, 4.103 Clausewitz moves from the macro to the micro in explaining the martial character of an army: ‘Anarmy’s military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the spirit and essence of thisactivity; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and makes them his own’. Carl vonClausewitz, On War Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: OUP, 1976), III, p. 144.
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conveniently their Hanoverian brother-soldiers – both having adopted the colourbefore the Dynastic Union.104Language, particularly French, was another homogenizing agent, drawingprofessional soldiers away from their native vernacular to a common languagespoken, or at least recognizable, to officers throughout Western Europe. Themajority of armies in this period were filled with officers who spoke French, as thelegacy of French military and political influence at the end of the seventeenthcentury would lead many officers, especially those in Germany, to favour French,even over their own mother tongue. Within large multi-national armies, thisinternational language would help bridge divides within these polyglot forces, andcreate a forum in which language was not a direct indicator of nationality orallegiance.This last point touches upon another key aspect of early-modern armies, apolite and gentlemanly culture that was one of the strongest bonds uniting menfrom militaries across Europe. Expectations concerning mannerism, bearing, andaction, all helped formulate an ideal much like that of the concept of a good soldier,as can be seen in examples of courts-martial where defendants were tried foractions ‘unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman.’105 The officer andessayist, Campbell Dalrymple, asserted that good relations between officers wereeasy to foster and maintain due to their ‘easy gentlemanlike familiarity.’106 Just aseffectiveness as a soldier was blind to ethnic origin, so too was the concept of agentleman.107
104 Campaigning in the Baltic in 1813, members the 73rd Regiment of Foot, the only ‘English’ regimentin the theatre, would pretend to be a Hanoverian Regiment in battle, only unfurling the Union Jack atthe last moment, in an effort to surprise their French opponents. The red Hanoverian uniform alsodisguised the German presence in the most memorable painting of the Siege of Gibraltar of 1783,where the only discernable articles of clothing to separate them from the surrounding Britons weretheir famous yellow sashes. Thomas Morris, The Recollections of Sergeant Morris edited by John Selbywith an Introduction by Peter Young (Windrush Press: Gloucestershire, 1998), p. 22.; John Trumbull,
The Sortie Made by the Gibraltar Garrison (1789).105 See Courts-Martial proceedings in, WO 71.106 Dalrymple, A Military Essay, p. 45.107 A gentleman did not necessarily imply a worldliness, especially in the English sense, where the‘country gentleman’ was seen as very much an indigenous and localized entity.
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A gentlemanly fraternity was manifested in a variety of ways, none the leastin creating a sense of commonality between allies and enemies, especially amongthe officer classes. A sense of etiquette – a chivalric and feudal legacy to which thesearistocracies still clung – was a part of being a good officer, and was manifested (bylaw and tradition) in a code of conduct between armed forces. Often times thisgentlemanly culture and emphasis on politeness was counterproductive to theinterests of the nation as a whole, for example, during the Siege of Gibraltar in 1780,where one Scottish officer wrote in his journal, that whenever the Spanish generalwas among the trenches, ‘we never fire into the lines, which is a piece of politenessusual I supposes on such occasions.’108 Reacting to a decree by the Convention ofFrance in 1793 whereby French troops were to give no quarter to British andHanoverian forces, the Duke of York issued a declaration to their ‘generous’ and‘brave enemies’, the French, to not ‘forget their characters as soldiers’ and imploringthem not to ‘pay any attention to a decree, as injurious to themselves as disgracefulto the persons who passed it.’109 Fortunately, this was a policy that was largelyignored, and in fact, in subsequent conflicts, French officers were repeatedlycomplimented by their British enemies, for their gentlemanly behaviour, andgenerally viewed as more amiable than their German fellow-officers. These aremerely two examples of the countless instances of such behaviour, where courtesiesor signs of respect were given to enemy forces, even when it might prove costly totheir own cause or countrymen. This was in part a consequence of the professional-military and gentlemanly spheres, which were not in perfect alignment withnational sympathies or the political motives of these various nations – atransnational aspect to what was otherwise a very nationalized endeavour.While there existed this transnational element, there was a multinationalaspect to these forces as well, as most armies in early modern Europe werecomposed of men from a variety of nations and ‘ethnicities’ – using the latterexpression even in its broadest terms. Though the British Army was relatively
108 (SAS), Seafield Papers, GD248/466/11 ‘Journal of the Siege of Gibraltar’109 Quoted in Robert Brown, Corporal Brown’s Campaigns in the Low Countries: Recollections of a
Coldstream Guard in the Early Campaigns Against Revolutionary France (Leonaur, 2008), pp. 120-1.
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heterogeneous compared to its European counterparts, all Western Europeanarmies were composed of peoples from a myriad of countries, some more thanothers. A number of men, such as the famous Scottish Jacobite James Keith, wouldfight for a variety of different armies, travelling to whatever army best suited theirambitions. This was also the experience of the Welshman Henry Lloyd, whoseservice in the French, Austrian and Prussian Armies informed his theories of thedifferent martial characters of each European force. Other times, whole regimentsor armies themselves could be transferred from a defeated force into the army ofthe victor – an event not so uncommon in Germany in the long eighteenthcentury.110 Prisoners could often become recruits, and the British Army wouldincorporate captured combatants, especially during the French Revolutionary andNapoleonic Wars, when prisoners of war were often implanted into the ‘ForeignCorps’ that had been created to help fight Republican and Imperial France.Therefore, even in an era of ever-heightening nationalism, where public discoursewas featuring more frequent and louder calls for the country’s forces to becomposed only of native sons, there remained a strong multi-national element.Therefore, pan-European and transnational trends would combine with the multi-national composition of most early-modern armies to create a set of ‘national’armies that were by no means as homogeneous as the prevailing discoursesuggested. Adding to this was a professional solidarity that would remain apowerful unifying theme throughout the century.Through shared exertions, and commonalities in lifestyle, experience, andtraining, early modern soldiers had a great deal in common, despite implications ofvarying martial characters. Cultures would certainly impact armies, but there wasalso a belief that there were manners and behaviours especially prominent amongsoldiers, and which united them while separating themselves from their fellowcountrymen. Once again, we look to David Hume:
110 Frederick the Great openly admitted to using this policy, stating that in any major war, Prussiashould look to invading Saxony and incorporating its army: ‘Where are the necessary recruits to befound? In Saxony, which will always constitute a theater of war whenever we fight the Austrians, allable-bodied men will be drafted’. Jay Luvaas, Frederick the Great and the Art of War (New York: FreePress, 1966), p. 76.
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The uncertainty of their life makes soldiers lavish and generous as wellas brave: Their idleness as well as the large societies, which they form incamps or garrisons, incline them to pleasure and gallantry: by theirfrequent change of company, they acquire good breeding and anopenness of Behavior: Being employ’d only against a public and an openenemy, they become candid, honest, and undesigning: And as they usemore the labour of the body than that of the mind, they are commonlythoughtless and ignorant.111While soldiers were grouped together by outside commentators, this thesis willshow the variety of ways that soldiers did indeed create a community whichinvolved fellow warriors of differing national origin. Nevertheless, there werecertainly factions within these forces, such as competition between regiments,divisions between the branches of service, and the most important of all, the dividebetween officers and men of the rank & file. Much of this was professional, but therewere class-divisions as well.The bonds of the soldiering profession were best seen with the introductionof a third party, usually one that did not share the same martial traditions orpractices as British and German forces.112 Despite any differences, men from allthree main branches of the army had derogatory impressions of militias andirregular or colonial forces. This professional solidarity was particularly strongwhen fighting against (or alongside) colonial rebels and Native Americans, orEuropean irregular forces, such as Hungarian Hussars, or Croatian, Portuguese orSpanish guerrillas. Thomas Morris, an English sergeant serving in Germany in 1813could point to many differences between his countrymen and their Hanoverianauxiliaries, but these were minimized in reference to the Cossacks within the army,who he deemed ‘barbarians, inspiring as much terror in our own ranks as in those ofthe enemy.’113 Here any major concepts of difference between regular British andGerman infantry are marginalized by the greater contrasts with a force notconducting a war in manner recognizable to European forces. Crucially, soldiers
111 Hume, Three Essays, p. 120112 For more a detailed discussion of these differences, see Stephen Conway, ‘The British Army,“Military Europe,” and the American War of Independence’ William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series,vol. 67, no. 1 (2010).113 Morris, The Recollections of Sergeant Morris, p. 22.
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writing in such contexts were defining ‘barbarian’ not by race or ethnicity, butmanner of fighting – there was a civilized method understood among ‘European’armies and those who did not adhere to it were beyond the pale. Therefore, these‘civilized’ armies had a great deal in common with one another: they were trained ina like manner, dressed in similar uniforms with often matching colours, used thesame language to communicate and held one another to the same standards, assoldiers and officers and as gentlemen. They were united in a professionalfraternity that was surprisingly transnational, given the rigid nationalized nature ofearly modern militaries.
**Conclusion**
National character and professional solidarities were not universally exclusiveconcepts within the minds of British, or other European soldiers. As the followingchapters will reveal, these two themes would be very much intertwined in theircommentaries. Throughout this thesis, there will be a variety of instances in whichnational character conflicted with these professional solidarities, creating twoopposing filters through which British soldiers perceived their Germancounterparts. While an emphasis on military ability would heighten the focus onthese traits desired of soldiers, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter,estimations of German or British soldiery never escaped being contextualized innational or ethnic terms. Rather than critiquing particular individuals, or evenregiments, most soldier-authors opted for blanket-terminology, which almostalways included phrases such as ‘the English’, ‘the Germans’, or if it was morenuanced, would include mentions of particular groups within Britain, or smallerprincipalities within the Holy Roman Empire: Hanoverians, Hessians, Prussians, andso forth.The following chapters will each in turn focus on a different relationship, or aparticular episode, where these themes of national character and transnational
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The first Anglo-German partnerships to be examined, pertains to the key militarypowers within the Holy Roman Empire: Austria and Prussia. Whereas these militarycollaborations would see the greatest number of British and German soldiersoperating in concert, a clear picture of the relations between the soldiers withinthese grand coalitions is surprisingly elusive, or at least unclear in contrast to thosewith auxiliaries or integrated forces. The disjointed and often disparate nature ofthese coalitions would impact relationships, and inform the writings of the soldier-authors who recorded their interactions and opinions. This chapter will discusssome of the features common to all forms of associations, and highlight some of thethemes that made the relations between these allies not as harmonious as theirname would indicate.One consistent feature of Britain’s military struggles with France withinEurope was the presence of one, or several, powerful German allies. While theeighteenth century (from the British perspective) has often been couched as anepoch marked by a prolonged diplomatic and military struggle with France, Britainrarely acted alone. Therefore, defining this century of intermittent warfare as a‘Second Hundred Years War’ devolves these conflicts into a duel between two states,whereas in reality these clashes were merely encapsulated within a broaderEuropean context in which numerous other states, especially Habsburg Austria,played a prominent if not central role. However, this is not to suggest that Britain’sbond with Austria, or any other German state, should be described as a ‘HundredYears Alliance’: these were coalitions of necessity, not preference, and therelationship between Britain and her two most common German allies, Austria andPrussia, were certainly imperfect and unstable.114 Yet, there were times in which
114 For Austro-British relations, the two most tumultuous periods (aside from the Seven Years War)were in 1725-8 after the Austro-Spanish treaty of 1725, and the Fürstenbund of 1785 when several
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the British politicians and the public itself were closer in action and sentiment to theAustrians than the Hanoverians to whom they were dynastically tied, while in thedecades following the Seven Years War, Prussia became the most celebrated andadmired of the myriad of German states with which British arms were so oftenunited.England’s wars against Louis XIV would prompt numerous governmental,financial and military reforms, and created a new approach to foreign policy thatwould become prevalent for the next 125 years. This would create what was latertermed the ‘Old System’ – a coalition between Britain, the Dutch Republic andAustrian Habsburgs focusing on the defence of Flanders, which would be a feature ofthe first three major conflicts with France, and would re-emerge at the end of theeighteenth century with the threat of the French Revolutionary armies. Security ofthe Flemish port cities was a key issue for the protection of Britain, and one thatwould make Austria of increasing value as an ally, especially after the passage of theSpanish Netherlands into the hands of Austrian Habsburgs. Yet, for the Hanoverianmonarchs, it was not merely the defence of England that was a concern, but that oftheir Electorate as well. One of the key motives for the first two Georges, especially,was in operating in the capacity as Elector of Hanover to assist in maintaining thelegitimacy and security of the Holy Roman Empire, and working within it to increasethe power and significance of their own Electorate. In this later case, the Kingdomof Prussia would feature as both a conspicuous threat, and a potential ally, with themost prominent instance of the latter being the Seven Years War, when for the firstand last time in this period, Britain and Austria became belligerents, while Prussiatook the mantle of Britain’s key continental partner.115
German princes combined to prevent Austria from trading territories with the Bavarian Elector. See,T.C.W. Blanning, ‘”That Horrid Electorate” or “Ma Patrie Germanique”? George III, Hanover, and theFürstenbund of 1785’, The Historical Journal, 20, 2 (1977), pp. 311-344.; Brendan Simms, Three
Victories and a Defeat, esp. chap 7.115 Of particular utility to understanding these relationships and alliances, see: Jeremy Black, The
Continental commitment: Britain, Hanover, and Interventionism: 1714-1793 (London: Routledge,2005).; Jeremy Black, A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy 1660-1793 (London: Sutton, 2000).;Peter Wilson, German Armies.; David French, The British Way of Warfare 1688-2000 (London:Routledge, 1990).
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The long eighteenth century would see repeated coordinated militaryventures with one, or multiple, German allies, not just in the Low Countries but inthe Holy Roman Empire, France, and even Spain. During these conflicts, Britishforces would be marching, fighting, living and dying alongside German-bornsoldiers. Interactions and associations with these forces would be a large part of awarrior’s life during a continental war. Crucially, these allied forces would onlyrarely be coordinated with the British Army, and the contrasts in the motives,functions, and qualities of these armies would greatly impact how they wereperceived. The picture was not always rosy, and the opinions of Austrian andPrussian armed forces were not continuously favourable, despite the long-standinghistories of close association in opposition to a mutual enemy: France.
**History of Allied Collaborations**
The origins of the long-standing anti-French collaborations with the AustrianHabsburgs originated with the War of the League of Augsburg, better known as theNine Years War (1689-1697). Here the tandem of England, Austria and Holland wasestablished as a means of curbing Bourbon expansion, and though the results of thelong and intensive struggle were inconclusive, an enduring military partnership wasformed. A mere five years later, an even greater struggle broke out to determine thefate of the Spanish Habsburg territories in the War of Spanish Succession, and it washere that the golden years of British-Austrian collaboration transpired. British andImperial forces would fight in Germany, the Low Countries and Spain on behalf ofthe Austrian Habsburgs and the combination of military genius in the two polities’commanders, the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy, created amutual respect and legacy that would have a lasting impact on British-Austrianrelations. In the middle of the eighteenth century, British military and financialsupport helped maintain the Habsburg territories upon the death of Charles VI, onlyfor the relationship between the two states to break down with the so-called
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‘Diplomatic Revolution’ that brought Austria and France together in a coalitionagainst Britain and her new ally, Prussia. Yet the ‘Old System’ was reset at the endof the century, when Britain was to play a leading role in the ‘First Coalition’ in 1793,which included both Austria and Prussia, in a failed attempt at putting the humpty-dumpty of ancien régime France back together again.As for Prussia, the relationship was by no means as consistent, or asimpactful as that with the Austrian Habsburgs. Initially, while still merely a localpower in central Europe, Prussian forces were primarily hired as auxiliaries to themaritime powers or in fulfilling obligations within the Holy Roman Empire.However, the policies and exploits of Frederick II, ‘the Great’, made Prussia into amajor European player, and in three separate occasions, during the Seven Years War(1758-62), the War of the First Coalition (1793-1795), and the last years of theNapoleonic Wars (1813-1815), British and Prussian forces were united in the samecause.116 However, until their humiliation at the hands of Napoleon in 1807, thePrussians were by no means as hostile to France as the Austrians remainedthroughout this era, which explains in part why the Austrians had remained suchimportant confederates.Last of the German ‘allies’ were those smaller states that worked withinlarger coalitions, either in predominantly independent roles, or as auxiliaries ofother major powers. German auxiliary forces subsidized by the Dutch, and smallerarmies serving on behalf of the Holy Roman Emperor (including the Reichsarmee),would come into contact with British armies, but in most cases their associationswere blurred with the nation with which they served, and are harder to detectwithin the writings of observers. The armies that marched, battled, and camped allacross the Low Countries over the course of the century would largely be identifiedin terms of Dutch, British, Austrian and French, and regardless of the ethniccomposition of those forces, more often than not they would be described by thoseterms. Therefore this chapter will focus predominantly on Britain’s partnerships
116 These dates reflect the periods when both armies were operating in the same theatre, not theentire duration of their coalitions. The Prussians were at intervals subsidized by Britain, andtherefore in some cases, for example 1794, might be better considered as auxiliaries.
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with Austria and Prussia, the two major powers within the Holy Roman Empire, andwhile referring to these two powers as Britain’s only German ‘allies’ is anoversimplification, their unique nature in contrast to other relationships justifies theexclusion of other forces.
**Structure, Proximity and Integration**
The structure of allied armies had a considerable impact on the relations betweensoldiers and influenced the frequency and nature of interactions within British-German coalitions. One of the key differences separating Austrian and Prussianarmies with the German auxiliaries and integrated corps discussed in later chapters,was that these allied forces operated independently of the British. Though at timesthese coalition partners would unite under a single commander, usually at criticalmoments in campaigns and during battles, they would normally operate under theirown initiative and might be situated hours, or days apart from one another. Theeffects of proximity in creating a sense of difference and detachment from theirallies would be further underlined by variances in their pay, provisioning, billetingand relations with local inhabitants. These differences would often impact howBritain’s fighting men perceived their German fellow soldiers, and thereforethroughout this and subsequent chapters, an attention to the means or degree inwhich armies were integrated will be highlighted.Allied armies often served at great distance from one another, andinteractions with soldiers in an allied force could be erratic or infrequent, thushaving a profound impact on relations, if not prohibiting them altogether. The mainPrussian Army during the Seven Years War never came into contact with the ‘HisBritannic Majesty’s Army in Germany’, the name for the British forces operatingthere, whose commanders’ knowledge of Prussian movements and intentions wereoften vague, or gleaned from hearsay or informal sources. In the numerouscoalitions against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, there was a twenty-year
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interval (1795-1815) between combined operations with the Austrians, and thelatter being merely in parades after the fall of Paris. Even if they were operating inthe same region, during campaigning seasons these armies might be split in order tooccupy different strategic locations, and in winter would often be dispersed todifferent encampments. Even in the Waterloo campaign, where British and Prussianforces were working closely together, the armies themselves rarely encountered oneanother and were separate from shortly after the battle itself until their entranceinto Paris.117Not all experiences with allied German armies were so disparate, and therewere some attempts at creating a more cohesive force. One of the methods was by‘brigading’ or ‘marrying’ certain regiments within allied armies, an attempt atunifying both forces, but also done as a means of ensuring cooperation and keepingan eye on one’s allies.118 However, the most common means of creating unity inmovement and purpose was to appoint a commander-in-chief in command of allcoalition forces. This was simple enough for warrior-kings such as William III and,briefly, George II, men who could demand such a role, yet in other periods therewere numerable problems in finding an acceptable leader who would have theauthority and ability to please all parties. Therefore this position often devolved toan Austrian or German prince of some form, which often meant a member of theHanoverian royal family.In many ways, the network of allies and auxiliaries within Germany impactedthe role of the Hanoverian monarchs and their sons throughout the century. It wasof course typical for kings and princes to have at least nominal roles in theirrespective militaries, but the status of the Hanoverian monarchs as princes of theEmpire further militarized this dynasty, as a means of providing commanders whocould have the authority to lead a coalition of states from within the Empire. Overthe course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, numerous members ofthe Hanoverian royal family would lead forces in battle on the continent. George II’scommand of the army in the summer of 1743 (done to with the intent of creating
117 General Cavalie Mercer, Journal of the Waterloo Campaign (London: Greenhill Books, 1985), p. 231118 Burne, The Noble Duke of York, pp. 118, 154.
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harmony between British and Hanoverian forces) was followed his son, the Duke ofCumberland (1745, 1747-8, 1757), and three children of George III, most notablythe Duke of York (1793-4). These members of the royal family were at times theonly men with the status, military experience and qualifications needed to commandthese disparate coalitions, or the British and auxiliary contingents within them.Britain’s dominant financial and political roles in these coalitions furthernecessitated their requiring a place of prominence in the overall command of thesecoalition armies.Though there was at the end of the seventeenth century a healthy disdain forhaving Englishmen subservient to a foreign commander, by the Seven Years War(1756-63), British-sponsored forces were again entrusted to a foreign prince:Ferdinand of Brunswick.119 Borrowed from the Prussian officer corps, PrinceFerdinand’s talents assuaged any reluctance among the British commandingofficers, to the degree that both he and his son were looked upon to lead British-ledcoalitions in subsequent conflicts – though they both turned down the offers.120 Atother times, when allied with Austria and the Netherlands, the task of finding acommander-in-chief was even more difficult, and the overall command was oftenshared amongst the highest-ranking officers of each respective force, which wasoften a recipe for infighting.
**Commonality and Difference in Anglo-German Coalitions**
In the wars between 1689 and 1795, more than thirty of these years saw closecooperation with Austrian armies, and more than a dozen with the armies ofPrussia. In this time frame, the British forces shared much of the same trials and
119 A caveat should be provided here for the French Huguenot generals who would have a significantpresence throughout this period, especially Henri de Massue, Duke of Galaway and Jean Louis, FirstBaron Ligonier. Galway was defeated at the Battle of Almansa in 1707 by the French, led, ironically,by an Englishman. David Francis, The First Peninsular War 1702-1713 (London: Ernest Benn, 1975),pp. 33, 337.; ‘John Ligonier’, ODNB edited by Sidney Lee, vol. XXXIII (London: Smith & Elder, 1893), p.242.120 Burne, Noble Duke of York, p. 168.
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tribulations, and lived remarkably similar to their allies. While each nation’scontingent remained for the most part independent, there was in fact a degree ofintegration and commonalities of experience acting as unifying agents among thesediverse and disparate groups.One of the aspects of a soldier’s life that showed a noticeable degree of thisintegration was in diet and in the supply of food. In most campaigns, especiallythrough to the mid-century, bread was contracted for the coalition army as a whole,and this ‘ammunition’ bread was given to all forces. This shared diet was certainly apoint of commonality, in a century in which diet was becoming more and moreingrained within national character. Yet one problem that arose from this (andwould remain as a surprising area of contention in all British-German militarypartnerships) was the division over the type of bread, especially rye, which theGerman soldiers loved, and the British despised. This became an iconic divide inthese Anglo-German armies. The problem was not unique to these coalitions, andwas a recurring theme, even as late as the Peninsular War, with one Germancommissary in the British Army writing thatThe English soldiers, and particularly the officers, pull dreadfully longfaces over the rye bread. ‘It lies sour on the stomach!’ wailed ColonelHawker. Even the horses could not get on with rye, for it purged themviolently. On the other hand, the Germans were as delighted as childrenwith rye bread.121
This was not nearly a discrepancy in preference, but in fact had tangible effects onarmies. Several times throughout the century, adhering to a German diet was seenas a culprit for illness for native Britons.122 Lord Ligonier warned against supplyingrye bread to British soldiers during the Seven Years War, as he asserted that duringthe War of Spanish Succession, ‘more men were lost by this kind of Bread than by
121 August Schaumann, On the Road With Wellington: A Diary of a War Commissary (London:Greenhill, 1999), p. 158.122 Another Peninsular War veteran wrote during his first weeks in the Iberian Peninsula: ‘We neverwanted for a single article except wheat-bread, which failed us occasionally, and with a person notaccustomed to rye, it does not agree.’ Lieut.-Col William Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, in
the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns (Spellmount: Staplehurst, 1999), p. 9.
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the sword of the enemy.’123 Early in the campaign of in 1743, Joseph Yorke,acknowledged,we shall not find our numbers so compleat as every Englishman c[oul]dwish... for People don’t consider that an English Army is not used tosubsist on such Food as Germans, & tho’ they do not grumble or repine athardships (w[hi]ch must do ‘em justice to say they do not in the least) yetin the end it must be necessarily be destructive to their Constitutions.124
Towards the end of the century the divide in diet became more profound, in qualityand quantity, with the British being much better fed than their counterparts withinGerman armies. Yet as late as 1793-4, the Quartermasters for the allied armies inFlanders remained Austrian, including Prince Hohenlohe in 1794, a man whoshowed clear incompetence and led to considerable hardships for all soldiers –British and German.125 Dearth was a shared experience in these coalitions–although not a soldiers’ favourite means of establishing unity. As one Hanoveriancolonel remarked of the Imperial, Hanoverian and British forces of the ‘FirstCoalition’, that ‘among these various nations, united by a mighty, just, andhonourable cause in common brotherhood in arms, cordial union of exertions,hardships, and alas! Also excesses... there was one feature common to all – viz.,fatigue and gnawing hunger.’126 Implicit in this commentary, is a sense of cohesionand a unity derived from a common cause and shared experience. Sharing rationswas one way of creating a bond between forces, but starving together was another.Treatment may have been similar, but not all armies were expected toperform the same functions. As homogenized as these early modern-armies were,there were variances in the skills and proficiencies of each army, which wouldmanifest themselves in certain troops being given specific tasks. This was certainly
123 Quoted in Gordon Elder Bannerman, ‘British Army Contracts and Domestic Supply, 1739-1763’PhD Dissertation, King’s College London (2004), p. 175.124 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS 35363, fol. 29, Joseph Yorke to Hardwick, April 13th, 1743, ‘not manyfurlongs from the Rhine’.125 The Duke of York lobbied his father for Hohenlo to be replaced by Karl Mack, whose ‘presencealone would restore confidence to the troops, and instill a degree of spirit’. Burne, York, p. 112.126 Christian Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer A Hundred Years Ago: Memoirs of Baron Ompteda,
Colonel in the King’s German Legion Translated by John Hill (London: Grevel & Co, 1892), p. 53. Itshould be noted that the title of this work is a misnomer, and these represent not his memoirs, asBaron Ompteda died at Waterloo, but his private letters written to his family.
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the case for German light infantry and cavalry. Hussars in the Austrian or Prussianservice would, from the 1740’s onward, act as the outpost and skirmishing forces,which benefited the British Army greatly given their lack of men trained in thesematters. Outpost duty – defined as those duties of establishing pickets, screeningthe army’s movements, making raids against enemy positions and gatheringintelligence on enemy movements – were usually in the job description of Germancavalry formations, and the British Army would be perpetually criticized throughoutthis extended period as being woefully inept and unpractised in these operations.127The same was found with light infantry units, which were also few in the BritishArmy up until the end of the eighteenth century, and here again, the German Jäger orthe Croatian Pandour in the Austrian service, would most often compensate. At theend of this period, the British rifleman of the Peninsular War received greatnotoriety for their endeavours, yet they were merely fulfilling a role normallyplayed by Britain’s German allies and auxiliaries. German light infantry and cavalryformations did receive the attention and appreciation of the British Army and theirexploits are mentioned in British accounts, most notably when the remainder of thearmy lay quiet.128 It was formations such as these that gave rise to some of thestereotypes about German soldiers – not those particularly common to publicdiscourse, but assumptions of natural ability found in the writings of the soldiersthemselves.129 Yet there were aspects of the British Army that were seen to besuperior as well, particularly the courageousness and reliability of the British lineinfantry.Beyond the functions within the army, there were also a series of formalitiesand ceremonial positions that impacted relations between each nations’ forces.Throughout these coalitions, it was customary for one contingent to form the ‘rightwing’ of the army, which signified a position of honour, even if these troops were notphysically placed on the right side of the force. In these grand confederations this
127 Calvert, The Journals and Correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert, p. 366.128 During the relatively uneventful campaign of 1744, especially in the winter months, all eyes werefocused on the exploits of the Austrian Hussars, and their daring raids that helped liven the spirits ofthe coalition army. Davenport, ‘To Mr. Davenport’, p. 39.129 For more on these discussions, see below, esp. Chapter VI.
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was most often given to – or demanded by – the British-sponsored forces.130 Whilemerely a formality, the distinction did occasionally cause some resentment withinAustrian and Dutch ranks, particularly when it was felt that they were abusing thehonour to gain access to better areas for supplies or forage.131 For their part, Britishofficers saw any break in this tradition on the part of allied commanders as a breachof etiquette: there was anger at the placement of the British soldiers at Steenkirk in1793, and again on the eve of Fontenoy in 1745, when one officer wrote of thedistribution of forces, ‘a great oaf has always put the English upon the left.’132 Otherbreaches in protocol, even slight ones, would create a degree of hostility among theBritish officers: this fusion of the martial and gentlemanly cultures, so often aunifier, could have detrimental effects on relations.133Of all the structural aspects of these armies that created or reinforceddivisions, one of the more consequential emerged from disagreements among thecommanders. In many of these coalitions, command of the army was shared, andeven when there was a nominal commander-in-chief, the various contingentstended to act in their own interests. During the Blenheim campaign, which gave theDuke of Marlborough immortal fame, the command of the army was nominallyshared with Prince Eugene and Louis of Baden-Baden.134 This can be viewed as asuccessful partnership, but other, less successful coalitions saw frequent conflictsbetween the high-ranking generals that had a tendency to reflect upon the armiesthemselves.This is not to say that relations between British and German armies directlymirrored the rapport between their respective commanders. Major Harry Calvert,
130 SNA Dunmore Papers, Rh4/195/2 fol. 9 Harrington to Dunmore, Hanover, May 29th, 1745.131 ‘The Dutch & Austr[ians] saying they are starving for want of Forage, complain that we have theadvantage of being upon the Right & so eat the forage from them all the way’. BL Hardwick PapersAdd MS 36250, Diary of Joseph Yorke fol. 76.132 It’s likely that he was referring to the Hanoverian General Sommerfeld, but it remains unclear.Needless to say this was merely indicative of a common reaction. BL Hardwick Papers Add MS36250, Diary of Joseph Yorke, fol. 10b.133 The Austrian General D’Aremberg caused a stir, and enraged Joseph Yorke, when he did not takethe proper position when reviewing the British infantry during manoeuvres. BL Add MS 36250 Diaryof Joseph York, fol. 45.134 While in Württemberg, ‘the Generals held a Conference, wherein it was resolved… that PrinceLewis and the Duke [of Marlborough] should have each a Day of Command alternatively while theycontinued together’. John Millner, A Compendious Journal, p. 88.
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whose journal and letters of the campaigns of 1793-5 became an endless string ofcriticisms of the Austrian ministers and government, never seemed to reflect poorlyupon their soldiers, stating to his friend Hew Dalrymple, ‘I am willing to believe thatthe Austrian army have been… dupes of the infernal cabal’.135 In periods in whichdebates among commanders lead to inactivity or defeat, the soldiers themselveswould hold their allies accountable, and in these particular circumstances, there wasa great deal of symmetry between the writings of soldiers and of popular discourse,with many of the grievances being aired publicly in the respecting nations’ press.136Not all shared commands were recipes for disaster, and the partnership ofEugene and Marlborough (‘the two greatest Men in the Age’) in the War of SpanishSuccession was incredibly successful.137 Yet this was a tough act to follow, andsubsequent commanders – especially among the Austrians – failed to live up toEugene’s legacy, and likewise Britain provided few commanders of inspiration foranother century. The effects of poor leadership hindered relations between thearmies, and are particularly prominent in the coalitions of the 1740’s and 1790’s.Recalling his experiences in the War of Austrian Succession, Andrew Robertson, asurgeon in the 42nd Highland Regiment, had little to say of the Austrians heencountered, and spent much of his journal denouncing the commander of theImperial forces, the Duke Léopold Phillipe d’Aremberg.[His] behaviour does merrit some remark on this ocasion he who owedhis reputation at court, and his command in the army, to the contunanceand recommendation of the generous minded L[or]d Stairs [sic], nowused the sneeking cunning of his country, with the sinking credit of hisgenerous benefactor, as a step to rise unto his master’s favour. This view(to his shame it be said) dissolved all former obligation, broke that bondthat should [exist between] the Gen[e]r[a]ls of one aleyed army, and nowmanifested itself publickly by his refusing at first to joyn his Austriantroops with the British…138
135 Calvert, Journals and Correspondence, p. 267.136 Perhaps the most famous of these being Lord Stair’s published resignation. For a list of grievancesdue to inactivity or quarrelling among army commanders in 1744, see: BL Hardwick Papers Add MS36250, Diary of Joseph Yorke, esp. fols. 40-1, 45, 53, 54. For similar grievances in the First Coalition,see: Calvert, Journal and Correspondence, pp. 184, 217, 246-7.137 John Millner, A Compendious Journal, p. 87.138 NAM 6807-426 ‘Andrew Roberson Journal’, pp. 10-12.
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Needless to say, the perception that allied commanders were actively workingagainst one another, had a detrimental impact on relations, and in this particularinstance, explains the continued anti-d’Aremberg diatribe throughout the remainderof Robertson’s journal. Often such writers try to ascertain the key scapegoats forfailed campaigns, or defeats in battle, and Austrian generals were good (and oftendeserving) candidates. This was a problem that would arise again and again, and isnotable in critiques of German auxiliaries in the American War in particular. Otherdistasteful commanders would emerge, such as the Austrian Marshal Clerfeyt who in1794 was accused by both British and Hessian forces to be sacrificing their forcesunnecessarily, and using them in order to spare his own Austrian contingents – anodious, but surprisingly rare, circumstance.139 In any case, these were problemsowing to the behaviour of specific individuals, and not national fault-lines.Nevertheless, such conflicts did give soldier-authors a deeper appreciation of theirstatus as Britons, for example, during the nadir of relations with Habsburg forces in1794, even the Austrophilic Calvert wrote: ‘I daily thank God I am an Englishman,and pray that the time may arrive when it may no longer be necessary for us to haveconnection with the fools and villains who are playing the principle parts on theContinent of Europe.’140 Ironically, these statements made in reaction to theAustrian government’s withdrawing from the war in Flanders to deal with pressingmatters in Poland, mirrored Britain’s abrupt withdrawal from the War of SpanishSuccession eighty years earlier, leaving the Austrians in a similar circumstance.141Outside of accounts of battles and marches, discussions of infighting and intriguebetween commanding officers are some of the most common topics for soldier-authors, revealing that for all the commonality between these militaries, one of theprimary causes for any poor relations or bitter resentments started with the failureto integrate among the highest-ranking men in British and German armies.
139 Burne, Duke of York, p. 50140 Calvert, Journals and Correspondence, p. 303.141 Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. I, p. 552.
70
**Inhibitors and Instances of British-German Interaction**
Over the last few pages, we have focused on how the structure of the armies and theworkings of a coalition could harm or help relations between fellow soldiers. Here,we will focus on the interactions of officers and soldiers to highlight the areas ofcontention and cordiality. Each subsequent chapter will include a discussion ofsome of the ways in which British and German soldiers related with one another inthese various multinational formations. Some were unique to their own setting orparticular conflict, and therefore need some elaboration within their own context,yet there are some forms of association that were common to all, and particularlypronounced in Anglo-German allied armies. Before discussing some of these meansand instances of interaction, there should be some mention of the issues thatprevented British soldiers from frequently encountering or mingling with theirGerman counterparts.Throughout this era of recurrent Anglo-German armies, language wouldremain the key inhibitor of interaction between the fighting men of each nation.The linguistic divide would hinder professional relationships, but also hamperfrequent conversation and other forms of social connection. The importance ofsharing the same language was not only a necessity for military or social functions,but also for dealings with civilians, and the camp followers that accompanied thesearmies. The knowledge of English among German officers was rare, and in mostcases where the officers knew English, it was from past experiences workingalongside the British Army. The same was true for British officers. Yet in this, therewas some change over time. Early in the eighteenth century, precious few Britishofficers could speak German, yet by the end of the century, and owing in a large partto the mystique of Frederick the Great and other German militaries, knowledge ofthe language was not as uncommon, and even some soldiers had made efforts tolearn it.142 In most cases, this was familiarity, not fluency. Though learning Germanbecame a pastime for some British fighting men, for others all that was required
142 William Todd, The Journal of Corporal Todd, 1745-1762 edited by Andrew Cormack and Alan Jones(London: Sutton Publishing, 2001), pp. 257.
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were a few words pertinent to day-to-day living.143 For Britain’s German allies, theneed to learn English was not as important as it was for auxiliary forces servingunder predominantly English speakers. These differing circumstances would meanthat the linguistic divide remained more pronounced in associations with the moreindependent German allies, than the auxiliaries who would have attained a greatermastery of the language owing to more frequent encounters.The linguistic barrier had serious consequences for soldiers in the field.Miscommunications or misinterpreted orders were always a concern, especiallywhen the commanding officers and their lieutenants were of differing nationalities.There was perhaps no greater example of this than the case of General GeorgeSackville, whose failure to act on Ferdinand of Brunswick’s orders (intentionally orotherwise), prevented the victory at the Battle of Minden in 1759 from becoming acomplete route. Sackville’s court martial, which he requested in order to vindicatehimself, was an event unique in the history of Anglo-German coalitions, in that solittle blame was placed on the German commanders, who had received morescrutiny in previous conflicts.144 Though his case was certainly a high profile affair,little was done subsequently to prevent similar episodes, and in later wars officersfrom differing nations still received orders in languages they could not understand.The language divide was a cause of frustration, but would also spurn anumber of comical passages in the writings of soldiers-authors. This was equallytrue of those who had attempted – with varying degrees of success – to master theirallies’ language. Strange accents, misapplied words, and the futility ofcommunication with local civilians, would all be a part of the memoirs and diaries ofthe participants. Artillery officer Cavalie Mercer’s account of the Waterloo campaigncontains a number of passages where he pokes fun of the German accents of his
143 One English officer wrote to his brother from his garrison in Sicily, ‘A Battalion of the GermanLegion is quartered here and one of the officers has very kindly undertaken to instruct my Captain &myself in the Language, the Study of which I have commenced with great Resolution and Diligence;but under a great disadvantage having neither Grammar [book] or Dictionary.’ BL Dansley PapersAdd MS 41,580, fols. 55-56, CC Dansley to George Henry Dansley, July 21st, 1808.
144 For more on his trial, see: WO 71/134.; for secondary works, see especially, Piers Mackesy, The
Coward of Minden: the Affair of Lord George Sackville (Allen Lane: London, 1979).
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allies and their comical pronunciations of his native tongue, not even sparing thecommander of the Prussian forces, Marshal Gebhard von Blücher.145 As comical asthey might have seemed to some, attempts at communicating in their allies’ nativelanguage was something that was more often appreciated, and could createinstantaneous good-will.In the end, the most common solution was to speak en Français. As discussedin the introductory chapter, French was the universal language of early modernmilitaries, and ironically, the national vernacular of their common enemy becamethe language with which British and German soldiers communicated with oneanother. Due to the gentlemanly education of many officers, French was prevalentas a second language throughout Western Europe, as it was the language of courtlyculture. The majority of diplomatic and official military correspondence betweenthese allies would remain in French throughout the century, and was particularlyuseful in situations where there were allies other than those of British or Germanorigin. French, however, was by no means a perfect solution for communicatingamong these allies, as the armies were comprised primarily of monoglots. At theBattle of Steenkirk in 1693, an English colonel recalled the confusion created when‘orders were sent to me in French, a language which, I profess, neither I nor any ofmy officers understood.’146 Little over a decade later, Sergeant Peter Drake, anIrishman who had spent several years in the French Army, found himself quitepopular upon entering a British regiment, on account of his fluency with French andutility as a translator for British officers who only knew English or ‘a broadScotch’.147 Mastery of both French and German was an ongoing issue for Britishofficers, and which remained so through the period in question. As late as the1790’s prominent British officers were having the same communication problemstheir predecessors had one hundred years before, and when Harry Calvert was
145 Cavalie Mercer, ‘With the Guns at Waterloo’ in B.A. Fitchett (ed.), Wellington’s Men, Some Soldier
Autobiographies (London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1900), p. 312.146 Quoted in Childs, The Army of William III, p. 43.147 S.A. Burrell, (ed.), Amiable Renegade: The Memoirs of Captain Peter Drake 1671-1753 (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 190-4.
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asked if he had any advice for his nephew, soon to be entering the army, he wrote tohis brother:give the young hero as much French as he can possibly take, while he isin England. Languages are the sine quâ non to an officer who wishes torise above the common routine of regimental duty; and I have myselffelt very severely the misfortune of not understanding German.148Indeed, despite the utility of French, learning German became a common solution,especially when it was the one means of communicating with German-speakinglocals or men in the rank and file. In 1805 when the British Army made a briefexpedition to northern Germany, the commanding general, Sir William Gomm,wrote, ‘I assure you I am obliged to put my German to the proof in my own defence.It is very seldom that I find French of use to me here.’149This linguistic divide should not be seen as something particular to Anglo-German confederations. Most armies had to deal with such difficulties, especially ascontinental European armies tended to incorporate far more foreigners than theBritish. At the same time, the British Army by itself was no stranger to this issuewithin its own ranks, as it was likewise a polyglot force, with Irish and Scots Gaelicspeakers in abundance, not to mention the large percentage of Huguenots within thearmy in the first half of the century.150 As British recruiting efforts in the Highlandsincreased after the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, several regiments from northernScotland were raised, and it became advisable that their officers be able to ‘speakthe Highland Language’.151 As late as the Napoleonic Wars, Highland Regiments (letalone the now increasingly common Irish formations) were still comprised of menwho only knew their ancestral tongue, with one officer remarking of severalbattalions raised in the spring of 1808, ‘two thirds of them can scare speak a word ofEnglish.’152 Another officer, Alex McDonald, writing home from America in 1776,
148 Calvert, Journals, pp. 69-70.149 Sir William Maynard Gomm, Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm,
G.C.B. Commander in Chief of India, Constable of the Tower of London… From 1799 to Waterloo, 1815.Edited by Francis Culling Carr-Gomm (London: John Murray, 1881), p. 72.150 John Brewer, Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1990) pp. 55-6.151 National Library of Scotland (NLS) Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, 16319, fol. 25. January 6th 1757.152 SNA GD1/736/86 J Cameron to Owen Cameron, 3rd May, 1808.
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inquired from his wife the languages spoken by his two sons: ‘Pray does my Jackspeack any Gaellich[?] I wish he did & Donald likewise; They will both havecommissions soon.’ As for his daughter: ‘alas… English & French will do.’153 Fromthe perspective of this Scotsman, French, the international language of early-modernmilitaries, was not as important for those who had to cope with a language dividewithin their own regiments.
As with the language, distance could prohibit interaction. For the variety ofreasons highlighted above, these allied armies could operate some distance fromone another, but during periods of convergence there still might be restrictionsprevented the comingling of soldiers from the respective armies, as often times thiswould lead to desertion, theft, or quarrels. Already there were few war diarists andmemoirists from earlier in the century, especially those who focused on day-to-dayactivities, and the infrequency with which the soldiers encountered one another hasdiluted our knowledge even further. There will be a significant contrast with therelations with auxiliaries and an even clearer distinction with integrated corps,particularly during the Peninsular War, when British and German troops were livingday-to-day along side one another.Even during battles, distance remained an issue, and numerous authorsattested to not knowing the fate of their allies amidst the smoke and confusion, andremained in ignorance even several days after the events. Therefore, theirestimations of their allies abilities in combat were also built on what they had heardfrom those around them, not always witnessing events for themselves. This wouldpave the way for rumours to be placed where facts could not be discerned. Oftentimes, soldiers participating in battles had little knowledge of what their allies haddone, and relied on either word of mouth or the British press, which often timeswere one and the same.154
153 NLS MS 3945 fols. 56-7. Alex MacDonald to his wife, 1776 .154 Major Davenport was one officer particularly cognisant that his letters might become published,and therefore limited the details of battles in his letters to his brother. Davenport, To Mr. Davenport,pp. 13-14, 71.
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Such were the variety of restrictions that prohibited interactions betweenBritish and German soldiers in these allied armies. Later chapters will detail otherways, or display how these inhibitors changed with time, or within a specificcontext, yet each would remain a problem in all British-German armies. In spite ofsuch restrictions, there were ample meetings and associations between the Britisharmy and their German allied forces, ranging from observations made from militaryparades, battles, campaign marches, and more personal and personable settings,such as formal and informal social gatherings.The first of these forms of interaction, were those indicative of the quotidianactivities of professional soldiers. Given the mundane nature of many of theseactivities, such as foraging, picqueting, or marching, few of these interactionsspurred comments within journals or memoirs.155 Nevertheless, the novelty ofbeing surrounded by foreign soldiery did inspire some commentary. During theopening months of the French Revolutionary Wars, Harry Calvert wrote to his sister,‘It is a very great amusement to me to inspect and examine the manners and dress ofthe different corps we are acting with – the drawings which Captain Cook broughtfrom the South Seas are nothing to some of our friends.’156There were some other professional functions that inspired a greater amountof commentary. Some of the most memorable features of soldiering in these grandcoalitions were the military parades, reviews and other formal celebrations, whereprinces and commanding generals would both observe their own and their allies’forces. Parades were an important part of conveying the ability of a nation’ssoldiers outside of the battlefield, and were where men from other nations couldadmire the training, discipline and appearance of each respective army. It was amatter of professional and national pride, and for many British soldiers, their best
155 For Sergeant Anthony Hamilton and Benjamin Wheatley, their first interactions with Prussians (in1814 and 1815 respectively) were when they had escaped capture from the French. Hamilton wasgreatly appreciative of the local Prussian commander who looked after him, and made sure that hewas well fed and provided with ‘a bottle of the best wine.’ Sergeant Anthony Hamilton, Hamilton’s
Campaign with Moore and Wellington During the Peninsular War (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1998), pp.147-8.; Christopher Hibbert (ed.). The Wheatley Diary: A Journal and Sketch-book kept during the
Peninsular War and the Waterloo Campaign 2nd ed. (Windrush Press: Gloucestershire, 1997), p. 84.156 Calvert, Journals, p. 80.
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opportunity of observing their German allies. The impressions made, and what thesoldiers themselves recorded, were usually geared towards the appearance,discipline and physical features after these events. Whether in grandiose parades, ormore modest activities, British and German allied soldiers would encounter oneanother, and while not the instigator of the form of commentary that socialinteractions would inspire, we do have some indications of the impact on Britishsoldier-authors. Writing from Flanders in 1794, one English officer wrote to hisfamily, ‘I am now so used to do[ing] duty with & see[ing] some of the finest troops inthe world that on my return [to England] how shall I relish your provincials – fourBattalions of Austrians are attached to us, some of them are almost giants’.157Not all encounters with German soldiers were passive observations made inbattles, on the march, or during military parades. When not brigaded together,some Britons made the effort to visit their allies. There was a touristic side to manysoldiers, which lead to forays into allied camps merely to observe the pageantry anduniqueness of these armies, creating yet another instance of interaction. Calvert, sofascinated as he was by the Austrian Army, rode with his friend Hew Dalrymple tothe Austrian camp ‘on purpose to see two regiments of hussars… which arrived twodays ago’.158 The cavalry officer Captain William Tomkinson found himself on asimilar expedition two decades later, when the armies were gathering on the eve ofthe Waterloo campaign:My brother Henry, who had come out from England about a week[ago]… was impatient with the idle life we were leading [in] ourquarters, and was anxious to go and see the country in our front, andvisit some of the towns occupied by the Prussians, for the purpose ofseeing their troops and the towns they occupied159It was common for Britons to visit the camps of their allies, to barter for food orother goods, but such actions, combined with similar trips to see places of interest,reveal the presence of a ‘grand tour’ element within the army, perhaps unsurprisinggiven the aristocratic culture that existed within the officer corps.
157 HRO MS 1M44/110 fol. 100 Wallingford to his mother, St Amand, April 8th, 1794.158 Calvert, Journals, pp. 89-90.159 Tomkinson, Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p. 278
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There were a variety of day-to-day encounters in which these soldiers metand interacted, as well as formal and informal social events. Balls, parties anddinners were especially prevalent for officers, and it was here that this gentlemanlyand aristocratic culture was most prevalent. In every campaign, there were socialevents of note, and in these grand alliances, the attendants could be corporals, orKings. There were frequent events [for] the high-ranking officers of each respectivenation, with the most elaborate being attended only by men with rank higher thancolonel, or lieutenant colonel.160 For the aristocratic-minded officers within theBritish Army, a coalition with the forces of the Habsburg Emperors included theincentive of being involved in a refined society, and would be a point of contrast formany who would later serve with some of the smaller German states within theEmpire. This was attested to by many officers who during years of peace visited themany courts of the Reich for official business, military reviews, or to ingratiatethemselves in the courts of foreign princes – and their admiration for the Austriancourt and army always seemed to match their disappointment and boredom withmany of the lesser states, such as Hessen-Kassel, Brunswick, and even Hanover.161Sir James Murray enjoyed his trip to Berlin, but not so much in other capitals: ‘youhave know idea of the deplorable time I have passed at Brunswick’, he wrote to hisfamily, though he did attend ‘two very brilliant masquerades.’162 Sir JamesCampbell, whose memoir is as much a travel diary as it is a recollection of hisexperiences in the Seven Years War, described this contrast, where the lesser courtsof German princes were ‘dissolute and loose; being for the most part filled withmilitary men, who in times of peace are often driven to gaming and intrigue’. Thesevisits were sharply contrasted with the ‘brilliancy and splendour of the court ofMaria Theresa’ where there were ‘fetes, which were uniformly sumptuous,ceremonious and dull’ – and only boring because he was more interested in
160 MS Add 69382, fol. 74. Lt. Col. Russell to wife, Aschaffen, June 12th, 1743.161 Sir Martin Hunter, The Journal of General Sir Martin Hunter (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 1894),pp. 183-4, 188-9.; George Hanger, Life Adventures and Opinions of Col. George Hanger (London: 1801),pp. 28-34.162 Robson, Eric (ed.). Letters From America, 1773 to 1780 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,1951), p. 9.
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discussing military matters than eating.163 While such parties were the purview ofthe most high-ranking officers, lower ranking officers and common soldiers couldfind themselves in social events of a multinational nature as well, but usuallyconfined to towns near to their encampments.164During campaigns, social functions with Austrian commanders may have beenfor a large part a matter of formality. While some British officers took theopportunity to visit old friends, or even a number of Britons, including Jacobitesserving within the Habsburg forces, for the most part there were few ties betweenthe officer classes. High profile dinners were often mere formalities, and not anindication of friendship (or even cordiality) among officer corps.165 In 1744,Marshal Wade’s aide-de-camp, Joseph York, wrote in his diary his relief that hewould not be accompanying ‘the Marl’ to a dinner with allied commanders: ‘what afine mess o[f] politicks he’ll have. For my own part [I will] dine with my old mess incamp.’166 Indeed, most of the accounts we have of meetings between Britons andAustrians in the 1740’s or 1790’s usually refer to meetings of the more formal kind,where there would be discussions, or ‘warm disputes’, over policy and strategy.167There were some indications that Britons and Irish officers would seek outcompatriots within their allied armies, but it appears that most, like Joseph Yorke,preferred the company of fellow Britons.168While social interactions may have been more formality than friendliness,similarly, conflicts were not necessarily owing to any deep-seated aversion to theirGerman allies. One of the key features of these grand alliances is that the most high
163 James Campbell, Memoirs of Sir James Campbell of Arkinglas 2 vols. (London: Colburn and Bentley,1832), pp. 156-7.164 BL Chequers Papers, MS Add 69382 fols. 10-2.165 It should be noted the one exception to this being the Scots-Brigade in the Dutch Army, yet,through the course of the century it became progressively less ‘Scots’. For the diary of one Scotsmanin the Austrian service, see: NAS Papers of the Hope family of Craighall GD377/265.; GD377/267.166 BL Hardwicke Papers Add MS 36250 Diary of Joseph Yorke, fol. 5.167 Ibid, fol. 9.168 Not all British officers refrained from associating with foreign officers, such as Peter Drake who asan Irishman, and a former French officer, found himself isolated from his colleagues in the BritishArmy: ‘It was always my ambition to keep company with my betters, but my station prevented mydoing this with the officers of the army, so I sought out company among foreigners.’ His situationwas interesting in that, though a subject, he was often described, and somewhat felt, like a foreignerwithin the army, especially at a time where Englishness was so emphasized, as was the case in thefirst decade of the eighteenth century. Burrell, Amiable Renegade, p. 215.
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profile episodes of violence between British and German soldiers emerged not fromeveryday quarrels, but friendly fire and mistaken identities on the battlefield orduring campaign. Similarities in appearance, especially in uniforms, and theconfusion ubiquitous in warfare of this nature, often led to unintentional infightingbetween these confederates. Equally common was the mistaking of enemies forfriends. In some ways, this was a problem especially prevalent in the large alliedarmies in Germany and the Low Countries.169 The instances are innumerable, but anotable passage can be found in the writings of Cavalie Mercer at the Battle ofWaterloo, which is off-putting in its light hearted approach to one such debacle.Mercer, who seemingly relished in satirizing German accents, recalled in his memoirthe moment a Prussian battery having just entered the battlefield, amidst all theconfusion, began to fire at his men. The British fired back:We had scarcely fired many rounds… when a tall man in a blackBrunswick uniform came galloping up to me from the rear, exclaiming,“Ah! Mine Gott! – mine Gott!; wil you no stop, sare? … De Inglish kills derefriends de Proosiens!...” and so he went on raving like one demented. Iobserved that if these were our friends the Prussians, they were treatingus very uncivilly…Interestingly, Mercer apparently showed no hard feelings for the numerous deathsinflicted upon his battery, spending much of that evening amongst these samePrussians, and remarkably, throughout his memoirs held them in far greater respectthan his other allies among the Flemish and Dutch forces – a common sentimentthroughout the army.170 In the end, such instances did little to lessen the opinions oftheir fellow coalition members, allowing Mercer to recall the event with surprisinglevity, rather than bitterness.Outside the confines of the battlefield, there were other instances of conflictand infighting between British and German soldiers, although given thecomparatively few first-hand accounts of theses quarrels, it is difficult to discern anytrends in this respect. Subsequent chapters will extrapolate on some of causes forinfighting between British and German soldiery, but the overall theme is that such
169 Hibbert, The Wheatley Diary, p. 84.; BL Chequers Papers Add MS 69383 fol. 129 Russell to wife,July 17th 1743.170 Mercer, Journal, pp. 179-80.
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occurrences were not of vast difference to fights within the British or Germanarmies, and reveal no deep-seated antipathy. There were orders given bycommanding officers to prohibit quarrels, yet fights and duels elude most of thesources for these armies, and furthermore there remained no singular event thatstood out as remarkably different to the type of infighting that went on within anygiven army. In fact, with all the hostility and finger pointing during the campaigns of1743-4, the most notable conflict seems to have been a ‘national’ quarrel within theBritish Army, between the English and Irish.171One of the main instigators of any conflict between British and Germansoldiers was periods of dearth and hardship, when soldiers lacking food or foragewould steal from fellow soldiers. The first months of 1743 and the latter of 1744were prime examples, but so was the inaugural campaign of the ‘First Coalition’ fiftyyears later, when lack of supplies and rampant illness put strains on the alliedforces. Mistrust was a common theme, especially for the British soldiers who werestruck by the poor discipline of their Austrian allies and Hanoverian and Hessianauxiliaries. As one British officer confided: ‘My good mother imagination cannotpaint to you how badly we poor English are off, as to procuring any one thing wewish for among Austrians, Hessians &e – who w[oul]d steal the fresh water & blackbread from us’.172 This passage was written at a time of considerable hardship, butthere were others who attested to a disdainful attitude of the Austrians throughout
171 This was a quarrel mentioned in several accounts, and was a fight between the British in the‘Blues’ (The Royal Horse Guards) and the Irish cavalrymen of the 7th, known here as ‘Ligonier’s’.According to George Sackville, who was raised in Ireland: ’The Blues have shown their desire offighting this campaign [having failed to attack at Dettingen] by picking a quarrel with Ligonier’sregiment. It began with boxing but ended in drawing their broadswords, and four or five of the blueswere so hurt that I am afraid they will be able to give no further marks of their courage this year.Unlucky for them the quarrel was national, and they engaged too far before they reflected that theirregiment had been lately completed by draughts from Nevil’s, who to a man prefer’d the honour oftheir native country [Ireland] to that of a regiment they have so newly been incorporated into, thatthey all turn’d on Ligonier’s side, and used the Blues in such a manner as will teach them for thefuture not to put themselves in competition with their superiors. It is really very lucky it ended in thedisabling of only four of five men… The truth I believe is that the Blues reflected a little too severelyon our country, and that Ligonier’s had not temper to bear it and so return’d blows instead of words.’Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, 2 vols.(London: HM Stationery Office, 1904), p. 289.172 Hampshire Record Office 1M44/110 fol. 37a, Lord Wallingford to his mother, Dunkirk, Aug 20th,1793.
81
these campaigns, and tensions certainly mounted in periods when one army hadceased fighting due to diplomatic reasons, and the other remained at war.173 Indeedany period of inaction caused by disagreements between the commanding officers,was usually marked with increasing friction between the ranks. Once again, thecampaign against Revolutionary France in 1793-4 was an archetype for suchresentments, where the struggles between British, Austrian, Hanoverian andHessians commanders became the poster-child for such dysfunction. Writing to hisfather, George III, the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief of British forces,complained of the ’very shamefull and insolent manner which the Austrians behaveto all he troops of whatever nation that are in Your Majesty’s pay, which has soexasperated them that it is very much to be wished that we might form a separatearmy without being in the least mixed with the Austrians.’ He added further,I have done everything in my power to smooth and to keep everythingquiet, but really the behaviour of the Austrians is such that it is my duty torepresent it. They despise everything which is not their own, they arecontinually throwing every blame upon Your Majesty’s Troops andaccusing them of slackness when God knows they are infinitely braverthan they are, and at the same time wantonly exposing them upon everyoccasion. Wherever I am they do not dare to do it, but I have received thestrongest complaints on that account from the British, the Hanoveriansand the Darmstadters…174The Duke certainly had his own axe to grind with the Austrians, whose leaders hadmarginalized his own command, yet his sentiments were echoed by others and werenoticeable even to their enemies.175 Interestingly, the complaints of the Austrianscame from both British and German auxiliary forces, and this divide would be acommon theme, as it was in the inaugural year of the War of Austrian Succession,fifty years earlier. At times, relations between the British and Austrians were closerthan with other member-states of the Holy Roman Empire. Such variances revealthe complexity and difficulty in trying to make German or Germany a monolithic
173 Violence nearly broke out in 1714 with the British departing; 1762, when Again Britain madepeace without Prussia; and more drawn out resentments can be seen when Austria withdrew from,essentially ceding it to France in 1794-5. See, respectively: Fortescue, History , vol. I, p. 552.; JamesCampbell, Memoirs, pp. 152-3.; Calvert, Journals, pp. 246-371.174 Quoted in Burne, The Noble Duke of York, p. 153175 Ibid, pp. 149-53
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term, as there were certainly innumerable divisions within the Empire, both instates and in identities. Just as the British Army was an often inharmonious entity,so too were the collective German armies with which these Britons were so oftensurrounded.Taken collectively, the relations between British forces and their Germanallies were the most distant and dispassionate of all the forms of British-Germanmilitary collaboration. While unified by a shared cause and common struggles,there was little in their interactions that suggested any fondness outside ofprofessional solidarities. In later chapters, this picture will change, as British andGerman soldiers operating in closer proximity were more united in their cause, andnot separated by great distance or by divisions among their commanders. Yet withthis increased closeness, a greater sense of the points of friction between soldierswill also emerge. This closer proximity would also be evident in the writings of thesoldiers themselves, for the increased frequency of encounters between soldiersattributed led to clearer and more concise descriptions of their allied soldiers. Thepicture we have of Britain’s Germanic allies, as we shall see, does not differ muchfrom those disseminated in popular discourse.
**Perceptions**
This thesis began with several excerpts from the private letters of Lord Wallingford,writing about his interactions with Flemish civilians and German soldiers. Indeed,Wallingford described several meetings with Austrian soldiery, all the while makingcomparisons to his own men in the Coldstream Guards, and British forces in general.Whereas soldier-authors in the first three quarters of the eighteenth century mostlydealt with military matters and in recounting events as they saw them, more andmore of these men turned to evaluations of their fellow allied soldiers, and theirown men as well. By the close of the eighteenth century, the confluence of a greateremphasis on professionalism and a stronger sense of nationalism within these
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armies, would spark an increase in descriptions of fellow soldiers abilities, and anevaluation of attributes and behaviours indicative of ‘English’, ‘French’ or ‘German’soldiery, or their methods of warfare. These evaluations would not always be clear-cut, especially when dealing with Britain’s German allies, where perceptions moreoften reflected the state, and not the men composing their armies.While ‘German’ is an adjective used throughout this thesis to echo thewritings of the soldiers themselves, this was not always the case with Austria andPrussia, which were clearly defined and divided in the minds of British writersbeginning in the 1740’s, if not earlier. Indeed some military treatises of the erajuxtaposed the two, much in the same way that the British were contrasted with theFrench or German models of warfare. In an unpublished tract by John Burgoyne, arapidly rising star in the British Army before his infamous defeat at Saratoga in1777, he declared that ‘The Emperor’s army shows all the natural advantages thePrussians want’, in terms of wealth, manpower, and most importantly for Burgoyne,‘liberality’ and ‘national spirit’.176 These latter two elements were the foundationsfor most criticisms of the Prussians, an ethnically heterogeneous force, especiallyamong those who believed that armies were best when they reflected the nationalcharacter of their nation. Comparisons and recollections of each army wereimpacted further in that these two rivalling states each had their respectiveadmirers within the British military. Past experiences or predispositions, such asthose for political, religious, or personal reasons, meant that certain Britons wouldbe biased or inclined towards one or the other. George Henry Lennox, in writing tohis friend the Earl of Dunmore during the Seven Years War, revealed that hisassociate’s opinions did not necessarily match the political situation in Europe: ‘Imust congratulate you upon the secret joy I am sure you felt at receiving the news ofthe advantage gained by The Austrians’ he wrote, ‘but I shall say no more on thatsubject as you know we differ generally when we talk of Prussians & Austrians.’177Those British military men who had the luxury of appearing at both courts tended tofavour their time at one more than the other – and in doing so revealed the rivalling
176 Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes… of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, pp. 65, 69.177 NAS Rh4/195/3 fol. 5 George Henry Lennox to Dunmore, Hameln, July 20th, 1757.
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solidarities between soldiers and aristocrats. Most, however, viewed these forcesthrough the filter of the military profession to which they all belonged. In the earlyspring of 1793, Major Harry Calvert, although trying to give an unbiased analysis tohis friends and family, still nevertheless took sides in the matter.The conduct of the Austrians deserves every encomium, and affords astriking contrast to that of the Prussians. Is it not wonderful that amonarch, who derives his power and consequence solely from thereputation of his arms (for without a superiority of military characterthe kingdom of Prussia instantly degenerates into the marquisate ofBrandenburgh), can permit his great and natural rival so far to outstriphim in the career of military fame?178Indeed, Calvert would repeatedly contrast one with the other, and whereas the‘Austrian allies’ were ‘the finest infantry in Europe’ and ‘the very best troops’ he hadever seen, his comments regarding the Prussians were largely absent of praise.179Without contrasting one state with another, there were certainly favouritesamong British officers. In 1807, one group of Welsh and English officers were‘deservedly in the dumps’ and inconsolable after the news of Prussia’s defeat at Jena,despite Prussia’s unpopularity due to their recent occupation of Hanover.180Nevertheless, while the Austrians may have been more popular in the hearts ofBritish military men, rare were discussions of Austrian military treatises, whereasstudies of Frederick the Great were ubiquitous among British officers a quartercentury after his death.181 Indeed, the victories of the Frederick II inspired manyBritish military men, though few Britons would serve under his command, oralongside his armies. Indeed, rare are the discussions of Prussians emerging frominteractions with the British Army, unlike with the Habsburg forces, though heretoo, appraisals of Austrians are not as plentiful as we could wish.For a deeper insight into perceptions of these German allies, recountingdescriptions of the Dutch forces may be of some use. In many ways, the relations
178 Calvert, Journals, p. 39.179 Ibid, 83, 88, 142.180 Gareth Glover, (ed.). From Corunna to Waterloo: the Letters and Journals of Two Napoleonic
Hussars (London: Greenhill, 2007), p. 38.181 As late as 1812, one English cavalry officer, Charles Cocks, wrote to his Nephew that thecampaigns of Frederick the Great should be the cornerstone of his military education. Page,
Intelligence Officer, p. 154.
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with the army of the United Provinces can act as a means of contrasting perceptionsof troops from German states. The Dutch were active participants in the majority ofBritain’s struggles with France between 1689 and 1815, especially in the first half ofthis period, up until the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, when Holland began toadhere to a policy favouring neutrality. In the wars against Louis XIV, the Britishand Dutch were cosponsors of numerous German auxiliary forces, and their sharedcause and common Protestantism should have put them in good standing with theirBritish confederates. Yet, the relations between British and Dutch forces were farpoorer in contrast to those with Austria, Prussia, or any of the German states withinthese coalitions. Certainly, much of the earlier disdain and poor opinions of Dutcharmies extended from the wars of the late seventeenth century, and later, the rolethat William III’s Dutch forces played in marginalizing English soldiers andcommanders, yet these sentiments were consistent throughout the eighteenthcentury.182In the minds of many soldiers, be it in the War of Austrian Succession, or theWaterloo campaign, the Dutch were a by-word for poor soldiering anduntrustworthiness. Discussing the campaign in 1745, the ‘Prime Minister’ HenryPelham complained that the British were ‘ill supported’ by their Dutch allies, andrecounted reports from the Army in Flanders that, ‘all agree in the general goodbehaviour of the English, and the shamefull [sic] one of the Dutch’.183 ‘Our goodfriends the Dutch have again behaved with their usual cowardice’ complained theDuke of York in 1793, to which his aide-de-camp Major Calvert concurred: ‘I think ithigh time the Meinheers should return to their bogs’ – a statement that would havemade the London pamphleteers proud. ‘From such friends and allies’, Calvertcontinued, ‘may the Lord deliver us’, adding by way of contrast to his belovedAustrians, that only a handful of their battalions and Hussar squadrons could ‘drivethem out of the country.’184 A dozen years later, once again in Flanders, one Scottishofficer described the Dutchmen serving within British regiments as ‘cowardly
182 John Childs, The Army of William III, pp. 43, 64, 73-4, 95, 115-6,183 NAS Rh4/195/2 fol. 10 Henry Pelham to Earl of Dunmore, [June] 9th, 1745.184 Calvert, Journals, p. 80.
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rascals who boast a lot’, revealing that opinions of Holland’s military men duringthis period did not end on a high note.185 In fact, in 1815 their recently reformedarmy was an object of near universal disdain among Peninsular War veteransduring the final campaign against Napoleon. Remarking upon their character afterhaving witnessed Dutch soldiers (‘barbarians’) burn down a Catholic Church, CavalieMercer concluded: ‘Our allies are by no means an amiable set, nor very cordial withus… They are a brutal set. The Dutch appear the best. They are all uncommonlyinsolent to us.’186That British-Dutch relations were poor in the early nineteenth centuryshould come to no surprise, given the recurrent wars and conflicts that hadtranspired since Britain’s declaration of war on the United Provinces in 1780, andthe intervening hostilities in the following quarter-century. But the tone of thisrelationship was a constant for the majority of this 125-year period. The onlyvariable was the causes of such resentment: at the end of the seventeenth century,British hostility was owed primarily to the preferment enjoyed under William IIIowing to their superiority in professional ability. Therefore, although the reasonsfor such animus had changed, the sentiment remained the same. This was not thecase for the evolving perceptions of Prussia and Austria, and quite different from themore constant, and generally more favourable estimations of allies and auxiliariesfrom the lesser German states.The almost universally negative descriptions of the Dutch, and the accountsof relations with Dutch soldiers, provide a useful contrast and a means of comparingBritons’ relationships with Austrian and Prussian armies. While relations withAustrian or Prussian forces may not have always been very good, the Dutch seemedto be perennially the most dejected of Britain’s coalition partners, save perhaps forthe Hanoverians who for the year of 1743 took sole claim of this distinction.Furthermore, by virtue of their being so few accusations of cowardice ortreacherous behaviour regarding German forces, we can infer that these German
185 C.T. Atkinson, 'Gleanings from the Cathcart MSS: Part 4: the Netherlands, 1794-1795 JSAHR Vol.XXIX, No. 120, (Winter 1951), p. 22.186 Mercer, Journal, pp. 242-3
87
allies, even though they might have similar ethnic compositions as some Dutchcontingents, were viewed far better than those men fighting on behalf of the UnitedProvinces.Contrasts with Dutch forces also provide another piece of insight into thecommentaries of Britons, in that the Austrian and Prussian armies were both, likethe Dutch, heterogeneous collections of various nationalities. Though the Dutcharmy contained a significant number of German soldiers, within their ranks and asauxiliaries, throughout the century they were always referred to as ‘the Dutch’. Thiswas not always the case for the Austrians and Prussians. The diversity in theHabsburg forces challenged those who wished to place the ‘Austrian’ into one catch-all generalization, although they were united by a ‘national spirit’, or so it wasclaimed.187 ‘The Austrian army comprises a great variety of troops’, ran onePeninsular War veteran’s first impressions during the occupation of Paris in 1815,all of them ‘differing in personal appearance, uniform, language, and character.’Rather than discussing the troops (usually the target for sweeping generalization)he instead looked to their officers, who he claimed were all ‘theorists’ of outdatedtactics, who were quick to flee in battle.188 As for the soldiers, the artillerymanCavalie Mercer mustered a more coherent, if somewhat negative, description: ‘theyare a heavy people altogether, these Austrians’, he said, finding their uniformsoutdated and ‘not a little ridiculous.’ While previously describing them as ‘tall,heavy built, boorish-looking fellows,’ his remarks on their behaviour were far morefavourable: a ‘good, quiet people’ and ‘good-natured and orderly.’189 Sir MartinHunter also focused on height, stating of the Emperor’s Guard that they were ‘fine,soldier-like-looking fellows’, whom to him appeared ‘as if they had been all cast inthe same mould – so uniform, all of so equal height, and so like one another in the[ir]countenance.’190 Six years earlier, Harry Calvert, one of the Imperial Army’s ‘most
187 Many of the ‘Austrians’ that Britain fought with were in fact Flemings, especially in the War ofAustrian Succession, Reed Browning, The War of Austrian Succession (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1993), p. 101.; Fonblanque, John Burgoyne, p. 69.188 Harry Ross-Lewin. With ‘The Thirty Second’ In the Peninsular and other Campaigns edited by JohnWardell (London: Sompkin, Marshall & Co, 1904), p. 314.189 Mercer, Journal, p. 327.190 Hunter, Journal of General Sir Martin Hunter, p. 189.
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enthusiastic admirers’, wrote of his impressions of a more varied collection ofHabsburg troops: ‘Their dress is fully extraordinary, and their countenances, bycontinued exposure to the elements, have the true Indian dye; but they are thebravest, hardiest soldiers I ever saw.’191 Ultimately, descriptions of Austrians wereless frequent compared with other armies in the latter half of the eighteenthcentury, given that only one of the coalitions against Revolutionary and NapoleonicFrance featured an army composing British and Austrian troops side-by-side. Thisallowed for few opportunities to posit depictions of national character from first-hand experience.The few British descriptions of Austrian soldiers (aside from comments ontheir performance in battle) geared towards their height and stature, whichcompared favourably with their other allies, and especially the British. There werefew divisions in views of Austrian and Prussian appearance apart from theiruniforms and the most negative remarks on this topic seemed to be reserved for theHungarian and Croatian irregulars and light cavalry in the Austrian service. OneHanoverian officer of the First Coalition recalled that the wild-looking HungarianRegiment Sztaray, ‘made a striking contrast to the elegance of the English guards’,the latter feeling much the same way.192 One British officer remarked that the facesof the men within these foreign units were ‘at once unnatural and pitiless.’193 Evenwhen opinions of the rank & file Austrian soldiers were less than favourable toBritish commentators, the presence of these irregular soldiers from the fringes ofthe Habsburg dominions made a point of contrast, in appearance and in action, thatultimately favoured the soldiers from within the Reich. Describing the actions ofthese Hungarians and Croatians, one officer in the 1740’s wrote: ‘they are a terriblepeople that never give or take quarter, neither they nor the hussars have any pay,but are always on free quarters everywhere, which they take care to make good,sometimes with great cruelty’.194 As discussed in the preceding chapter, the role ofmilitary professionalism was a large factor in these negative impressions, as their
191 Calvert, Journals, p. 80.192 Ompteda, Memoirs of Ompteda, p. 53.193 Moyle Sherer, Recollections of the Peninsula (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1996), p. 103.194 Davenport, To Mr. Davenport, p. 40.
89
irregular appearance, fighting style, and mannerisms, created a contrast not toodissimilar to interpretations of other soldiers fighting in a style clearly differentfrom the prevailing norms of Western Europe, and exemplified in forces such asCossacks, Turkish warriors, Native Americans, and even American colonists.Therefore, the Austrians are something of a problem when trying to fit them into adiscussion of perceptions of Germans, in part due to the shifting definition of‘German’ away from its Imperial-Austrian origins in the accounts of Britons in heearly eighteenth-century, and secondly, due to the sheer diversity within theHabsburg forces, which would remain a theme through to the First World War. Yetthis diversity in itself was a point of contrast for the British Army, whose uniformred coats would have been a contrast in itself to the variegated forces of theHabsburgs.Much was the same for views of the Prussian armies, but there were someareas of contrast. Firstly, the perception of Prussia’s forces fluctuated significantlythrough the mid-eighteenth to early-nineteenth centuries. From unremarkableorigins, the image of Prussia’s military became inextricably linked with the celebrityof Frederick II, who ruled Prussia between 1740 and 1786. The repeated successesof the armies of Frederick ‘the Great’, would lead to a perception of Prussian soldiersas being highly disciplined and effective in battle – and so they were. The methodsin which they were trained and disciplined became worthy of emulation and thetactics of the Prussians were of special interest to Britons, particularly afterFrederick’s overwhelming victory at Rossbach in 1757, given that he had a achieveda complete route of the French Army, a feat which eluded British commanders sinceMarlborough’s victory at Blenheim fifty-three years earlier. It was obvious then,that he should be a popular figure in the minds of British officers, such as GeorgeHanger, who diligently studied the works of ‘the great Frederick; while adoring hisimmortal fame’.195 For the next half-century, there would be a conflict within theBritish Army about the adoption of this Prussian way of dress, enforcing discipline,and conducting wars. Those who respected this ‘German’ means of warfare would
195 Hanger, Life Adventures and Opinions, p. 29.
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look most favourably on the armies of other German states who modelledthemselves on the Prussian army, as seen in the praise for the highly disciplinedforces of Hessen-Kassel, Brunswick and Ansbach, who often served with Britain,when the Prussians did not. Many aspiring military men wished to further theircareer and their knowledge of the profession by serving in the Prussian Army,something only few managed to do, with the exiled James Keith being the mostfamous. James Campbell wrote of a fellow British officer, who upon the cessation ofhostilities between Britain and France in 1762 immediately joined the PrussianArmy currently occupying a nearby city.196 Yet this enthusiasm for all thingsPrussian slowly faded and towards the end of the eighteenth century there was afeeling that the Prussian Army was, as indeed it was proved to be, an antiquatedforce, with the only legacies of the days of Frederick II being its outdatedmanoeuvres and drill, and excessively harsh discipline.197 Calvert, in 1793,contrasted the Prussians with the rapidly improving Austrian army, and claimedthat ‘the Prussians have a great deal of lee-way to make up, to regain the militarycharacter they established under [Frederick the Great]’, who had died some 7 yearsbefore.198 The opinions of the Prussian soldiers were steadily poorer, thanks in partto their defeat at the hands of Napoleon, and later during the Waterloo campaignthey remained both respected for their appearance and abilities in battle, but weremore and more the embodiment of the crueller aspects of German soldiery.199The cosmopolitan nature of the Prussian Army – with a composition that wasnearly half foreign until the 1770’s – earned some derogatory comments fromBritish military men, in the same manner as for the Austrians. Indeed, while fewBritish soldiers would interact with the Prussians throughout the century, theirinfluence made them a frequent topic in many manuals, drill-books, and military
196 Campbell, Memoirs, pp. 151-2.197 Even by the 1780’s, there were still fans of the Prussian Army, including George III’s sonFrederick, who idolized his name-sake, and after watching a review of the Prussian Army,proclaimed, that the Prussian cavalry was the ‘infinitely superior to anything I ever saw’. Burne, The
Noble Duke of York, p. 25.198 Calvert, Journals, p. 88.199 ‘The Prussian Soldiers, owing to rigid discipline and a too frequent use of the cane, are meremachines; but they are fine men, and look well on parade’. Ross-Lewin, With ‘The Thirty Second’, p.313.
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histories. John Burgoyne derided the Prussian Army as a collection of ‘strangers,deserters, prisoners and enemies of various countries, languages and religions’ whocould not ‘be actuated by any of the great moving principles which usually causeextraordinary superiority in armies,’ and most damningly, lacking a ‘national spirit’,which was believed to be the source of his own countries excellence in warfare.200Indeed, those who celebrated national character feared the Prussian system thatsought to eradicate these singularities in order to achieve uniformity in an army thatwas intrinsically multinational.In the end, the infrequency of interactions led to a perpetuation ofstereotypes, and in the few encounters with the Prussian armies their appearancesand actions and only reinforced them. During the Seven Years War, only thePrussian cavalry, primarily Hussars, were serving with ‘His Britannic Majesty’sArmy in Germany’, and these men, living and operating in a manner similar to theHungarian cavalry which the British were so disdainful of, could do little to alter anyopinions from the characterizations built up in the public sphere. One officer uponfirst observing these hard-living Prussian cavalrymen, described them as, ‘a nastylooking set of rascals, the picture you have in the shops in London is very like themthough it does not represent their rags and dirt… They drink more brandy thanwater and eat I believe more tobacco than bread’.201While only encountering one another for brief periods while on campaign,descriptions made of Prussians were often from officers witnessing formal reviewsand parades of Prussian soldiery, where they would awe spectators with
200 Quoted in Silvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of a Military Life in the
Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas, 1981), p. 111.201 These observations were made after the hussars had long been in the field, compared to therecently arrived British observer. This phenomenon was common, and effected Moyle Sherer, aBritish officer, when during the Peninsular War he first encountered the highly reputable Britishcavalry, who had been campaigning for several years: ‘As we passed out of town we saw severalofficers, men and horses of the heavy brigade of British cavalry… [who] looked sickly. Both officersand privates were very ill dressed, and their brown and shapeless hats had a most unmilitaryappearance. Whoever had seen these regiments in England; in pale, sallow-looking men, andskeleton horses, would hardly have recognized the third Dragoon Guards and fourth Dragoons, twocorps enjoying, deservedly, a well-earned name. Thus, oftentimes, on actual service, vanishes all thatbrilliancy which has won the heart and fixed the choice of so many a youth, and which appeared sogay and attractive on crowded esplanades at home.’ Mackesy The Coward of Minden, p. 28.; Sherer,
Recollections, p. 70.
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manoeuvres and movements. In such formal settings, where these men wereobserved at a distance, most remarks were discussing their uniforms. In the 1760’sBurgoyne scorned the ‘many absurdities’ in the ‘dress and outward appearance ofPrussian troops’, where they had adopted ‘fopperies as essentials’.202 Yet suchopinions were shed as quickly as the ornate coats and hats so loathed by those whofound them grandiloquent accessories. By the time of the Waterloo campaign,Cavalie Mercer was greatly impressed by a squadron of Prussian lancers: ‘whosesimple and serviceable costume pleased me much… [having] not a particle ofornament, nor superfluous article about their appointments. I think they are themost soldier-like fellows I have ever seen.’203 It is regrettable that the fewcomments we have of Prussian soldiery deal mostly with the superficial –particularly as outward appearances were so susceptible to change.
Apart from discussions of the appearance and mannerisms of the Austriansand Prussians, the commentaries from British sources deal primarily with theassessments of their abilities as soldiers. In making these appraisals, thesediscussions were particularly focused on their competence in a variety of tasksusually associated with an iconic conception of good soldiering. In later chapters,we will examine many of the ways in which divisions between British soldiers andtheir German counterparts would help define a national or martial character ofthese groups. With each conflict or setting, there were particular issues that came tothe fore, and those indicative of Anglo-German coalitions will be addressed here.Billeting and treatment of civilians was one such area of contrast particularlycommon when British soldier-authors turned to discussions of their German allies.British forces, starting from the mid-century, made great efforts to try and pay fortheir supplies from locals and were less heavy-handed in demanding provisions andbillets from the local populations.204 Lieutenant Thomas Powell, having failed to
202 Fonblanque, Burgoyne, p. 64.203 Mercer, Journal, p. 231.204 As a less professional army at the end of the seventeenth century, even English towns would havepreferred to be billeted by foreign, rather than native, soldiers. Childs, British Army of William III, p.95.
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purchase supplies from a local French civilian in 1793, recounted the distinctdifference in the approach of his allies: ‘The Austrians came after us and were notquite so civil, they took away everything the man had’, then burnt down his house,where Powell later found the man’s remains.205 Though the British were nostrangers to the cruelties of war, such gratuitous violence revealed a stark differencewith their own forces, or at least how they imagined them. The result of thesedifferences, particularly towards the turn of the nineteenth century, was that thereemerged distinct means of conducting wars, not so much in tactics or strategies, butin the procurement of supplies and relations with civilian populations, and where adistinctly ‘English’ manner was to be delineated between French and Germanapproaches, which included, in part, harsh impositions on local citizenry:Hessians & Austrians always seize [a] Private Property as their own[where]as the English request, & study their Manners [whereby] we areby far more acceptable [to the local citizenry] – We in England should notlike to have an officer either with your leave, or by your leave, come intoour House & blunder up stairs206This focus on winning hearts and minds manifested itself at the conclusion of theSiege of Valenciennes several days later, when the French wished to offer theirsurrender to the British, who remained in the good graces of the local citizens whilethe Austrians were unanimously loathed.207 It is quite telling that even after acentury of war, the attitudes of the French towards the British were palpably betterthan their estimations of the Habsburg armies. The admirable conduct of the Britishwas no doubt responsible, although after the fall of Paris cavalryman Tomkinsonjested, ‘nothing enrages the French more than the good conduct of our army,thereby removing all plea for abuse from them of us.’208Perhaps the most prominent of the professional differences noticed byBritish commentators was in the role of plundering and marauding, something allarmies did, but are particularly prevalent in the writings of British soldiers andofficers, and where they drew the clearest divides between foreign forces and their
205 NAM 7607-45 Diary of Lieutenant Thomas Powell, 14th Regiment of Foot 1793-1795, fol. 10.206 HRO 1M44/110 fol. 15 Lord Wallingford to his mother, Camp near Valenciennes, May 18th, 1793207 Ompteda, Hanoverian-Englische Officer, p. 65.208 Tomkinson, Diary, p. 326.
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own men.209 As Corporal Brown wrote in his journal: ‘The Foreign troops plunderedwherever they came, without hindrance, and generally destroyed what they couldnot take away: but the British were always forbidden to plunder.’210 Marauding wasa common theme for all armies, but the seemingly systematic manner in which theseactions were carried out created a rift between the armies.Every house was plundered in the most unfeeling manner, by theAustrians and others of the foreign troops; whose hardened hearts,neither the entreaties of old age, the tears of beauty, the cries ofchildren, nor all the moving scenes of the most accumulated distress,can touch with pity; nor do they content themselves with takingwhatever may be useful to them, but destroy whatever they cannotcarry away.211These same commentaries were encountered again during the Waterloocampaign of 1815, where there were only short periods in which British andPrussian forces acted in concert, and rarely met between the evening after the greatbattle, and the capturing of Paris, nearly three weeks later. The famous meeting andhandshake between Wellington and Blücher at La Belle Alliance, figurativelyrepeated through the ranks that evening, was the closest these armies would be forthe majority of the campaign.212 Instead, the British followed in the wake of theadvancing Prussian Army, following in the swathe of destruction they left in theirpunitive march to the French capital.213 And in this duration, the witnessing ofdepravities, which the British Army was so intent on preventing by their own men,
209 This was not a major point of difference in the mid-century wars in Europe, where all sides wereculpable. From the comments of Joseph Yorke: ‘the country [is] pillaged [with] no possibility ofrestraining our Army, every body [has] taken notice of it, & complains that our army must starve &yet nobody begins to execute & make examples, [although] strict orders [were] given out.’ BL Add MSHardwicke Papers, 36250 Diary of Joseph Yorke, 1744-5, fols. 40-1.210 Robert Brown, Corporal Brown’s Campaigns, p. 34.211 Ibid, p. 37.212 Tomkinson, Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p. 315.213 ‘We had got on the route of the Prussian army, which was everywhere marked by havoc anddesolation.’ At Loures, ‘A corps of Prussians halted there last night, and, excepting the walls of thehouses, have utterly destroyed it.’ Mercer, Journal, pp. 231-2. Sir Alexander Gordon, At Wellington’s
Right Hand, The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon 1808-1815 Edited by Rory Muir(Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2003), pp. 401-2.
95
reinforced a sense of professional, and national, difference.214 As one officer recalledof this journey: ‘for the last three days we have followed the route of the Prussians;they plunder every village.’215 With so few other means of contact, this was themain impression left in the minds of many British soldiers. Whereas plundering andexacting Kontribution were part of the soldiering profession in the seventeenthcentury, it was a practice that was frowned upon in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, yet British commentators felt that they were a part of the only armymaking a concerted effort to curtail such offenses.216Despite this contribution to the popular association with plundering, it was,within these coalitions, an equally strong condemnation of their discipline and theirallies’ effectiveness as soldiers, to be taken in consideration with other factors, suchas drill, appearance, and ability in combat. Yet there remained some nationalisticunderpinnings to criticisms of German plundering, as such actions were oftenoverlooked or downplayed by Britons when they themselves were culpable. Thiswas a feature of warfare that all sides participated in, even if one group or anotherfound it particularly egregious, and many saw it as a sad necessity of war. During aspring of scarcities in 1793, Wallingford wrote home that ‘we are almost strangersto meat, except we plunder’, and though he helped rescue a local family from ‘thefury of the Austrians’, he reflected on the many crimes committed, by both Britishand Austrian soldiers. During the opening stages of the Siege of Valenciennes, 1793,he wrote, ‘shocking scenes I have been witness [to] since coming here. But when theAustrian trumpet sounds, & our English Grenadiers march beats, I forget all & am asoldier.’217Treatment of non-combatants was one area of difference spotted by Britons,but the support for fellow soldiers was yet another. During this same siege, Lt.
214 This distinction was even apparent in marching music, where the British were the only ones torefrain from playing tunes, such as ‘The Downfall of Paris’ that would not further agitate theirdefeated opponents. Tomkinson, Diary, p. 326.215 Tomkinson, Diary, p. 322.216 Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce: A Study in European Economic
and Social History 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Fanz Steiner Verlag, 1965), vol. II. pp. 60-1.; See also, FritzRedlich, ‘Contributions in the Thirty Years War’, Economic History Review XII (1959-60), pp. 247-254.217 HRE 1M44/110 fol. 15 Lord Wallingford to his mother, Camp near Valenciennes, May 18th, 1793
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Thomas Powell, was particularly disturbed by the lack of care for woundedAustrians.The Austrians are the worst people in the world for assisting each otherwhen badly wounded and it is a rule in the Austrian Service, that if a manis so badly wounded as there is no likely hood of his being able to serveany more, the Surgeons never give him any assistance but leave him todie.218The lack of empathy for wounded soldiers was, according to Powell, due to the costsof supporting invalids, which the Emperor could ill-afford, ‘particularly as he isalways at war’.219 That the Austrian surgeons would leave their wounded to dieshocked Powell’s sensibilities and he regarded this as ‘barbarous treatment’, to becontrasted with the ‘very human’ actions of British surgeons who did far more tokeep the wounded alive.220 Such differences (highlighted by weighted terminologyand rhetoric) reinforced a sense of ‘otherness’ between the British forces andGerman armies, and further established the humanity of the British Army as acommon theme.221 In what will be a recurring trend throughout the followingchapters, a critique of the practices of specific soldiers or armies would quickly turnto a discussion of their British or German national character. To Powell, theAustrian soldiers knew if they were wounded badly, they would likely die, and that‘the Emperors Troops are imbibed with a good idea for this purpose, as they areborn Soldiers, for every man is obliged to be one, and if they die in the field ofAction, or in consequence of an Action, they are sure[ly] to be rewarded [in the]hereafter.’222That the Austrians were viewed as good or ‘born’ soldiers was nothing new.Back in the days of the Pragmatic Army, respect for the Austrians prowess in battlewas common. One London-born footboy of Major Phillip Honeywood wrote that the‘Oysterenns’, as he called them, ‘dip [their heads] and look about them for they
218 NAM 7607-45 Diary of Lieutenant Thomas Powell, 14th Regiment of Foot 1793-1795, fol. 4219 This phrase was, ironically, used by Germans to describe Britain. See below, Chapter V.220 In his journal, Powell recounted rescuing a ‘Tirrolian’ who was left for dead by his own surgeons.NAM 7607-45 Diary of Lieutenant Thomas Powell, 14th Regiment of Foot 1793-1795, fol. 5.221 Sadly, the Surgeon for the 42nd Regt., MacDonald, writing in the 1740’s does not mention thepractices of the Austrians in these respects.222 NAM 7607-45 Diary of Lieutenant Thomas Powell, 14th Regiment of Foot 1793-1795, fol. 5.
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do[d]ge the [musket] balls as a cock does a stick, they are so used to them.’223 AfterDettingen, there were even rumours among soldiers back in England that the victorywas owed primarily to ‘the very particular hand of providence & the Austrians’,which, when repeated to Lt. Colonel John Russell by his wife, was flatly denied.Russell, having witnessed the events first-hand, nevertheless acknowledged that‘the Austrians behaved well’, and had done their part.224 In battle at least, theHabsburg forces were rarely criticized for their abilities or behaviour, and whenproblems arose, it was usually blamed on their commanders. Therefore, theGermans within the Austrian forces retained a character of being men raised forsoldiering, in the manner articulated by Lt. Powell, and very much in line withdescriptions of other German states, as discussed in subsequent chapters. Whereasother aspects of the Austrian Army might lead to derogatory comments, rare werepoor appraisals of their abilities in battle, and in this manner, Habsburg forceswould earn compliments, where other aspects of their abilities as soldiers garnereddisparaging remarks, particularly in tendency to plunder and their treatment offoreign civilians and their own wounded. This was matched with perceptions ofPrussia, where their lauded military status was depreciated by their ruthless meansthrough which they attained their martial capabilities. Collectively, thesedifferences, real or perceived, added to a sense of difference between British forcesand the forces of Germany’s two most powerful states, and did little to overturnpopular impressions.
**Conclusion**
Relations between Britain and her German allies were not always good, and indeed,some of the strongest sources of resentment between the soldiers of these politiesstemmed from disagreements between the governments or commanding officers ofeach respective power. While there were attempts at creating unity through a singlecommander, more often, the shortcomings of specific individuals and the
223 Sam Davies, ‘Letter regarding the ‘Battle of Dettingen’’, JSAHR Vol. 3 (1924), p. 37.224 BL Chequers Add MS 69383 fols. 1-2, Mrs. Russell to Lt Colonel Russell, 25th July, 1743.; Add MS69383 fols. 16-17, Lt. Col. Russell to wife, Bebrick, August 7th, 1743.
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Throughout the long eighteenth century, the German auxiliary was the mostcommon and most recurrent form of Anglo-German military association, and theone that had the greatest impact on perceptions and relations. The hiring of Germansoldiers during military conflicts would become one the more consistent aspects ofBritish military strategy during the eighteenth century, and in the process wouldcreate one of great fault lines in British politics. So consistent was this policy that inevery major European war German ‘mercenaries’ would make up a significantproportion of the armies fighting on behalf of the Hanoverian monarchs. Thischapter will survey some of the key relationships, to examine trends in theirintegration and relations with British soldiers, and will include a brief examinationof Anglo-German relations in the 1740’s.The term ‘auxiliary’ in this thesis signifies a formation of soldiers, or even anentire army, whose mobilization, upkeep and subsistence was paid for, in part or infull, by a foreign state, thereby serving in a subordinate position to the sponsor’sgovernment. The main difference in this thesis between ‘auxiliaries’, and ‘allies’receiving subsidies, was that auxiliary forces would have to swear an oath ofallegiance to the British Monarch at the commencement of their service, therebyserving with the British Army at the behest of the King and his government. Thisdefinition is not without its flaws, as the rather vague or frequently changingrelationships between states and armies in many of these eighteenth century warscomplicated the terminology within contemporary discourse. For example,although the British were granting subsidies to Maria Theresa throughout the Warof Austrian Succession, the first actions of the British Army were in the capacity ofauxiliaries of the Austrians, during which time the Battle of Dettingen (1743) was
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fought – all before Britain was technically at war with France.225 Likewise, in thePeninsular War, some Britons described themselves as auxiliaries of the Spanish,although once again, Britain received no money from the Spanish Junta.226Furthermore, in times of war, Britain’s Hanoverian auxiliaries were not alwaysfinanced directly by the British government, for example, in the 1740’s whenpayments for Hanoverian troops were cynically made by the Habsburg monarchMaria Theresa with English money.227The scale and terms for the participation of these forces alternated greatlyfrom one treaty to another. An auxiliary force could be at times as small as onebattalion, or comprise some 15,000 men or more, from one state alone. Theirduration of service was usually set for the entirety of a conflict, but other times wasset annually, while their recruitment and training were the responsibilities of thecontingent’s sovereign. Troops hired as auxiliaries would be made to swear an oathof allegiance to the British monarch, which, though for a formality, was somethingthat motivated auxiliary soldiers, especially during the American RevolutionaryWar, when few other incentives were available. While in service of a foreign crown,auxiliary forces maintained their own command structure, uniforms, military codesand methods of maintaining discipline, and in large coalitions would act as an armywithin an army. This would be a dividing characteristic between subsidy-troops andthe ‘foreign corps’ that would become a feature of Britain’s conflicts at the turn ofthe nineteenth century.The financial toll for subsidizing foreign troops was often fluctuating, andalthough many contracts would use previous templates, the costs could change dueto prevailing circumstances. Uniformity in ‘pay and emoluments’ between nativeand foreign soldiers was uncommon, and usually occurred only during service inBritish territories, and in most cases money was granted to the Prince, who was notcompelled to extend these wages to his forces. Yet even when serving under suchterms, the British Government might save money by utilizing foreign auxiliaries,
225 Browning, War of Austrian Succession, p. 138.226 Schaumann, On the Road With Wellington, pp. 40-1.227 Uriel Dann Hanover and Great Britain, 1740-1760: Diplomacy and Survival (London: LeicesterUniversity Press, 1991), pp. 61-2;
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especially when their relative costs while remaining in Europe remained lower thanfor British troops. This could also be dictated by the nature of the formation beinghired. Though Hanoverian soldiers in Gibraltar in the 1780’s were to be ‘upon thesame footing as his Majesty’s English troops’, the relatively few officers in thesebattalions lowered costs appreciably.228 Whether their wages were high or low, thetroops themselves had little choice in the matter, and all they could ask was to bepaid regularly.
Though referred to in contemporary discourse as ‘mercenaries’, a term stillcommonly used in today’s scholarship, these subsidy troops had very little incommon with soldiers of fortune, and differed greatly in motive and circumstance tothe armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Certainly there were fortuneseekers in German auxiliary forces, as there were in all armies in the period pre-dating the rise of citizen-soldiers. Yet the most ‘mercenary’ men of all, were thosearmy recruiters who aimed at making considerable profit, not by hiring themselvesout for money, but by recruiting or impressing men into service.229 There wascertainly no shortage of mercenary behaviour in the British Army, especially amongan officer corps obsessed with promotion and advancement. As one Scottish officerconfided to his brother, ‘rank is the main thing I push for tho’… [for] I am damn’dtired of being upon a captains pay.’230 This was by no means a unique sentiment,either in the British Army, or in other armies across Europe. Throughout this era,and even in to the seemingly patriotic struggles against Napoleonic France, thedesire for higher pay and promotion outweighed other considerations.231
228 WO 1/823 fol. 433, No addressee, London, August the 12th 1775229 See below, Chapter VI230 NAS GD 206/2/495 fol. 10a, Robert Hall to brother, John Hall, Peterhagen, 24th July, 1759.231 One look at the writings of John Mostyn, cavalry officer and briefly commander of ‘His BritannicMajesty’s Army in Germany’ in the Seven Years War, should confirm the presence of men motivatedby principles other than love of country or sense of duty. His complaints to his friend the Duke ofNewcastle of his time in ‘so healthy an establishment’ with little chance of a ‘colonel dropping orailing out of my way’ is one such example of his priorities. Women were a close second, duties as asoldier, perhaps a distant third. Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer, p. 170. BL Ms NewcastlePapers Add 32733 f. 137, John Mostyn to the Duke of Newcastle, August 13th 1750; Add 32737 fol.282 Mostyn to Newcastle, May 1752; Piers Mackesy, The Coward of Minden: The Affair of Lord George
Sackville, pp. 44-5.
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For the various Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, their lending of armiesshould not be considered to be motivated solely, or even primarily, for profit. AsPeter Wilson has shown, the terms ‘mercenary’ and ‘soldier-trade’ (Soldatenhandel)are misnomers that have oversimplified and distorted the complex and variedreasons for which German armies were hired-out to foreign Princes, and why theirsoldiers served.232 In many usages, ‘mercenary’ is merely a harmless expression,used for clarification, for lack of a better term, or merely misapplied – somethingthat was common even at the time.233 The broader usages of this expression havegiven the impression that these arrangements were based solely on fattening thepurses of the various Dukes, Landgraves and Electors of the Empire, when in realitytheir intentions were far more complex.
**Motivations**
The motivations for German princes were in fact many and had far more to do withpolitical aspirations than financial gain. Self-defence figured prominently, especiallyfor Rhineland states during the wars against Louis XIV, or any region where war wasnot an option, but an imposition. For the Electorate of Hanover, the hiring outsoldiers (after the Dynastic Union of 1714 almost exclusively to Britain) was amatter of survival, and seemingly inevitable once war between Britain and Franceerupted.234 However, financial gain or profit should not be wholly removed fromtheir motivations.In this manner the hiring out of forces became a way of increasing a Prince’sprestige and status, as well as a means of actively engaging in the great political
232 Peter Wilson, The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: AReassessment’, The International History Review, vol. XVIII, No. 4 (November, 1996), pp. 757-792.233 One well-informed English officer wrote in his diary of the situation in the Peninsula had beensaved by ‘an army of 30,000 English mercenaries’. Julia V. Page, Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula:
Letters and Diaries of Major the Hon Edward Charles Cocks 1786-1812 (Hippocrene: New York, 1986),p. 126.234 Hanoverians were mobilized briefly during the Polish Succession crisis, and were under theemploy of Maria Theresa in the latter years of the War of Austrian Succession, though the British infact provided the money. Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, pp. 62,3.
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struggles of the era. Throughout the century, even for states such as Austria andPrussia, subsidies from western European states were often required in order toremain militarily active, and the need for external sources of revenue remained aconstant concern.235 To this end, it was Britain, the United Provinces and Francethat were the primary means of helping these princes maintain armiesdisproportionate to the size of their respective states.236In some cases, political fault lines emerged, where certain princes dealtregularly (though by no means exclusively) with or against one particular state. Yetthere were some instances, such as Hessen-Kassel in the War of Austrian Succession,where forces were hired out at the same time to allies and opponents of MariaTheresa – though they never met on the battlefield.237 Certainly the soldiers hadtheir own thoughts on the matter. Jeffrey Amherst, sent to escort the Hessians toEngland at the outbreak of the Seven Years War, assured British ministers that therequired oath of allegiance ‘had all the appearance of being taken with a general andhearty good will.’ He continued: ‘I am assured, the one took before the Bavariancampaign’, fourteen years earlier when they were hired out to opposing sides, ‘had avery different Reception; when the Oath was tendered to them, it met with almost ageneral negative & had like to have been attended with very bad consequences inthe Corps.’238 Nevertheless, the opinions of the soldiers did not hold much sway,and for good or ill, they served where their princes directed them.
The British motivations for hiring auxiliaries from these absolutist Germanstates were many. The most prominent (and obvious) reason was to address thedeficiency in manpower in fighting large continental wars with an army repeatedlydepleted at the cessation of hostilities, and incapable of replenishing or maintainingan adequate number of men to effectively oppose the threat posed by France. Justas the money for hiring soldiers permitted German princes to become militarily
235 Wilson, German Armies, pp. 33-4.236 Ibid. 3, 22.237 Lowell, German Auxiliaries in the American War, p. 2.238 Reginald Savory, 'Jeffery Amherst conducts the Hessians to England, 1756'. JSAHR, 49 (1971), p.158.
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active in central Europe, so too did it allow Britain the same ability, facilitatingBritish involvement in Germany and the Low Countries within coalition armies attimes reaching 60-80,000 men, with their own forces representing merely a fractionof the total. Furthermore, hiring German soldiers was cheaper given their lowerwages (at least for those fighting on the European continent) and that these menwere commonly well disciplined forces added to their appeal, particularly for thosetroops from Hessen and Brunswick. Apart from these causes, there were smallermore incidental reasons, such as permitting access to magazines or passage throughcertain territories, or as in the case of the Hessians in the 1730’s, keeping a forcemobilized as a deterrent.239 This latter case also highlights one of the primaryobjectives in hiring auxiliary forces, in that they were often times the only means ofprotecting Hanover, and without the Dynastic Union, it is certain that Britain wouldnot have been so committed to this practice.
**History of German Auxiliaries in the British Army**
For the history of Britain’s German auxiliaries in the long eighteenth century, we canonly be too brief, as this relationship itself deserves its own monograph, and worksby Uriel Dann and Rodney Atwood show that even a twenty years period or oneconflict are topics deserving their own treatise.240 Yet an overview is certainlyneeded here, especially in the case of the Hanoverian, Hessian and Brunswick forces,which will be recurring actors in this history.British utilization of German auxiliaries was a phenomenon that transpiredprimarily between 1689 and 1816, with merely a few outliers. The origins ofBritain’s subsidizing of German states can be traced back to 1665 and a treaty withthe Prince-Bishop of Münster during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, which came to
239 One subsidy treaty with the Prince-bishop of Trier had more to do with access though the Rhineand Mosel valleys than access to his armed forces. Peter Wilson, War, State and Society in
Württemberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 86; Atwood, Hessians, p. 14.240 See: Rodney Atwood, The Hessians: mercenaries From Hessen-Kassel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press, 1980).; Dann, Hanover and Great Britain.
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little effect militarily, and the Bishop was left holding the bill.241 It would be anotherquarter century before the first significant and sustained subsidization of Germansoldiery, with the Dutch Stadholder and subsequent English Monarch, William III.Though German auxiliaries (represented here by a small collection of Holsteiners inthe Danish contingent) played a minor role in the Dutch invasion force of 1688-9,the more significant impact of this policy was in the hiring of some 12,000 soldiersfrom German princes to occupy Dutch border-forts during the absence of Holland’smost veteran soldiers.242 In other words, the Glorious Revolution is owed in somesmall part to this ‘soldier trade’ – a strange prospect. It was through the influence ofa Dutch King and a Dutch foreign policy that England would become more activelyengaged in subsidizing foreign contingents, to the extent that by the outbreak of therebellion in America, some eighty years later, it was Great Britain’s turn to hireGerman soldiers to hold their forts (at Gibraltar and Minorca) to free up soldiers tofight in another revolution.In the Nine Years War (1689-1697), which began in the wake of William’saccession to the English throne, the hiring of German auxiliaries to oppose thearmies of Louis XIV became a joint English and Dutch effort, with most subsidiesbeing split evenly between the two states. The policy would be sustained throughQueen Anne’s reign, primarily by the Duke of Marlborough and would culminate inthe sharing the costs of supporting nearly 100,000 German auxiliaries (not includingDanish forces) towards the end of the War of Spanish Succession.243 During the firstdecade of the eighteenth century, England was engaged in twelve treaties with otherEuropean states, covering a part, or the entirety, of a wide variety of expenses: fortroops, supplies and ‘extraordinary costs’, and dealing with Hessen-Kassel, Treves,Saxony, Prussia, Brunswick-Lüneberg, the Palatinate and several smaller
241 Wilson, German Armies, p. 34242 This policy would be used again in 1716, whereby George I paid for Gotha, Münster andWolfenbüttel troops to cover the Dutch border fortresses, thus permitting them to send 6,000 Dutchsoldiers to help turn the tide in the first Jacobite Rebellion in Scotland. Jonathan Israel, ‘The DutchRole in the Glorious Revolution’ in Jonathan Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Moment Essays on the
Glorious Revolution and its World Impact (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), pp. 106-8.; Wilson, German Armies,p. 205.243 Wilson, German Armies, p. 116.
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principalities.244 These forces usually numbered between three and ten thousandmen, and were not always meant for service in conjunction with British or Dutchforces, as with the Hessian and Prussian contingents that served in the Italiantheatre.245 This use of subsidy troops paid dividends for the Maritime Powers, anddespite the unpopularity of such policies, the hiring of German ‘mercenaries’ wouldbecome a permanent part of Britain’s continental strategies, both in peace and war.Through the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War (referredto here as the ‘mid-century wars’) as well as the American War of Independence, theGerman auxiliary soldier became more and more of a feature in the British-ledarmies and coalitions, both in Europe and beyond. While the Seven Years War(1756-1763) was the high-point in terms of scale, expense and scope (whereupwards of 60,000 Germans would remain continuously in British-pay until thewar’s conclusion), the role of hired German manpower expanded its breadth toinclude the British Isles and the American Colonies. In each conflict, the politicalbacklash for paying foreign soldiers to fight on behalf of Britain was considerablyunpopular, and in the case of Lord Carteret in 1744, could help doom a ministry. Yetit is a testament to their utility, and the relative success of the policy, that thispractice would continue unimpeded to the end of the century, merely slowing as of aconsequence of French occupation of German territories at the end of the century,and only ending with the period of prolonged peace in the decades following theCongress of Vienna. Therefore, the political discourse which impacted perceptionsof German soldiery and national character in the minds of the British public, did noteffectively create an equal distaste for the practice in the eyes of British ministers,and even won several converts, the most notable being William Pitt the Elder who,regarding the policy of hiring or subsidizing German forces, went from the chiefvoice of condemnation to its staunchest adherent.
244 Once again, this is excluding the Holstein troops within the Danish auxiliaries. John Hattendorf,
England in the War of Spanish Succession (New York: Garland, 1987), p. 132; For Holstein troops, see:WO 26/12, fol. 356.; WO 30/89 fol. 393.245 Hattendorf, England in the War of Spanish Succession, p. 278.
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**Specific States**
Of the numerous German territories involved in the so-called ‘soldier trade’, thereare a few states that had a long-standing and valuable relationship with GreatBritain. The most recurrent partners in this era were the Landgraves of Hessen-Kassel, who would supply forces in every major British-French conflict from theNine Years War to the First Coalition in 1793-4. The second, were the Princes ofBraunschweig, or Brunswick, a family closely tied to the Hanoverian Dynasty whoserved as a supplier of troops for British Armies, but also a contributor of Generalsas well, where several branches of the Brunswick dynasty would providecommanders of prominence in British-led coalitions. Lastly, and perhaps mostimportant of all, are the Electors of Hanover, who are no-doubt better known bytheir more prominent position as Kings of Great Britain.The auxiliaries from Hessen-Kassel were stalwarts in Britain’s coalitionarmies for nearly one hundred years. Exceptional to other relationships, theHessians were subsidized even in times of peace, as in the 1730’s, when they werecontroversially mobilized in order to protect the Electorate of Hanover. In apamphlet in defence of the policy, and as a mark of their value in previous conflicts,Horatio Walpole declared the Hessians were of ‘the utmost use… upon all Occasions’and that they were ‘the Triarii of Great Britain; her last Resort in all Cases, both inPeace and War; both Home and Abroad; however ally’d, or whosoever distres’d!’246Though best known for their role in the American Revolutionary War, the Hessiansplayed important roles in the Spanish and Austrian Succession wars and the SevenYears War. Hessian troops would be sent to Scotland to help in the suppression ofScottish Rebels in 1746 and would return to Britain again in 1756 in order toprotect southern England in case of an invasion by the French.247 In the majority ofsuch conflicts, the initial Hessian contribution would be above 6,000 men, but in the
246 Horatio Walpole, The Case of the Hessian Forces, in the Pay of Great-Britain, impartially and freely
examin’d (London: 1731), pp. 30, 33.247 Though Irish songs and traditions would recall there being Hessians in Ireland in 1798, thesewere primarily Hanoverians serving in various foreign corps. See: Eva Ó Cathaoir, ‘GermanMercenaries in Ireland, 1798-1807’, pp. 406-426.
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American War, an initial 11,000 soldiers were sent in 1776, and during the SevenYears War this number surpassed 20,000.248Another prominent supplier of soldiers was the House of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel.249 Like the Hessians, Brunswickers were a common sight in British-German coalition forces, though by no means matching the scale of the Hessen-Kassel contingents. There was a large Brunswick contingent in the Seven Years War,and Brunswickers were sent to America in 1776-83, participating – so it would seem– under the pseudonym: ‘Hessians.’ In 1815, Brunswick (-Öls) soldiers would alsoserve as auxiliaries in the Waterloo campaign, donning the trademark blackuniforms that they wore while serving as a ‘Foreign Corps’ in the British Army from1807-1814.250The most notable of all the subsidy troops under British direction were fromthe Electorate of Hanover. The forces of the Electorate shared in some of Britain’smost glorious triumphs of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but arealso known among scholars of this period for being the whipping-boy of anti-Hanoverian publications, due to their ties to the monarch. In the seventeenthcentury soldiers from this region (there being no Hanoverian Electorate yet) hadfought on behalf of the Dutch and Venetian Republics, and in the eighteenth centuryHanoverian soldiers would literally stand side by side with British regiments inGermany and the Low Countries, and fought with the British Army in Gibraltar andMinorca, and even with the East India Company on the Subcontinent in the1780’s.251 In British-funded armies with little or no British presence, theHanoverian contingents would often become the heart of the army, as they were inthe armies of the Duke of Cumberland and Ferdinand of Brunswick between 1755and 1758.252There are certainly a few reasons why these Hanoverians were uniqueamong all of the German auxiliaries. In many ways they were acting as allies and as
248 Atwood, Hessians, p. 18.; Burne, The Noble Duke of York, p. 46.249 The Brunswick-Lüneburg branch became the Electors of Hanover, and shortly thereafter the Kingsof Britain.250 For more on these so-called ‘Black Brunswickers’ see below, esp. chapter 7.251 For Hanoverians in these services, see: Wilson, German Armies, pp. 34, 77-9, 162.252 Piers Mackesy, Coward of Minden, p. 23.
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subjects of the same monarch, not specifically as hired guns. Yet their inclusion inthis chapter stems from three reasons. Firstly, they served at the pleasure of theHanoverian monarchs, and therefore shared a connection with the other auxiliaryforces, although the latter did so for contractual reasons. Secondly, Britain’s statusas the primary sponsor or sole supplier of the costs for their mobilization,maintenance and support, meant that they were very much treated and supportedin the same manner as other auxiliaries, such as the Hessians. Lastly, and in partdue to this similarity, they were perceived by British politicians and the public assimilar, or the same, as other German contingents, as can be seen with the discourserevolving around the Hessian and Hanoverian regiments sent to defend England in1756. While there were some commonalities between Hanoverians and otherGerman auxiliaries, there were certainly some elements that set them apart. TheHanoverians themselves were considered to be more loyal and a better option whenBritain required additional manpower, largely due to their shared sovereign. Afterthe outbreak of hostilities in colonial America in 1775, it was proposed by many,including Lord George Germaine (formerly Sackville) and his colleague the Marquisof Granby, that Hanoverians, not Hessians, would be the ideal candidates for fightingin America, and in virtually every other conflict this opinion was echoed, even inpreference to states such as Prussia, an army held in high esteem by manyEnglishmen.253 Yet the differences between these German territories was notmerely in perception, as economic considerations often played a role, as did theaspirations of the various German princes.254
253 NLS Fletcher of Saltoun MS 16518, Henry Fletcher to his father, 1756.254 British ministers were always searching for bargains and means of reducing costs, which lead topreferences for certain states or princes, as even when soldiers were given the same wages, this wasnot always reflected in many subsidy treaties, and furthermore, the army structures were oftendifferent, and some extra expenses could be saved hiring armies containing fewer officers. Whilemost subsidy-agreements were created from political or military necessity, in some instances (suchas 1759 and again in 1775-7) cost considerations certainly created favourites from among the pool ofpossible German states. Barrington to Holdernesse, 10th December 1759 in: Tony Hayter (ed.) An
Eighteenth-Century Secretary at War, The papers of William, Viscount Barrington (London: ArmyRecords Society, 1988), pp. 137-8.
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**Incorporation and Integration**
Incorporating a foreign contingent with different means of drill, discipline, and mostof all communication, certainly had its challenges, yet relations with Germanauxiliaries were much better than with independent Austrian, German or Dutchforces. Nevertheless, fitting auxiliaries within the British Army was not always aseamless or smooth process, in part due to the contractual nature of their affiliation.Payment and maintenance of these forces created numerous problems, and thesystem was not without its drawbacks.255 British officers and officials had toaccompany each contingent, as in an attempt to prevent corruption it became apolicy that only Britons could serve in the capacity of paymaster, and were quiteoften commissaries as well.256 Many times such officers were the only Britonsaccompanying these forces, and strangely, knowledge in German was not aprerequisite, making communication problems a severe difficulty, especially whenprovisioning German regiments within the Reich.257 While the Seven Years Warwas the gold standard for expense and complication, moving auxiliary forces aroundthe Holy Roman Empire created a bureaucratic nightmare in every conflict. In 1776Colonel Joseph Yorke, for decades a man deeply involved in military and diplomaticmatters in Germany and the Netherlands, complained to an associate that he was ‘asmuch occupied with getting a single Regiment down the Rhine and Meuse as if itwas an Army on account of the different Territories, especially the Prussian[‘]s, asthey love to finger all fine men they see, & the [Hessen] Hanau reg[imen]t is a fineone.’258 Often times these difficulties would be overcome by relying upon German(especially Hanoverian) officers to aid in the mustering, maintenance and
255 For supply problems in the Seven Year War in Germany, see: Bannerman, ‘British Army Contracts’,pp. 68-71.256 Reed Browning, ‘The Duke of Newcastle and the Financial Management of the Seven years War inGermany’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 31, no. 2 (1971), pp. 24-5.257 An excellent letter book of one such commissary, Colonel Robert Boyd can be found in theNational Army Museum. See: NAM 7908-34 .258 Amherst was not stranger to such duties, having been involved in the preceding two wars inorchestrating the movements of auxiliary forces. CKS C41/70, Joseph Yorke to Jeffrey Amherst, April1776.
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transportation of these regiments to their desired locations.259 As in the case withthe Prussians, agents from German states were not only an aid to manoeuvringthese soldiers, but they could also be a menace. Yet this was also an advantage ofsubsidizing forces, as it was the responsibility of the German princes to find recruitsfor and maintain these armies, which saved the British the hazards of recruiting inthe Empire – something few Britons managed to do successfully.260Payment of auxiliaries created other problems as well, as this could createjealousies among the various armies within a coalition force. The main focus werethe British soldiers themselves, whose comparable wealth, and the hostility itcreated, was a theme recurrent throughout the century. While it was less common,this was also an area of contention between Hanoverian and other German forces.In the Seven Years War it was seen that they were given a privileged status, andaccording to Piers Mackesy, ‘there was a strong reciprocal dislike between theHessian officers and the better-paid and thriftier Hanoverians.’261 The long historyof close association created by the Dynastic Union would lead to the Hanoverian
259 A Hanoverian General was given the task of orchestrating the Hessian auxiliaries’ march throughcentral Germany, and in the American War a decade later, Georg von Scheither, a Hanoverian Coloneland Army recruiter, (who will be discussed in detail in Chapter V) spent a great deal of time workingon the arrangements safe passage for Hessian and Ansbach regiments through the Reich. ReginaldSavory, ‘Jeffrey Amherst conducts the Hessians’, p. 156.; HSTAH Hann 47 II nr. 115.260 British responsibilities in the capacity as paymaster were not only relegated to the support andsustainment of various German regiments, but in one instance in Germany during the Seven YearsWar, British regiments participated in impressing local men into new formations, described in theletters of Major Richard Davenport, to his brother. This is an interesting but somewhat overlookedpart of life in the British Army, and therefore deserves a lengthy quotation here. From BramscheGermany, 6th April 1760, Davenport wrote: ‘I have had one employment, which was a horrid tormentto me for three days… viz. that of pressing 40 men, in the cantonments of the Regiment, to be sent tothe new corps which are raising in our part of Germany. As the thing required caution and secrecy, Icould not speak of it but ordered the Regiment to exercise on foot and as soon as they wereassembled, immediately dispersed the men and officers in parties, to bring in all they could lay holdof. Before night they brought in 120 of all sorts, horribly frightened and expecting to be sent to theKing of Prussia. I discharged all that looked old directly and locked up the rest that night. All thefollowing day and the third morning I had no peace for the crying of women and the squalling ofchildren, who were surrounding me and begging me on their knees to spare their fathers andhusbands and pursuing to their entreaties by eights and tens at a time, without at all regarding mynot understanding their language. If they had been English married women, I believe I would havemade my conditions, but the married ones here have no signs of women but the marks of the sex,which is indeed in capitals. Out of pure tenderness of heart, I dismissed all the married men and sentforty stout lads to Osnabruck. The other British regiments had the same order and each sent hither40 good recruits.’ Davenport, ‘To Mr. Davenport’, p. 78.261 Mackesy, Coward of Minden, p. 23.
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soldiers expecting equal care and compensation for their services, which lead to amutiny among the Hanoverian Grenadiers near Brussels in 1793, who, having been‘promised English pay, [declared] that they would not march a step further till theyhad received it’.262 Though the Duke of York managed to successfully mediate thesematters, it showed that there was nevertheless an expectation to be treated asequals with the British they were brigaded with, while also hinting at a deep-rootedsuspicion of financial misdealing and neglect: common occurrences when dealingwith subsidized soldiery.263 Perceptions of preferential treatment could be a pointof division as well, which, as will be discussed in examining the British Army in the1740’s, was quite damaging to relations.
**Treatment of Auxiliaries**
Despite the presence of mistrust and mistreatment in these relationships, theGerman auxiliaries fighting alongside the British were by no means purely cannonfodder. James Wolfe, the celebrated victor of the Battle of Quebec, had famouslystated of employing the often-maligned Scottish Highlanders, that they ‘might be ofuse’ given that they ‘are hardy, intrepid, accustomed to a rough country, and nograte mischief if they fall.’264 For all the public sentiment over the century thatdeplored any circumstance where the auxiliaries were spared the brunt of thefighting, in both sentiment of the officers, and the actions of the army, there is noindication that auxiliaries conducted the worst or costliest operations. Certainly theHanoverians in the First Coalition of 1793-4 suffered woefully disproportionatecasualties, but this was far more to do with circumstance and illness, although they
262 Burne. The Noble Duke of York, pp. 43-4.; Gebhard von. Scharnhorst, G. v. Scharnhorsts Briefe. Bd. 1
Privatbriefe, Hrsg. K. Linnebach (München und Leipzig: Georg Müller, 1914), p. 213.263 In a similar incident During the Waterloo Campaign, Cavalie Mercer broke up a quarrel amongBritons and Hanoverians, which began when the Hanoverian cavalrymen were upset at being givenbread ‘not even fit for common soldiers’. Mercer, Journal, pp. 264-5.264 Wilson Beckles, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London: William Heinemann, 1909), p. 141.
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were engaged more often than the British.265 For most cases, auxiliaries weretreated as equals, and did not suffer unduly on account of being hired soldiers. Infact, some auxiliary regiments would be spared the worst of the action, intentionallyor unintentionally, thereby suffering a mere fraction of the casualties of BritishRegiments operating in the same theatre.266There were, nevertheless, a few episodes when the treatment of Germanauxiliaries matched public sentiment, and for the purposes of this chapter, we willfocus on one particular example: the Hessians in Winchester in 1756-7. Theintention for the arrival of these auxiliaries was to defend Britain in case of a Frenchinvasion, while native regiments were brought up to strength and trained. Yet theiremployment and arrival were marked with political dissent and public hostility, anda general lack of support for the maintenance of some 7,323 men.267 On thetransports sailing to England, Jeffrey Amherst, whose duty it was to escort theHessians to England, stated that they ‘every moment complained of wants of everything’ and once disembarked, the equipment and supplies provided for thesesoldiers was indeed quite inferior, leading to a strong sense of resentment.268 Forthese auxiliary regiments, forage was shipped to England from northern Germany,and one visitor to the Hessian camps in July of 1756 wrote to his wife of the sicknessof their horses due to ‘extremely bad’ corn and hay.269 While bakers were importedfrom Germany to help bake their beloved rye bread, some quantities food for thesoldiers was also shipped in, contrary to the opposition pamphlets that depictedGerman soldiers enjoying victuals intended for the British fighting men.270Ironically, faced with a shortages of proper supplies, it was local Englishmen who
265 Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer, p. 59.; British Officer, The present state of the British army
in Flanders; with an authentic account of their retreat before Dunkirk… (London: 1793), p. 4.266 Though Hardenberg’s Hanoverian Regiment had fought alongside the 73rd Regiment of Footduring the siege of Gibraltar, by 1780, the former had lost 7 killed, and the latter 114. By Septemberof 1781, another 21 Hanoverians and 77 Britons from these two regiments were listed as casualties.NAS Seafield Papers GD248/466/11267 Savory, Reginald. 'Jeffery Amherst conducts the Hessians to England, 1756'. Journal of the Society
for Army Historical Research, 49 (1971), p. 170.268 CKS, Amherst Papers U1350 01/6.269 HRO 44M69/F7/3, fol. 3, R.J. to Wife Anne, Britford, July 13th 1756270 For supplies for the Hessians and Hanoverians in 1756-7, see: Bannerman, ‘British ArmyContracts and Domestic Supply’, pp. 141, 148-9, 160, 165. An indicative print of Germans taking foodfrom British soldiers can be seen from The Two H.&H.s (1756).
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filled the void, occupying the area adjacent to the Hessian camp near Winchester,and the empty streets nearby became ‘very populous & gay’ from the presence ofsutlers and merchants – and a number of curious locals.271 Yet there were stillshortages of equipment and supplies needed by these auxiliaries, such as medicalequipment and the materials needed in creating camps and hospitals.272 To makematters worse, the Hessians had clothing insufficient for the cold weather, andthough the Hanoverians who arrived in England at the same time had been providedwith wool clothing, the Hessian contingent had none (which did not go unnoticed),leading them to petition the Duke of Cumberland for blankets to help them survivethe winter.273 Such was the treatment of the soldiers at Winchester, a pamphlet waspublished and several public appeals made for their support and bettertreatment.274 Their suffering was alleviated somewhat by an Act of Parliamentproviding quarters for the ‘foreign troops’ on the same terms as British soldiers –but in many ways it was too little and too late.275 By then the damage had beendone, and furthermore, the political tenor of the nation was in such a state that thestealing of a handkerchief by a Hanoverian soldier – referred to as the ‘MaidstoneAffair’ – would set of another volley of derogatory pamphlets.276Not all episodes were so mishandled. The Hanoverians serving in the EastIndia Company in the 1780’s fared better in treatment and than some of the Britishregiments, and for the battalions in garrisons such as Gibraltar and Minorca, there
271 HRO 44M69/F7/3, fol. 5, ‘R.J. to Wife’, Britford, 22nd July 1756272 The expenses accrued for the Hessian hospital had to wait until the negotiations for a subsidyagreement in 1776 to be remitted by Lord North’s ministry. For the expenses of the HanoverianHospital, see: HSTAH, Hann 47 Abt. II nr. 57.273 Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg (HStAM), 4h nr. 3073 fol. 98 Copy of letter addressed to the Dukeof Cumberland, October 30th, 1756.274 One newspaper entry regretted the treatment of the Hessian soldiers: ‘’Tis greatly to be lamented,that a people whose arrival our nation waited with so much impatience, who came with suchwillingness to our assistance, who have remarkably behaved with the greatest veneration to ourKing, and with a becoming respect, order and decency, wherever they have been quartered, shouldnow be deprived the common comforts of life, by a nation ever remarkeable [sic] for humanity andgenerous dispositions even towards our enemies.’ HStAM 4h nr. 3073 fol. 113.275 Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, p. 97.276 For more on the public reaction to these German Auxiliaries and the Maidstone Affair, seeMatthew McCormack ‘Citizenship, Nationhood, and Masculinity’, pp. 971-993.; primary documentscan be found in HSTAH Hann. 41 XXIII Nr. 48; BL Egerton Add. MS 3440.
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would have been no discernable differences.277 Two decades after their unhappystint in the English countryside, the Hessians would be again in British territory – inthe colony of New York – and would there receive superior treatment from theirBritish sponsors. The proper care provided for auxiliary soldiers could certainlyfoster a sense of professional solidarity, and reinforce the premise that these werevalued allies, not mercenaries. There were few things that could do more to affectperceptions than preferential treatment or acts of negligence.To keep these auxiliaries in good faith, proclamations from the army’s seniorofficers were often essential. Full of florid praise and excessive flattery, these wereimportant psychological tools, and a means of creating a rhetorical counterpoint tooverly negative popular discourse. A declaration from the Gibraltar Governor andGarrison commander George Elliot in 1783 is a clear example of combining genuineappreciation with exaggerated adulation. Of the Hanoverians in the garrison afterthe ‘Great Siege’, he nearly ran out of adjectives in his praise:Their conduct has always been most exemplary, but since the Enemy satdown before the place, their patience, subordination, discipline,vigilance, fortitude, zeal, vigour, and courage has scarce ever beenequaled, but I will venture to affirm has never been exceeded.278Such declarations were often formalities, and therefore cannot always accuratelygauge the value of auxiliaries or subsidy troops, but they were an effective means ofmaintaining morale, and indeed, had an impact among the soldiers. During theAmerican Revolution, one Hessian officer, Johann Ewald was infuriated wheneverthe efforts of his Jäger battalion went unmentioned in the declarations of the Britishcommanding generals, yet they had received their fare-share of praise, and hismemoir is brimming with pride when he recalls the many times in which hissoldiers were lauded for their efforts and abilities.279The incorporation of these auxiliary forces was not always an easy task, andthe wide spectrum of how these soldiers were orchestrated and situated with and
277 HSTAH Hann. 38 C nr. 34 Arthur Campbell to Colonel Reinbold, 1st October, 1786278 HSTAH Hann. 38 A nr. 23 fol. 6 ‘Declaration 21st June 1783’, from George Elliot, Gibraltar.279 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War, A Hessian Journal Translated and Edited by Joseph P.
Tustin (Yale: New Haven, 1979), pp. 55, 78, 110, 121.
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within the British Army at-large would impact relations. Adding to other factors,such as political persuasion, pre-conceived ideas and individual experience, the carethese soldiers were given and the tasks to which they were charged would informinteractions with – and opinions of – their fellow soldiers.
**Interactions**
Interactions between British soldiers and German subsidy troops were frequent,especially when compared to the relations with Britain’s allies. Auxiliaries wouldoften share encampments and act jointly in day-to-day activities necessary for thearmy’s maintenance, unlike the infrequent encounters with, for example, theAustrian armies in the Low Countries. During campaigns, the British contingents(usually numbering between 10 and 30 thousand men) would often remain close totheir Hanoverian or Hessian auxiliaries, and due to the nature of the armies, varioustasks, such as foraging, ‘pioneering’, garrisoning, or picqueting, would be carried outby equal numbers of men from the British and German forces.280 Whilecampaigning in the Reich, British armies would not only be flanked by auxiliaryforces, but would contain an ever-increasing number of German-born men, ashigher-ranking officers would often be assigned aides or hire translators fromamong the auxiliary forces. This practice, combined with the variety of sutlers andcamp assistants, meant that an army composed of British and German forces, be it incentral Europe, or the middle colonies, would be a highly heterogeneous andpolyglot force.
The Hessians and British forces in the American War of Independence wereunique given that they were continuously interwoven for several years, yet there
280 While they were often in close proximity, there were occasions when the British and Germanauxiliaries operated some distance from one another, as shown by the correspondence of JohnMostyn, who complained to the Duke of Newcastle that his commanding officer, Ferdinand ofBrunswick, and much of their German forces were some sixty miles from his own position: ‘what is yeworst of it, is that it is all in the writing & reading way, two things I never had patience to bear’. BLAdd MS 32902 fols. 416-7, Mostyn to Newcastle, Osnabruck, Feb. 26th, 1760.
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were other episodes in which the British were closely attached to their hired allies.During campaigns and battles on the European continent, the warriors of theserespective polities would usually be integrated at a regimental level, especially theHanoverians, who throughout the mid-century wars would form part of the ‘RightWing’ alongside British forces, as they were at prominent battles, such as Fontenoyand Minden. During the War of Austrian Succession, the British and Hanoveriantroops were almost always billeted in the same areas, and when the armies neededto disperse in order to forage and gain supplies more readily, these groups wouldstay close to one another, when the Dutch or Austrian forces might be miles away.Perhaps the best instance of this close integration was among the garrison ofGibraltar, between 1779 and 1783, where three under-strength HanoverianRegiments would endure unimaginable hardships along with their fellow Britishdefenders. In such circumstances, the professionalism of both forces, but especiallynotable among the Hanoverians, permitted a close cooperation and was celebratedby ministers and generals alike.281The importance of this close proximity is that frequent interaction would helpchallenge the stereotypes and preconceived ideas the soldiers had of one another,and rumours could be more easily confirmed or challenged. Often times, the firstprolonged interaction at camp, or on the march, would spark commentaries aboutthese soldiers’ martial or national character.282 A young James Wolfe understoodthe value of English soldiers coming into contact with other armies, so that therewould be more familiarity, and less fear or antipathy, when encountering foreigntroops in battle. In the last stages of the War of Austrian Succession, he watched aparade given by six Wolfenbüttel Regiments, and later penned his desires that moreBritish soldiers should attend these events.
281 Good relations were no doubt encouraged in that two regiments in the garrison (Hardenberg’sand the 12th Regiment of Foot) had a shared history, and had fought alongside one another twodecades before at the battle of Minden. McGuffie, The Siege of Gibraltar, pp. 45, 54.; John Drinkwater,
A History of the Siege of Gibraltar, 1779-1783 (London: 1863), p. 96.282 This was especially the case of the Hessians arriving in New York in 1776. For an example fromthe Seven Years War, see: Friederich von der Decken ‘Tagebuch des herzoglich braunschweigschenMajors und Kriegsraths von Unger, geführt währen siebenjährigen Krieges’ in Vaterländisches Archiv
des Historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen (1837), p. 340.
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It is really surprising that in the multitude of the idle and curious, it doesnot enter into any of the heads [of English officers and soldiers] to be foronce spectators at a military show, and muse themselves some littletime with a view of the variety of troops that compose the threeseparate bodies in the country. The English should accustomthemselves to such sights, that they may be less at a loss, and act likemen when anything new or extravagant presents itself, and that a plaid,whiskers, or a ruff cap may not be esteemed by them altogether terribleand invincible.'283Parades and military reviews gave officers and soldiers alike a chance of observingtheir comrades in their splendour and full regalia, which never ceased to be afeature in the writings of the soldiers witnessing them. The focus was on their skillin manoeuvres, but physical attributes once again received the most comments.During the Seven Years War one officer bragged to his brother that the HereditaryPrince of Brunswick was so impressed by the British regiments after reviewingthem, that he ‘could not sleep ye nights for thinking of them.’ As for himself, heprofessed, ‘I never saw finer troops than ye Hanoverians, Hessians and especiallythe Brunswickers’, and once again there was an obsession with height: ‘theirReg[imen]t. of Foot Guards are as tall as our blew [sic] Guards’ – Britain’s elitecavalry.284 One Brunswick officer noticed this disparity after watching the exercisesof a British regiment, stating that ‘these people are not so tall, but they are well-drilled.’ 285
Social collaborations do not receive very much attention, but there arefrequent accounts of soldiers comingling with native inhabitants, especially inGermany, where officers would often entertain or attend local dances or balls (threea week for one officer in the Seven Year War).286 Festivities between British andGerman soldiery were often a matter of politeness and etiquette, yet many officerswere treated as celebrities upon arriving in foreign lands, and were oftenbombarded with invitations to attend social functions with the local civilians.
283 Beckles, Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 85.284 NAS GD206/2/495 fol. 8a, Robert Hall to his brother, Münster, September 13th, 1758.285 Decken, ‘Tagebuch des herzoglich braunschweigschen Majors’, p. 341.286 Davenport, ‘To Mr. Davenport’, p. 40.
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Interactions and familiarity with a region’s populace were an important aspect ofsoldiers’ lives, and would help add nuance to conceptions of ‘Germanness’ or‘Englishness.’ While the highly negative interactions with Flemish, Portuguese andSpanish civilians would further decrease British estimations of their soldiers, thegenerally more positive interactions with German civilians – especially amidst alliedterritories – could have a positive effect. For corporal Robert Brown, who had spentmuch of 1793-5 among hostile civilians in Flanders and the Netherlands, thetreatment he and his fellow soldiers received in the city of Bremen bordered on thesurreal: ‘the behaviour of the people to us was remarkably kind and polite. It issomething like a dream or fairy vision, and we could hardly give credit to oursenses’. His recollections of time spent in Holland provided a considerable contrast,given that,when we asked for any thing to refresh ourselves, with the money inour hands… [they] answered only with a shrug up of the shoulders, nixnix, nix bread, nix butter, nix beer, nix brandwyn for the Englishman…[whereas in Bremen] it seemed like some sudden enchantment, but itproved real, for they used us like part of their own family, or childrenwhich had long been absent, and now returned, and omitted nothingthat could contribute either to our ease or pleasure.287While some were treated like family, others literally became relations. A number ofBritish soldiers took German wives during the campaigns in the Seven Years War,and the Hessians in the American War found plenty of brides among the colonialpopulation.288 Corporal Todd, a soldier in ‘His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany’wrote, ‘We live well here’ and that ‘Several of our men gets Married here as theYounkers thinks it a great Honour to Marry with an English Soldier, their wagesbeing so very small here.’289 The significance of this was attested to in a laterjournal entry, where the good relations and numerous marriages with localtownsfolk ‘made them United with us as though we had been of their ownCountry.’290
287 Brown, Corporal Brown’s Campaigns, p. 173.288 John W. Jackson. With the British army in Philadelphia. (London: Presidio Press, 1979), p. 83.289 Todd, The Journal of Corporal Todd, p. 131.290 ibid. p. 131.
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Throughout these periods of prolonged association and interaction, therelations between the soldiers, were generally positive. In the War of AustrianSuccession, British and Hanoverian soldiers were forbidden from visiting othercamps past nightfall, but this was a provision to prevent theft or desertion, notmerely to limit conflict.291 Shortly after the arrival of the British in the Seven YearsWar, Prince Ferdinand gave an order prohibiting duelling within the army,especially between men from different nations, and during the American Warrepeated attempts were made to improve the relations between British forces andGerman auxiliaries in Canada.292 Unfamiliarity was a chief cause for conflicts, andparticularly in the mid-century wars, where the worst problems were found duringthe first years’ campaign. Within two years of their arrival in Germany during theSeven Years War, the British seemed to be well settled, with the English commander,the beloved Marquis of Granby, reassuring the Duke of Newcastle that he and hisHanoverian counterpart General Sporcken ‘live like brothers’. He added,I most sincerely honor, and love that brave, and honest, and goodGeneral: I can assure your Grace, that there is the greatest harmonyamongst the Troops: I have heard of no Complaints; if any have arisen,the officers of the respective Corps have settled them; shou’d they havecome to our ears, Sporcken and Myself certainly cou’d and wou’d haveimmediately put an end to them.293Even in the failed campaigns against Revolutionary France in 1793-4 relations withauxiliaries maintained a positive tone, in spite of the contempt and disputes amongthe armies’ senior commanders. ‘Particularly satisfactory’ wrote the Hanoveriancolonel Christian Ompteda, ‘is the harmony which prevails between all thesedifferent troops under the Duke [of York]’s command, Imperial, English, andHanoverian. It is only between the Prussians and the Imperial forces that traces ofthe old animosity may be still detected.’294 Just as a history of conflict lingered
291 BL Hardwicke Papers Add MS 36252 fol. 77, June 5th, 1743.292 Wood, ‘By Dint of Labour and Perseverance’, p. 51.293 BL Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32911 fol. 423-4 Letter from Granby to Newcastle, Geismar, Sept20th, 1760.294 Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer, p. 36.
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between Austrian and Prussian, so did a shared history of partnership help fostergreater camaraderie between Briton and Hanoverian, and other forces that werefrequent auxiliaries of the British Army.
**Relations and Perceptions in the Pragmatic Army**
In order to highlight some of the key issues indicative of the relationship betweenBritish soldiers and their German auxiliaries, and to further underscore some of thekey differences with regards to their German allies, a short study of the ‘PragmaticArmy’ will be of assistance.295 In 1742-3, British forces in Flanders under theCommand of the Earl of Stair were combined with an Austrian army and Hanoverianand Hessian auxiliary forces, with the primary objective of preventing the Frenchfrom overrunning Flanders and the Rhineland while most of the Habsburg forceswere engaged elsewhere. This coalition army was referred to as the ‘PragmaticArmy’, in honour of its chief aim, upholding the Pragmatic Sanction. This was anagreement that stipulated that Maria Theresa would inherit all Habsburg dominionsfrom her father, Charles VI, an agreement that was quickly broken by Frederick II ofPrussia, and subsequently Louis XV of France. At first the British, as indicatedbefore, were acting as auxiliaries of the Empress, and the force of some 16,000Britons (later, 21,000) would work closely with these other German militaries,particularly in the campaign of 1743, where the Pragmatic Army marched intocentral Germany and where George II took command shortly before the Battle ofDettingen on the 27th of June.Back in Britain, the cause for Maria Theresa, the beleaguered young monarch,was popular, and numerous British pamphlets fashioned her into the penultimatedamsel in distress, while those who seemed hesitant to come to her aid, including
295 For an extensive study of the Pragmatic Army, and its composition, movements and politicalconsequences, see: Wolfgang Handrick, Die Pragmatische Armee 1741 bis 1743: Eine alliierte Armee
im Kalkül des Östereichischen Erfolgekrieges (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991).
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the long-time Prime Minister Robert Walpole, were denounced and condemned.While the cause may have been fashionable, of extreme distaste to many in theBritish public was the formidable subsidy given to Hanover in order to raise a strongcontingent for the Pragmatic Army, during which time the Electorate itself remainednominally neutral. While soldiers gathering in Flanders in 1742 and 1743 awaitedfor the arrival of these Hanoverian troops (the Hessians would arrive severalmonths later), already there was a fierce opposition to these auxiliaries back inLondon, whereby ‘pamphlets against the Hanover[ian] & Hess[ian] troops come outdaily in a most malicious & invidious manner’.296The campaign of 1743 would make things much worse. The first interactionsbetween British and Hanoverian forces would incite a great deal of jealousy, whichwas exponentially compounded once George II took the reigns of the PragmaticArmy.297 Indeed, it was assumed that he had taken charge because of the infightingbetween Hanoverian and British generals, hostility he only exacerbated bysurrounding himself by the former, to the agitation of the latter.298 The jealousy ofthis favouritism – from preferring Hanoverian grooms and assistants, to confidingonly with Hanoverian generals, to suspicions that his Germans subjects werereceiving better provisions – all furthered the hatred of Britons (especially amongthe officer corps) to these auxiliaries.299The zenith of these poor relations was also the climax of the campaign thatyear, when a divided French force attacked the Pragmatic Army near Aschaffenburg,in a battle that would be known in Britain as Dettingen. The inactivity of much ofthe army during the battle, and the placement of the Hanoverians in an area wherethey did little the entire day, was a cause celeb for British pamphleteers, who
296 NAS Morton Papers GD150/3485, fol. 41, Unknown author to the Earl of Morton, London,December 7th, 1742.297 Handrick claims that there was relations were more favourable on account of previous history,but few references to the War of Spanish Succession were found, save for those complimentingGeorge II for a bravery that matched his endeavours as a young German prince. Handrick, Die
Pragmatische Armee, pp. 116-7.298 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont Diary of the First Earl of
Egmont (London: HM Stationery Office, 1923) vol. III, pp. 275.299 Ibid, p. 274.; BL Add MS Chequers Papers 69382 fol. 101, Lt. Colonel Russell to wife, Hanau June28th, 1743.
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dubbed the commander of their cavalry, General Ilten, the ‘Confectioner General’given that many of the Hanoverians were closer to the supply train than they wereto the enemy.300 The Austrians that were involved were praised (so too were theHanoverian artillery, which was largely overlooked), and though victories normallyproduced a sentiment of camaraderie and unity, this was undermined once again bythe tactless behaviour of the king, who during the battle showed a bravery that waslaudable to all, but a fashion sense surprisingly offensive to his British subjects. TheGerman-born monarch, tried to relive his glory days by wearing a yellow sash inhonour of the Electorate (as he did at the Battle of Oudenaarde in 1708) to thehorror of the British who interpreted this as a sign of his true loyalties and hispreference for his German dominions and subjects.301 Of course when news reachedLondon of these events, a new round of anti-Hanoverian pamphlets ensued,supplied with fresh ammunition, exacerbated further by the Earl of Stair’s verypublic resignation. Perhaps the most famous of these tracts was A True Dialogue of…
A Trooper Lately returned From Germany, a Jacobitical publication that bothdenounced the Electorate and the Elector with equal vitriol.302 The variousresponses and reactions to such tracts led to a pamphlet war carried out with morediligence and fervour than the antagonists back on the European continent. Indeed,for the remainder of the campaign, little action was taken, save to move the armyback to Flanders to await the Dutch, who were to join the war several months later.Relations between King George II’s British and Hanoverian subjectsremained poor in the wake of Dettingen, however, the following year saw anincredible shift in the minds of the British soldier-authors, in that the inactivity of
300 These forces were actually acting as the rearguard of the army. Skrine, Fontenoy, p. 79.; The
Confectioner General Setting Forth the H[anoverian] Dessert (London: 1743).; The H[ano]v[eria]n
Confectioner General (London: 1743).301 Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, p. 53.302 Francis, Lord Hasting, wrote from London of ‘a very diverting dialogue between a trooper abroadand a sergeant at home upon their first meeting. What they say is truth, and has been confirmed bymany by a great many officers lately come over’, and he mentioned this particular tract and that ‘twohawkers very often have the impudence to rehearse [it] publicly by dialogue in the street’. HistoricalManuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of the Late Reginald Rawdon Hasting, esq.(London: 1934), vol. III, p. 39.; Anon. True Dialogue Between Thomas Jones, A Trooper, Lately Return'd
From Germany, And John Smith, A Serjeant In The First Regiment Of Foot-Guards to Which is Added, a
Memorial of the E- of S- (London: 1743).
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the army was contrasted to the rapidly improving relations towards theirHanoverian auxiliaries. The seeds of this shift were, in part, that the armies werebecoming accustomed to one another, and that the focal point of tensions, George II,had departed and returned to England. Yet there was another element that wouldshift the focus away from Hanoverians, in that the arrival of the Dutch, their‘phlegmatic brothers of Holland’, would redirect the ire of Britons (andHanoverians) as would the dubious conduct of the Austrians’ commander, the DukeD’Armeberg. 303D’Aremberg’s rudeness and frequent disagreements with Britishcommanders, including the newly appointed Marshal Wade, caused a deepening riftwith the Imperial forces, and a mutual dislike of this particular officer was a point ofcommonality between Britons and Hanoverians. When D’Aremberg was reviewingthe Hanoverian forces alongside Marshal Wade, the Hanoverian ‘General en Cheff’Wendt, deliberately waited for the Austrian to pass, then gave a sharp salute to theEnglish commander, a subtle act of disrespect that Marshal Wade’s aide-de-camprecalled as ‘the finest sight I ever saw’.304During this period of heightened contempt among the commanding officers ofthe British, Austrian and Dutch forces, the poor behaviour and deportment of theDutch soldiery made them, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the key focus ofBritish scorn. Such was the poor opinion of these soldiers that they made Britain’sGerman auxiliaries desirable by contrast. By 1746, Joseph Yorke was writing of theforces provided by the States General: ‘if they would but take some Germanauxiliaries into Pay’, he felt, they might have made more of an impact, adding that hedid not ‘care how few of their National Troops they send into the Field, for worsethere can’t be.’305 The Duke of Richmond encapsulated the mood of many fellowofficers when during the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 he demanded that the Ministry‘send for 10,000 or more Foot, be they Hessians, Hanoverians or Deviles, if they will
303 NAM 6807-426, Diary of Andrew Robertson, pp. 10-12.304 BL Add MS Hardwicke Papers 26250, Diary of Joseph Yorke, 1744, fol. 45.305 Yorke would, ironically, go on to become ambassador to the United Provinces. BL HardwickePapers Add MS 35363 fol. 124, Letter from Joseph Yorke, Inverness April 30th 1746.
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butt fight for us.’306 Suddenly, the Hanoverians did not seem so terrible, andcontrasting them with the Dutch after latter’s failures at the Battle of Fontenoy in1745, Andrew Robertson, surgeon for the 42nd Highlanders wrote in his diary:I remember sometime after the affair of Dettingen that the Hanoveriancommanders had the title of Confachoners [Confectioners] given to them,and that that was no less than applied to His Majesty. But I think that theDutch deserves that title better, and all the difference between aHanoverian and Dutch Confachoner is that the former can spoil a finevictory, and the latter occation a bloody defeat.307Robertson would continue to call the Dutch commanders ‘Confachoners’ for theremainder of his Journal. Hints at ‘great Disputes and Animosities’ and ‘Rage &Violence’ between British and Dutch forces also suggest that, though the hostilitytowards the Hanoverians was a real problem, it never matched the disgust for theDutch troops, nor for that matter, the tenuous relations with Flemish civilians.308At the same time, there was some indication of improving relations betweenBritish and Hanoverian forces, beyond the British finding an alternative focus forcomplaint. George Sackville, arriving in 1744, less than a year after Dettingen, wrotethat ‘the Hanoverians are in great favour with us, and the English encamp and doduty with them without the least dispute, so Mr. Wade was in the right to say thatthe reconciling of the troops was the least difficulty he apprehended when heaccepted the command.’309 Only a few days later, he wrote, ‘I cannot help every daylooking with surprise on the good agreement of the English and Hanoverians. Theyget drunk very comfortably together, and talk and sing a vast deal withoutunderstanding one syllable of what they say to one another.’310For the remainder of the war, complaints of the Hanoverians all butdisappear from the accounts of those who were the most critical, showing that evenif they did not come to appreciate them, at least they were inured to one another.Later battles would bring these two camps closer together, the most notable being
306 BL Newcastle Papers Add MS 32705 fol. 423, Richmond to Newcastle, Coventry, Dec. 7th, 1745.307 NAM 6807-426 Diary of Andrew Robertson, pp. 159-162.308 Quoted in, Conway, ‘War and National Identity’, p. 888.; BL Add MS 36252 fol. 12.309 HMC, Stopford-Sackville, vol. I, p. 284.310 Ibid, I, 288-9.
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the famed and honourable defeat at Fontenoy, where the British and Hanoverianswere in the thick of the fighting together, and emerged, though not victorious, full ofpraise for the actions of their fellow soldiers.311 That the relations between thesecamps would be better after a defeat than after a victory, reveals the strangerelationship that marked the Anglo-Hanoverian associations within the PragmaticArmy. However, they were also indicative of most conflicts throughout the century,where initial distrusts were quickly worn away by shared experience and mutualrespect among soldiers. This shift in sentiment is summed up effectively in thememoirs of Sir John Clerk, writing of 1745:I observed while I staid in England a very great and unexpected alacrityamongst all degrees of people for defending our happy constitution, and‘tho but lately great pains were used to reproach the Hannoverians andrender them despicable in the eyes of the people of England, yet nowthings took another turn, especially since the last year’s Battle atFontenoy, for at that time the Hannoverians behaved so well that many ofthe English souldiers protested to me that they were willing to divide aLoaf [of bread] with them.312From the words of one British cavalry officer after the Battle of Fontenoy, ‘by thebehavior of the Hanoverians they may henceforth justly be styl’d of the samenation.’313
**Perceptions of Auxiliaries**
Most relationships between Britons and their German auxiliaries were far lessdramatic in comparison to what transpired in the early days of the Pragmatic Army,though this should not suggest that perceptions of the respective soldiers wereentirely positive. The effects of stereotypes, political persuasion and individual
311 NAS Rh4/195/2 fol. 9, Harrington to Dunmore, June 9th 1745.312 Clerk himself was certainly a fan of German armies, later enquiring with John Christie about theviability of having his son join the Prussian Army under Frederick II. John Clerk, Memoirs of the Life
of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, edited by John M. Gray (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, vol. xiii,1892), p. 91. NAS GD18/4198, John Christie to Sir John Clerk, January 10th, 1751.313 Quoted in, Stephen Conway, ‘War and National Identity’, p. 887.
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experiences should not be overlooked, nor overemphasized. There were in fact,numerous instances when British soldiers would merely mimic partisan viewpoints,but more often their commentaries would reflect their own circumstances – whichis not to say they contradicted one another. Certainly there was a greaterunderstanding of the differences between mercenaries and auxiliaries amongsoldiers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, than scholars in the twentiethand twenty-first. This can be seen in the discussions of many soldiers who employone term or the other to reflect their own opinions, and the most derogatorycommentaries regarding subsidy-troops almost always use the term ‘mercenaries’.Hanoverians could often escape the effects of the mercenary stereotype in politicaldiscourse, due to their ties to the Monarchy, yet they were periodically the mostsusceptible to these accusations, as we have seen with the Pragmatic Army of 1742-4, although these sentiments re-emerged in 1756.There were recurring accusations of intentional tardiness, which bore withthem insinuations of a reluctance to fight, which fell on most German subsidytroops, although most commonly associated with the Hessians. It was the nature ofdealing with hired forces that made this slowness an occasion to question theloyalty and eagerness of these men – whereas for allies or fellow nationals it was acause for questioning their discipline and organization. The lateness in which theHessians arrived during the allied army’s march through Germany in 1743 madethem a scapegoat for the unsuccessful conclusion of the campaign, and already theHanoverians were being derided for their seeming cowardice and mercenarybehaviour at Dettingen. Three years later, in Scotland, the Duke of Cumberland,while earning his sobriquet the ‘Butcher’ suppressing the Jacobites, complainedrepeatedly of the slowness of the Hessians, and the Duke and his correspondentssaw the 6,000-strong contingent as a greater threat to his supply stores than to theScottish rebels.314 As we shall see in the subsequent chapter, such accusations ofslowness or tardiness were filled with symbolism, and were particularly commonamong opponents of the practice of hiring mercenaries.
314 W.A. Speck, The Butcher: the Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45 (Blackwell: Oxford,1981), p. 120.
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The implications by critics of a mercenary behaviour among the subsidytroops was one of many means of creating a distinction between their own forcesand the fighting men of other states – of course to the benefit of their own martialcharacter. The most negative opinions of auxiliary forces in public discourse wereduring periods where there was a perception of favouritism over Britain’s nativesons. This was particularly true in 1743, when George II took to command of thePragmatic Army, and during the brief time when the Hessians and Hanoverianguarded the English coast in 1756-7. Yet there were other areas of difference uponwhich soldiers and officers would focus, and not all of these comparisons favouredthe author’s own countrymen.In matters of appearance and mannerisms, there was a great degree of paritybetween popular discourse and the sentiment of soldiers. As indicated by ColonelWolfe, the German soldiers’ stiff posture and moustachioed face awed some, butmore found them peculiar, or comical. In terms of demeanour, here too there was aharmony between public discourse and private writings. In the American War,British officers complained of the stiffness and timidity of their Hessian colleagues,and there were some self-critical commentators among the German soldiery whoconfessed as much.315 For a prominent aristocrat such as George Henry Lennox, histime as aide-de-camp in the Duke of Cumberland’s Army of Observation wasapparently a dull one. He wrote to a Scottish associate that his sheet music would bebetter company than ‘our Friends the Germans’, and later professed, ‘I can’t hear ofthis expedition without wishing to be with my Grenadiers, for these Germans growtiresome. They are brave officers in the Field, but stupid dogs in society. For we
315 From Rodney Atwood’s quotation of Friedrich von der Lith: ‘The pedantic, obsequious characterof the Germans, empty of compliments, contrasts too greatly with the open, unaffected, noble ways ofthe English, for it to please them, and of individual freedom the Germans had scarcely any idea. Evenmany of the German officers felt this lack and sought to make up for it in their outward behaviour,but usually fell into a swaggering tone that made them laughable. They wished to speak and behavefreely and openly, and through this only betrayed all the more their slavish sentiments in which theyhad been brought up and the servile fear in which they were kept. If the youngest English officer laidbare all his thoughts without shyness at the table of the commanding general with the greatestfrankness and assurance, our German generals sat like schoolboys stiff and silent, and full of anxiousmodesty scarcely dared to speak and move. – The wonder is, that this pedantic character of theGerman people blossomed even in that clime.’ Quoted in Atwood, Hessians, p. 152.
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have no Prince Kinsky’s, Lacey’s, or any of them Jolly Fellows here.’316 Suchcomments bear a striking resemblance to the tales of grand tourists, or accounts ofdiplomatic envoys, while further revealing the discrepancy in aristocratic officers’opinions of the courtly society of the Austrian high command compared to theseemingly provincial culture within these smaller German forces.Contrasts in social behaviour and within polite society were only tangentiallytied to criticisms of professional ardour, as it was expected that officers would alsobe good gentleman. Yet some comments regarding Teutonic soldiery could bedirectly traced to military matters. One of the primary areas of difference recountedby British commentators was the religiosity of the German soldiers, especially theHanoverians and Hessians. The hostility shown by British soldiers for theCatholicism of Flemish, Portuguese and Spanish is easily contrasted with theadmiration for Protestant zeal displayed among the German forces. Theinstitutionalized piety and ceremonies displayed by the Hessian regiments inparticular were remarked upon by English soldiers and no-doubt appealing to thosewho shared the belief that piety had a salubrious effect on a nation’s soldiery.During their stint in Winchester in 1757, prints were made informing would-bespectators and curious locals as to the best time to visit in order that they mightwatch the proceedings.317 During the rebellion in America, especially within thefirst months of operating together, British officers found Hessian demonstrations ofpiety particularly admirable, and a point of contrast with their own forces. Othersmerely found this worthy of mockery. Lord Rawdon, who disdainfully referred tothe American rebels as ‘psalm-singers’, wrote that the Hessians within his own army‘sing hymns as loud as the Yankees, though it must [be] owned they have not thegodly twang through the nose that distinguishes the faithful.’318 In 1813, ThomasMorris and his fellow Englishmen were once again making jests at this outward
316 RH4/195/3 fol. 5, George Henry Lennox to Dr. Dunmore, Hameln July 20th, 1757; fol. 6, same tosame, Verden, 21st August, 1757.; W. A. J. Archbold, ‘Lennox, Lord George Henry (1737–1805)’ inMcCann, ODNB.317 HRO 44M69/k7 fol. 147, ‘A Correct View of the Hessian Camp on Barton Farm near Winchester’[1756]318 HMC, Rawdon Hastings, vol. III, p. 179.
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expression of devotion by their Hanoverian auxiliaries, suggesting that they were infact singing about their superior ration of schnapps.319Cleanliness was another area of contrast, and one that developed andchanged as the century progressed. The distinction in hygiene (synonymous withprofessional competence) changed throughout the century, and reflected theincreased interest within the British military establishment in increasing the healthof the men in the rank & file. In 1689, when William’s Army under Frederick, theDuke of Schomberg was encamped in northern Ireland, deep suspicions offavouritism arose from the British soldiers for the foreign mercenaries, given thelatter’s relatively healthy condition in contrast to the sickness found among theEnglish forces – to which cleanliness and sanitation were primarily responsible.320Yet, by the middle of the Eighteenth century, it was the British who placed a greateremphasis on cleanliness, which created numerous remarks from Briton and Germanalike on the undeniable contrast between the two groups. The dirtiness of Hessian,Prussian and other German soldiers was a common theme, as was the constantamazement of German authors regarding the cleanliness of English soldiers andsailors.321The most prominent subjects were in military ability, and the degree towhich each group compared to the standards of an ideal soldier. Just as indiscussions of religiosity, or cleanliness, these institutional and national differenceswere intertwined. The role of professionalism was critical to successfulcollaboration, and was particularly acute in descriptions of these hired soldiers. Justas inaugural encounters drew attention to key cultural differences, the firstmarches, parades and battles highlighted differences in discipline and martialability. Some of the key areas of contrast, especially during the early campaigns of aconflict, are owing to the nature of the armies. The British, usually a collection of
319 Thomas Morris, Recollections of Sergeant Morris, pp. 83-4.320 John Childs, The British Army of William III, p. 163.321 Helga Doblin, (trans.); and Mary C. Lynn (ed.), The American Revolution, Garrison Life in French
Canada and New York: Journal of an Officer in the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, 1776-1783 (Westport:Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 4.; Johann Conrad Döhla, A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution;
Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by Bruce E. Burgoyne (Norman: University of Oklahoma,1990), p. 71.
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rapidly augmented or newly raised regiments, would often find themselves fightingalongside troops from highly militarized German principalities, and because of this,in a greater state of readiness at the outbreak of war. Witnessing the drill andmanoeuvres of the Hessians in Winchester in 1756, James Wolfe was envious oftheir degree of skill and discipline when he visited their camp:We have waited upon the Hessians, in the exercise, both of their smallarms, & artillery, their steadyness [sic] under Arms, & strick [sic]attention is worthy of imitation, and the exact knowledge that everyofficer has of his own part is exemplary, their parts are neither intricatenor difficult, [being] calculated for the Genius, & temper of the[ir]People.322The Hessians were indeed something of a tourist attraction during their stay inEngland (as they had been in Scotland during the Jacobite Rebellion), but ratherthan focusing on religious practices or appearance, Wolfe was turning his attentionprimarily to military matters. While evaluating the Hessians military effectiveness,Wolfe here hints at a sense of the unique ‘temper’ of the Hessians, ostensibly areference to the natural character of the people. Yet the focus remains ondifferences in discipline and bearing. In creating such contrasts national pride orbias had to sometimes be set aside, and for James Wolfe, his hastily assembledregiment (the 33rd) fell short in contrast to these auxiliaries, to the point in which hewittily remarked to the Duke of Richmond: ‘the Hessians, & such other Troops… areto compose the Army of this Country [in Salisbury] – in which I hope we shall not beincluded.’323In many conflicts, most notably the Seven Years War and the AmericanRevolution, these German ‘Hilfstruppen’ were seen to be equal in their discipline andprofessionalism – if not outright superior – than their British counterparts. In themonths after arriving in Flanders in 1743, British commanders were constantly inneed of corralling their soldiers, and curbing the violence between them and thelocal townsfolk. British generals had to repeatedly command their soldiers notdisrupt religious processions within Flemish towns, or ‘ease themselves in ye streets
322 West Sussex Record Office (WSRO), Papers of the 3rd Duke of Richmond, Goodwood 223 fol. 3/10,Letter from James Wolfe to the Duke of Richmond, June 23rd, 1756.323 WSRO Goodwood 223 fol. 3/9, Wolfe to Richmond, Canterbury, 4th April, 1756
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in the day time contrary to all decency’.324 Such problems of discipline wereparticularly acute at the commencements of each successive war, both in Europeand abroad, and were a by-product of Parliamentary insistence on maintaining askeleton army in peacetime. While British cavalry remained exemplary throughoutthe eighteenth century, often the behaviour of the infantry regiments left a greatdeal to be desired, though usually in the purview of inaugural campaigns. When thePitt-Newcastle ministry sent British troops to Germany in 1758, they were met witha positive reception, and praised by Ferdinand of Brunswick for their appearanceand ability. Yet in one particularly condemnatory account, by the scholar andbiographer Jakob von Mouvillon, the British were far from the ideal soldiers thatthey might have seemed.Braver troops there cannot indeed be found in the world when in thebattle field and under arms before the enemy; but here ends theirmilitary merit. In the first place their infantry is composed of soindiscriminate a conglomeration of men, that it is difficult to maintaineven a shadow of discipline among them. Their cavalry is indeeddifferently constituted, but a foolish love for their horses makes themastonishingly rapacious after forage; so that in this respect they willexhaust a district far sooner than the Germans with whom a limit may befixed. Officers’ commissions among them are all had by purchase, andtheir consequence is, that their officers do not trouble their heads aboutthe service, and with few exceptions, understand absolutely nothingwhatever about it; and this goes on from the ensign to the general.325Though Mouvillon was penning these impressions decades later, one contemporaryaccount would seem to validate these rather disparaging assertions. From the diaryof one Brunswick officer, Major von Ungern, the depiction of the British infantrymatched these criticisms.The [English] infantrymen are more disorganized and licentious in theirbehaviour than the cavalrymen; they impulsively eat and drinkeverything, and as precise as they are while on duty, they are equallyrude when off it. They run through all the towns nearby stealing, robbingand plundering, they commit the greatest excesses, [and] they are overlyfond of drinking… Since the English Corps has been with our army, thediscipline within it has visibly declined. The English soldier permits
324 BL Add MS Hardwick Papers 36252 fols. 8a, 10. General Orders from June 25th and July 2nd.325 Quoted in Edward Barrington de Fonblangue, Political and Military Episodes… of the Right Hon.
John Burgoyne, p. 33.
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himself all kinds of debauchery, and is an evil influence on the soldiers ofthe remaining troops from which our army is composed.326Certainly there are matching descriptions of German auxiliary forces, most notablythe Hessen-Kassel soldiers fighting in the American War, little more than a decadelater. Yet what is most interesting here, particularly with Ungern’s assertions, is theaccusation of setting a bad influence on their fellow soldiers – a surprisinglycommon theme in armies where plundering was so commonplace. In New York,1777, Major Francis Hutcheson recounted stories of the ‘excessive plunder ourArmy has been shamefully guilty off [sic]’, and portrayed it as due to the negativeinfluence of the German auxiliaries: ‘the Hessian[s] set the example and they werereadily followed.’327 But there was a long tradition of attributing lapses in disciplineto the subversive influence of others, and in the Pragmatic Army in the 1740’s boththe British and Dutch accused one another of being bad influences on their ownmen.328 It is curious that such accusations were so common, even among men whohad previously discussed similar wrongdoings by their own troops.329 Here then isone of the effects of compartmentalizing based on national origin, as condemnationsfor acts such as marauding or theft seemed to always be couched in terms ofnationalities, not regiments or individuals, and therefore have an heir of ethnic bias.In any event, there was a greater degree of parity in the committal of such ignobleacts than any side cared to admit, particularly in the mid-century wars.However, the divide in professionalism between these forces – as far assoldiers’ commentaries are concerned – changed significantly over time. Unlikeprevious conflicts, in the Low Countries in the 1790’s the British were from the startto be deemed far superior to their German auxiliaries and allies – no doubt because
326 Decken, ‘Tagebuch des herzoglich braunschweigschen Majors’, pp. 341-2.327 BL Haldimand Manuscripts Add MS 21680 fol. 175, Hutcheson to Haldimand. New York, February16th, 1777.328 Jeffrey Amherst wrote in his personal journal: ‘The Dutch plundered much & our men began totake examples by them’, though Amherst had recorded a number of General Orders over the pastyear to trying to limit British marauding. CKS Amherst Paper’s U1350 01/01 Amherst’s Journal for1744 p. 151.329 Stephen Conway has noted this phenomenon with British and Hessian officers in the War ofAmerican Independence in particular. Stephen Conway, ‘Military-Civilian Crime and the British Armyin North America, 1775-1781’ PhD Dissertation, University College London (1982), esp. pp. 152-4.
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some of the first contingents sent were the guard infantry. One English officerbragged that ‘all about us we are worshipped, the British Guards look’d on as GodAlmighties.’330 When the liberation of Germany in 1813 permitted Britain to onceagain subsidize German forces, this difference was even more pronounced. Duringthe Waterloo campaign of 1815 there was an appreciable difference between theprofessional and dutiful British, and their auxiliaries of hastily assembled Brunswickand Nassau regiments and Hanoverian militia (Landwehr), which were deridedrepeatedly for their unprofessionalism, tendencies to plunder, and seemingindifference to their cause. As one officer recalled of the forces under the Duke ofWellington:We were, take us all in all, a very bad army. Our foreign auxiliaries, whoconstituted more than half of our numerical strength, with someexceptions, were little better than a raw militia – a body without a soul,or like an inflated pillow, that gives to the touch and resumes its shapeagain when the pressure ceases – not to mention the many who wentclear out of the field, and were only seen while plundering our baggage intheir retreat.331During this conflict there was a growing sense of division between the British forcesand their German allies, a phenomenon which reinforces the relative parity whichhad previously existed between the two groups, and indicates that the ‘mercenaries’employed in previous conflicts were not merely valued by their quantity, but theirutility. While there were differences, real or distorted, the military profession andthe cause for which these men fought contributed greatly to a sense of unity andcommonality.332 As discussed with the frustrations between Austrian, British andDutch armies in this series of conflicts with France, the infighting and disparatemotives of each ally greatly contributed to a disdain between the men in the ranks.
330 HRO 1M44/110 fol.15 Letter from Lord Wallingford to his mother, Camp near Valenciennes, May28th, 1793.331 Quoted in: Fitchett, (ed.), Wellington’s Men, p.136.332 Corporal Todd, perhaps one of the most valuable accounts of soldiering in the eighteenth century,wrote had found himself in numerous occasions surrounded by his Hanoverian, Hessian andBrunswicker allies during the Seven Years War. At one point, separated from his own regimentbefore a battle, he ‘resolv’d to Joyn the first Collumn of Infantry belonging to our Army, whetherEnglish or Germans’, as his main objective was to contribute to the battle by any means possible.Todd, Journal of Corporal Todd, pp. 156, 227-8.
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Certainly perceptions of auxiliaries benefited from their being under the samecommand – and thus usually sharing the same objectives – as the British.The other major unifying element was victories in battle and particular featsdisplaying military ability, which would remain throughout this epoch as theprimary means of harbouring a sense of unity. Just as exemplary behaviour in battlewould curb resentment of the Austrians, so too did this effect auxiliary forces –troops who were expected to fight, yet impressed their paymasters more by goingbeyond the call of duty. The work of the Hanoverian artillery at Dettingen in 1743was so lauded that caveats to compliment their efforts could be found in even someof the more polemical condemnations of the Electoral forces. Conversely, anyshortcomings by these subsidy troops would hamper the cohesiveness of theseforces. One of the primary factors that forever damaged the memory of the‘Hessians’ in the American War was that they were apart of, and in many wayscontributed to, the defeat of British arms.
**Conclusions**
Few issues in British foreign and military policies in eighteenth century were asfraught with turmoil and political divisiveness as the hiring of German auxiliaries.Though most objections were geared towards the costs and motives of suchpractices, the subsidy troops themselves (Hanoverian and Hessian soldiers inparticular) were recipients of intense public scrutiny. From the 1730’s to the 1770’sand beyond, auxiliaries were one of the chief bugaboos in the minds and mouths ofthose advocating isolationist or ‘blue water’ policies in Britain, yet most soldierswould see things differently.333 Those fighting alongside these auxiliaries saw them
333 At the commencement of each successive war, as the British Army assembled, be it in England,Flanders or America, British soldiers wrote of their anticipation of the arrival of their Germanauxiliaries. Similarly, in 1758, British officers were anxious to join their auxiliaries on the Continent,as was the case of John Mostyn, who hoped that the Duke of Newcastle would see to his placement inFerdinand’s army in Germany, so he would no longer be relegated to ‘cruising like a marine with thefleet’ in one of the many raids against the French coast. BL Add MS 32881 fol. 238, Mostyn toNewcastle, July 19th 1758.
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as assets vital to the war efforts for which they fought, not an intrinsic menace totheir liberty and livelihood. The mercenary title has remained, and the legacy ofthese soldiers, particularly in the accounts of historians, is one that has reflected thepopular impressions, not the attitudes of those with whom they served.This chapter has surveyed these auxiliaries’ motives, treatment within thearmy, and some of the key themes in the recollections of contemporary soldiers.From these, we can see that there was parity in the treatment of both native soldierand foreign auxiliary, and no callous frivolity in the usage and application of subsidyforces. Professional solidarities were enhanced by the discipline and esprit de corpsapparent in the first encounters with these subsidy troops, revealing that these‘mercenaries’ were potentially better soldiers than native Britons, at least until theend of the century, when the dynamics appeared to change. At the same time, acommon cause was a strong unifier, seen not only in relations between soldiers, butbetween British fighting men and the civilian populations they encountered withinGermany. The solidarities emerging from a joint cause and professional fraternalbond would at times have a strength surpassing national affiliation, as seen when arecently captured corporal Todd preferred the company of other captives, chieflyHanoverians and Hessians, to the British and Irish men now serving in the FrenchArmy.334 National distinctions would certainly remain, but they were stronger inthe vocabulary of soldiers than in their actions.It would be foolhardy to try to label the relations between British forces andGerman subsidy troops throughout the century as innately positive or negative,because each encounter over this vast era had various factors that would informopinions and determine the manner in which these polities related. Certainly, if thefirst two years of the Pragmatic Army are any indication, the relations betweenthese forces could change quite dramatically over a short period. Yet, judging by theever-improving relations in the War of Austrian Succession, the generally positive
334 Todd, Journal of Corporal Todd, pp. 227-229, 236.
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attitudes during the Seven Years War, and the ‘harmonious’ nature of the auxiliariesin the First Coalition, the overall tenor leans towards cordiality, which, if notshocking or surprising in itself, is a dramatic contrast to the temperament of thenation at-large. Yet there is one instance of prolonged interaction between Britishand German auxiliaries that is well documented, and from this, we can glean a betterappreciation of the social and organizational dynamics of this relationship. Havingsurveyed some of the themes common in dealings with German auxiliaries, we cannow focus on the American War of Independence, where we can better appreciatethe attitudes and associations prevalent within this form of Anglo-German army.
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Chapter IV:
Case Study 1 – The ‘Hessians’ in the American War
For this, the first of two chapter-long case studies, we will examine the most widelydiscussed of the German auxiliaries in British service in the eighteenth century: the‘Hessians’ in the War of American Independence. Throughout this thesis, we havebeen examining the role of preconceived ideas and stereotypes, and their effects onthe perceptions of the soldiers themselves. Here we turn to a group that has some ofthe most enduring stereotypes of all, as the ‘Hessian mercenary’ is one of the morememorable actors in the American creation myth. However, this chapter is notdesigned to either narrate their services in America, or to combat the many mythsregarding the ‘Hessians’, as these have been successfully done many times before.The military history of these German auxiliaries is well covered by German, Britishand American scholars from the nineteenth century onwards and the bibliographyregarding their service has grown considerably since the last quarter of thetwentieth century, especially during the Revolutionary Wars’ bicentennial.335 Yetwith a few notable exceptions, not-the-least Rodney Atwood’s chapter on ‘Anglo-Hessian Relations’ and in the writings of Silvia Frey and Stephen Conway, an
335 Max von Eelking and Edward Lowell’s histories of these German contingents are the mostextensive, with Lowell’s not having much of the ideological edge that Eelking’s work contains.Friedrich Kapp’s contribution contains perhaps the best account of the treaties with the variousprinces. More recently, the two best military histories are the works on the Hessen-Kassel forces, byRodney Atwood and Ernst Kipping. The 1970’s and 80’s were a critical period for reappraisals of the‘Hessians’, as their image as mercenaries or as pawns of greedy princes was successfully challenged(although this point had been raised by Joseph Rosengarten a century ago), while the social relationsbetween British and German soldiers received some, albeit brief, attention in the ‘new militaryhistories’ of Silvia Frey, Stephen Conway and Christopher Hibbert. Since then, the best works on ‘theHessians’ have been examining the political or ideological histories of these soldier and theirrelations with America, and impressions of them in the public sphere in Britain, Germany, and theUnited States. There should be a special mention to the works of Bruce E. Burgoyne and HelgaDoblin, whose translations of ‘Hessian’ diaries, have been of inestimable benefit in the creation of thischapter. Joseph George Rosengarten, A Defence of the Hessians (Philadelphia: 1899).; Edward J.Lowell, The Hessians and the other German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War (NewYork: Harper and Brothers, 1884).; Friedrich Kapp, Der Soldenthandel deutscher Fürsten nach
Amerika (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1874).; Max von Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the North
American War of Independence, 1776-1783, translated by J. G. Rosengarten (Albany, NY: Joe Munsell’sSons, 1893).
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examination of the interactions and relations between British and German soldiersin the American War has received far less attention than most other aspects of theirservice.336 With this in mind, the aim of this case study is to fit this well-knowninstance of Anglo-German military cooperation into the broader context of thesoldierly interactions of these polities. Doing so will be a means of providing crucialinsight to how the German auxiliaries in the American War both typify this long-running relationship, but also stand apart from other instances of German forces inBritish pay.
**Background**
With the history of the ‘Hessians’ so widely covered, only a brief overview of theirorigins and composition will be necessary here. In 1775, Lord North’s Ministry wasin a crisis, facing a widespread rebellion across the Atlantic with an underpoweredBritish Army numerically insufficient for conducting any operations of consequencein the following year. Therefore, once again, British ministers looked abroad to thelarge standing armies of the European continent to hire a force capable of helpingquell the civil war currently underway in America. Yet, unlike in previous conflicts,where the smaller German states were a natural choice for bolstering the Army,preliminary efforts at hiring soldiers were directed mainly towards the EmpressCatherine the Great, for 20,000 of her Russian troops. The failure to obtain theseRussian soldiers, further compounded by the refusal of the Dutch Republic to lendout its Scots Brigade, meant that once again Germany seemed the best means ofacquiring competent soldiers at a quick rate. Even before talks with Catherine cameto naught, there were offers from the Princes of Hessen-Hanau and Brunswick, and
336 It should be noted that Atwood’s chapter deals more with issues of rank and command hierarchy,and that many of the best accounts of British and German interaction are interspersed in otherchapters. Atwood, The Hessians.; ‘Stephen Conway, ‘The British Army, “Military Europe,” and theAmerican War of Independence’, p. 76-7.
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other princes were close behind.337 By February 1776, subsidy treaties had beenratified and soldiers from Hessen-Kassel, Hessen-Hanau and Brunswick were beingmobilized for service in the colonies, all under the supervision of Colonel WilliamFaucitt, who was simultaneously working with Colonel Georg von Scheither torecruit Germans for British regiments.338The treaties that would lead to ‘the Hessians’ serving in America areunexceptional in comparison to those subsidy-agreements discussed in the previouschapter, save their unique trans-Atlantic nature. There was nothing particularlyexceptional about these arrangements save for their incredibly high profile inEurope and that these German princes were leasing soldiers to a cause that waspolitically inconsequential for them, thereby exposing themselves to the criticismsof their contemporaries, and posterity.339 The terms of these treaties were highlyfavourable for the various German princes, and their only setback was therequirement to replenish fallen soldiers with new recruits, which would in time putgreat strains upon the smaller states to maintain their quotas.‘The Hessians’ is a term that has come to signify these near 30,000 soldiers,from what were technically six separate armies hired from principalities in the heartof the Holy Roman Empire.340 The largest contingent, at 18,970 men, was thecontribution from Hessen-Kassel, loaned from the Landgrave Frederick II, who inhis youth had commanded the Hessian forces in Scotland during the suppression ofthe Jacobites.341 As the largest and most notable force, they would lend their name,and in many ways their reputation, to the other German troops and serve in most ofthe major campaigns in the central colonies, including New York, the Jerseys, RhodeIsland, and the Philadelphia campaign, with a few regiments also taking part in thefighting in the Carolinas and Georgia. The most distinguished troops from theHessen-Kassel forces were the Jägers, rifle-armed soldiers who, along with a handful
337 These include the failed bids of Bavaria and Württemburg. Atwood, Hessians, p. 8.338 Stephen Conway, The British Isles and the War of American Independence (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p.16339 Redlich, German Military Enterpriser, vol. II, pp. 98-99.340 The figures for these soldiers, with the exception of the Hessen-Kassel forces, are from listsprovided in Kapp, Soldenthandel, p. 208.341 For his correspondence with his father, see: HSAM 4/2/3981.
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of English and Highlander battalions, would serve as the primary skirmishers andlight infantrymen for Generals Howe, Clinton and Cornwallis. These were welltrained, and well-paid volunteers, who received continuous praise for their servicesby the British commanding officers, and were seen by many as superior in everyway except range to the more celebrated American riflemen.The other, actual Hessians, were those who made up the far smallercontingent of Count William of Hessen-Hanau, the eldest son of Frederick II and hiswife, the princess Mary, daughter of George II of Britain. The Hessen-Hanaucontingent, the first to be offered to the British Crown, numbered some 2,400 menand would be sent to Canada, with the majority taking part in the ill-fated campaignin upper New York under General Burgoyne. This disastrous expedition resulted inthe surrender at Saratoga on October 17th 1777, of an army of roughly 6,000 men,half of which were German. From this point onwards they would be part of whatwas known as the ‘Convention Army’, and as prisoners of war encamped throughoutthe Middle and New England Colonies over the following two years, waiting theirturn to be exchanged.The more prominent of the two German forces serving in the Canadiantheatre was the contingent of the Prince of Brunswick, which had close ties and along history of cooperation with the British Army as auxiliaries, and thismanifestation would see some 5,723 men serving in America.342 Lt. GeneralFriedrich von Riedesel commanded the German forces in this theatre, andmaintained good relations with both British and German officers and soldiers.Fourth among the Germans contingents were the soldiers of Ansbach-Bayreuth,notable for the relatively substantial number of Catholic soldiers within its threeregiments. Among the 2,353 soldiers that would be sent by the Margrave CharlesAlexander was a young lieutenant, August Wilhelm von Gneisenau, who would laterbecome the famous reformer and Feldmarschall in the Prussian service.343 TheAnsbachers were certainly one of the more impressive looking forces to be sent to
342 Kapp, Soldatenhandel, p. 208.343 Charles Alexander was a heavily indebted prince, who would later sell his domain to the Prussianmonarchy and spent his waning days in England.
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America, but they were of dubious character, having mutinied once in transit downthe Main River, and were initially held up in New York for fears of desertion. Theywould spend the majority of their time in America in the vicinity of New York,mainly operating in punitive raids and skirmishes, and were the largest Germancontingent at the siege and surrender at Yorktown.344Lastly are the forces from Waldeck and Anhalt-Zerbst, both numbering closeto 1,200 men, with the former being sent to fight in Florida, the latter as garrisontroops in Canada. Waldeck, though it had some forces serving in British Pay underFerdinand during the Seven Years War, was more commonly a lender of soldiers tothe Dutch Republic, and together with the Anhalt-Zerbst and Ansbach-Bayreuthforces, represented an expansion in the number of principalities leasing soldiers tothe British government through the middle of the eighteenth century.345In numbers and in costs, this assembly of hired auxiliaries was not nearly asextensive, nor as expensive, as that employed in the Seven Years War. Collectively,these 30,000 soldiers, the Hanoverians serving in Mediterranean, and the severalthousand Germans within British regiments, represented a large percentage of thetotal forces mobilized for George III. The German auxiliaries alone would representbetween 33 and 37 percent of the total forces in America. They were often betweena third and a half of the strength of any given army, yet only in New York during late1781 did they comprise a significant majority of the forces in one particularregion.346 From Canada to Florida, there was a nearly universal German presence,as only on the furthest frontiers, namely in the Ohio valley, was there an absence ofsome form of Germanic auxiliary force, and German born soldiers would comprise aconsiderable percentage of the American and French forces as well. The famousdefeat and capture of the Hessian Regiments under Rall at Trenton, on ChristmasDay, 1776, and the failed assault on a rebel fort at Redbank are the only instances ofbattles fought exclusively by German forces in this conflict, and in major operations
344 Edward J. Lowell, The Hessians and the other German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the
Revolutionary War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1884), pp. 256-7, 277.345 Kapp, Soldatenhandel, p. 81.346 Atwood, Hessians, p. 257.
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and minor skirmishes British and German troops were often close to equal innumbers.Though there were numerous fears that these auxiliaries would merelydesert once they arrived in America (owing to the high number of Germans alreadysettled in the colonies) their performance in battles and their remarkably lowdesertion rates, at least initially, discredited these fears.347 Nevertheless, desertionwas high among these auxiliaries in the waning years of the war, and extreme in thecase of the Brunswick and Hessen-Hanau ‘Convention’ forces. While the initialcontingents sent to the colonies were of admirable martial ability and were seen bythe majority of Britons as good soldiers, the requirements needed to keep theregiments at full capacity would mean that the quality of men entering into the armywould decrease significantly. In the end, only slightly above half of the Germansoldiers sent to America would return home, with more than 5,000 remaining in thenewly formed United States.
**Integration**
The smaller, almost intimate, scale of the British Armies in the colonies, and theextended duration of the conflict, led to a significant amount of integration duringthe American War, enhanced further by the favourable treatment the ‘Hessians’received from their British paymasters. Though history may remember the‘Hessians’ as mercenaries, they were very much ‘allies’ in the thoughts, words andactions of the British generals.348 The deference shown by many Britishcommanding officers, their role within the army, and the tasks to which they were
347 For attempts at getting Hessians to desert, see: Lyman Butterfield, ‘Psychological Warfare in 1776:The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society, 94. (1950), pp. 233-241.
348 For the deference shown by Jon Burgoyne (by no means a lover of the Hessian auxiliaries), see:John Burgoyne, Orderly book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne: from his entry into the state of New York
until his surrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct. 1777; from the original manuscript deposited at Washington's
head quarters (Newburgh, N. Y., J. Munsell, 1860), esp. p. 17.
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employed, reveal that they were to be treated – if not always considered – as equals.Whatever shortcomings in the perceptions of their fellow-soldiers, these foreigncontingents were well cared for, far better in fact than the Germans serving withinBritish regiments.The first weeks of service in the British Army would not render suchimpressions. Conditions on the transports heading to England (often renovatedslave-ships) were in some cases so poor that many German officers soughtimmediate improvements for the longer voyage to America.349 However, for theofficers themselves, theirs were satisfactory accommodations, and the fewcomplimentary remarks are further supported in that the most unfavourablecomments were reserved for the terrible weather, and their obligatoryseasickness.350 In most other cases, the German soldiers were transportedalongside, or with British forces, and therefore enjoyed a great deal of parity in thisrespect.The primary means to win over the hearts and minds of the auxiliaries, wasto appeal to their stomachs. From their first meal upon George III’s ships, theGerman troops would be given roast beef and English beer in a casual ceremony ofAnglicization that would continue for foreign soldiers fighting alongside the Britishthroughout the next half-century.351 Though the food supplied en route was notparticularly appealing, once in the colonies, conditions improved, at times as a directresult of British attempts at trying to alleviate the weariness and tight stomachsincurred on the long trans-Atlantic voyage. The commentary of the German soldiersregarding food and provisions throughout the war is generally favourable, withsoldiers being granted ‘allowances which even the most fastidious stomach can
349 The poor accommodation on the transports of the Ansbach-Bayreuth forces lead to a mutiny,during which their Jägers fired upon the mutinous regiments. This was in part due to the crampedconditions on the river boats, which, according to Lowell, the soldiers thought would be the shipsthey would be travelling to America in. Lowell, The Hessians, pp. 48-9.350 Johann Friedrich Specht, Specht Journal: A Military Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign translated byHelga Doblin, edited by Mary C. Lynn (Westport CT: Greenwood, 1995), pp. 6, 12.351 Atwood, Hessians, p. 82. Bruce E. Burgoyne (ed. & translated), Georg Pausch’s Journal and Reports
of the Campaign in America (Heritage: Maryland, 1996), p. 46.
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endure.’352 There were a few exceptions of course, such as the noticeabledepreciation in this variety of foodstuffs during Burgoyne’s campaign in upper NewYork in 1777, where soldiers were issued flour and an unwavering supply of saltedpork, for ‘pork at noon, pork at night, pork cold, pork warm.’353 Worse still for theseBrunswick and Hanau forces, the soldiers were required to bake their own bread,which one officer complained would not have been seen even in the Russian Army,which from the German perspective, was the nadir of European forces.354 Others,though well supplied, were not immediately won-over by English cuisine and theirpalettes still yearned for various German specialties – although ironically, thesauerkraut shipped to soldiers in the opening months of the war was destined forBritish and not German soldiers. Some men nursed small quantities of flour broughtfrom home, or made an effort at acquiring rye bread and other familiar foodstuffsfrom locals once in the colonies.355 One Brunswicker praised the Canadian ryebread, but harboured disbelief at the reception in the British Army of a specialCanadian delicacy: rattlesnakes.356 But foreign provisions, such as rattlesnakes andspruce beer (as a preventative against scurvy), were adjustments that not only theGerman auxiliaries had to make, but transitions which they experienced along withtheir fellow Europeans, the British, for in most cases the menus were one in thesame, and new to both. While this was primarily a consequence of the theatre ofwar, there were deliberate attempts at fostering good will through a commonality ofprovisions. The Hanau artillerymen were indebted to the ‘uniquely good care,’ ofGeneral Phillips, who was ‘concerned that portions are as good for them as for his
352 William L. Stone, (trans.), Letters of Brunswick and Hessian Officers During the American Revolution(Albany: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1891), p. 60.353 Quoted in, Lowell, The Hessians, p. 151.354 August Wilhelm Du Roi. Journal of Du Roi the Elder Lieutenant and Adjutant, in the Service of the
Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778. Translated by Charlotte S. J. Epping (New York: D. Appleton and Co.,1911), p. 90.355 Murhardsche Bibliothek Kassel (MBK), 4* MS Hass, 247, ‘Im Lager Staaten Eiland’, fols. 102-107.;‘Journal of Johann August von Loos’, in Valentine C. Hubbs, (ed.), Hessian Journals: Unpublished
Documents of the American Revolution (Camden House: Columbia, 1981), p. 47.; Helga Doblin, The
American Revolution, Garrison Life in French Canada and New York, p. 36.; Bruce Burgoyne, The Diary
of Lieutenant Johann Heinrich von Bardeleben and Other von Donop Regiment Documents (Maryland:Heritage Books, 1998), p. 54.356 ‘It may be that I am prejudiced, but none of it for me! Thanks!’ Stone, Letters of Brunswick and
Hessian Officers, pp. 87-8.
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own and the other Royal artillery companies.’357 The sharing of the same foodstuffswas a point of commonality not always shared with Britain’s allies, and can be seenas one of the more favourable aspects of being a subsidy troop for the British crown.Other facets of the treatment of German auxiliaries are mixed, especially withbillets and barracks, where few lessons were learned from the debacles of 1756.358Notwithstanding this point of tension, in most cases the German Hilfstruppen sharedthe same hardships and bounties as British soldiers and had little in common withthe feelings of resentment incurred by the poor care given to the Hessian andHanoverian auxiliaries in the early days of the Seven Years War.359 Though this didindeed contribute to unity, as we shall see, a commonality in supply also had adetrimental impact from attitudes towards ‘Hessian’ plundering and marauding, asthe contrast created by their behaviour and that of British soldiers, was seeminglyunjustified or gratuitous on account of the parity in provisioning with British troops.In terms of dress and drill, there was a deliberate policy of creatinguniformity, and the changes were by no means well received. There was a degree ofself-consciousness on account of officers of Hessian and Brunswick contingents, inregards to their highly ornamental uniforms. The gold-laced hats of the Hanauartillery were ‘considered very ugly by the English’ and shortly after arriving in NewYork, Hessian soldiers were required to cut the lace from their uniforms.360 At first,this was done so that they would match with the British in parade, but it was also apart of an adaptation to warfare in the colonial wilderness, seen previously with theadjustments made by 60th ‘Royal Americans’ Regiment in the Seven Years War, andnow being adopted throughout the British Army.361 Yet, most elements of the
357 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 46.358 Upon returning to New York after the Philadelphia campaign, the Hessians were reported to havemoved to ‘miserable quarters in huts’, and their reputation for plundering, and the subsequenthostility from the Colonial populace, meant that these soldiers were often moved to less desirableand more distant billets. Bernhard A. Uhlendorf (ed. and trans), Revolution in America: Confidential
Letters and Journals 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Bauermeister of the Hessian Forces (NewBrunswick: Rutgers, 1957), p. 231.359 This balance could also be seen with ship bounties, for example, when Lord Cornwallis divided thebounty of a captured frigate evenly among British and Hessian grenadiers. Uhlendorf, Revolution in
America, p. 228.360 MBK, 4* MS Hass 247, ‘Im Lager Staaten Eiland’, fol. 102a361 Conway, ‘The British Army, “Military Europe,”’, p. 76-7;
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Germans’ uniforms remained, especially for the Brunswick forces, which stubbornlymaintained a dress totally unsuited for the climate and terrain they foundthemselves in. As for drill and commands, in both armies in Canada and the middlecolonies, exercises with British and German soldiers were conducted to put both onan even footing – which more or less meant conforming to British commands andmethods. Such practices were an introduction to techniques adopted by the Britishfrom years fighting on the American frontier, and represented not a Prussian orEuropean manner of drill and exercise but an ‘American’ one, which caused a degreeof resentment among German soldiers, especially when it was so far from theirFrederician model. Resentment towards these impositions was quick to follow. Theresult was that, according to Georg Pausch’s complaints to the Hereditary Prince ofHessen-Hanau, ‘instead of previous friendship, only enmity is to be seen.’362Another creator of tension was the seeming subservience of German officersdemanded by their superiors, and often equals, within the British officer corps.Whereas small detachments of soldiers and even wings of an army would be left tothe command of a German officer, the ‘Foreign Troops’ never operatedindependently of British commanders for a myriad of tactical, constitutional, andpolitical reasons, and if given the opportunity to operate on their own initiative, thishappened only briefly. Some private misgivings regarding the German officerssupported such policies, as seen in the correspondence of the Scottish grenadier,Major Charles Cochrane, who referred to the debacles of Trenton and Benningtonwhen he stated that ‘these people have greatly deceived us all, and entailedMisfortune on us when ever entrusted with Commands separate from the British.’363Furthermore, as Atwood has highlighted, in a manner fitting their true status ashired auxiliaries, the British officers neither required nor wished for much inputfrom their Hessian counterparts.364 Unlike the joint leadership, or round-robincommand structure that haunted the coalition attempts in European conflicts, herethe British were definitively in charge.
362 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 59.363 NLS MS 5375, fol. 38 Charles Cochrane to Andrew Stewart, Germantown, 19th October, 1777.364 German officers were also present at Burgoyne’s councils of war before surrendering at Saratoga,though it is not certain their specific effects on his policies. Atwood, Hessians, 245.
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Unsurprisingly, some officers among the auxiliaries acutely disdained theirsubservience to the British. ‘Personally, for my part, I never participate’ confessedthe artillery officer Pausch regarding the drills designed at creating uniformitywithin the forces in Canada. Still smarting from previous impositions, the Hanauartilleryman explained, ‘[I] only send an officer, because each time an Englishcaptain is assigned thereto, and only an English officer commands at the time. Thenational pride and haughtiness of these people allows them in their conceit tocommand my troops, but I can not command them.’ Despite such conflicts betweenofficers, he boasted that the NCOs and soldiers themselves maintained ‘the greatestfriendship and unity’, suggesting that attempts at coordinating British and Germanforces primarily fostered resentment among the higher ranking officers.365Positioning within the army would be another area in which subservience tothe British was implied. Within the structure of the army itself, the Germanauxiliaries were nearly always the main units comprising the ‘left wing’ of the army,to the point where the Brunswick Colonel Johann Specht – and certainly manyothers – considered them to be synonymous.366 Mirroring previous Europeanconflicts, the British demanded the ‘right wing’, the position of honour in paradesand in army organization. While Hanoverian auxiliaries would often share thisposition with the British in large multinational coalitions, here, with the exception oflight infantry, the German forces were relegated to the left, no doubt further addingto resentments of English hauteur. The same structural consideration was given for‘the extreme rear guard’ of the army, which the Hessian Officer John von Krafftclaimed the British ‘constantly hoped for,’ though this may have had more practicalpurposes.367This was an implied distinction between the forces, yet there is no indicationthat the British utilized their German auxiliaries differently from their own men. Infact, both testimony and statistics reveal that on many occasions they were sparedthe brunt of the fighting, with some regiments receiving only a handful of casualties
365 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 59.366 Specht, Military Journal, p. 78.367 John C.P. von Krafft, Journal of Lieutenant John Charles Philip von Krafft, 1776-1784. (NY: NYTimes, 1968), p.42.
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through the course of the war.368 Yet this was not apparent at first. Britisheagerness to get the Hessians into the thick of the fighting shortly after theirdisembarkation in the summer of 1776, was met with resistance from Hessianofficers, who wanted to ensure that their men were not used ‘condescendingly asmercenaries’ but as ‘allies of a great Prince.’369 This emphasis on equal value wasfurther reinforced by the adaption of a common practice of dividing various dutiessuch as foraging, picketing, and reconnaissance to equal numbers of British andGerman forces, thereby ensuring that neither group would be given the leastdesirable tasks. Though it is difficult to judge the effect this had on the participants,it certainly provided yet another venue with which these groups might interact.There was also a degree of psychological attachment to both the BritishArmy, and the cause they fought for. No doubt, the oath of allegiances and thedynastic ties helped in this. While preparing to embark for England, BrigadierSpecht recalled himself and his fellow soldiers cheering, ‘Long live the King! Longlive the Duke!’ at the redoubt at the Hanoverian port of Stade, above which flew aUnion Jack ‘to honour’ them.370 Celebrations for the birthdays of the Royal Family,and various other typically British festivities, added to a sense of unity, in which theGermanic ties of the Hanoverian dynasty played no small part. Months after hercapture at Saratoga, Baroness Riedesel, the wife of the Brunswick general, gatheredtogether British and German officers to drink to the King’s Health, ‘which was donewith the most sincere loyalty, both to his person and his cause. Never, I believe, was“God save the King” sung with more enthusiasm or greater sincerity.’371 For theirpart, British forces were more than happy to return the favour, and showed theirhigh estimations with a variety of formal and informal salutations. One such salutefrom an English warship, was recalled as ‘a great honor which the proud Englishmandoes not like to show to everyone.’372 Nevertheless, even though many Germansoldiers would maintain an appreciation for the British Army, they remained very
368 Atwood, Hessians, pp. 117, 231.369 Hubbs, Hessian Journals, p. 60370 Specht, Journal, p. 5.371 Marvin Brown (ed.). Baroness Riedesel and the American Revolution (University of North CarolinaPress: Chapel Hill, 1965), p. 71.372 Hubbs Hessian Journals, p.61.
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much German in their identity and their institutional affiliations. But there areindications of a lingering attachment to their time in King George’s Army, for whenthe Bayreuth regiment paraded into its home city for the first time in six years, ‘withdressed ranks, smartly shouldered weapons, and music playing’, quite tellingly, theband was playing an English march.373
**Interactions**
The areas and methods of interaction between British and German auxiliaries in theAmerican War were not particularly different from previous, or succeeding conflicts.Nevertheless, the unique circumstances of the American Rebellion meant that therewere a certain number of divergences from the eighteenth century norms. Moreimportantly, the increased popularity of this subject, as well as the enormity ofsources in contrast to previous wars, make this particular episode an excellentperiod from which to highlight many of the forms of interaction typical betweenredcoats and German auxiliaries.The inhibitors of language and distance remained prominent, yet, thedynamics of the language divide was slightly different, given the nature of theconflict, and more importantly, the setting. The British and German soldiers wereoperating in a predominantly English speaking environment, and therefore theimpetus for learning new languages fell upon the German forces, as the Ansbach-Bayreuth officer, Johann Döhla explained:Many of the [British] officers spoke French, some German also; howeverthey seldom used the French language, and German only in the greatestemergency. All orders from the King, Parliament, and the commander inchief were given in English, and all reports were required in the samelanguage. Our officers therefore had to apply themselves diligently tolearn this language if they wanted to succeed and did not want to dragalong interpreters, which cost money and were not always available.374
373 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 253.374 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 71.
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Whereas in Europe it was the British officers who were seen as unprofessional fortheir linguistic shortcomings (for example, when George Sackville was held chieflyresponsible for the miscommunication between the British and German highcommands), here it was English that was the lingua franca, and the onus to adaptwould land squarely on the German commanders. Yet, this did not prevent theBritish officers from endeavouring to learn German, as Lieutenant W.J. Hale of the45th Regiment considered the language ‘almost absolutely necessary for thefrequency of British officers being detached with Hessians’ in the rank & file.375Certainly the German officers knew the pressures imposed by this languagebarrier, and many relied heavily upon their knowledge of French, and any British orIrish men serving as aides or within their ranks who could act as translators.376 Forthose men without these options, the complications created by this linguistic dividewere intense. Captain Pausch of the Hessen-Hanau artillery sought to resign (arequest denied by his sovereign), because ‘not another single German officer in thewhole of America finds himself, regarding his honour and fortune, in a moredangerous position,’ serving ‘alone and among troops, who do not understand me,nor I them.’377 Noticeably, death or capture do not figure into his risks, but they didfor the Brunswick Lt-Colonel Friedrich Baum, whose ill-fated sortie at Benningtonpresaged Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga and made him a ready-made scapegoatfor the failures of that campaign. With only a token familiarity of French, a non-existent knowledge of English, and a cantankerous personality that transcendedthese linguistic barriers, Baum was easily misled by a band of apparent loyalists.When these men turned out to be rebel sympathizers, the result was not only theloss of his ‘honor and fortune,’ but his death and the destruction of his expeditionaryforce.378 In most cases, the linguistic divide had less dramatic effects, though it was
375 H.W. Wilkin, Some British Soldiers in America (London: Hugh Rees, 1914). p. 240.376 Burgoyne, Specht Journal, pp. 5-6.; Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, pp. 6, 49 .377 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 54.378 To assist in communicating, Baum was accompanied by an Irishman Laurentious O’Connell, in theBrunswick service. Another advisor, a provincial, Captain Samuel MacKay, was purported by hiscolleague Wasmus to exclaim, ‘How is it possible… that General Riedesel [the commanding general]could entrust such a ----- man with such an important expedition, who is so coarse and rude and alsodespised the council of those who had been sent along for guidance, assistance and advice’. For allthe discussion of his monophony, the real fault may have lain in more practical character flaws, or
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occasionally blamed for the poor relations among the soldiers – which despite theunique circumstances of the American War, was typical in Anglo-German coalitions.One of the elements that set this conflict apart from so many others is thesphere in which British and German forces first interacted. Rather than the initialencounters between these men being at an army camp, or a military revue, in theAmerican War transports became the most common venue, and before any Germansoldiers had met a significant number of their British counterparts, they had alreadyspent months alongside British sailors. The difference created is striking. Thetrepidations and seasickness from which the German soldiers almost universallysuffered meant that they were usually under duress during these voyages. This wascompounded further in that their first interactions were with British sailors –neither the most reputable members of society, nor those who would share in thesense of camaraderie and fraternity that could be found between two groups ofprofessional soldiers. The Brunswick Lieutenant August du Roi was relieved that thecaptain of his ship ‘did not have the course character common to other seamen’,possessing only the better ‘qualities of his nation’.379 Others, however, found littleamong the British sailors to like: impressions of these ‘sea-dogs’ were usuallyderogatory, and the feeling it seems was mutual. According to the Anbacher, JohannDöhla, insinuated that it was a natural disinclination, stating, in an indictment ofGerman national character, ‘Above all, [British sailors] do not like the Germanpeople, because the German people are too arrogant and consider themselves betterthan others.’ However, his impression of the English sailors was no better,
those around him. James Hadden laid the blame, in part on the British officer, Colonel Skreene whoappointed him to the task. ‘The trusting so important an affair [to someone] who cou’d not utter oneword of English when “insinuations” were required and address expected certainly can hardly bepalliated by the jealousy of Gen’l Reidesil [sic] from a wish to employ the Germans on someimportant enterprise’. Doblin, The American Revolution, p. 68.; Stephen Conway, The War of American
Independence (London, Edward Arnold: 1995), p. 61.; James M. Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and orderly
books. A journal kept in Canada and upon Burgoyne’s campaign in 1776 and 1777 (Albany: Munsell’sSons, 1884. Reprinted in Freeport, N.Y. by Books for Libraries Press 1970), pp. 132, 294 (footnotes).379 He further adds of this particular captain, George Prissick, ‘His behaviour towards us soon wonour friendship, and is attention to our men gained him the respect of the soldiers, who looked uponhim as a father.’ August Wilhelm du Roi, Journal of du Roi the Elder, p. 10.
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proclaiming them ‘a thieving, happy, whoring, drunken lot and much inclined toswearing and cursing people.’380Close proximity in tight confines with such characters was a catalyst forconflict, and the language barrier only compounded matters.381 Throughout the warepisodes of violence commonly occurred upon transports heading to the colonies, orin transit between areas of operation. One German officer recalled thatmiscommunication and suspicions between Germans soldiers and English sailors,‘immediately caused a nasty misunderstanding on the day of embarkation’ –although the conflict was peaceably settled.382 The small boats on the rivers ofCanada and in upper New York would also be scenes of such conflicts betweenGerman and British soldiers and sailors, where on cramped radeau tempers wouldflare, to the point that officers dared not leave their men unsupervised for fear thatthey would become involved in some quarrel.383 On the longer voyages, conditionscould be just as bad. ‘It is easy to understand that a people like these Hessians, tiredof being imprisoned for four or nearly five months… and obliged to drink foul waterand to eat mouldy biscuit and… [bad meat] cannot be in good humour.’384However it appears that once the German soldiers had terra firmaunderneath them once again, they took less umbrage to the jeers and jests of theBritish servicemen, and conflicts, at least instigated by German solders, were lessfrequent.385 More importantly, the rate at which conflicts arose between theauxiliaries and the men manning these transport vessels provides a comparison
380 Stephen Popp recalled that ‘we really were amazed when we saw the sailors. What a raw and wildtribe they are! And we who could not understand a thing were shamed and ridiculed to the limit bythem, until by signs and winks we finally caught on.’ Döhla, Hessian Diary, pp. 14-15. Stephan Popp, A
Hessian Soldier in the American Revolution: The Diary of Stephan Popp, translated by Reinhart J. Pope(Private Printing, 1953), p. 3381 Several conflicts are outlined in Atwood’s discussion of Anglo-Hessian relations, yet he leaves outthe settings of such conflicts as the crucial factor. See Atwood. Hessians, ch. 6, esp. pp. 154-157.382 Doblin, The American Revolution, p. 6.383 ‘It was already so well-filled with men that not all of them could be accommodated. We were allEnglish because the space was too tight for any unpleasantness.’ Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, pp. 38-9.384 Quoted in: Atwood, Hessians, p. 55.385 For the British sailors, the sight of terrified and bed-ridden foreigners was a point of humour, butfor all their jests, there were numerous instances of cordiality, especially when pointing out thevarious forms of sea-life – such as the ‘purpose pig’ – to which men from land-locked imperialprincipalities had never encountered. Hubbs, Hessian Journals.; Atwood, Hessians, p. 51.; Du Roi,
Journal, p. 14.
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with relations with the British soldiers. A large proportion of the violentinteractions recounted by soldiers were on ships, and between soldier and sailor,revealing that it was not national antipathy that was the major catalyst, but aconflict between men of the navy and army. Once on land, and interacting with menof their own branch of service, relations seem to follow the trends commonthroughout the century. In many ways, the associations of British and Germansoldiers during the American War typified the standard manner in which these twogroups interacted during this time period. Yet, there were still distinctive aspectsbrought about by the uniqueness of the American War.For interactions between the men in the rank and file, once again, there is lessevidence than for the officers, but certainly the very nature of the war resulted inmaking such encounters more common than they had been in previous conflicts.Despite the tendency to separate British and German troops, there would befrequent intermingling in camps and barracks. Unlike European theatres where thevarious armies would be encamped at times a day apart, in America, British andGerman troops would often camp together, or at least in close proximity.386 This‘brigading’ with certain regiments could foster good relations, as testified by thecordial friendship between the 34th Regiment and the Hessen-Hanau artillery inCanada in 1776.The Commander of this [34th] Regiment… entertained me and my twoofficers throughout the day and my troops were quartered in a barn, inwhich they all lay together, by his regiment. This is done by all theEnglish and Germans here in Canada. A great amount of honor andfriendship was demonstrated to us… by the mentioned regiment.387As mentioned before, food and drink would be a common unifier, and whilethe armies’ commanders tried to ensure that British and German soldiers weresharing the same food, they were trying to discourage them from sharing the samealcohol. Though this may be a positive sign of friendship and association, it was notexactly popular among their officers, as in the case of one Bayreuth private who hadto run the gauntlet, having ‘drank to excess with English cannoneers’ while on
386 Brown, Baroness von Riedesel, p.44.387 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 31.
155
duty.388 There was at least one conflict between the British and German soldiers ofBurgoyne’s Army ‘occaisioned by Liquor’, where, according to the army’s GeneralOrders, ‘one of the greatest Military Principles was so far forgot by some Britishsoldiers that a Guard was insulted.’389 Though intoxication was a common cause ofinfighting, Georg Pausch was proud to note that after the first few months in Canada,there had ‘not been the least conflict because of drunkenness.’390 There wasquarrelling over a communal vegetable garden in the garrison in New Jersey, butmore peaceful exchanges could be seen in Rhode Island, where British soldiersmight visit the ‘flesh market’ established by the Hessian regiments.391 There wereother aspects of the daily life of British soldiers that would not necessarily involveinteractions with German troops. Religious worship was obviously separated,especially for the Catholic Ansbachers, and the only times in which English soldierssought out German chaplains, was for them to preside over weddings with the lessreputable women among the Army’s camp-followers.392There was certainly evidence of discord among the rank & file, whichincluded a notable amount of theft, and a few cases of murder. Von Krafft witnessed‘innumerable’ incidents of such infighting during the campaigns in New York, NewJersey and Pennsylvania. In one instance, a Hessian grenadier sergeant was killed bya group of Irish soldiers, who assailed him ‘with their bayonets, wounded him inmany places, [and] robbed him of everything.’393 There are multiple accounts of aconflict between an English officer of the 20th regiment, and a Hanau corporal(‘cannoneer’) by the name of Heinrich Nantz, who drew the ire, and the bayonet, of
388 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 123.389 Burgoyne, Orderly book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, p. 45.390 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p.36.391 Peebles, John Peebles’ American War, p. 274. Doblin, Garrison Life in French Canada, p. 116.;Atwood, Hessians, p.155.392 ‘Such things and a thousand others of like or worse character were not rare here. A certainsergeant of the above named English regiment, a handsome young fellow, had been married sixteentimes to loose women of the town by different English and German chaplains, through shrewdcontrivances, without consent of his officers and told me too that he hoped to do so often again,before making up his mind to take the last one in real earnest.’ Krafft, Journal, pp. 139-40.; For thesegregated nature of Ansbach religious services, see: Bruce R. Burgoyne (trans. & ed.), A Hessian
Officer’s Diary of the American Revolution translated from An Anonymous Ansbach-Bayreuth Diary (As
originally written by Johann Ernst Prechtel…) and Prechtel Diary (Maryland: Heritage Books, 1994), p.141.393 Krafft, Journal, p. 91.
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the Englishman by staring at him and his female companion. Nantz, despite hisinsistence that he could not speak English, had enough familiarity with it to knowthat being called a ‘Dutch bugger’ was no compliment, and struck the officer, whoseuniform was concealed under his coat. This was a conflict where both sides wereclearly at fault, given that the English officer, Lt. Norman, took considerable offensetowards a harmless action of a Hanau soldier, meanwhile the ‘cannoneer’, havingmet and been ‘allowed to look at’ Frederick the Great, was determined not to bebelittled by someone he thought was a civilian.394 A disparity between class andrank was crucial in this conflict being preserved and recounted, as if these men wereboth of the same station, it might have been settled in a duel, and perhaps not cometo the attention of the German officers who tried to reconcile the offended parties.395That the conflict was relayed in this manner is a testament to the irregularity of suchoccurrences, though later scholarship would portray the different contingents inBurgoyne’s Army to be constantly quarrelling.396 Similarly, though von Krafftattested to violence within the army, his definition of ‘English’ was broad enough toinclude loyalists from provincial regiments, some of whom assailed him when hetried to rescue a fellow German soldier from a drunken brawl.397 Once sailors andloyalists are removed from the equation, the number of quarrels between Britishand German soldiers is lower than at first glance.As for interactions and associations between officers, the small size and closeproximities of the various contingents within the army led to the parties, balls andother celebratory functions being predominantly multi-national affairs. Thewritings during the American War are invaluable for permitting insight into theseevents and the role that officers from among the German auxiliaries played in thesocial life of the British officer-class. There was a history between some of these
394 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, pp. 60-1.395 The whole affair, and its resolution was handled primarily by Maj. Gen. Riedesel, the Brunswickcommander, who on several occasions acted as a moderator and translator between the Hanau andBritish forces.396 The editor of James Hadden’s journal, the American Colonel Horatio Rodgers, wrote that the‘unfortunate element in Burgoyne’s army was its mixed character’ and that ‘the British entertained apoor opinion of, if indeed they did not despise the Germans.’ Hadden, Hadden’s Journal, pp. lxxxv, 37-8 (footnotes).397 Krafft, Journal, p. 83.
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officers that predated the campaigns of 1776-7. It was not uncommon forcolleagues and acquaintances from the Seven Years War, or the intervening period,to reunite during this new campaign. ‘Not long after our arrival’ in Portsmouth,wrote Colonel Specht,Capt. Boyle, an English officer, approached us addressing us in Germanwith the greatest obligation and offered to render us all sorts of services;he was happy seeing the Braunschweigers again, by whose urbanity hehad been charmed in the last campaign, and offered to be our guide.398For others it was a chance of reuniting men from official or recreational forays to theprincely courts of the Holy Roman Empire. This did not necessarily endear them toone another, as attested to by the writings of Sir James Murray, who before the warhad a ‘deplorable time’ at the court of the Prince of Brunswick.399 Yet a morepositive sentiment can be found from another journeying British officer, GeorgeHanger, whose ‘pleasant and agreeable’ years among German courts, and his closefriendship with many officers from Hessen-Kassel, inspired him to leave the BritishArmy to join the Hessian Jägers, where in America he would be a valuable liaisonbetween British and German troops.400 For the officers of the auxiliary forces, therewas also a great deal of prior experiences, and not just from ‘His Britannic Majesty’sArmy in Germany’ in the Seven Years War. General Riedesel and several Hessianofficers had spent time in England in 1756-7 with the Hessian and Hanoverianforces, where Riedesel himself acquired a token knowledge of the nativelanguage.401 Though such connections would be uncommon, it did show that therewas some history among men in the officer corps, and that not all friends andenemies among the officers were creations of the American War.For the remainder of Britain’s officers, this may have been their firstprolonged encounter with their counterparts from central Germany, but it did not
398 Specht, Journal, p. 10399 Robson, Letters From America, p. 9.400 ‘The hospitality and the open honest character of the Germans, so attached me to the country, thatwhen ordered home to join my [British] regiment, I quitted it with much reluctance, and absolutelyshed tears on my departure.’ Hanger, Life Adventures and Opinions, pp. 40-2, 44-5. Krafft, p. 56.401 Frederick Augustus von Riedesel, Memoirs, and Letters and Journals, of Major General Riedesel,
During his Residence in America. Translated from the Original German of Max von Eelking by WilliamL. Stone. 2 vols. (Albany: J. Munsell, 1868), vol. I, p. 3.
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take long before the Hessen were a continuous presence, both in military duties andin their social lives as well. Certainly, there was a share of genuine friendship, andamiable relations were not merely due to a culture of politeness. General Clintonwas considered ‘a great friend of the Germans’, and General Phillips was anespecially popular figure among the Hanau and Brunswick men.402 British officersand men in Burgoyne’s army repeatedly praised General Riedesel, and even whenthe other officers and soldiers of the Brunswick contingent were under scrutiny, hewas rarely suspected of misdoing. Yet we should not have too rosy a picture of suchrelations, as Rodney Atwood has shown, that in cases such as General Howe’sattitude towards General Heister, the first commander of the Hessen-Kasselcontingent, acts of politeness and deference merely cloaked resentments andmistrusts, yet this was more towards individual officers, and there is no indicationthat such apprehensions were universal.403No doubt the British and each of the German armies had collected infirm and,generally speaking, humourless officers, but the apparent disparity between the twopolities reinforced depictions of Germanic dullness and incivility, which dominatedthe discourses of the British upper class. Whilst garrisoned on Staten Island in thewinter of 1778, Alexander Leslie complained of there being ‘very little society’within the predominantly Hessian garrison, and the ‘slowness’ that dominatedanalyses of German military men were extended to critiques of the manners andmannerisms of their superiors.404 A year later, a civilian Robert Biddulph wouldrelate much the same impression: ‘The ensuing Winter will be a very dull one, as weare garrion’d by Hessians, who, tho’ they all speak English, do not make their Wayamong the Inhabitants who are sociable talkers.’405 The implication here is that thelanguage barrier, which was strong at first, did not remain the key inhibitor to thesocial interactions between these officers, which instead may have merely beencultural incongruities.
402 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 49. Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p.38.403 Atwood, Hessians, pp. 108, 146.404 NAS GD26/9/518 Letters of Alexander Leslie, Staten Island, November 23rd, 1778.405 Quoted in Atwood, Hessians, p. 152.
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Conflicts between British and German officers are rare sights among thejournals and correspondences, in spite of the resentments many felt toward oneanother. For duels and matters of honour, the pugnacious John von Krafft’s accountis rich with details of these affairs, in part because Krafft seemed very keen toinstigate them (he participates or is present at four within the first two months ofbecoming an officer), but these were mostly with officers within his own regiment.With such characters within the army, it is surprising that there are precious fewaccounts of conflicts between the two officer classes.406Turning to more convivial associations, there were specific episodes thatdistinguish themselves from forms common in previous, or subsequent Anglo-German armies. Parties receive continuous mention in the writings of British andGerman officers, as do several other forms of association that are not paralleled inother conflicts. In the high profile festivities of the British officer corps, Hessianofficers would be a continuous presence, and in significant numbers. A dinner partyhosted by General Clinton included the invitation of ‘as many Englishman andHessians as the dining room could hold.’407 Baroness Riedesel did her best toalleviate the gloom and boredom of being a prisoner of the Americans by inviting ‘allthe generals and officers’ of the so-called Convention Army, to attend ‘a ball andsupper’ to celebrate her husband’s birthday.408 Similarly, a ‘Mischianza’ inPhiladelphia in honour of the departing General Howe was to have both officercorps as guests and participants.409 General Howe’s German aide-de-camp FriedrichMuenchhausen wrote of New York: ‘we have balls, concerts, and meetings, which Iam already weary of. I do not like this frivolous life… A crazy life it is, just havingbeen under serious fire, and then seeing fireworks of joy’ and then dancing.410 TheKing’s Birthday was one cause for collective celebration, and British officers were
406 Krafft, Journal, pp. 31-36.407 Uhlendorf, Revolution in America, p. 304.408 Obviously, the highest ranking German officers were in high demand for various festivities, as Maj.General Riedesel, was urged by General Phillips to attend a ball given for the King’s Birthday, despitehis being several days ride away from Quebec. Baroness p.71. p. 345.409 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 74.410 Friedrich Muenchhausen, At General Howe’s Side 1776-1778: The Diary of General William Howe’s
Aide de Camp, Captain Friedrich von Muenchhausen. Translated by Ernst Kippling and annotated bySamuel Smith (Monmouth Beach: Philip Freneau Press, 1974), pp. 8-9.
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also a part of celebrations in the armies of the respective German princes, such asone for the Duke of Brunswick, where it was noted, ‘the English officers werepresent at the fete’.411 German officers were even invited to the parties of notableloyalists.412 Events were not exclusively for officers, as was the case when SirGeorge Osborne ‘entertained the Hessian and British Troops with a Fete Champêtre
dans toutes les Formes, which has made as much noise at the Rebel Head Quarter asat our own.’413 Part of what is so noteworthy of many of these celebrations, is thatthey were accessible to a larger spectrum of classes, as the most prominent partiesand celebrations during European campaigns would often comprise of princes andaristocrats, while in the colonies, it might be include many among the middling sort,lower ranking officers and subalterns, and even men in the rank & file.Despite the presence of these foreign officers and soldiers, they did notnecessarily have a prominent role at such events. For the grander balls, theirs was aminor role amidst the complex proceedings, and in what references we haveregarding the social life of officers in the army, they were primarily relegated torunning gambling games. During the grand ‘gala’ ball in Philadelphia in the winterof 1778, ‘one of these rooms was cleared, and a faro [sic] bank was installed whichwas run… by three Hessian officers.’414 John Peebles also mentions the presence of a‘Pharo Bank kept by the Hessians’, one of main sources of entertainment for officers,although in this case it was something that lasted longer than just one evening.415Lieutenant Hale much resented this ‘Pharaoh Bank’ maintained by the ‘yägers’,which he stated had ‘not a little disordered the finances of several officers…imprudent enough to endeavour.’ It must have been a popular pastime, as hecomplained that ‘this Army is now ten times worse officered than it was two years
411 Wasmus, American Revolution, p. 27.412 Atwood, Hessians, p. 151.413 Huntington Library MS Pocock Papers, PO 1170, George Osborne to George Pocock, May 15th1777,414 John Peebles confirmed this, in his diary. Quoted in Jackson, With the British army in Philadelphia,p. 246.415 Peebles, American War, p. 161
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since, owing to that extravagant rage for play’, which created indebted officers whowould be compelled to leave the army.416Aside from running these gambling games, there is little mention of their rolein most parties, other than their mere attendance. Therefore, in many cases, and ina manner quite different from the Hanoverians in the Napoleonic Wars, the Germanpresence was more based on formality than celebrity. Admiral Lord Howe’ssecretary, Ambrose Serle kept track of the various dinner parties with General ‘deHeister’ and his ‘suite’ which he stated, ‘like all such ceremonious affairs, went offvery cold & very dull.’417 Likewise, Hessian officers would often attend for the sakeof politeness, as attested to by the Hessian Johann von Loos, who sought merely to‘please the English’ by joining in their celebration of the King’s birthday.418Therefore, it may be that more often the Hessians received mention in recollectionsof social events as a point of novelty or merely as a means of gauging an event’simportance.Novelty was reflected to an equal degree by accounts of another, moresombre aspect of the officers’ lives: funerals.419 The presence and often-prominentrole of German soldiers and officers and the obvious cultural variations that wereapparent in these ceremonies, was something unique to commentaries on theAmerican War. It was in these solemn occasions that the Hessians took centre stage,performing elaborate burials that both impressed fellow Britons, but also reinforcedperceptions that the German soldiers were obsessed with death and their ownmortality. The appreciable difference of the Germans’ funerals for their fallenwarriors was noteworthy for British authors, and a point of pride for the Hessiansoldiers. There are several remarks in British accounts on the presence of Germanofficers at the funerals of fallen redcoats, as well as their attendance at those
416 Riedesel also saw this as a leading cause of desertion among the German soldiers in the‘Convention Army’, who would desert when they could not pay their debts. Wilkin, Some British
Soldiers, pp. 241-2; Stone, Memoirs, and Letters… of Major General Riedesel, vol. II, chap. 1.417 Ambrose Serle, The American Journal of Ambrose Serle, Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776-1778. Editedby Edward H. Tatum, Jr. (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1940), p. 150.418 Hubbs, Hessian Journals, p. 30.419 Two decades later, Lord Wallingford would describe this part of life in the army as a ‘moreunpleasant duty then going to meet the enemy’. HRO 1M44/110 fol. 37a Letter from Wallingford tohis Mother, ‘Camp before Dunkirk’ Aug 20th, 1793.
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services for the German dead.420 As with the high-profile social events, attendancewas due both to politeness, as well as fondness.421 For the funeral of FriedrichMinnigerode, a man who ‘was loved by the English and Hessians’, the entire garrisontook part in the procession, and the service at the local Lutheran church wasattended by ‘all the English generals.’422 Funerals were noteworthy not only forthose who attended, but the British reaction to them, especially as these ceremonieswere not merely confined to the officer class. On July 3rd 1776 a ‘musketeer’ of aHessen-Hanau regiment was buried ‘with the usual ceremonies’ according to theBrunswick surgeon Julius Wasmus, yet he remarked that ‘the English and Canadianswere astounded by the magnificent burial.’423 The death of an Indian war-chief inBurgoyne’s Canadian Army was honoured by a procession of sixteen Germandragoons, bearing a ceremonial musket to his grave, followed by the firing of threevolleys into the air.424 The discrepancy in marking such occasions is likely why theGerman presence at these events were so often noted, even if they did not go to anylength to describe their actions. Yet such displays further impressed upon Britishminds a picture of German soldiery that was obsessed with death, in theirceremonies and their sentiments. Thomas Anburey noted that during the winter of1776-7, men from the Hessen-Hanau and Brunswick contingents would gather ingroups of ‘twenty or thirty at a time’ and ‘mope and pine about’, convinced of theircertain demise.425 Funerals were an important instance of interaction, but their
420 Doblin, American Revolution, p.40421 Yet no doubt that many colleagues were deeply moved, and such tragic events give someindication of the friendships between British and German soldiers, as when General Clinton tearfullyembraced the dying Captain von Vollrath. Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 52.422 HSM 4* MS Hass. 18b, ‘Dinklage Tagebuch’ fols. 233-4.423 Helga Doblin, Eyewitness Account of the American Revolution and New England Life: The Journal of
J.F. Wasmus, German Company Surgeon, 1776-1783 (Greenwood Press: 1993), p. 35.424 Ibid. 70.425 Anburey continues, ‘Nor can any medicine or advice you can give them divert this settledsuperstition, which they as surely die martyrs to, as ever it infects them. Thus it is that men, whohave faced the dangers of battle and of shipwreck without fear (for they are certainly as brave as anysoldiers in the world), are taken off, a score at a time, by a mere phantom of their own brain. This is acircumstance very well known to every one in the army.’ Anburey, Travels through the Interior Parts
of America, vol. 1 pp. 161-2.
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elaborate roles in these events, combined with the context in which they transpired,contributed to a sense of ‘otherness’ rather than commonality.426
**Professionalism and National Character**
The impressions and reflections made by British soldier-writers regarding theGerman auxiliaries in the American War, though founded upon differences innationality, were to a considerable extent focused on professional differences.Whereas the discourse in subsequent generations would contextualize their Germanallies very much in reference to national character, in the American War the focuswas ability and performance in the various soldierly duties – no doubt owed in partto the contractual relationship that brought about the German presence. In fact, herein the American War, when both British and German authors most often discussedinnate abilities or foreign characteristics at length, it was in describing NativeAmericans.While most descriptions would be seen as merely commentary onprofessional merits, there remained a great deal of nationalistic sentiment, anddescriptions of various groups of soldiers were always to some degree articulated inthis way. In the retelling of various military feats, the Army was clearly divided intodistinct European groups: usually ‘English’, ‘Germans’ (and even the occasionalmention of ‘Highlanders’), but also ‘Hessians’, which often became a catchall term.Though the ‘Hessians’ were in fact a far more disparate group than commonlyportrayed, there was indeed a sense of solidarity among them, yet this was acollective ‘German’ identity, not a Hessian one. Johann Döhla, at the head of theAnsbach forces wrote, ‘at the time of our arrival in America, we burned with a desireto demonstrate our bravery and to show that the Germans, and especially those ofthe famous Franconian blood, did not lack courage and wished to demonstrate this
426 Yet the difference was perhaps not so profound, and in the Peninsular War, one British officer,noting the fatalism among his fellow soldiers during times of sickness and hunger, stated that ‘theEnglish soldier thinks more seriously of death, and his accountability hereafter, than perhaps anyother, except the Protestant soldiers of the north of Germany.’ Sherer, Recollections of the Peninsula,p. 72.
164
also in another distant part of the world.’427 This solidarity among the Germans maynot have been especially common, but it is shown elsewhere, for example, eightmonths after Saratoga, the Hessian General Bauermeister was ‘very happy’ to hearan artillery commander give a ‘testimony of the valour of all the German troops’from Burgoyne’s now captured army, especially as he claimed that ‘nostraightforward account had ever been given.’428 Nevertheless, there were thosewho remained firmly committed to their own state or homeland, exemplified by thewritings of Friedrich Muenchhausen who provides a glimpse of a conflict ofallegiances and identities: ‘Happy it would make me to be with my beloved oldBrunswickers… I would seize every opportunity to show them that, although I amwearing a red British uniform, and am still a Hessian captain, I am really aBrunswicker in heart and mind.’429 While the forces within the native Britishregiments might be equally conflicted, both British and German could draw fargreater contrasts between themselves and the ‘cowardly’ and ‘undisciplined’ forcesof their Indian allies and American opponents.These commentaries hint at another aspect of a nationalistic sentiment, whensoldier-authors would usually reserve the strongest praise for their own forces, andin these evaluations the end result regularly favoured one’s own army.430Lieutenant Hale seemed particularly unilateral when comparing the two forceswhen he concluded that the Hessians, ‘the best of the German troops, are by nomeans equal to the British in any respect.’431 Conversely, the Englishman GeorgeHanger went against the grain in proclaiming that there were ‘no braver or betterdisciplined forces in the world’ than the Hessians, but given his three year tenure ascaptain in the Hessen-Kassel Jägers, he too was being biased towards his own.432Therefore identities beyond merely those of a soldier were at work inshaping perceptions, and while origins may have been a divisive force, this was
427 Döhla, A Hessian Diary, p. 22.428 Uhlendorf, Revolution in America, p. 159.429 Muenchhausen, At General Howe’s Side, p. 14.430 Lord Rawdon, though impressed with the Hessians, stated that ‘They are good troops but in pointof men nothing equal to ours.’ HMC, Rawdon, p. 179.431 Wilkin, Some British Soldiers, p.224432 Hanger, Life, Adventures and Opinions, p.34.
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overcome in part by displays of commonality to a shared cause and more evidentcontrasts found in those of colonial origins. The unity among soldiers was sharedwith a sense of a European identity, in which lesser cultural differences wereminimized in contrast to non-European groups, and in which professionaldifferences were slight compared to the appearance, methods of fighting, andmotivations of the rebels.433 This was a common theme in extra-European conflictsduring this era, for example on the Indian Subcontinent, where a European style ofwarfare was more pronounced. Commenting upon the speedy withdrawal fromPhiladelphia, the jäger captain, Johann Ewald, suggested that it was a ‘veryremarkable’ feat of ‘the European’, while many accounts in soldiers’ journals andcorrespondence describe at length the unfamiliar mores of colonial inhabitants,while similar commentaries regarding their European allies are almost non-existent.434Solidarity was not necessarily dependent upon contrasts with an ‘other’, andthere were more active means of unifying the British and German forces. One of themain aspects in creating good impressions among the British officers, was the ‘zeal’and ‘vigor’ displayed by the German officers and soldiers when fighting the rebels.In such commentaries, it was not a matter of merely performing the duties of asoldier, as expected, but their seeming desire to go beyond these expectations, andto share with the British both a disdain for the American rebels and a loyalty to theKing surpassing mere contractual obligation. Whether it was ideological reasons,
esprit de corps, or merely a desire to see the war’s speedy conclusion, the auxiliariesimpressed their British allies by their tenacity in battle and a genuine, or apparent,support for ‘the cause’.435 Hanger stated that the Hessians fought with ‘the greatest
433 For a survey of European solidarity within the British Army, see Conway, ‘The British Army,“Military Europe”‘, esp. pp. 89-100.434 For example, Thomas Anburey, whose correspondence focused far more on the peoples of Canadaand Native Americans, than on the War he was fighting in. Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War,p. 138.; Anburey, Travels.435 For the ‘Hessian’ view of the American colonies, see Ernst Kipping. The Hessian View of America,
1776-1783 (Monmouth Beach, NJ: Freneau, 1971); Inge Auerbach, et al. Hessen und die
Amerikanische Revolution 1776. (Marburg: das Hessische Staatsarchiv, 1976). I, p. 244. For more onidentities and solidarities during the American War of Independence, see: Stephen Conway, 'From
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gallantry and fidelity, and the most sincere attachment to the cause’, whilerepeatedly general orders and statements from the British commanders applaudedthe German forces for rendering ‘the greatest service to the King’ and for matchingthe ability and ferocity of the British troops.436 Unity in fighting against the rebelscould even transcend national allegiances, as exemplified by the comments of theveteran officer and diplomatic envoy Joseph Yorke, who wrote to his friend JeffreyAmherst, that ‘the poor Germans they should be attended to by everyone in thissphere, since we trust them to fight our battles, whilst so many of our unworthysons [meaning political opponents] are doing all they can to hurt us.’437 Yet thisgood-will and sense of unity through common purpose, could be, and often was,quickly undermined by the Hessian soldiers’ inclination to plunder, which alteredperceptions in the minds of Britons that their real motivation was greed.Amongst the myriad of descriptions of German auxiliaries (and theiraccounts of the British), there is still a wide spectrum of topics regarding physical,cultural and professional differences. Some descriptions were merely musings onprosaic or mundane dissimilarity, yet far more were intrinsically tied into anongoing comparison between ‘English’ and ‘German’, in which manners andmethods of soldiering took prime placement. And while it is important to note thatthere were various different polities making up the German auxiliaries, thecommentaries were very similar, and only divergent in minor matters, not the broadthemes to which we now turn.As with discussions of auxiliaries in other conflicts, the first significantinteractions between these forces were often on parade grounds, and in formalreviews, which naturally would lead to reflections on appearances and physicaldescriptions. Most remarks were generally positive, regardless of the principality of
fellow-nationals to foreigners : British perceptions of the Americans, circa 1739-1783'. William and
Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 59:1 (2002), pp. 65-100.436 The Germans ‘have been treated with the greatest Deference, which (as might be expected withGermans) has made a pleasing Impression upon their Temper and Conduct, and inclined them asheartily in the Cause as the warmest among us could desire.’ Quoted in Atwood, Hessians, p. 64;Hanger, Life, Adventures and Opinions, p. 40.; Helgin, American Revolution, p. 61.437 CKS, Amherst Manuscripts U1350 C41 fol. 70, Joseph Yorke to Jeffrey Amherst, The Hague, March1777.
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origin, although after meeting the Brunswickers for the first time, one Scottishofficer, Alex MacDonald, told his wife that they were ‘the oddest looking fellows’ hehad ever seen.438 The ‘Anspachers,’ in the words of another Scotsman, John Peebles,were the ‘finest looking troops & tallest, I ever saw.’439 This was a sentiment andphrase which frequently emerged from first encounters with these auxiliaries (andas we have seen, German armies in general), and on occasion this dual complimentmade its way into the descriptions of the English as well, for example for the guardartillery where one could find ‘no taller, finer nor more proper troops.’440Comments after the initial battles or skirmishes with the rebels were equallylaudatory and are – quite naturally – the dialogue most concerned with comparingand contrasting the professional character of Briton and German. In 1776, Britishforces already in New York and Canada waited through an anxious spring andsummer for the arrival of the German auxiliaries, and this anticipation quicklyturned to acclimation with the clearing of the rebel presence in Canada, and morepoignantly, the battles that resulted in the capture of New York. Success, as it sooften did in this epoch, yielded praise. Frederick Haldimand, who had eagerlyanticipated the Hessian arrival, in order to ‘do something of consequence’, waselated after the battle of Jamaica Pass, where he was certain that ‘nothing couldbehave better than the Hessians.’441 And the word-of-mouth very much favouredthe Hessians in this early phase of the conflict. Sir George Osborne, muster-masterfor the Hessen-Kassel soldiers, wrote to his associate the Admiral George Pocock,My Little Hessians are not inclined to spare their cattle or effects, [but] inevery other respect they behave, like (what they are) the best troops inthe world. Not one deserter in twelve thousand men, and are alacrityand steadiness in our cause that is really beyond the utmost of ourexpectations.442
438 NLS MS 3945 fol. 36. Alex MacDonald to his wife, Portsmouth, June 16th, 1776.439 Peebles, American War, p. 311440 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 36.441 BL Add MS 21680 fols. 135, 147, Frederick Haldimand to Hutcheson, Staten Island, August 8th &September 1st 1776.442 HL MS Pocock Papers PO 1169, Sir George Osborne to George Pocock, West Chester New York,October 26th 1777.
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This rather iconic passage would indicate that professionalism and enthusiasm werenotable points of praise for the German auxiliaries, in the face of which other defectsmight be overlooked, especially in the earlier phases of this conflict.In the first months of the war participants would remark upon other areas ofcontrast. As in the other conflicts during the long eighteenth century, the religiositywas a topic of analysis and reflection. For the Hessen-Kassel contingent, the psalm-singing and church parades that a decade before filled the local Winchester civilianswith curiosity and wonderment, would re-emerge in the commentary of Britishofficers in the colonies. Once again, this area of difference became a means of notjust comparing cultures, but British and German soldiery, with this topic being oneof the few that favoured the latter. The god-fearing Ambrose Serle, walking aroundthe army camps on Staten Island, wrote ‘it was pleasing to hear the Hessians singingPsalms in the Evening, with great solemnity, while, to our shame, the British navy &army in general are wasting their time in imprecations or idleness.’443 Some Britishsoldiers were not completely idle, if we are to incorporate the commentary of oneQuebec businessman, James Thompson. Having hired men from both nations as daylabourers, Thompson, a former-sergeant, noticed that the British soldiers had an‘abominable desire for liquor’, would spend all of their money on alcohol and wereoften seen ‘lolling in the dirt, like beastly swine’, whereas the Germans he employedwere ‘very seldom seen Entoxicated [sic], and what money they get they take careof.’444 Comments comparing alcohol consumption were rare during the AmericanRevolution, but would, as will be seen in the following chapters, become one of thekey divides distinguishing the soldiers of these respective polities.Though British soldiers might be described as ‘lolling in the dirt’, cleanlinesswas in fact an area where the German auxiliaries compared unfavourably – aconclusion in which the British soldier-author and travel-author would whole-heartedly agree. Upon arriving at Portsmouth, for many German auxiliaries their
443 Serle, American Journal, pp. 55-6.444 Thomson further condemned the red-coated soldiery: ‘while they have any money in theirpockets, they are never at ease, while any of it remains, nor do they care how long it lasts, so that theyare in a state of Entoxication, and whoever comes in their way while they are at it is heartily welcometo share.’ Quoted in: G. A. Steppler, ‘The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III’, p. 125.
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first view of an English town, the predominant description is ‘clean’ or somepermutation thereof. But it was the tidiness of British soldiers and their campswhich impressed the German officers, and the close relationship betweencleanliness and health would lead to a stereotype of the ‘Hessians’ as unclean,unhealthy, and ergo: inferior soldiers.445 The pious singing of the Hessians did notsoothe Ambrose Serle’s disdain for them, and he penned in his journal – and laterscratched out – that they were a ‘dirty, cowardly set of contemptible miscreants.’446Another man with a nautical background, the marine Captain John Bowater, who setthe gold standard for negative commentaries regarding the Hessians, recountedthem as ‘so very dirty that they have always one half of their people in theHospitals.’ Perhaps unsurprisingly, he praised the British soldiers for being‘remarkable healthy from the great attention pay’d them’ and their practices ofswimming, foot races and ‘other manly exercises.’447 These men further reveal thedegree to which relations between Hessian forces and the men of the British Navywere at odds. However, Sir George Osborne, a fellow soldier who normally had agreat deal of praise for these auxiliaries, supported these criticisms by stating thatthe poor state of the Hessians’ hospitals meant their soldiers dwelt in them toolong.448 Yet this relationship between dirtiness and sickliness was stronger inperception than in reality, where despite an influx of unhealthy raw recruits into theGerman regiments, their relative health compared to the British forces wasconsistently better, once the initial illnesses from sea-travel ran its course.449 Thecleanliness of British soldiers was also contributing to negative stereotypes, wheretheir seeming overemphasis on hygiene was interpreted in some German accounts
445 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 71.446 Serle, American Journal, p. 246 footnotes.447 Marion Balderston (ed.), The Lost War: Letters from British Officers during the American Revolution(Horizon: New York, 1975), p. 125.448 CO 5/236 fol. 6, Copy of Letter from George Osborne, 15th March 1777.449 One officer of the 3rd Waldeck Regiment bragged that during a hot summer of 1778, that theirregiment had not one person sick, which is corroborated by much of the records concerning theseregiments. For the data relating to active and sick soldiers among British forces in America from1777 onwards, see C.T. Atkinson, ‘British Forces in North America, 1774-1781: Their Distributionand Strength.’ JSAHR, 16 (Spring 1937), pp. 3-23; 19 (Autumn 1940), pp. 163-166; 20 (Winter 1941),pp. 190-192. Marion Dexter Learned, (ed.) Phillip Waldeck’s Diary of the Revolution (Philadelphia:Americana Germanica Press, 1907).
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as a further indication of English foppery, a criticism of English martial characterparticularly levelled at their officers.450Religiosity, sobriety and cleanliness were certainly prominent areas ofcontrast, but it was pace and speed in manoeuvres and manners that drew the mostcommentary, and where Germanic national and martial characters were the mostclosely related. Commentaries on pace, in military manoeuvres or socialmannerisms, were common throughout this century-long association betweenBritish and German soldiers. For the Hessians specifically, being termed slow wasnothing new. The Duke of Cumberland complained of the ‘slow motions’ of hisHessian auxiliaries when trying to suppress the Scottish rebels in 1746, and as weshall see, in regards to the King’s German Legion three decades later, thecharacterization still existed.451 Yet in the America War, there were more weightedand subtle reasons for remarking upon this particular feature of Germanic martialcharacter.During the war, this one issue could become the embodiment of an author’soverall impression of the German auxiliaries. In one of his first remarks of thesoldiers of Hessen-Kassel, John Peebles wrote, that they were ‘slow but steadytroops,’ and for many commentators there was a sliding scale between these twotraits, which directly paralleled the author’s overall opinion of their abilities assoldiers.452 Bowater, whose judgment of the Hessians was overwhelmingly negative,wrote that they were ‘exceedingly slow,’ citing their ‘mode of discipline,’ which was‘not in the least calculated for this country.’453 Another British serviceman, with aslightly more favourable but still negative estimation of these subsidy-troops,proclaimed: ‘I believe them steady, but their slowness is of the greatestdisadvantage.’ His dismay that his own regiment so outpaced the Hessian
450 In one reported letter, a Hessian officer complained that they would ‘soon find toilets in thetrenches, and receive orders to perfume the gunpowder.’ This published account was perhaps retolddue to it matching the sympathies of the author, George Forster, who had less than flatteringadjectives for the English in general (‘selfish’, ‘phlegmatic’, ‘unfriendly’ for starters). See JohannGeorge Forster, Briefwechsel, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1829), vol. 1 p. 244.451 Jonathan Oates, ‘Hessian Forces Employed in Scotland in 1746.’ JSAHR, 83:335 (2005), p. 210.452 Peebles, John Peebles American War, p. 63.453 Balderston, The Lost War, p. 125.
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Grenadiers at Brandywine, and therefore bore the brunt of the fighting, hints atearlier accusations of Hanoverian reluctance in battle during the 1740’s.454 Thesame implications can be found in comments during Burgoyne’s march on Albany,where the slowness of the German auxiliaries, was seen as deliberate, owed to areluctance to fight, or attributed to the jealousies of the German senior officers.455The Brunswick Colonel Breymann’s late arrival at the Battle of Bennington, waslikewise a cause célèbre for those critical or suspicious of the German auxiliaries.Not all British observers who commented upon this discrepancy in pace andmanner saw it as a bad thing, with some regarding it not as a defect, but a point ofadmiration, and emulation. For those positive portrayals, ‘steady’ or ‘steadiness’were widely used in substitution of ‘slow’ or ‘slowness.’ Thomas Dilkes admired the‘steady and regular advance’ of the Hessian grenadiers, which he felt, ‘in comparisonto the rapid movement of our own men’ was ‘uncommonly fine to see.’456 WilliamFaucitt, while reviewing the first wave of auxiliaries from Germany, described thesesame grenadiers as ‘perfectly steady under arms’ while Lord Rawdon was pleased atthe ‘awe’ inspired by ‘these steady troops’ during their inaugural campaign.457Therefore the terms ‘slow’ and ‘steady’ were popular descriptions, and hint at awide concurrence between the descriptions of like-minded commentators.As weighted or biased as many of these criticisms might be, they also cannotbe divorced from the fact that the Hessians were in certain ways a great deal slowerthan their British allies. While German slowness became symbolic with the keydeficiencies of the ‘Hessian Mercenaries’, it was not something that the Germanswould entirely discredit. In some cases, the German officers concurred, or at leasttestified to it in their own writings when describing the British.458 For them, the
454 Wilkin, Some British Soldiers, p. 245455 Hadden, Hadden’s Journal, pp.118, 132.; for other suspicions within the army, see: Frank WarrenCoburn, A History of the Battle of Bennington Vermont (Bennington: Livingston Press, 1912), pp. 22-4.456 Alfred Kroger, Geburt der USA : German newspaper accounts of the American Revolution, 1763-1783(Madison: 1962), p. 180.457 Faucitt to Suffolk, CO 5/139 fol. 25.; HMC, Rawdon, pp. 183-4. See also: A. W. Haarmann,'Contemporary observations on the Hesse-Cassell troops sent to North America, 1776-1781', JSAHR,54 (1976), pp. 130-4458 Civilians also observed this contrast. For one example, see: Nicholas Cresswell, The Journal of
Nicholas Cresswell 1774-1777 (New York: Dial Press, 1924), pp. 220, 221.
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relationship with a national character was more apparent than in British accounts.English officers, to Johann Döhla, ‘move quickly and hastily’ in contrast to thegentlemen in these auxiliary corps. Furthermore, this Ansbach-Bayreuth officeradded that ‘the common British soldier is swift, marches easily, and in general, theEnglish nation is very swift and light on their feet’, given that they were notburdened with the heavy clothing or the sense of foreboding common in the Germancontingents: ’when they go against the enemy, they are fresh, optimistic, and do notworry about their life.’459 Away from considerations about formations andmarching pace, the quickness of the British was something admirable, and by nomeans as ‘weighty’ as the remarks of Britons. This cultural division would benoticeable through to the Napoleonic Wars, and though it never contained the samesymbolism as the rebellion in America, it was an important element in discussions ofnational and martial character.This concept of slowness was tied into a whole host of different criticismswith the German auxiliaries. The most apparent reason for this particular critique,was that the British Army had already adapted (or were adapting) to wildernesswarfare in colonial America, and the Germans had arrived equipped and trained forwarfare in central Europe. The slow orderly movements of the German auxiliaries,following the Frederician model, were contrasted to the quick pace and openformations adopted by British units. When British commanding officers tried toimpose ‘uniformity of pace and motion’ among the contingents, not everyone waskeen to change.460 As the stubborn Georg Pausch exasperatingly wrote to his Prince,‘every day on the parade ground I must execute their quick march with them, to mygreatest displeasure. This would not be done by us nor in Prussia, nor in the entireworld, except when hunting with fleet horses and good hounds.’461 Therefore, manyof these critiques were sparked from exasperation at the persistence of thesesubsidy troops to retain these impractical formations and motions.462
459 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 71.460 From Burgoyne’s General Orders. Quoted in Hadden, Hadden’s Journal, p. 79.461 Burgoyne, Pausch’s Journal, p. 59.462 Bowater claimed that the Hessians were ‘strictly enjoined by the Landgrave, not to alter’ theirpace and formations. Balderston, Lost War, p. 125.
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The stereotype of Hessian slowness was also attributed to the uniform anddress of the German armies. As previously addressed, these allies were oftenrequired, or felt obligated to make their uniforms match or conform to the British,or more specifically, colonial, style. Yet, they were still derided for theirburdensome attire, which they clung to – and which clung to them – for most of thewar. During Burgoyne’s campaign in the wilderness of New York, Riedesel’sdismounted Brunswick dragoons wore heavy boots, caps and coats, and bore acavalry sword ‘weighing at least 10 or 12 pounds.’ Hadden, discussing theBrunswick and Hanau troops in Burgoyne’s Army, stated that men outfitted in sucha way ‘cannot be expected to march or manoeuvre well on Foot and be expert atTreeing or Bush fighting’.463 While not as burdened as the Brunswick dragoons,most of the other auxiliary regiments wore clothing unsuited for the climate, andterrain, and an implication of clumsiness or awkwardness, common among popularstereotypes, was very much infused into these observations.Finally, the last aspect in this perception of ‘Hessian’ slowness, was inreference to their tendency to have large baggage trains, which included aninsinuation that they were burdened with carrying all their plunder. A caricatureprinted in London in 1778 entitled A Hessian Grenadier portrays an auxiliary soldierwith his characteristic hat, hair and moustache, but also seven or eight bags hangingfrom his back, including a large cut of meat – an item not likely to be seen in paradesor military revues.464 Once again the British political caricatures were – as they arewant to do – depicting their subject in the worst possible terms, but this time it wasnearer to the mark. While no soldier burdened in such a manner could haveescaped punishment for marauding, the Hessian Grenadiers in particular had a largewagon train for that purpose. In the summer of 1780, John Peebles, after havingbeen delayed on the day’s march by the collapse of several such wagons, wrote in
463 Another account of the Hessian Dragoons, mocked them for their ‘high and heavy jack boots, withlarge, long spurs, stout and stiff, leather breeches, gauntlets, reaching high upon his arms, and a hatwith a huge tuft of ornamental feathers’ dragging ‘a tremendous broad sword; a short bit clumsycarbine was slung over his shoulder, and down his back like a Chinese Mandarin, dangled a longqueue.’ Hadden, Hadden’s Journal, p. 181, 231 (footnotes).464 Anon. A Hessian Grenadier (London: M. Darley, 1778).
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exasperation: ‘what an amazing quantity of baggage the Hessians have.’465 Similarly,General Howe hinted that the Hessians’ attention to their belongings was in part areason for his inability to keep pace with Washington.466 Thus, slowness mightseem merely a noteworthy difference in behaviour, but in fact it encapsulated anumber of issues and points of criticism with the Hessian forces: their slowmanoeuvres and pace in battle, unwillingness to adapt to frontier fighting, theirburdens from bulky clothing and plunder, and perhaps even a reluctance orunwillingness to fight.Of the various descriptions of difference ascribed to British and Germansoldiers, some were less tangential, and directly related to the differences in themilitary cultures. Of these descriptions, outpost duties and picketing were recurringcriticisms of the British, and of course for the German auxiliaries, especially theHessians, the issue of marauding became the most exceptional. As the warprogressed and frustrations rose, some German officers began second-guessing andcriticizing their British allies for a series of mainly tactical mistakes, thushighlighting areas of tension between the two forces. From criticisms of Howe andBurgoyne in their military decisions, to accusations of hauteur and arrogance forimpositions on German dress and drill, there were specific issues that lowered theestimations of British forces in the minds of many of their auxiliaries. There wasone topic however, which would be a long-standing point of condemnationregarding British soldiers: outpost-duty. The jäger captain, Johann Hinrichs, anofficer who kept a journal during the campaigns in South Carolina, was particularlycritical of ‘the negligence of the English’ in their outpost-duty, pickets andrearguards. Yet rather than leave it to an error in discipline and drill, he couchedthe problem in terms of English national character.It is well known that the English are charged with heedlessness inmilitary service. Whether this be carelessness, haughtiness, and conceit,or consciousness of their own greatness, inborn pride, confidence in
465 Peebles, American War, p. 481.466 Captain Ewald of the Hessian Jägers laid the blame squarely on Howe, and, quite ironically,thought that they would have at least should have been able to catch up with the rebel’s baggage ifHowe had willed it. Atwood, Hessians, p. 106.; Ewald, Diary of the American War, p. 70.
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personal strength, and the conviction of their superiority over the enemy,I do not care to decide. The fact remains that it is there.467This neglect of outpost duty became yet another means of prescribing a defect to aproblem beyond the military sphere, even if Hinrichs did not know exactly where tolay the blame. Such criticisms by German authors were usually on a variety ofdifferent topics, whereas for criticisms of the Teutonic soldiery, the issue ofmarauding was salient.The breakdown of military discipline within the auxiliaries’ ranks that lead tothe frequent plundering of the colonial population received more commentary thanany other concern, and though it tugged at moral sensibilities, it was moreprofoundly felt in reference to the professional sentiments of the Britishcommentators. Though Francis Hutcheson, the paymaster for the army in NorthAmerica, wrote glowingly of the Hessians’ ‘great coolness and resolution’ in battlein the first campaign, he regretfully reported that they were ‘to[o] much addicted toplunder,’ and within the first few weeks of arriving in the thirteen colonies, thesesoldiers had gained a well-deserved reputation for, in the words of John Peebles,‘methodically’ plundering and ‘moroding to [a] shamefull degree.’468Looting was despairingly common in all early-modern armies, especiallywhen they were comprised of so many men with disreputable backgrounds throwninto such dire circumstances.469 British forces were no strangers to the practice,and in many cases were just as bad as the auxiliaries.470 Yet, the stigma remained
467 Bernhard A. Uhlendorf (trans and ed.), The Siege of Charleston; With an Account of the Province of
South Carolina: Diaries and Letters of Hessian Officers from the Von Jungkenn Papers in the William L.
Clements Library (Ann Arbor: UP of Michigan, 1938), pp. 161, 193, 265.468 BL Add Ms 21680, fol. 149. Hutcheson to Haldimand, New York, Sept 1st, 1776.; John Peebles,
Peebles American War, pp. 129, 378. For similar comments, see: Henry Cabot Lodge (Ed.) Major
André’s Journal 2 vols. (Cambridge (MA): Houghton & Co., 1903), vol. I, pp. 39, 42, 78-9.469 For Hessian marauding and plundering, see Atwood, Hessians, chap. 8.; for a more comprehensiveexamination of the auxiliaries and British forces, see: Conway, ‘Military-Civilian Crime’, esp. chap. 2.470 To over-generalize, some trends hint at a difference between these forces in that the British werelikelier to commit crimes against the person, the Hessians more inclined to commit crimes againstthe property. After complaining of the Hessian plundering, George Osborne wrote that ‘Among theBritish troops there is an inveteracy against the American Rebel that is so strong I am certain thanany Army ever felt against an Enemy, it is with difficulty they are restrained from refusing quarter,and the prisoners they do take, they treat with a manner so - - - icating, that I am convincedthousands would come to us if they were certain of being received with common attention.’Furthermore, I have yet to find a discussion among Hessian soldiers to match Lord Rawdon’s blasé
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with the ‘mercenaries’, and once again, the nature of the War in America created asituation that would make such actions doubly insidious to Anglo-German relations.Firstly was of course, that this lack of professionalism would hinder the professionalsolidarity so important to a coalition army.471 Equally important, the nature of thewar, which was essentially a civil strife from the British perspective, made any suchtransgressions to potential allies and countrymen particularly grievous. The resultwas an instant point of contrast, and citing Hessian plundering was also a means todraw a divide between British and German forces in many commentaries, and a wayof giving authors a means of bifurcating the redcoats and the bluecoats – to theadvantage of the former.The seeming inability to curb such behaviour, would also create a divideamong the officer corps, and create suspicions – sometimes justified – that theHessian officers were either accommodating, or promoting this behaviour amongtheir men. In one instance, two Scottish officers were invited to dine with theHessian Colonel Karl Donop, a seemingly positive instance of British-Germaninteraction within the army, until of course the German Count’s intentions wererevealed. Donop, who, according to Major Charles Cochrane, ‘came abroad to relievea ruined fortune’, invited the two Scottish infantry commanders to share a ‘valuableseizure’ made by his soldiers. ‘To get them more readily to take part’ in dividing theplunder, Donop reportedly tried to ‘fill them Drunk’, unsuccessfully, for ‘the twoScotch Heads were too strong’, and they turned down his offer.472 Whether or notthis tale was true is hardly relevant – what was important was that for all theabilities of Colonel Donop, his professionalism and motivations were hindered by aperception of Hessian fortune-seeking, and as mentioned earlier, similar caseswould help characterize these auxiliaries as men not motivated by honour, duty or
comments regarding the raping of local women by British soldiers. Huntington Library MS PocockPapers, PO 1169 Sir George Osborne to George Pocock, October 26th, 1776. West Chester New York.;HMC, Rawdon Hastings, vol. III, p. 179.471 Conway, ‘The British Army’, pp. 97-8.472 Cochrane was certainly dismayed with the Hessians in general, and wrote of this account as anexample of the ‘Plundering Mercenary Irregular behaviour of the German Soldiery.’ NLS MS 5375 fol.38, Charles Cochrane to Andrew Stewart, Germantown, October 19th 1777.
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loyalty, but by profit.473 Ironically, the commentaries that emerge from Burgoyne’sexpedition to New York in 1777 are filled with discussions of marauding and horsestealing, but it is the Native American allies who are censured, from both British andGerman eyewitnesses.474Marauding was a consistent issue in the first two years of the conflict, butother criticisms would emerge, in part owing to the poor quality of recruits arrivingfrom Germany. As maintaining the strength of the regiments in America becamemore problematic, the various princes of Germany, especially Frederick II of Hessen-Kassel, turned to less and less scrupulous methods to acquire men, in many waysliving up to the negative stereotypes regarding recruitment in the Holy RomanEmpire.475 While a rapidly descending quality of soldier was a problem every armyfaced in this age of attrition, it deeply affected the German auxiliaries, particularlythe Hessians, who prided themselves on their martial ability. As early as May 1777,John Bowater complained that ‘now as to the Hessians, they are the worst troops Iever saw. [The] Government has been cheated by their sending one half militia, andthe greatest part of the other recruits, [have] very few Viterons [sic] amongstthem.’476 This comment is not without some hyperbole, nevertheless, the quality ofthe soldiers was deteriorating, and at the same time Bowater was making theseremarks, Johann Ewald was complaining that the new jäger recruits were ‘desertersfrom all the services of Europe’, and he was in charge of an ‘insolent rabble’,whereas before he had ‘commanded the most upright and obedient of men.’477 Theproblem of this decay in martial order and ability was acute in all of the Germanforces, as the Ansbach regiments removed some 100 soldiers (10 percent of theirforce) on returning to Germany, on grounds that they did not meet the army’s
473 See Atwood, Hessians, esp. chapter 8.474 The Brunswicker, Wasmus, complained in his journal of the extensive plundering of the NativeAmerican auxiliaries, as ‘almost every one of them had a horse laden with all kinds of stolen goods.’Wasmus, the American Revolution, p. 70.475 Frey, British Soldier in America, p. 17.476 Quoted in Balderston, The Lost War, p. 152.477 Ewald, Diary of the American War, p. 68.
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requirements.478 The result was that perceptions of the German soldiery were notconsistent from the beginning to the end.Lastly, perceptions of the German auxiliaries were altered further by a seriesof military setbacks, which paved the way to all manner of rumours andscapegoating in which stereotypes and characterizations came to the fore. This wassomething of a tradition by the late eighteenth century, and for nearly the lasthundred years German armies and soldiers had been a target for blame, and theAmerican War was no different. From the defeats at Trenton (1776), to Bennington(1777), to Red Bank (1777) and beyond, the auxiliary forces would become one ofthe many scapegoats during, and after the war. The defeat and capture of threeHessian regiments at Trenton was especially singled out as an event with criticalrepercussions.479 Yet there were others instances, some of which were blown farout of proportion in order to fit a particular narrative. Writing from Pennsylvania,Charles Cochrane stated that during Burgyone’s expedition (which he would havehad very little knowledge of) was greatly delayed by the ‘infamous behaviour of theForeign Troops’, presumably at the Battle of Bennington, where he had heard thatseveral hundred soldiers had surrendered before ‘’ere nine of them were lost’.480This greatly exaggerated account was one of many examples of the rumours andhearsay which was rife in the army, since this was, as Ambrose Serle reflected, ‘afertile soil for lying.’481 Regarding the defeat at Trenton, the army chaplain SamuelSeabury wrote to his friends in Edinburgh, that ‘some say they [the Hessians] hadkept Christmas a little too merrily; others, that instead of briskly turning out on thealarm, they stayed to secure the plunder they had amassed.’ Given that Seabury was
478 Döhla, Hessian Diary, p. 245.479 Thomas Hutchinson, the de jure governor of Massachusetts, stated rather surprisingly, that thesetback had ‘lessened the opinion of the abilities of the commanders of the British army’, rather thanthe German commanders. Ira Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill:UNC Press, 1972), p. 156.; Peter Orlando (ed.). The Diary and Letters of is Excellency Thomas
Hutchinson Esq II Vols. (London: Sampson Low, 1883), p. 139.480 NLS MS 5375 fol. 38 Charles Cochrane to Andrew Stewart, Germantown, October 7th, 1777. Seealso: William Digby, The British Invasion from the North. The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and
Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby of the 53rd, or Shropshire
Regiment of Foot. Illustrated with Historical Notes by James Phinney Baxter. Munsell's Historical SeriesNo. 16 (Joel Munsell's Sons, Albany, NY: 1887). pp. 288-9481 Serle, American Journal, p. 140
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also willing to believe that Washington had been appointed ‘dictator’, his accountsare less valuable for their validity than they are for their insight into how rumourswere built around perceptions and negative stereotypes of German auxiliaries.482No doubt that many times the auxiliaries were worthy of blame, but in severalaccounts, they were faulted disproportionately. Just as success bred praise, defeatincurred undue derision.
**Conclusion**
The German auxiliaries in the American War may never escape the ‘Hessianmercenary’ stereotype which defined them for two centuries, and has only beenseriously challenged in the last three decades. Their legacy as egregious plunderers,their status as hired soldiers (a concept deeply egregious to the nationalisticsentiments of nineteenth and early twentieth century military historians) and theirrelative prominence in a futile war, have seemingly doomed them to infamy. As thelast several decades of scholarship have revealed, their ignoble reputation is owedfor the most part to the popular rhetoric from within Britain, Germany and America,though a healthy number of transgressions certainly fortified these assertions.These traditional views have had a significant effect on our impressions of Germanauxiliaries throughout the eighteenth century as it is assumed that the negativeaspects of this relationship were mirrored in previous and succeeding wars. Whilethis chapter has looked to better defining the exceptionalities of this particularconflict, there were a number of developments which matched previous trends.While the objective here was not to confront the caricatures of Hessian auxiliaries,the evidence provided should reveal that they were by no means pariahs within theBritish Army.Apart from a few dissimilarities, one of the great values of the wealth ofinformation we have about these ‘mercenaries’ is that they permit us a better
482 NLS Fettercairne Papers, MS 4796 F3/75, fols. 111-113, S. Seabury to Doctors Chandler & Cooper,New York, February 9th, 1777.
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understanding of the inner workings of these forms of Anglo-German militaryassociation. In terms of their treatment, the ‘Hessians’ received a degree of carematching, if not surpassing, other instances of Germans fighting alongside theBritish Army, and again, they were well supplied and did not suffer undue casualties.While their professional relationship may have been similar to previous wars, themen of all ranks were integrated in the day-to-day social and professional lives ofthe British Army to a much greater degree. Whereas in conflicts on the Europeancontinent armies would be more dispersed and segregated, in the colonies thesevarious forces were intertwined, making interactions between these two politiesmundane, but also criticisms and faults more pronounced.Concerning their portrayals and depictions of one another, if the majority ofthese commentaries are negative, it is due to the focus on their respectiveprofessional shortcomings, not on account of any national disinclination. In fact, themost disparaging opinions of the German auxiliaries in the American War reveal theextent to which these forces were contextualized as an investment, and comparisonsof martial ability were not couched in discussions of national character, but ratherevaluations of whether these subsidy troops were worth the money and trustinvested in them. It should be remembered, that disagreements or condemnationsshow up more in records more than when all sides are functioning as expected, andtherefore a few disgruntled British soldiers (or more commonly sailors) should notskew the overall picture.Furthermore, when contrasted with the opinions of colonial civilians, not farremoved from being Englishmen themselves, the contrast is stunning. Of all thederogatory remarks made of the Hessians by British military men, nothing matchedthe views of the colonial population, who looked upon them as ‘monsters’ orcannibals, with an appearance and comportment which to one young Philadelphianwas ‘dreadful beyond expression.’483 Back in England opposition politicians and
483 Jakob Piel recalled after his capture that many colonial civilians visited him and his fellow officers:‘They had come to see strange animals and found to their disgust that we looked like human beings.’Bruce Burgoyne [trans. & ed.], Defeat, Disaster and Dedication: The Diaries of the Hessian Officers
Jakob Piel and Andreas Wiederhold (Bowle, Maryland: Heritage Books, 1997), p. 23.; Atwood,
Hessians, p. 151.
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polemicists were no kinder to these soldiers, predicting that they would quicklydesert, with one MP professing that sending Hessians to fight in the colonies wouldonly lead to ‘peopling America with Germans.’484 While thousands of theseauxiliaries did in fact stay in America, the first year of the war proved to be theopposite of what these doomsayers predicted, and belied the potency of themercenary stereotype in the thoughts and arguments of prominent dissenters. Yetas time progressed, there was a noticeable decay in how British soldiers perceivedthe ‘Hessian mercenaries’, and these real or perceived shortcomings of their subsidyforces became a growing issue, made particularly acute by the seeming futility of thewar. This is perhaps one of the greatest impacts of the ‘Hessians’ in the AmericanWar, as the concept of the German auxiliary has become synonymous with thislosing effort, which has overshadowed the many other successes allowed by hiringGerman troops to assist British forces.The American War was unique for a variety of reasons, and though much ofwhat has been discussed in this chapter may further support a portrayal of therelations between Briton and ‘Hessian’ as tumultuous, if not contemptuous, therewas a great deal of stability and camaraderie as well. In spite of the professionaldifferences or the inability of the officers of the respective polities to blendseamlessly into one corps, the merging of German and British soldiers should belooked upon as a success, even if the war itself was not.




GERMANS WITHIN THE BRITISH ARMY
In the last three chapters we have examined the various similarities anddifferences between British soldiers and their German counterparts in coalition-style armies, and as auxiliaries of a predominantly British force. In the next twochapters, we will turn to those German soldiers who served formally within theBritish Army from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, focusing onthe staggered progression towards direct integration into the army. Thisdiscussion will be followed by a case study of one particular force that achieved adegree of structural and social integration that no previous foreign corps hadattained – be they Dutch, Huguenot, or German. That this force, the King’sGerman Legion should come into being at the end of the period underexamination is no coincidence, as those factors that spurred German assimilationthroughout this period were particularly acute in the quarter century of conflictwith Republican and Imperial France. Yet the King’s German Legion was merelyone of scores of foreign corps and integrated forces on the British establishmentduring this time period. In fact, though French émigrés would be recruited indroves during the first years of war with Revolutionary France, it was men fromthe various German states who would remain the most common and most soughtafter.
The English Army had always contained a number of foreign-born troops,and therefore the presence of German soldiers in the eighteenth century armywould seem at first, unremarkable. In the wake of the glorious revolution, theEnglish Army had become as heterogeneous as ever, as can be seen at the Battleof the Boyne in Ireland in 1689, where less than half of William III’s forces were
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English.485 William’s desire for professionalism and competence from hisofficers meant that the inexperience and questionable loyalties of the Englishofficer class were undesirable, and he spent the majority of his dozen years asmonarch confiding in Dutch and German generals. The rank & file itself wasextremely multinational, with many of William’s Dutch forces being put intoEnglish pay in the wake of his ousting of James II, and these Dutch troops werenot alone. Certainly the most notable collection of foreigners in this time periodwere the Huguenots, who were to serve throughout the Nine Years War underEnglish pay, and, significantly, the only ones to be placed on the Britishestablishment.486Within a few years of the Glorious Revolution the polyglot nature of thearmy had become extremely unpopular, and reaction against it, lead by ousted ormarginalized English officers, pushed for parliamentary legislation preventingthe King’s Armies from being so un-English. As mentioned in the introductorychapter, this resentment and hostility would be a direct reaction against thispreference of foreign soldiery, and this intolerance helped fuel the anti-Hanoverian movement that emerged in the following decades. This nascentnationalism, or perhaps merely xenophobia, went hand in hand with concernsover the religious make-up of William’s Army. Much was said at the time of hisinvasion of the several thousand Catholics serving in the invader’s forces, andfears of a foreign army stripping away the god-given rights of an Englishmanwere inextricably linked with trepidation that a Catholic army would become themilitant arm of popery in Britain. The Disbandment Act of 1699, and the Act ofSettlement in 1701 were the two weapons that Parliament deployed to parrysuch attacks.487 Following these acts, and for the next several decades, thetrajectory of the English – and later British – Army would be towards an ethnic
485 Kenneth Furgeson, ‘The Organization of King William’s Army in Ireland, 1689-92’; Irish Sword,XVIII (70), pp. 68-9.486 Childs, The British Army of William III, p.132.487 Matthew H Glozier, The Huguenots of William of Orange and the Glorious “Revolution” of 1688(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), p.136
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and religious homogeneity, where non-naturalized foreigners were a rareoccurrence, or at least at great variance when contrasted to the Armies of thecontinental states. Instead, most foreign soldiers fighting alongside the BritishArmy would be those contracted and hired through the German princes, and inmost cases, kept a healthy distance from the British establishment lists.
**German Contingents in the British Army**
These policies would remain intact for half a century, yet restrictions againstnon-protestants and prohibitions against foreign officers would be graduallyrescinded, with the most significant changes transpiring at the end of thecentury, a period better known for seeing a strengthening of local and nationalidentities. The manpower discrepancy that lead to Britain’s alliances withvarious German states, and the subsidizing of forces to augment her own army,would also create a demand for foreign soldiers within the British Army. Thisphenomenon is best placed alongside Parliament’s attempts at incorporating theuntapped manpower within the British Isles, a theme particularly dominant inthe decade following the Jacobite Rebellion in 1745-6. By the Seven Years War,1756, the manpower requirements to fight a truly global war, the first of its kind,meant that the British Government would need an army (and navy) large enoughto deal with France and Spain, all without the traditional and now obsoletepartnerships with the Austrian Habsburgs and the Dutch Republic. Coincidingwith an increase in subsidizations to smaller German states in Europe, in theAmerican Colonies a group of former Dutch officers of Swiss-Protestant stockwere tasked with creating a British regiment of foreign-born soldiers tocompensate for shortfalls in recruitment there. The successes already seen withthe raising of Highland Scots regiments would be the template for recruitingGerman men in the colonial hinterland with equally questionable loyalties, butalso a susceptibility to the pacifism of their Quaker neighbours. Filling the armywith foreigners was still an unpopular and unconstitutional idea, but the latterwas amended (very slightly) when a 1756 Act of Parliament permitted the
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creation of the 62nd Regiment of Foot, which before it was refashioned as the 60thFoot, was given the moniker, ‘The Royal Americans.’488 Yet Americans thesewere not, as two battalions were composed of mostly German colonists – definedboth ethnically and linguistically – and the other two battalions were taken frommen rejected from the Irish establishment.489 In an unprecedented step, and oneowing to the Dutch-recruiting officer background of its co-founder, AugustinePrevost, recruiting officers were sent to Germany as well (including Prevosthimself), to fill the ranks of the Royal Americans’ battalions. Thus began a policyrecurrent over the next 60 years, of recruiting officers from British regimentstravelling throughout the Holy Roman Empire, mimicking the ages old traditionof the German military enterpriser.490The Royal Americans Regiment was a successful undertaking, andbattalions served in most of the major campaigns in the colonies in the SevenYears War, and the Regiment continued to be largely German in compositionright through the Napoleonic Wars.491 Though recruiting in the Holy RomanEmpire was not overwhelmingly successful (which explains why men had to beimported from Ireland) it was just effective enough to encourage other regimentsof the British Army to send recruiters into Germany, to help increase theirnumbers.
488 The Act tried to justify the policy for raising foreigners to protect these regions, in partbecause these colonists would not do it for themselves: ‘the natural born Subjects of[Pennsylvania] … do in great part consist of the People called Quakers, whose Backwardness intheir own Defence exposes themselves, and that Part of America, to imminent Danger.’ Act ofParliament 29 Geo. II., CAP: An Act to enable His Majesty to grant Commissions to a certain number
of Foreign Protestants who have served Abroad as Officers, or Engineers, to act and rank as Officers,
or Engineers, in AMERICA only, under certain Restrictions and Qualifications.; HL Loudoun Papers,LO 6739 ‘List of Lieutenants and Ensigns proposed for the Royal Americans’.489 For an insightful history of the 60th Regiment see: Alexander Campbell, The Royal American
Regiment: An Atlantic History in Microcosm, 1756-1762 (Norman, Oklahoma: University ofOklahoma Press, 2010).490 HSTAH Hann 47. nr. 113 I fol. 126491 The Royal Americans were only allowed to serve in the American Colonies and the Caribbeanuntil the 1804 Act, permitting as many as 10,000 foreign men to serve in Britain. Lewis Butler,
The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps: Volume I. ‘The Royal Americans’ (Smith & Elder: London,1913) p. 208. Richard Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket(Harper Collins, 2002), p.329
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The following conflict, the American War of Independence, saw anotherimportant step in the integration of German soldiers, when in the autumn of1775, the Lord North Ministry contracted Georg von Scheither, a Hanoveriancolonel with experience in the Seven Year War, to raise 4,000 men from acrossGermany to help bring British regiments up to full strength.492 The requirementsneeded to augment the line regiments for warfare in the colonies meant placingGerman soldiers side by side with British soldiers in established regiments,sometimes at the rate of ten percent of the total.493 Scheither spent the next 8months, journeying across the Holy Roman Empire (he claimed he travelled wellover 2,500 English miles), under the supervision of Colonel William Faucitt, whowas likewise charged with dealing with Hanover and the various other statesfrom which Britain would purchase her auxiliaries.494 ‘Scheithers Recruits’which in the end neared 2,000 men, were sent in small groups to Dover to bereviewed, and then shipped to the colonies for distribution into the variousBritish regiments.495 Their treatment was fairly poor, and from the moment oftheir enlistment, to their arrival in their respective regiments – and beyond –they were treated more like prisoners than soldiers, usually locked up at nightand heavily guarded to prevent desertion or their kidnapping, which was the fateof some sixteen soldiers who were sold to Austrian and Prussian recruiters bylocal fisherman.496 But it was not just outside influences that were a problem, asthey were from start to finish a group prone to desertion, certainly a problemshared by all nations recruiting in Germany, but an indication that few of these
492 HSTAH Hann. 47 II nr. 113 II fol. 151493 Silvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America, p. 16.494 For Scheither’s personal papers, see: HSTAH Hann 47. I nr. 113 – 114.495 CO 5/168 Barrington to Germaine, 20th June 1776.; CO 5/196 fol. 391 Barrington to Germaine,22nd July, CO 5/210 fol. 419.496 ‘I am very sorry to tell this, but… these Recruits and engaged and payed by the King at so greatan expense, havent only been seduced but even carried away and caused to be sold to theAustrian and Prussian Recruiting parties, by his Majesty’s own Hannoverian Subjects. I had takenall possible care to prevent desertion… but I never suspected that two Stader sailors had them intheir passage boats in some unknown place and carried them off. I really confess that I neverthought, that we had such traitors among us.’ See: WO 43/405 , fols. 214-216, 324-5 BaronGrothaus to Barrington, Stade, May 15th, 1776.
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men had had any intention of serving for very long.497 When they arrived inAmerica their ill health, lack of equipment and poor discipline made them thepariahs of both British and German corps. Alongside the chequered fate ofScheither’s recruiting efforts, the Royal Americans would continue to enlistGerman soldiers (for service in the Caribbean) during the time period, with theirlight infantry maintaining an especially central-European composition through tothe end of the Napoleonic Wars.One of the most important developments in the American War ofIndependence was that the restrictions on religion were quickly falling by thewayside. Throughout the course of the conflict, laws preventing the service ofCatholics in the army were slackened then abolished, which was a policy directlygeared towards swelling the army with Hibernian blood. Yet this policy, whichwithin a quarter century would lead to an Irish presence (and eventual plurality)in the British Army, also had a knock on effect in the incorporation of Germansoldiers, if the inclusion of German Catholics did not outright precede it. AmongScheither’s recruits were a large number of ‘papists’, usually between 10 and 20percent of the contingents, and though British inspectors would turn away alarge number of these soldiers for being unfit (or in a few instances, ‘mad’),religion was not grounds for rejection.498The global struggles of the 1750’s-80’s, which would spur theincorporation of German soldiers into Britain’s colonial armies, would bedwarfed by the new strains created by the wars with Revolutionary andNapoleonic France. Unsurprisingly then, the trend of integrating Germansoldiers continued, and indeed, reached new levels when a variety of so-called‘foreign-corps’ would be placed upon the British establishment, while thousandsof other foreign men served as ‘English soldiers’ within British regiments, and attimes within England. These foreign corps, usually intact or semi intact
497 For more on these issues, see. Peter Wilson, ‘The Politics of Military Recruitment inEighteenth-Century Germany’ English Historical Review, no. 472 (June 2002), p. 539.498 Don N. Hagist, Forty German Recruits: The Service of German Nationals in the 22nd Regimentof Foot, http://www.revwar75.com/library/hagist/FORTYGERMANRECRUITS.htm#1 accessedMay 1st, 2011.; See also: WO 43/405, esp. fols. 237, 297, 354.
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regiments rescued from disbandment or destruction on the continent would inmany ways become entities mid-way between fully integrated units andauxiliaries. This was in part because they would often maintain their uniform,drill and customs from their time as a German unit, sometimes preserving someof these elements, or all, for the duration of their service within the British Army.Yet through time, some of these forces would become more Anglicized in theserespects. In many ways, this meant that the British Government had gone nearlyfull circle, beginning the nineteenth century, where the seventeenth had ended,with the British Army being a heterogeneous mixture of foreign soldiers andnative servicemen. Apart from French émigrés, there was a wide selection offoreign corps during the wars between 1793 and 1815, including contingentsfrom Corsica, Sicily, Switzerland, and Greece. But once again, the Germancontingents were the largest and most significant.499
The first of these Germanic foreign corps, was a regiment of Hussarsrecruited by of Charles Hompesch, which, following the cessation of hostilities innorthern Europe in 1795, were taken into the British Establishment, and sent tofight in Saint Domingue.500 Within two years, they would be divided among the20th Light Dragoons, and the Battalion of the 60th Regiment, where the remnantsof the original corps would serve for the remainder of the wars against Napoleon.A similar history can be found with a collection of soldiers raised by the Duke of
499 One such corps, composed of Germans and Swiss, was the 97th Regiment of Foot, a singlebattalion formation, which was created from a Swiss regiment under Spanish employ that wascaptured on Minorca, and spent most of its existence within the British Army fighting in theMediterranean, and the Peninsula. Though mostly Swiss to begin with, ‘The Queen’s Germans’became a repository of foreigners of all types, a smattering of Britons and Irishmen, and includedjust enough men of Teutonic origin to justify the name. See: Charles Oman, Wellington’s Army,
1809-1814 (London: Greenhill Books, 1986), p. 227.; Charles Boutflower, The Journal of an Army
Surgeon During the Peninsular War (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1997), p.53.500 Hompesch would later propose ‘collecting and forming into a corps or Legion all thoseGermans, natives of the banks of the Rhine, who through compulsion are made to serve at thepresent moment with the French’ of course, led by himself, but with the assistance of ‘a certainproportion of British [sic] officers to each Battalion’. Rodney Atwood stated that Scheither wasthe ‘last independent recruiter of any note in Germany, a statement that Hompesch would haveundoubtedly disagreed with, as he was fairly well known in northern Germany, and hiscontributions to the British Army alone were more than double that of Scheither. WO 1/237 fol.32 Undated Letter.
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Brunswick, which, after a failed attempt at liberating their homeland in 1809, in amovement reminiscent of the histories of Xenophon, fled to the coast to berescued and brought to England. During this same period, these men were joinedby the remnants of Major Ferdinand von Schill’s hussar regiment, a band ofPrussian freedom fighters of whom many would join the British service aftertheir leader, von Schill, became a martyr for the cause of German liberation.501The cavalry and infantry of the Brunswick-Öls Corps, styled the ‘Death or Glory’men on account of the skull and crossbones motif on their caps, or morecommonly, ‘The Black Brunswickers’ in reference to their pitch-black uniforms,would first be stationed in the Channel Islands, but ultimately spent the majorityof their time in the British establishment fighting with Wellington in thePeninsular War and as garrison troops in Sicily.502 Though they were not alwaysconsidered very effective troops, they did however achieve a great deal ofintegration within the British Army, owing to their association with a morefamous foreign corps, the King’s German Legion.503
The most notable integration of German soldiers into the BritishEstablishment was the King’s German Legion, a force of predominantly exiledHanoverian soldiers who formed an important part of the British Army’sEuropean resistance to Napoleonic France.504 In many ways the King’s German
501 For a fascinating and highly readable monograph on the many propagandized retellings ofMajor von Schill’s life, see: Sam Mustafa, The Long Ride of Major von Schill: A Journey Through
German History and Memory (Plymouth: Rowan & Littlefield, 2008).; See also: GermanCavalryman [J. von Wickede], Wider Napoleon! Ein Deutsches Reiterleben 1806-1815,herausgegeben von Friedrich M. Kircheisen (Stuttgart: Robert Luß, 1911), esp. vol I.502 Holmes, Redcoat, p.51.503 Brunswickers would share the same benefits in rank and pensions/half-pay as officers in theKing’s German Legion. WO 1/428 fol. 67.; WO 26/42 fol. 83-84.504 The King’s German Legion have received by far the most attention of all Germans within theBritish Army, with the most noteworthy and significant contributions to their history from NorthLudlow Beamish, History of the King's German Legion (London: 1837 (1997)).; Adolf Pfannkuche.
Die Königlich Deutsche Legion 1803-1816 (Hannover: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1926).; AnthonyBrett-James, Life in Wellington’s Army (London, George Allen: 1972); Daniel Savage Gray, ‘TheServices of the King’s German Legion in the Army of the Duke of Wellington: 1809-1815,’ PhD,Florida State University, (1969).; Roger Edward Francis Guilford North, 'The raising andOrganizing of the King's German Legion'. JSAHR, 39 (1961), 168-84.; Bernhard HeinrichSchwertfeger, Geschichte der königlich deutschen Legion, 1803-1816. (Hanover and Leipzig,1907).
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Legion, or KGL, was the high point in the long history of these militarycollaborations, and beyond purely military matters, was perhaps the singlegreatest instance of British-Hanoverian unity apart from the monarchy itself.505The origins of ‘the Legion’ can be traced to the days following the resumption ofhostilities between Britain and France in the spring of 1803. The invasion ofHanover in June by French forces led to the disbandment of the Electorate’sArmy in accordance with the Convention of the Elbe, ratified by Hanoverianministers on July 5th. The occupation of Hanover resulted in an exodus, first ofhigh-ranking officers such as the King’s son, Prince Adolphus (the Duke ofCambridge), followed by men from the rank and file of the Hanoverian Army.Already, there had been some interest in preserving or rescuing remnants of thisforce, and now, with an influx of Hanoverians arriving in England, plans begancirculating for creating a regiment from the exiles.506The formation of these refugees into a single corps was the brainchild ofthe Scotsman and ex-Dutch Army officer Colin Halkett and Friedrich von derDecken, a Hanoverian and former aide-de-camp to the Duke of Cambridge. Tohelp in the recruiting process, the Duke of Cambridge issued a proclamation onAugust 10, 1803 to be circulated in northern Germany which called for ‘all braveGermans’ to take up arms in this ‘King’s German Regiment.’ The results of theroyal family’s efforts, and the widespread advertisement that soldiers wouldserve under German officers, was that by the end of the year there was a surplusof recruits, and enough men to form a battalion of artillery and three cavalryregiments as well. To reflect this force now being a compound of the threebranches of the military, the King’s German Regiment was renamed the King’sGerman Legion.507
505 C.T. Atkinson, ‘Hanoverian Soldiers in Gibraltar,’ United Service Magazine 180 (1919), p.25.506 The Convention of the Elbe, formally known as the Convention of Artlenburg, stipulated thatthe Hanoverian Army could be transferred to England in exchange for French prisoners held inEngland, and the raising of a regiment within Britain was seen as a means of working around thisclause. Gray, ‘Service of the King’s German Legion’, p. 16.507 Gray, ‘The Services of the King’s German’, pp. 16-18.; and Roger North, 'The raising andorganizing of the King's German Legion', pp. 169-170.
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Originally charged with helping in the defence of southwest England inthe event of a French invasion, the Legion would soon find itself a part of themajority of Britain’s subsequent campaigns in Europe: northern Germany(1805), Denmark (1807), Sweden (1808), the Netherlands (1809), Sicily andItaly (1808-1814), the ‘Peninsular War’ in Spain and Portugal (1808-1814), andfinally the 100 days and Waterloo (1815). Similarly, the Legion was chargedwith garrisoning various locations throughout Britain’s European dominions,including Ireland between 1806 and 1808, Gibraltar at intervals between 1805-1813 and of course England throughout the conflict, mainly at the KGLheadquarters at Bexhill.508Such was the success of the King’s German Legion, that following theliberation of central Europe in 1813, a British-sponsored ‘Russian GermanLegion’ was formed and meanwhile officers from the King’s German Legion weresent to assist the reconstruction of the Hanoverian Army.509 Yet perhaps themost striking testament to the vitality of the corps’ legacy, was the ‘GermanLegion’, formed the at the outbreak of the Crimean War, in 1854, some 38 yearsafter the disbandment of the KGL, and more than a decades after the terminationof the dynastic Union between Britain and Hanover. Some 10,000 German menwere originally recruited, primarily from the states and provinces of northernGermany, many of who were recently relieved from service with the DanishArmy. Though the intention and the personnel were similar, it was by this pointan antiquated system, and this Legion ended up not fighting in the Crimeansteppe, but rather settling the South African veldt, where it was sent upon thewar’s conclusion, thus determining this last embodiment of a German Legion as
508 The growth of Bexhill from a village to a town at the beginning of the nineteenth century iscredited to the presence of the Legion’s headquarters, where a number of men were continuouslystationed. There were even schools established to teach the children of the soldiers in Englishand German. See http://www.bexhill-museum.co.uk, Accessed April 4th, 2009. Biedermann,Emanuel. Von Malta Bis Waterloo: erinnerungen Aus den Kriegen gegen Napoleon I (Bern: Hallwag,1941), p. 134.509 New Hanoverian formations were also in British pay, and wore British-style uniforms, andconsidered British soldiers. NAM 35694 Manfred Bresemann, ‘The King’s German Legion 1803-1816 and the British Traditions Handed Down by the Legion to the Royal Hanoverian Army up to1866’, Hanover, 1984 p.12
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settlers more than soldiers.510 The German Legion’s existence is noteworthy, notfor their own contributions to British military efforts, but more for theaffirmation of the importance, both actual and psychological, of German soldiersto the British Army, whose legacy – though not utility – lasted into the secondhalf of the nineteenth century.
**Features of German Recruitment**
Having briefly examined the history of the Germans in the British Army in thelong eighteenth century, there are a few points that need to be made here or
510 W.B. Tyler, ‘The British German Legion – 1854-1862’, JSAHR vol. 54 (1976), pp. 14-29.
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readdressed concerning this transition from a largely English army, to a forcethat incorporated into its ranks thousands of foreign-born males.Firstly, the integration of Germanic soldiery directly parallels theintegration of other forces, especially when compared to the integration ofHighlanders by the mid century, and Catholic Irish at the time of the AmericanWar of Independence. The continued necessity of filling and sustaining Armyregiments required a steady influx of new recruits, and this was the leadingcause for the rolling back of restrictions on ethnicity and religious affiliation.This last aspect is crucial, as the opening up of service in the British Army toCatholics, meant that men from throughout all of the Holy Roman Empire couldbe recruited, and is, in part, why describing these men as ‘German’ – as indicatedin the introductory chapter – reflects the broader definitions of Germany, and isnot merely restricted to the handful of principalities that were allied with Britain.Secondly, the government’s policy of integrating men from the HolyRoman Empire was not particularly innovative, as in most cases, they wereactually reacting to recruiting operations already under way. The Swiss colonelPrevost, the man responsible for helping to create the Royal Americans, wasalready contracting officers and recruits months before the policy was ratified byParliament – in essence, breaking a law by pre-empting its passage. This led to aconflict between many German and Swiss men in the 60th and Prevost, who hadpromised them greater wages than what they received once Parliament gave itsconsent to the practice.511In the case of Scheither’s recruits, though this was an enterprise of theWar Office, the one action which preceded governmental policy, was therecruitment of known Catholics, men who would be present in the British Armywith the full awareness of all participants that their presence was in directopposition to the laws against Papists serving in the British military outlined inthe Act of Settlement. This policy of course would be revoked within two years,
511 There were inquiries into conduct of Colonel Prevost who denied, or failed to give promotionsto the foreign officers in the Royal Americans, affecting them ‘in what is most dear to them,Honor, Preferment, Privileges and Property.’ HL Loudoun Papers : LO 6304 March 5th, 1761
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to some vigorous, if not delayed, public outrage. Even the King’s German Legionwas created only after the recruitment of several hundred Hanoverians by ColinHalkett made creating a new foreign corps possible.512 Therefore, it would bewrong to assume that Parliament and the Secretary of War spearheaded theintegration of German soldiers, rather, as the government was want to do duringthis time period, they reacted to situations already transpiring within the army.This leads us to the third point regarding the integration of Germansoldiers: the importance of a transnational officer class. In much the same waythat Britain was reliant upon German commissaries, and officers for movementand procuring supplies in Germany, so too was it totally reliant upon German,Swiss and Dutch know-how for accessing the pools of able-bodied men from thevarious principalities in the Holy Roman Empire. Though there was animportant bond between British and Germanic forces, this is not to suggest it wasunique. In fact, as discussed before, the Dutch role in introducing many of thesepractices into the British Army was critical, and no greater example can be seenthan with the role of ex-Dutch officers in the recruitment of Germans, such as theSwiss-born officers Haldimand and Prevost, and the Scottish Colonel, Halkett, aveteran of the Guards Regiment in the Dutch service.513 Therefore this strongconnection between British and German soldiers was not a bi-nationalmovement, but a transnational one, where a wide variety of men from variouscountries and principalities crossed boundaries to serve and recruit in aborderless environment created by the ‘soldier-trade’. In many ways, this was alingering aspect of European militaries, and the actions of these men harkenedback to the era of mercenaries and military enterprisers common in thepreceding centuries.514 The result was that, in a manner that was directlyopposite to the intentions of the Act of Settlement, professionalism and skill took
512 Halkett would later help form the Hanoverian Levies (Landwehr) after the liberation ofHanover in 1813. Beamish, History of the King’s German Legion, vol. 1, pp. 75-78. Gray, ‘Service ofthe King’s German Legion’, p. 325.513 Adolf Pfannkuche, Die Königlich Deutsche Legion, p. 19.; H. M. Chichester, ‘Halkett, Sir Colin(1774–1856)’, Gates, ODNB.514 In this spirit, Alexander Campbell in his work on the Royal Americans repeatedly refers toJames Prevost as ‘the mercenary.’ Campbell, The Royal American Regiment, esp. chap. 1.
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precedence over nationality. For the Royal Americans, foreign men such asHaldimand and Bouquet were selected above native Britons because – aside fromtheir personal contacts – they had experience in multinational armies, and couldact as liaisons between British and German troops given their fluency in French,the language of the military profession. In many ways, their preference overalready naturalized foreign men, especially the pool of men from the colonies,suggests that professionalism in a military setting could be a stronger bond thanthat between Briton and colonist.515 Therefore, officers from continental armies,with the experience and contacts needed to recruit within the Holy RomanEmpire, were the real facilitators of this integration.Lastly, there should be some mention of the role of the Monarchy in theintegration of German soldiers. The ‘Germanness’ of the Hanoverian Kings wasintegral to relations with allies and auxiliaries, as it was here. Most attempts atrecruitment within the Reich began with a Royal patent, and pamphletsdistributed in recruiting areas along the Rhine or near to Hanover, would utilizethe Monarchy’s Electoral status and Imperial offices to a cause that without them,would have been illegal.516 The Monarchy itself was beneficial for recruiting inGermany, but the King was not the greatest factor in bringing in and integratingGerman and British solders, but rather the royal family as a whole. AugustinePrevost, who founded the Royal Americans, was a friend of the Duke ofCumberland, the son of George II, while Decken used his contacts acquired fromserving as an aide-de-camp for George’s III’s son, the Duke of Cambridge, to puthimself at the head of efforts towards recreating the Hanoverian Army in theguise of the King’s German Legion.517 Throughout the conflicts withRevolutionary and Napoleonic France, the sons of George III (the Dukes of York,Cambridge, and Cumberland – the latter becoming King of Hanover in 1837)became liaisons for soldiers coming from occupied states in central Europe,
515 WO 43/405 fols. 2-14-6 William Faucitt to Viscount Barrington, Hanover, 10th November,1775.516 HSTAH Hann. 47 II Nr. 113 II, fol. 151, Werbungflugblatt, printed Hannover, 30th December,1775.; Conway, ‘British Army’, p. 84.517 Gray, ‘Services’, pp. 16-18.
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given their close affiliations with the Hanoverian Army, and their education atthe University of Göttingen. Their vocal support for foreign corps such as theKing’s German Legion, the men from Hompesch’s Regiments and theBrunswicker troops protected them from public backlash and infighting withinthe army.518 As with auxiliaries, a lack of dynastic connection or direct Royal tiesto one’s land of origin did not necessarily prohibit a degree of support for theBritish Monarch/Hanoverian Elector. George III, even as his health was fading,was eager to welcome these foreigners and make them feel apart of the army,often deliberately celebrating the army’s heterogeneous nature during theirtenure as defenders of England’s coasts.519 Such support did not go unnoticed bythe British press, who had their fears of a Germanic ‘Praetorian Guard’ beingformed from these refugee-soldiers, yet the Royal Family reaffirmed this bond inspite of criticisms, and did a great deal to protect the image of the many foreigncorps, but the German ones in particular.520Therefore, the origins, and developments that lead to the incorporation ofGerman soldiers, involved not only political and demographic factors, but alsothe efforts of a wide variety of people, including a number of foreign-born
518 HSTAH Hann. 38 nr. 158 fols. 2-13, 18.519 Bexhill, Sept. 20th, 1804 ‘Our heavy cavalry at Weymouth is one of the main objects of theKing’s attention. That has, of course, its disadvantageous side for us, as opposing us to theEnglish. Even the German tune Landesvater is said at times to have taken precedence of God Savethe King. Really moving are such incidents as these: The King walked in among the ranks, wentinto home details, many of which were unknown to him – particularly much of the decisive partof our latest history. He then consoled the men over the present unhappy condition of theircountry, and exhorted them to be of good cheer and trust in Providence.’ Another account of aprevious ceremony at Weymouth recalls the King walking among these foreign corps, and upondiscovering the origins of various soldiers, continually made remarks such as ‘very goodsoldiers!’, or ‘all good men’ and encouraged these foreigners to sing and dance in a mannerreflective of their nations of origin. Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer, p.176.; Gleig, The
Hussar, pp. 68-9.520 Landsheit recounted one such faux pas where after a review of a troop at Weymouth, QueenCharlotte sent for the women and children of the regiment: ‘Her Majesty had a kind word to sayto each, and desired that each should have a guinea. But when, at last, she came to one – thenative of her own country – she drew forth her purse and gave her five guineas. Finally, the Kingordered a hogshead of beer and an amply supply of pipes and tobacco for every troop, anddeparted. Yet, for this act of kindness, both King and Queen were abused in the prints of the days,as if their affections had pointed only to foreigners, and the English regiments were neglected.’Gleig, The Hussar, pp. 69-70. Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 1700-1837 (Suffolk:Boydell Press, 2007), pp. 255-8. For a collection of William Cobbett’s arguments against thisfavoritism, see: Daniel Green, The Great Cobbett: The Noblest Agitator (London: Hobber andStoughton, 1983), pp. 345-8, 377.
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officers and the royal family itself. And in contrast to the nature and character ofAnglo-German coalitions, there was a dramatic change over time from a period inthe beginning of the century where non-naturalized foreigners were purged fromthe muster rolls, to a period when they represented a large proportion of theBritish establishment. Perceptions played a part in this process, and now that wehave addressed the manner in which German soldiers were incorporated, we willturn to the motives for doing so.
**Recruiting German Troops*
There are several reasons in particular that made German recruits desirable,although their availability and the need for expediency were the leading factors.The political situations in Europe contributed to a preference for Germansoldiery. As German states were for the most part at peace with Britainthroughout this period, or antagonists for short intervals, their soldiers did notsuffer from the frequent bans placed on men from most western European states.In British regiments with a strong foreign presence, such as the 60th RoyalAmericans or the King’s German Legion, there were limitations or prohibitionson recruiting French-born men, and often a number of other nationalities – a banthat not found for Germans.521 In many ways, this meant that German-born menwere not so much desired as they were acceptable, and were sought after, notbecause they were the best troops, but since they did not represent potentialenemies.While there were fears of recruiting future enemies, Germans alsobenefited from having served as former allies, with the frequency of finding
521 During the Napoleonic Wars, this list of banned soldiers for such regiments became quite long,for example, for the King’s German Legion: ‘neither French, Italians, Danes, Swedes, Russians,Spaniards or Portuguese shall be enlisted’. The Huguenots were an exception to this, given thatthey were perceived to share a common enemy, although they never were so large a presenceafter their heyday in the Nine Years’ War. WO 1/648 fol. 373, ‘Proposal for enlisting Recruitsfrom amongst Prisoners of War in England, for the King’s German Legion’, October 17th 1811.
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veterans in Germany, especially light infantrymen, particularly appealing.522 Theinterests and innovation in light infantry tactics in the states of the Holy RomanEmpire (especially their jägers) meant that they would be recruited, orincorporated into the army to compensate for a fighting-style in which Germantroops were considered to excel, and one that was commonly scorned as un-English. This disinclination towards light infantry work, in Europe and the NewWorld, in part explains why it was foreign officers such as Augustine Prevost andHenri Bouquet who, combined with the backwoods experiences of the coloniststhemselves, geared the 60th Regiment into specialists in frontier warfare. As theRoyal American Regiment would remain a repository of German recruits for thenext half-century, its light infantry tradition would persist throughout its historyand subsequent transformation into the ‘King’s Royal Rifles’.523 In the case of therecruits raised by von Scheither, himself a commander of light infantry, it wasadvised that he clarify that these recruits would not be ‘chasseurs’, as it wasfeared that light infantrymen would resent being placed in line regiments.524Furthermore, in the 1790’s the regiments raised by Charles Hompesch, and hisbrother Ferdinand, were exclusively light troops, with the hussar regiment beingasked to perform as light infantry (which they flatly refused to do) while servingin Saint-Domingue.525 A decade later, light infantry formations became one ofthe hallmarks of the King’s German Legion as well, where in the Peninsular War,these foreign light infantrymen were tasked with mentoring the British. OneIrish Lieutenant recalled of his fellow riflemen, that the ‘German sharpshootersimproved them considerably in the several duties of light troops; still they neverattained to such a degree of perfection as might have been expected from a
522 This explains the leaflets issued by Scheither calling for non-invalid pensioners to fill hisquotas. HSTAH Hann. 47 II Nr. 113 II, fol. 151.523 ‘Because it was expected to be employed in bush warfare operations, its uniforms were devoidof lace – an unprecedented step at this time’, A.J. Barker. Redcoats (Gordon Cremonesi: London,1976), p. 145.524 HSTAH Hann. 47 II 114 fol. 21.525 Gleig, Hussar, p. 35.; René Chartrand, Émigré and Foreign Troops in British Service (I) 1793-
1802 (Oxford: Osprey, 1999)
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consideration of their natural qualifications.’ Elaborating further, thishighlighted the cultural dichotomy in the approach to such work:Our men… entertained very generally the absurd notion that… [usingcover] was an act of cowardice... How differently the old Germansthought! They were always to be seen dodging from tree to tree, orensconcing themselves between rocks and fences, with admirablemethod and steadiness, while the British skirmisher would step outsturdily on the open space, and make a target of himself for theenemy.526Though there were implications that such behaviour could be learned, manysimilar comments were couched in a way that implied Germans were simplynaturally better or more inclined for such work, despite these Britons’ ‘naturalqualifications.’ In either case, these men were sought after for fulfilling a key gapwithin Britain’s military.527This form of typecasting touched upon a discourse on national characterprominent within the army, and as a consequence, these stereotypes held byBritish military men, (emerging from their own experiences) had no parallel withpopular preconceptions. Other characterizations merely diverged, orcontradicted prevailing characterizations. The propensity of drunkenness withinthe British Army created a negative stereotype to which foreigners, especiallyGerman soldiers, benefited.528 Despite the ages-old depictions of Germandrunkenness (part of the purported effects of being from a northern climate),here German soldiers were seen as naturally less susceptible to this professionaland moral weakness. George Bent reflected that the foreigners, primarilyGermans of the 60th Regiment, were surviving in the West Indies at adramatically better ratio than his fellow Britons, to which he postulated:
526 Ross-Lewin, With ‘The Thirty Second’, p. 306.527 This relationship was further highlighted by the frequent publications of light infantryhandbooks by Germans who had fought within or alongside the British Army, such as the HessianCaptain Ewald who served in the American War. Conway, War of American Independence, p. 246.528 The account of one sergeant in the Peninsular War seems to reveal this was a truly Britishtrait, given that among the English, Welsh and Scottish contingents, ‘the only point of generalresemblance’ was ‘excessive drinking’. Anon. Memoirs of A Sergeant: The 43rd Light Infantry
During the Peninsular War (Gloucestershire: Nonsuch, 2005). See also: Christopher Hibbert (ed.),
A Soldier of the Seventy-First: The Journal of a Soldier of the Highland Light Infantry 1806-1815(Leo Cooper: London, 1975), p. 33.
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Let two regiments of an equal strength embark from Portsmouth forthe West Indies, the one composed entirely of Britons, the other ofForeigners; let them live together and be stationed in the samequarters, and, at the expiration of two years, it is found that the latterregiment musters double the effectives of the former, and it is theliquor that must account for it. The cheapness, and great plenty ofintoxicants is too great a temptation to the British soldier, who, whenweakened by a state of continued inebriation, falls an easy victim tothe Island fevers. The foreigner, on the contrary, being morenaturally inclined to sobriety, and subject also to severer discipline,does not so readily collapse.529Such perceptions, in fact, lead to policy, as can be seen with the arrival of thehorse-less cavalrymen of Hompesch’s Hussar Regiment in Port au Prince in 1795,who were given the freedom to go into the market towns where the British werenot.530 This approach to drink had parallels in the Peninsular War as well, wherethe horses of the Legion would remain in better health than with their Englishcounterparts, who prioritized alcohol over forage.531 Given that this problemwas prevalent among the aristocrats in the British Dragoons and the ‘dregs ofsociety’ in Caribbean garrisons, we can infer that it was not merely an issue ofclass or rank. Yet, German sobriety would seem more of a perception than areality, as one KGL officer proclaimed he and his comrades ‘drank barbarously,’and ‘not once did any of us go to bed sober.’532 In a different corner of the world,German soldiers garrisoned at Halifax in Nova Scotia seemed to make a habit ofgetting drunk and wandering into the woods while on picket duty, for which theywere repeatedly court martialed.533Though such examples belie prevailing theories differentiating theBritannic with the Teutonic, there was a more negative, homogenizing reason forwanting foreigners: that they could serve as cannon-fodder – or moreappropriately mosquito-fodder – for the British Army. In these undesirable
529 Captain George Bent, ‘Major Morris Bent, South Staffordshire Regiment, A “Royal American”’
Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, JSAHR 1 (1921), p. 98.530 Gleig, The Hussar. P.35531 For one example, see: Schaumann, On the Road, pp. 218-219532 Ibid, p. 269.533 A typical case can be found in WO 71/198 Fol. 17 Trial of Peter Driesens and JosephSchneider, Halifax in Nova Scotia, September, 22nd 1814.
202
locales, one soldier was as good as another, especially when their utility wasmore in occupying strategic positions, rather than fighting battles. This is one ofthe major contrasts with the treatment of German auxiliaries, where there wassome amount of responsibility felt for their loss, and there was a hesitation to putthem in a position that was unfavourable to other soldiers. This was not alwaysthe case with regiments such as the Royal Americans. After the conclusion of theFrench and Indian War, these soldiers would be garrisoned in some of the leastappealing outposts in British North America, from Halifax in the north, to thesmall forts along the Great Lakes in the west.534 An indication of the miserableconditions in these outposts can be seen in the appeals of one garrison officer forbetter rations for Fort Miamis:We are so miserable here… that I have never in all my life seen asoldier actually in service suffer so much by want as we suffer withoutdistinction. We have no kind of flesh nor venison nor fish, nothing tohound; and that we could suffer with patience, but the porck is so badthat neither officer nor men can eat it, and self lief [I myself havelived] more than seventeen weeks up[on] flour and peace soup, andhave eat no kint of meat but a little bear at Christmas. We have plentyto drink, and that I think is what kips up in health, and the breadwhich is tolerably good.As for the Caribbean, an equally undesirable location, this was the firstdestination outside Germany for Hompesch’s Hussars, with their colonel, CharlesHompesch, a man who tried to convince these men that they would be heading toa land of ‘gold and silver’, conspicuously absent during this expedition.535Likewise, the Hanoverian recruits who would later become the King’s GermanLegion were originally destined for distribution among the British Regiments inthe West Indies, until the War Office was convinced there were enough men toconstitute a separate corps. Yet several years later, while the Legion wereencamped on England’s southern coasts, the famous opposition MP andparliamentary historian William Cobbett would denounce the Ministry for having
534 Quoted in: Lewis Butler, The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps: Volume I. “The Royal
Americans” (London: Smith & Elder, 1913) p.130.535 Gleig, the Hussar, p. 34.
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not sent them abroad, especially for the campaigns in South Africa and SouthAmerica.amongst all the regiments… upon the embarkation list, I have not seenany of the Hanoverians, of whom we have, according to the lowestaccount, thirteen thousand in this country! That these heroes mightnot relish the East or West Indies or the Mediterranean or NorthAmerica… I could easily conceive. But supposing… that they mustburn… with impatience to join in the “deliverance of Europe” andparticularly of their own dear country I am… filled withastonishment… to see such a long embarkation list and not a singleman of them upon it. 536It is interesting to note, that his arguments here stem from not wanting theLegion in Britain, but serving on the other side of the Atlantic (somethingCobbett had done himself) was not an issue for him, as it was by this time thenatural depository for these foreign corps.537 For Cobbett, he could make hisappeal at a time when the views of German martial ability, in discipline, battle,and character, were at their lowest ebb, following Napoleon’s defeat of thePrussians a few months before. This was proof to him, and his colleagues withanti-establishment sympathies, that having Hanoverians in the Army, did notnecessarily make them stronger, or less susceptible to defeat by the French.538Yet this was not always the case, nor was it the universal view, as the army wasstill typecasting German recruits, and filling specific areas of the army –especially light cavalry and light infantry – with men from the recentlydismantled Holy Roman Empire.Be it for a perception of natural ability, or pragmatism in the need ofcannon fodder, there were certainly a number of reasons for recruiting Germansoldiers, and perhaps above all, it was often cheaper – especially when foreign
536 Quoted in Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 1700-1837 (Suffolk: Boydell Press,2007), p. 253.537 Similar concerns were raised when the Commons debated the appropriate role of awardingpermanent ranks upon the officers of the KGL, where Lord Milton protested that he ‘had noobjection to their being employed in commands abroad, but he did not like to see them incommand in this country.’ Handsard ‘Motion Respecting the King’s German Legion’ December1812. c. 261.538 Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, pp. 253-256.
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officers would serve for reduced pay.539 As Lieutenant John Ford conjectured inhis personal account of the Peninsular War, ‘Foreign Soldiers will march over thesame ground as the British Troops supported upon one half their cost’.540 Thismay have been the only incentive that the War Office needed.
**German Recruits: Motivations and Reservations**
Having discussed the motivations of the recruiter, it is only logical to turn to therecruited, and examine their motivations for joining the British Army and thereservations they had about joining taking the ‘King’s Shilling’. In most instances,we cannot assume that the reasons were much different than for those in anyother service in Europe, yet, there are a few trends worth mentioning.541The first explanation is perhaps the simplest: money. Either for profit, tostave off starvation, or to escape/pay-off debts, service in the British Army couldprovide. The Brunswick surgeon Wasmus before heading to American in 1776stumbled into a friend, whose severe debts provoked him into enlisting inScheither’s Corps.542 In the British Army, a higher wage for privates and officersalike was appealing, as was the increased rations that made service in the BritishArmy famous.543 As one light infantryman recalled, ‘an English soldier, to besure, cannot amass a fortune; but in comparison with soldiers of other nations,he appears like a lord; and altogether his lot is far preferable.’544 Germansoldiers often made remarks about their positive impressions of the food with
539 German troops were usually paid at the rates of native soldiers when placed within BritishRegiments, or when serving within British territories.540 NAM 6807/71, fols. 105-6, John Ford, ‘Military Scraps’.541 For recruitment into the British Army, see, Steppler, ‘The Common Soldier in the Reign ofGeorge III, 1760-1793’. Kevin Barry Linch, ‘Recruitment of the British Army: 1807-1815’ (PhDThesis, University of Leeds, Unpublished, 2001), pp. 200-209.542 Doblin, The American Revolution, p.6.543 In October of 1796, one officer recommended that there should be a ‘reduction in their spiritsration in order to give them a larger allowance of bread, ‘as foreign soldiers are bigger eatersthan British’, in C.T. Atkinson, ‘Foreign Regiments in the British Army, 1793-1802’, JSAHR, vol.22(1943-44).; WO I/872.544 Anon, Adventures of a Young Rifleman in the French and English Armies, During the War in
Spain and Portugal, From 1806 to 1916 (London: Henry Colburn, 1826), pp. 297-8.
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which they were supplied, although less common during the height of acampaign. While encamped in Kent, Norbert Landsheit, a hussar veteran,recalled that upon his arrival in England, ‘we had every reason to be satisfiedwith the pains which the English government must have taken to render uscomfortable. Hut barracks [with]… commodious stables… [our] bedding,provisions, pay, and general allowances, were all on the most liberal scale,’ sothat ‘in the course of a week or two we felt as soldiers ought to do, who respectthemselves, and are taught from experience to feel, that they are in the service ofa just and liberal government.’545 Yet there is no evidence to suggest thatGermans were willing to endure travelling to England for higher rations andbetter pay, but there is no doubt it helped to keep them satiated once they hadjoined. In reality, this discrepancy in pay, at least for lower ranking officers, mayhave done more to retain Britons than it did to lure soldiers from across theNorth Sea. However, such benevolent treatment was a feature for the latterdecades, and not experienced by the first waves of Germans entering the Britishservice. For the men joining the Royal Americans, there was an incentive of landto settle upon the cessation of hostilities after the Seven Years War, but it isuncertain whether this was the primary motivation for the Europeans whojoined – though this inducement was repeated again for recruiting Germansoldiers for the war of 1812, where men were offered land in Canada in returnfor service as light infantrymen in the newly formed 7th Battalion of the 60thRegiment.546 Such policies reveal the mercenary motivations for enlisting in thearmy of a foreign power, however, there were nobler causes, as in the case of themen of the King’s German Legion, who will be discussed in the subsequent casestudy.
Given that these motivations were relatively typical for men in Europeanarmies in this era, the primary inquiry here should not be why men joined, butrather, addressing why German men refused. In most cases, recruitment in
545 Gleig, The Hussar, p.33.546 Lewis, Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, vol. I
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Germany produced underwhelming results, and, with the exception of the King’sGerman Legion between 1803-6, most attempts achieved fewer men thanoriginally intended. There are a number of factors that explain this. First werethe obvious constitutional inhibitors, from both sides, forbidding the British fromhiring German soldiers to serve in Europe, and from edicts within the Reichbanning foreign recruiters. This was very much the same for the British Army,yet there were some key differences – mainly that the scattered and minusculenature of most German principalities meant that most German princes haddifficulty preventing their able-bodied men from crossing a border to join inanother army. Likewise, this same scattered and fractured nature meant that itwas equally difficult for imperial authorities to prevent outside agents fromsnatching away men who would otherwise be sought after by the Austrians orother German armies. There was still some degree of effective resistance, as wasthe case of Major John Savage, a recruiting agent who was thrown in prison forhis attempts at enlisting men to fight in the British Army in 1775-6.547 Onceagain, the solution was to utilize the King’s status as Elector to facilitaterecruiting, following the precedent of Danish and Prussian Monarchs.Beyond legal enforcement, there was direct interference by various states,especially Austria and Prussia.548 Prussians were the most consistentcompetitors, which should not surprise, given their reputation and history ofboth recruiting outside their borders, and the famously unscrupulous meanswith which they would obtain their ‘recruits.’ Prussia remained the primaryroad-block to recruitment for the King’s German Legion, especially after theiroccupation of Hanover in 1806, but they had been a thorn in the side of Britishrecruiting efforts for half a century, with Frederick the Great also being the chiefspokes-person against the leasing of German soldiers at the time of the American
547 Conway, ‘British Army’, p. 80.; WO 43/405 fols. 214-216, William Faucitt to ViscountBarrington, Hanover, November 10th, 1775.548 The Danish government was also hindering the embarkation of recruits from Hanover, in1805. HSTAH Hann. 38 D, nr. 91 Varia & Korrespondenz, fols. 2-3. Letters to Lord Camden,Secretary of State.
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War of Independence.549 Certainly, in this process, British recruiters maintaineda slightly higher level of integrity than the Prussians, returning their deserters toFrederick’s forces even while his own recruiters were kidnapping men fromGeorge III’s agents.550 Competition for these potential recruits was a consistenttheme, and Scheither’s recruiting efforts were helped to some degree by therelative peaceful situation in central Europe in 1775 and 1776.551 Yet even hefell short of his goals.Aside from political obstructions, many of the factors hindering Britishrecruiting efforts were relatively straightforward: issues such as language,distance and placement in the army. Officers in particular were not sought afterfrom within Germany, given the unhappy legacy of William III’s Army and thelegal roadblocks that emerged thereafter, and this had an effect on recruitingtroops as well, as soldiers normally preferred to serve under an officer of theirown nationality, especially if that commander was well known. This was a pointof contrast for the Legion, which was able to lure additional recruits to Englandgiven the presence of numerous Hanoverian officers who were now permitted tocommand in these foreign corps.552 Throughout the century, the presence ofGerman men in the British Army helped draw away fellow-nationals from withinthe French Army, yet getting these men to desert the from the French was not thesame as getting them to enlist with the British.553Perhaps the greatest barrier to successful recruiting in the Holy RomanEmpire was the deep-seated fears of sea travel, ostensibly synonymous British
549 WO 1/632 fol. 235, Decken to Lt. Col. Gordon, Stade, 8th March, 1806.550 HSTAH Hann. 47 II Nr. 113 II fols. 91-3.; WO 43/405 fols. 324-5 Grothaus to Barrington, Stade,May 15th, 1776.551 Scheither’s knowledge of recruiting and recruiters is exemplified in the lists he maintained ofknown recruiters and their associated armies. See: HSTAH Hann. 47 II Nr. 114 fols. 43-4.552 Prince Adolphus believed that bringing in Hanoverian officers well-known to potentialGerman recruits would ‘prove a great stimulus to the Hanoverian Soldiers’, York agreed,suggesting that this would help create a corps with ‘Officers of Abilities and Experience and Menwho are already formed and disciplined’. WO 1/626 f. 437 Letter from Adolphus Frederick toYork.; WO 1/626 f. 433, Letter from the Duke of York, October 17th 1803.553 In Canada during the Seven Years War, German soldiers who had been tricked into Frenchservice were quick to desert to the British. See: John Knox, An Historical journal of the campaigns
in North America for the years 1757, 1758, 1759 and 1760 edited by Sir Arthur Doughty (Toronto:Champlain Society, 1914-6), vol. I, pp. 246, 323.
208
service; an apprehension nearly universal among potential German enlistees,subsidy soldiers, and even native Britons as well.554 As Norbert Lansheit, one ofHompesch’s Hussars, recalled,there prevailed throughout Germany the greatest horror of England,and of the English service. We had been taught to believe thatEngland was never at peace, and that all her soldiers were liable to besent, and were sent, to act as marines on board of a fleet. Of the sea,however, we had one and all the utmost dreadLansheit further added, upon hearing news of possibly being sent to England,that ‘we took it for granted that, were we once fairly embarked, we should neversee our native land again, nor indeed, escape from our floating-prisons.’555 Adecade later, when the British Army was on what was essentially a glorifiedrecruiting expedition to the Elbe in 1806, preparations were made in advance toprevent their bevy of new recruits from deserting during re-embarkation forEngland.556 The Hessen-born Friedrich Lindau was encouraged to join the King’sGerman Legion by a man who had deserted shortly before their embarkation,and only his fear of punishment for being a deserter prevented him from
554 Thomas Agostini, ‘“Deserted his Majesty’s Service”, Military Runaways, the Press, and theProblem of Desertion in the Seven Years War’, Journal of Social History, vol. 40, no. 4 (2007), p.967.555 This fear was almost totally justified, after they embarked, and stayed on ships for the entiretyof the winter, in appalling conditions, then were sent to the Isle of Wight, and shortly afterwards,when given the impression that they would be serving as guards in London, were instead sent togarrison duty in the Caribbean. Gleig, The Hussar, pp. 20-1. For their fate upon entering theBritish service, see op. cit. chap. 3.556 Beamish notes that on the re-embarkation after the 1805 campaign, many hesitated as theythought: ‘That they were destined for colonial service, and would never be permitted to return totheir own country, as strongly dwelt upon, and the “barbarians” and “cannibals” of the East andWest Indies would, it was affirmed, be the inhabitants of their future quarters.’ Desertion washighest among the cavalry, who were hesitant to leave their lands behind. General Don wasinstructed to do the utmost ‘to prevent desertion amongst the troops’ for, ‘However welldisposed the Hanoverians are, and however Cordially attached to their Sovereign, it is notunnatural that they should feel indisposed to Sea Voyages, and Individuals may, under suchcircumstances, be inclined to withdraw, and remain behind. You will therefore take all possiblemeans, by embarking the German Legion in the First Instance, and by stationing the BritishTroops in proper Positions, to guard against this danger. I am sure you will, at the same time, feelthat it is desireable to avoid anything which should in appearance mark distrust, with respect tothe conduct of this highly respectable Corps.’ Beamish, History of the King’s German Legion, pp.88-89.; WO 6/13 Fol. 14.; WO 6/13 Fol. 17, Castelreagh to General Don, October 16th 1805.
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escaping to England to rejoin.557 German soldiers would readily admit to theirfears of the ocean (which interestingly became a source of admiration for Britishsoldiery),558 yet it was not something they wished to replicate, and was no doubta major detriment in attempts to recruit soldiers from German states. Britishmilitary policy, and the fate of many of these soldiers, did little to dissuadeGerman men of these fears.
**The Problem of Desertion**
One glaring divide between enlistees and auxiliaries is that the recruits servingwithin the British army were far more likely to desert. Desertion was always aserious problem in any army, yet the measures that were employed byScheither’s agents appear more like the transferring of prisoners rather thansoldiers.559 This may be in part due to the unscrupulous methods in which theywere ‘recruited’, but it also was an indication of an endemic problem within earlymodern militaries, and in particular, recruiting within the Holy Roman Empire.Just like the difficulties in obtaining recruits, it was equally hard maintainingthem. The battalions of the 60th Regiment garrisoned at Halifax had a terribleproblem with desertions from among their German soldiers, and would againhave these same issues once they were transferred to Spain. The King’s GermanLegion’s infantry battalions were likewise in part composed by professionaldeserters, men who had fled from several European Armies and had acquired anumber of languages in the process.560 But it was the 2,000 Germans broughtinto the British Army in 1776, which had the most problems, as they wereconstantly under watch and suffered from extremely high desertion rates. We
557 Friedrich Lindau, Erinnerungen Eines Soldaten aus den Feldzügen der königlich-deutschen
Legion (Hameln: 1846), p. 8.558 Decken, Englischen National-Character, p. 34.559 HSTAH Hann 47. nr. 113 I fol. 35, Johan Stutz to Scheither, Stade, February 13th, 1776.; Hann47. nr. 113 I fol. 57, William Faucitt to Scheither, Hanover, February 29th, 1776.560 Christopher Hibbert (ed.). The Wheatley Diary: A Journal and Sketch-book kept during the
Peninsular War and the Waterloo Campaign 2nd ed. (Gloucestershire: Windrush Press, 1997), p. 8
210
know from John Burgoyne’s General Orders to the Army, that groups of theseGerman recruits deserted together, even though they were serving in differentRegiments, which suggests they were not blending in with their British comradesand were still in close contact with German soldiers in other units.561 Such wastheir untrustworthiness, that they would often be forbidden from performingpicket duty, and, and several months after their arrival in New England, therecruits in the 22nd Foot, were ordered to be locked up at night to prevent theirdeserting.562Certainly desertion was nothing new, and barely notable in Britain’sArmies of the eighteenth century. Yet unlike native Brits, who when desertingusually made a poor reflection upon the battalion or regiment, these desertershad a detrimental impact on Germans in general. During the second year of therebellion in the American Colonies, the arrival of the Scheither’s men and thewave of newly recruited (or impressed) Hessian soldiers, led to a dramaticincrease in desertions among these foreign soldiers and auxiliaries, andperceptions of German soldiers in the eyes of the British forces steadilydecreased from their laudatory beginnings. The motives that spurred thisdesertion, in part, were the means in which these soldiers were recruited ortreated, and the confusion and isolation of being set amidst a strange army in astranger land must have been immense. Yet simpler reasons certainly remained.In the end, we must look at some of the more general causes for desertion, whichThomas Agostini and Peter Way have outlined, and here we find little variationbetween natives and foreigners.563
561 Orderly Book of Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne (New York: J. Munsell, 1860), p. 78.562 Germans serving in the Royal American Regiment in the Seven Years War appear to haveacted in the same manner. Hagist, ‘Forty German Recruits’, (endnotes).; Agostini, ‘“Deserted hisMajesty’s Service”’, p. 970.563 Regarding Germans in the 60th Regiment, Way writes: ‘Many soldiers cited the breaking oftheir terms of enlistment as the reason behind their desertion. Mathias Wassirman of the RoyalAmericans said he deserted because he had listed as a surgeon barber for three years, but wasmade a private for four years, and had been promised he would not serve beyond 100 miles ofPennsylvania, but was made to do so. His four days of freedom brought him a death penalty. Sentto a similar fate were Frederick Muller and Roger Camps, both German deserters from the RoyalAmericans, who claimed they did not receive their 15 weeks sea pay (wages for the time spent intransit across the Atlantic), and that their five days worth of ration were given all in turnips
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**The Integration of German Soldiers**
It is difficult to determine to what degree these men assimilated into their host-Army, for there are very few accounts of the soldiers themselves, and thoseforms of commentary that spring up for allies and auxiliaries are absent.564 Yetthere are bits and pieces from the personal writings of the soldiers andadministrative documents that can tell us something about their relations. Inthis discussion, the King’s German Legion will be for the most part excluded,given their unique circumstances. However, other formations, particularly theRoyal Americans and the foreign corps of the 1790’s-1801’s attained varyingdegrees of structural and social integration, where though they may have beenwearing red uniforms and being paid as British regulars, it did not necessarilymean that they were fitting seamlessly into the army. Meanwhile, otherregiments maintained their former, German, customs, which created noticeabledivides between themselves and other forces on the British muster rolls.One of the key factors that worked against assimilation, and perpetuated afeeling of difference, was the appearance of these various soldiers, both in theircomportment and their uniforms. In the same manner that the Highland kiltnurtured a Scottish identity, German soldiers, especially those forming their owncorps, would cling to their clothing as a means of preserving their heritage, and
which were consumed by the fourth day’. Thomas Agostini, ‘"Deserted His Majesty's Service’.;Peter Way, ‘Class and the Common Soldier in the Seven Years’ War’, Labor History, Vol. 44, no. 4(2003) p. 476.564 Perhaps the best account we have, especially in English, is a memoir of Norbert Lansheit (orLandscheit as he is known on the books in the WO), transcribed and edited by Robert Gleig,himself a memoirist of the Peninsular Wars and later rector of the Chelsea hospital, where hefound this German Hussar. Landsheit had an amazingly long career, in part why Gleig chose towrite and publish his history. Beginning his service with Hompesch’s Hussars in the war againstthe French Republic, he went on to serve in Saint Domingue, Guernsey, Southern England, theCape Colony, Argentina, Portugal, and Spain, and upon disbandment, was placed on a pension ofone shilling a day. Having transferred from Hompesch’s Regiment to the Queen’s Hussars, then tothe 20th Light Dragoons, and Finally in the Foreign Hussars, his experiences provide anincredible insight to the experiences of a German soldier (he never was ranked higher thansergeant) within the British Army. For his discharge papers, see WO 97/1180 fol. 9.
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the adoption of the redcoat was a key aspect in their assimilation. Upon itsformation, the Royal American regiment bucked traditions and contained no lacein their uniforms, an action that was deemed to be beneficial to light infantrywork, but which made them stand out among other infantry regiments. For the5th battalion of the Royal Americans, their badge can be traced back to the men’sassociation with various foreign corps, with their Maltese Cross motif a possiblenod to the Hompesch family, who counted among them Ferdinand Hompesch,the last Grand Master of the Knights of St. John.565 Though the Hanoverians ofthe Legion were used to wearing red (the colour of the Hanoverian uniform),their flags and insignias, while still more British than Hanoverian, gave subtlereminders of their difference and special origins.566 The Legion’s 1st Hussarregiment stubbornly clung to their blue uniforms, as worn from their days in theHanoverian service, but after years of campaigning, they too switched toscarlet.567 This was in part due to the pride and tradition of donning such outfits,but could also point to more superficial reasons, such as a love for costume andflare, especially among cavalry regiments. Landsheit bitterly regretted having togive up his dashing Hussar costume, in favour of the drabber British uniforms:‘we were’, he confessed, ‘prodigious dandies’.568Of all the German units on the British establishment, none received morecommentary in terms of appearance, and in this process attributed the greatestsense of difference, than the Brunswick-Öls corps, whose very identity, as the‘Black Brunswickers’ was intrinsically tied to their uniform. Dressed head-to-toein black, with a silver skull-and-crossbones on their hats, according to oneEnglishman, their ‘appearance excited general astonishment’, and he claimedthat ‘anything so fierce I never before saw’.569 Another officer recalled them as ‘a
565 Victor Sutcliffe, Regiments of the British Army: Part 1 Infantry (East Rudham: Mulberry CoachHouse, 2007), p. 329.566 Pfannkuche, Die Königlich Duetsche Legion, pp. 17-18.567 They had donned red uniforms long enough, that once they returned to their original bluejackets for the Waterloo campaign, none of their friends in the British Hussars recognized them.568 Gleig, The Hussar, p. 55-6.569 Charles Boutflower, The Journal of an Army Surgeon During the Peninsular War (Staplehurst:Spellmount, 1997).
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picturesque group’ with ‘somber uniforms’ and ‘dark mustachioed visages’,though he was well accustomed to their appearance by the end of theirservice.570 One German soldier in the Legion was rather unimpressed with thisexterior: ‘[They] had been described to us as warlike, fierce, and blood-thirsty:they did not, however, at all correspond to the description.’ His fellow Germansin the KGL were also quick to distance themselves from this other foreign corps,which had a less favourable reputation, adding that they ‘called them, in derision,“The Brotherhood of Revenge.”’571 The black uniforms which these soldiersdonned, including the ‘death’s head’ insignias were a strange sight to the eyes ofBritish soldiers, and several writers questioned the justification andappropriateness in donning such gloomy façades, which were designed as asymbol of mourning and revenge, and very much a reminder of these Regiments’origins. ‘Is this chivalry, or barbarity?’ pondered Augustus Frazer, who though aclose friend to many Hanoverians in the King’s German Legion, viewed theBrunswickers as something apart.572 As fate should have it, mostcontemporaries would lean towards barbarity. Posterity, however, restedsquarely on the side of chivalry, thanks in part to the painting, The Black
Brunswicker by John Everett Millais, which, composed thirty-four years afterWaterloo, was one of the most popular images of Britain’s allies from the war.Yet this was a romanticized difference that had popularity among the public,while those within the military shared a greater admiration for those foreigncorps who had served with greater distinction.There were other institutional variations that also reinforced a sense ofintegration, or perpetuated a sense of foreignness. Some of the most dramaticexamples are found in the variances between manners of enforcing British orGerman forms of drill and discipline. Here, some of the key cultural andprofessional differences were brought to the fore, and instigated a great deal ofcommentary, especially late in the period in question. Integrated soldiers would
570 Mercer, Journal, pp. 239-40.571 Anon. Adventures of a Young Rifleman, p.209572 Sir Augustus Simon Frazer, Letters of Colonel Sir Augustus Simon Frazer, K.C.B., edited byMajor-General Edward Sabine (East Sussex: Naval Military Press, 2001), p. 263.
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often be expected to conform to various rules and regulations, but there could bea great deal of resentment, or reluctance, in accepting alternative forms ofcommands, drills, and punishment.In terms of drill, the method of integration was not vastly different fromthe treatment of auxiliaries, although, it was received with perhaps lessreluctance, given their nominal status as British soldiers. Nevertheless, suchreforms could take some time. For the King’s German Legion, it took fully fiveyears for the universal adoption of British regulations.573 For the York Hussars,the Isle of Guernsey became the crucible where they were forged into soldiers ofthe British mould, where their new commanders set ‘aside all [their] old usages…introducing English drill, English habits, English distinctions, and Englishpunishments’.574 The cavalrymen of the Brunswick-Öls Corps, who arrived adecade later, underwent the same process.575 Yet, this was an era of remarkableparity between various armies, especially within English and German militarycultures, exemplified by, among others, Norbert Landsheit, who was familiarenough with English commands after a year’s service with the British, to bepromoted a sergeant with authority over native Englishmen.576 Therefore,delays in adopting British drill were made by choice, not determined bydifficulty.While variations in drill and command would create strong perceptions ofdifference, by far the most glaring, and dramatic comments on institutional‘otherness’ are born out of variations in the methods of punishment. For a Saxonrifleman joining the King’s German Legion after serving in the French Army, hismemoirs are filled with precise details about punishments and forms ofdiscipline, which become the primary area of discussion, after his transferring togarrisons in Malta and later Sicily.577 Such commentary was especially dominantwhen soldiers were moved a way from the battlefield, when these public displays
573 Beamish, History of the King’s German Legion, vol. I. p. 85.574 Gleig, The Hussar, p. 62.575 Anon, Wider Napoleon, vol. I. p. 315.576 These commands were some of the few words of English he knew, having served with an all-German regiment. Gleig, The Hussar, p. 76.577 Anon. Adventures of a Young Rifleman, esp. pp. 247, 267, 273, 298
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of discipline became the most violent and visceral aspects of their militarylives.578The variations in punishments were not as methodical or as organized asone would expect, and sometimes relied merely upon the whims of thecommanding officer. Landsheit and his comrades would in the course of the1790’s serve under a variety of English and foreign officers, each with their ownbrand of meting out discipline. Yet one of the most interesting features of theirdifferences was that both sides looked upon the other’s methods as harsh andcruel, even when their own methods went without comment. For Germansoldiers, the severity of British punishments, and in particular the use of the cat-o’-nine-tails, was an act of savage cruelty which seemed to encourage, ratherthan discourage misbehaviour.579 Colonel Ompteda of the King’s German Legion,believed that this harsh treatment led to ‘excessive drinking among the Englishsoldiers,’ owing to a ‘despair’ at having to endure ‘a discipline indisputably themost severe to be found in any European army.’580British opinions of ‘German’ discipline were equally condemnatory. TheBlack Brunswickers, which became a coven of former and potential deserters,had a continuous problem with iniquitousness to which corporal punishmentwas handed out on a regular basis. Already, this tacit display ofunprofessionalism made this foreign corps an ‘other’ in the minds of officers andmen who put an emphasis on their military duties, and the methods and mannerof such punishments only added to this sense of difference. An English fusilier,John Cooper, who had spent several campaigns fighting alongside the Brunswicktroops, recalled their ‘most fearful’ practice of ‘flogging by beat of drum’ whereby‘many were lashed into insensibility,’ and in the case of one Brunswicker soldier,beaten to the point of insanity. ‘It required strong nerves to look on. Indeed,
578 Landsheit dedicates much of his dictated memoirs to this subject. Gleig, Hussar, pp. 57-8, 62,80.579 Adolf Pfannkuche, Die Königlich Deutsche Legion 1803-1816 (Hannover: Verlagsbuchhandlung,1926). p.18. Gleig, Hussar, p. 62580 Ompteda himself would acts as translator for several courts-martial during his time in Britain.Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer, pp. 200-201.
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many fainted during these prolonged punishments.’581 Other dramatic formsprevailed elsewhere, such as the gauntlet, or the more traditional caning that wasa staple of the Prussian disciplinary code. The English Legionary, EdmundWheatley, viewed the physical abuse endured by the Germans of the King’sGerman Legion to be a contributing factor in the poor relations between theranks, given that ‘officers… do not hesitate to accompany a reproof with a blowand I cannot imagine any man so dejected in situation as to bear patiently [this]corporal chastisement.’582 Intriguingly, this was an opinion that reflected hiscommanding officer Baron Ompteda’s opinion of British punishments. In part,such sentiments were informed by a reformation in thinking that was sweepingthese European armies, and in particular, the British army and society, in whichsuch violent measures were often scorned, or at least adhered to withreluctance.583 The debate regarding Prussian style discipline within the BritishArmy had now expanded to encompass the questioning of British means ofenforcing obedience. What is striking is that outsiders commenting upon bothEnglish and German styles of punishment viewed the others’ as overly severe. Inthis case it was the mere difference that was important, as such institutionalvariations might have been more notable, not because they were improper, butthat they were different from that serviceman’s ideals of implementingdiscipline.In many ways, discussions of harsh discipline or brutal punishmentsmimicked debates over absolutism and liberalism in discussions of national
581 John Spencer Cooper, Rough Notes of Seven Campaigns in Portugal, Spain, France and America
During the Years 1809-1815 (Spellmount: Staplehurst, 1996), pp. 14, 20.582 Hibbert, Wheatley Diary, p. 8.583 One of the manifestations of how punishment within a military setting reaffirmed differencebetween native and foreign soldiers, was who would be allowed to inflict such punishments onBritish troops. The King’s German Legion, which as we shall see in the following chapter hadshared a great degree of administrative commonality with their host-army, nevertheless createda furore when several Legionaries were ordered to carry out punishments on several militiamen.While this may have been normal in the military sphere, in the public sphere, it was somethingaltogether offensive, and such was the wrath of William Cobbett, that he was thrown in jail forsedition for the comments he made upon the subject. This received a deal of attention, butperhaps less than the trial of Joseph Wall four years earlier for having African men flog hissoldiers. See: Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, pp. 255-259.; Linda Colley, Captives:
Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1815 (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), p. 328-332.
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character, an otherwise, unaddressed topic within the writings of soldiers. Fordecades the brutal practices within German armies were regarded as amanifestation of the absolutist nature of their princes. Yet, the British Army,unlike the nation itself, could not offer a contrast, as the cat-’o-nine tails and theharsh restrictions on British soldiers would create a parity in the ill treatment ofsoldiers between Britain and their German allies. Despite the relatively closeproximity of these two military cultures, there were aspects in each that furtherhighlighted divisions between the soldiers who adhered to them, although inreference to discipline, it was the manner of enforcement, not the severity, wherediscrepancies arose.The meting of discipline was not only valuable for highlighting differencein the perceptions of other armies, but it has also left the historian a paper trail ofcourts-martial proceedings, which can provide some snapshots into the lives ofthese integrated soldiers – although it is a source that must be used withmoderation given that may portray relations as overly negative. One German,Christopher Strobel, brought to trial for deserting a colonial regiment,complained ‘that he was used better by the Indians than by the Christians.’584 Alittle over a decade later, Georg Hunderdtmark, one of Scheithers recruits servingin the 9th Regiment, was found guilty of desertion, and in his defence madesimilar claims. In his trial he listed a variety of grievances, which paint a tragicpicture, and show some of the difficulties that might have been shared amongfellow German soldiers. He had never had the Articles of War read to him in hisnative tongue, had not received the clothing and money he was owed, wasinadequately fed, and most telling of all, ‘on giving some Shirts to the only twoWomen who are with the Comp[an]y … [to be cleaned] they flung them back andsaid they did not wash for Dutchmen.’ Here, the officers, soldiers, and even theirwives, played a role in isolating Hundertmark, and he was called a term that didless to hurt him than it did to reveal the perpetrator’s geo-political ignorance.That fellow Germans within the regiment testified to his defence, did little to
584 Quoted in Peter Way, ‘Soldiers of Misfortune: New England Regulars and the Fall of Oswego’,
Massachusetts Historical Review, vol. 3 (2001), p. 77.
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prevent a guilty verdict, for which he was executed shortly thereafter.585 ThoughBritish soldiers could have equally discomfiting experiences in the army, suchaccounts show the difficulties many Germans in the rank & file had in trying tointegrate within the army, and the unwillingness of British troops, and theircamp followers, to adopt them.These may be one-off cases, but there was certainly a problem that wasnearly universal for these foreign soldiers – the withholding of pay. Suchgrievances can be found from the Royal Americans through to years afterNapoleon’s last battle, with repeated complaints of being withheld money owed,with one of the most common being transit costs, a graft often used by pitilesssuperiors. While this was a predicament for British soldiers within the army aswell, no doubt the problems for these foreigners were compounded, given thatthey were not used to the customs and regulations in the army, and their naïvetéand linguistic difficulties made them easy prey for corrupt officers.586 Theimages one gains of these ‘military enterprisers’ like Prevost, Scheither andHompesch, only reinforces the aura of corruption and graft. The ill-treatment andsubsequent backlash from Scheither’s recruits were a glaring contrast to manysentiments related about the good pay and care given by the British Army fromlater commentators or their contemporaries among the Hessian auxiliaries.587
585 He also complained that his ‘treatment in the company ‘was more like that of a dog and aSoldier.’ Though some of his treatment was disputed, a fellow German in his company secondedhis comment that the women would not ‘wash for Dutchmen’ WO 71/84 fol. 181, Trial of GeorgeHundred Mark, Dewar’s House, August 24th 1777.586 Steppler, ‘Common Soldier’, pp. 77-81.; HL Loudoun Papers, 5812, box 124, John Donner, et al.‘Petition from a number of recruits raised in Germany against Col. Prevost’, New York, April 22nd,1758.587 According to Specht, while journeying to the colonies, ‘The officer of the ship British Queencame to us and reported to the colonel that the German recruits on his ship were againdisobedient not wanting to go on guard duty unless they got tobacco, more meat etc.; that theywere uncontrollable; that there were four particular ringleaders, who stirred up the others.’ Afterhis officers delivered a few lashings, ‘they changed their minds and the revolt was finished’. Also
en route to America, Georg Pausch hears so many complaints from the recruits of Scheither,which he only stays on that transport ship for a short time, and returns to his own. Upon theirarrival in America, General Bauermeister reported that, ‘these low-spirited people have receivednothing besides their German thaler pocket money, their two shillings at Portsmouth, and theirdaily rations, and, moreover, they have no prospect of getting anything. Some have even beenengaged as officers, but will never be able to serve in that capacity here, not even as non-commissioned officers. At our request, General Howe turned over to us all the Hessian deserters
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But there is a notable divide here, in that many of the depredations came whilethese forces were cast into the far corners of the British Empire. Closer to home,they were in better care, and better provided for.588
**Conclusions**
Between the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, German soldierswere steadily adopted in greater numbers into the British establishment,matching the trend whereby the state was harnessing ever-greater quantities ofher own manpower in her titanic struggle against France. Though the series ofwars that transpired from 1755 to 1815 have been seen as formative agents inthe unifying of Britain, this same era saw increasing numbers of foreign-bornsoldiers incorporated into the British Army. Yet the German element within themilitary during this period remained both small in scale and impact. Whereasallies and auxiliary forces could match, or even dwarf the British contingents, theproportion of Germans serving in the British establishment would rarely surpassten percent in a single army, and only in the case of the 60th Regiment did they atany time comprise the majority in a regiment of British regulars. Nevertheless,tens of thousands of men from across the Holy Roman Empire served in KingGeorge’s Army between the Seven Years War and the Hundred Days of 1815,contributing to a wide variety of international and domestic militaryundertakings.The level of integration was determined by several factors, but ultimately,Germans shared a similar reception as those of the Celtic fringe who were
discovered among them.’ Specht, Journal p.19; Burgoyne, Georg Pausch’s Journal, p.16.; BernhardA. Uhlendorf, (ed. and trans). Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals 1776-1784
of Adjutant General Major Bauermeister of the Hessian Forces (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1957), p.59.588 Upon discharge, the rifleman in the Legion received all his arrears in pay, to which heannounced he had ‘not the slightest cause of complaint against the English government’. Young
Rifleman, p. 357.
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funnelled into the ranks at much greater numbers. Their failure to completelyblend in was often attributable (aside from their language barrier and culturaldifferences) to the fact that the German soldiers who did serve in the BritishArmy were usually far less dedicated to the military profession. Once in thearmy these men could be mistreated and denied pay, and suffering from a senseof isolation, neglect or betrayal, many deserted, while others merely slackened intheir adherence to the ideals of a good soldier. This combined with the influx ofprofessional deserters and the other unscrupulous characters thrown into thesevarious formations lead to a perception that they were untrustworthy, andequally important: unprofessional. In many ways, this parallels the shift insentiments experienced by the Hessians in the American War, when the GermanPrinces, desperate to meet their quotas, turned to less desirable candidates to filltheir ranks. Yet unlike perceptions of the Hessians in the American War, theprimary point of criticism aimed at the Teutonic soldiery within the armyemerged not from marauding, but desertion – a more ignoble offense.Concerning the public view towards these men, once again there was adisparity between popular discourse and the opinions of soldiers. However,unlike German allies or auxiliaries, most of the British population showed littlecare or interest in these forces, and when they did, it was during their servicewithin the home islands, or when a foreigner stood to command native Britons.This was largely due to the fact that several thousand soldiers within the BritishArmy was an issue nowhere near as striking as hundreds of thousands of poundsbeing sent to foreign monarchs. The result was there were few negativestereotypes regarding Germans as redcoats, as far as the public was concerned.The one exception was the King’s German Legion, whose ties to the Hanoveriandynasty and Electorate allowed a new generation of polemicists and politicalgadflies to resurrect the decades-old arguments of Hanoverian impositions uponBritain and its people.589
589 Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, p. 244-256.
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For soldiers, the most prevalent preconception emerged from the rolesthat German soldiers performed within the British Army, as experts atskirmishing and specialists of light cavalry work. Here their relative successeshelped foster respect, and in doing so reinforced preconceived notions ofnational character and fighting ability – that Germans were somehow moreadapted to these duties than Britons. No foreign corps did more for theenhancement of these impressions of martial character than the men in theKing’s German Legion. Indeed, the Legion followed a number of trends commonto integrated corps, but was also an exceptional entity for a variety of reasons.Having largely ignored them for much of this discussion, we can now turn to acase study of their formation and nature of their dozen years of service to seehow they became something both wholly unique, but also a broadermanifestation of the relationships common to Anglo-German armies.
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CHAPTER VI:
CASE STUDY 2 – THE KING’S GERMAN LEGION, 1803-1815
The history and historiography of the King’s German Legion leave the scholar withno doubt, that this foreign corps was the most successful instance of Germansoldiers operating in the British Army at any point between the seventeenth andnineteenth centuries. Contemporary accounts of contacts with the Legion, and theopinions born out of those various interactions, further support this conclusion.While the King’s German Legion was unique in its highly regarded and lauded status,it was also very much a product of a century of Anglo-German soldierlyrelationships, and an embodiment of some of the major themes common not only tothe foreign corps of this period, but the myriad of military associations that in manyways culminated in this specific force. The Legion is invaluable as a topic for a casestudy, since it existed at a time when the soldier diary and memoir enjoyedexponential growth in popularity and demand, thereby leading to a prolific amountof primary sources, and, given the nature and high drama of the war againstNapoleon, an ample plate of secondary materials as well.Since the King’s German Legion has received far and away more attentionthan any of the other forms of integrated German soldiers, the history and deeds ofthis corps will not be required here. Instead, this case study will turn towards asocial history of the Legion, something only rarely touched upon, both in histories ofthe KGL, and those of the Peninsular War in general.590 The sheer quantity of soldiernarratives, also permits a look into the types of communal association betweenBritish and German soldiers, and from these pools of sources we can furtherinvestigate the sliding scale between national character and transnationalsoldiering. Focusing on the Kings German Legion allows us not only to drawcomparisons with other integrated corps, but also to test how issues of national
590 For the best account of this relationship, see: Antony Brett-James, Life in Wellington’s Army.
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character, identity, and the homogenizing influences of the military professionplayed out in this incredibly well documented epoch.
**Composition, Integration and Treatment**
Similar to the battalions of the 60th Foot, and the Brunswick and Hompeschregiments, the King’s German Legion was composed of predominantly, but notexclusively, German men. Throughout its twelve year history as many as 30,000soldiers had passed through its ranks, and though most of these soldiers in theearlier years were Hanoverian (in fact the 8,000 men enrolled in the corps by 1805were almost exclusively from the Electorate), by the end of the war the Legion hadbecome a diverse and polyglot force.591 One of the more resounding effects of theTreaty of Artlenburg in 1803, ratified following the occupation of Hanover by theFrench, was the agreement to dissolve the Hanoverian Army. The Britishgovernment wishing to tap into this external source of manpower, but not beingable to specifically target Hanoverians for fears of breaking these terms, broadenedtheir scope beyond the Electorate, thereby establishing the Legion’s future assomething both separate from the Hanoverian Army and an embodiment of a widerGerman resistance to Napoleon.592The increasing difficulties in recruiting soldiers directly from Germany, dueto French and Prussian obstructions, made it mandatory to find other sources ofmanpower, which resulted in a policy whereby prisoners and deserters from the
591 Most estimates are around 25,000 – 30,000, with 28,000 seeming to be the most popular. Grayalso estimates that at its height, some 3,000-4,000 men were needed every year to maintain the corpsat full capacity. From its conception, the Legion had been opened to men of other nations, with theexceptions of Spanish, French and Englishmen, the latter restriction referring primarily to soldiers,and not officers. The presence of Polish soldiers indicates that the Legion was not merely limited toco-religionists. Gray, ‘The Services of the King’s German Legion’, pp. 314-325. For a well-preservedcopy of the Legion’s patent, see WO 246/111 fol. 1.; Act of Parliament 29 Geo. II., CAP.5.592 Gray, Services, p. 17.; HSA, Hann 38D, nr. 237, ‘Proclamation of the Duke of Cambridge’, August10th, 1803.
224
French Army would be brought into the ranks.593 More so then in previous conflicts,the presence of Germans in the army was a successful lure, due to the ratherprominent officers that had taken command in the Legion.594 Though ideally theserecruits needed to at the very least speak German, this was not always the case, andby the end of the Peninsular War, its infantry battalions would be filled with Danish,Dutch, Swiss, Polis and French soldiers as well.595 Nevertheless, the KGL remained apredominantly German force, in language and culture, and ‘Legionaries’ and‘Germans’ were synonymous in the description of its soldiers. Although in structurethe King’s German Legion was not particularly unique, (except perhaps for its sheersize), it did achieve unprecedented integration within the British Army, far beyondwhat was shared by previous Anglo-German corps. This assimilation was notmerely structural: its utilization, the greater degree of legal integration, and evenpsychological incorporation, make the KGL remarkable.The line infantry rarely stood out in the minds of fellow soldiers andcommanders in the army, and for better or worse, they shared in the same tasks aspermanent regiments. This lack of specificity is best exemplified in that the Legionnever acted as a single force and the line regiments were dispersed and brigadedamongst various British formations during campaigns. In respect to treatment,duties, equipage and discipline, the various components of the Legion were treated
593 French obstructions, such as making the recruitment of Hanoverians by British officials a capitaloffence, successfully hampered efforts to recruit within the Electorate. Similarly, the Prussians, whooccupied the Electorate in 1806 upon agreement with the French, did all they could do hinderrecruitment, and set up various obstacles to prevent the exodus of able soldiers, whom they mighthave otherwise tried to recruit themselves. So wrote Friedrich v.d. Decken, while acting as adiplomatic liaison to Prussia: ‘I am sorry to add that the Prussians have taken such strong stepsagainst our recruiting, that it will be impossible to carry it on, in the same manner, as has been donehitherto: a considerable reward has been offered for detecting our recruiting Parties [and] several ofour Officers have been arrested by [Prussian Magistrates]’ See: North, 'The raising and organizing ofthe King's German Legion', pp. 168-84. Gray, ‘The Services of the King’s German Legion’ pp. 197-200.;WO 1/627, fol. 379, Clinton to John Sullivan.; WO 1/632 fol. 235 8th March, 1806 Friedrich v.d.Decken to Lt. Col. Gordon, March 8th 1806.594 One such example was the exploits of Georg Baring, who, in December 1813, while discussing aprisoner exchange with French officers present made an agreement for the desertion of the twoNassau Regiments. Frazer, Letters, pp. 344, 365-6.595 There was a great deal of debate over the recruitment of deserters and prisoners of war, and thepolicy did not last once the recruitment of Hanoverians was again possible, following the Electorate’sliberation in 1813. WO 1/245 fols. 151-5.; WO 1/648 fols. 369, 373.; WO 1/651 fol. 21.; WO 3/54fols. 459- 462.; WO 6/135 fol. 128.
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in a like manner to their native-British counterparts. For the relatively non-distinctinfantry battalions, if they received much notice, it was for being as reliable as thepredominately British elements of the army.Unlike previous formations, such as the battalions of the Royal Americans orthe German regiments serving in the French Revolutionary Wars, the HanoverianLegion was rarely given far-flung or undesirable stations, and in some cases shown agreat deal of favouritism. Due to the inherent problems in replenishing its numbers,the British commanders, including Wellington himself, frequently spared the Legionthose operations that inflicted the heaviest casualties – a point picked up on bymany in parliament who would have preferred utilizing them specifically for suchtasks.596 The light infantry, artillery, and cavalry became renowned in the Army fortheir effectiveness, with the cavalrymen being frequently eulogized in histories andpersonal narratives. In fact, such was the skill and quality of the Legion’s horsemen,especially the 1st and 2nd Hussars, that they were widely seen as superior to theirBritish counterparts.597The respect and renown of the KGL’s light cavalry, paved the way for agreater acceptance of the rest of the Legion. In British discourse the most commontopic regarding these soldiers was the skill and care shown by these Hanoverianhorsemen, be it to their duties, or to their mounts.598 However, the area in whichthey were given the most praise was in their performance of the British Army’s longstanding area of deficiency – outpost duty. ‘The German Hussars in the Peninsulaarmy were our first masters in outpost duties’ one British officer later confessed, asentiment which was widespread among the Hussars’ contemporaries.599 Edward
Cocks, who for many years fought alongside these German soldiers, shared this outlook
596 Lord Folkestone during a Commons debate in 1812, made a comparison of the rather largecontrasts in casualties between British regulars and Legionaries in the Peninsula. See: Hansard,‘Motion Concerning the King’s German Legion,’ vol. 12, December 10, 1812.597 George Robert Gleig, The Subaltern: A Chronicle of the Peninsular War edited, and with anIntroduction by Ian C. Robertson (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001), p. 138.598 There are dozens and dozens of commentaries and comments made on the difference betweenhow British and German soldiers cared for their horses. Suffice to say, the KGL’s cavalry wonunanimously in these comparisons.599 Original Italics. Lieut.-Col William Tomkinson. The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, in the Peninsular and
Waterloo Campaigns (Spellmount: Staplehurst, 1999), p. 216.; Ian Fletcher, Craufurd’s Light Division(Spellmount: Tunbridge Wells, 1991), pp. 91, 97.
226
in his diary in 1810, stating that ‘these Hanoverian Hussars are the best cavalry wehave... The 16th [Dragoons] is brigaded with them, they have been our masters.’ For
Cocks, these Hanoverian cavalrymen deserved British admiration, given that they‘understand outpost duty better, and take more care of their horses, than Britishdragoons.’600 Captain Harry Smith, who shared many ‘hairbreadth escapes’ with themen of the 1st Hussars, had nothing but praise for them, saying that they were‘regarded, as indeed they were, as exemplary soldiers for our emulation.’601The skill and dedication for such work was something lacking in Britishsquadrons, and as a result, it became common for German and British troopers toconduct outpost work together, so that the Britons could learn the craft. Indeed, oneinfantry officer who had a deal of disdain for the aristocratic sensibilities of theEnglish cavalryman, recalled that ‘a considerable portion of the [English] officerswere careless young fellows, brought up in luxury, and unused to anythingbordering on serious application… till at length two regiments of German light horsein our service… taught them something of the real duty of a soldier.’602 Contrary towhat might be expected, this teacher-student relationship did not incite jealousy, orresentment, but in fact created something of the opposite. As one Hanoverianofficer in the Corunna Campaign stated, ‘The English Dragoons enjoy serving underthe command of Germans, and endure the severity, which one has to use againstthem, very well, because they see that it is in their interests and for everyone’swelfare.’603 Here, professional considerations wore away hesitancy from workingunder the command of foreign officers, given it was felt it helped them achieve agreater proficiency in the methods and tactics of outpost duty and light cavalrywork. Through this close contact, strong friendships emerged, and these soldiersbecame markedly unified – both structurally and emotionally. In the words ofEdward Cocks, whose diary is perhaps our best contemporary account of the inner-workings of this relationship: ‘Never have two regiments been more united. We
600 Page, Intelligence Officer, pp. 63, 83.601 Harry Smith, The Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith, 1787-1819 (London: John Murray, 1903), pp.24, 26.602 Ross-Lewin, With ‘The Thirty Second’, pp. 303-4.603 Bernhard Schwertfeger. Der Königlich Hannoversche Generalleutnant August Friedrich Freiherr v.d.
Busche-Ippenburg (Hannover: Hahn’sche Buchhandlung, 1904), p. 122.
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have been like one corps.’604 Once again, success and professionalism becameunifying agents.Yet this structural integration did not come without its critics. The initialpromotions for the Legion’s officers were met with jealousy from many among thehigh-ranking British officers.605 The main cause for this friction with native officersstemmed from the policies between 1803-5, when various noblemen were givencommands that they held while in the Hanoverian Army, and in a very un-Englishmanner, did not have to earn (or purchase) their way through the ranks as theBritish officers had. As in all militaries, fights for rank and promotion were oftencarried out with more zeal and ferocity than battles, and this professional concernfostered resentment. Shortly after the creation of the Legion in 1803, theHanoverian Baron, Christian von Ompteda, wrote to his Brother about the mood inLondon after one such episode:Decken’s unheard-of promotion to an English colonelcy had provokedsuch opposition among the English of the same category that theEnglish… place every possible obstacle in his way, which is not promisingfor the construction of such a corps as the Legion. Generally speaking…
Et l’intérêt, ce vil roi de la terre stretches its scepter in all directions…‘Get rank, get money,’ is the first principle here, in pursuit of whichBonaparte… and who knows what else get forgotten.606Certainly one such thing that was forgotten was distinction over nationality, for itwas a reaction against a breach in the military traditions and the Act of Settlementthat drew their ire, not any national prejudice – though their foreignness by nomeans assuaged these resentments.607
604 Cocks would later bemoan the loss of many of his closest companions within the German cavalry.‘Poor Hussars! I have scarcely a friend left in the regiment… These men are not to be replaced.’Page, Intelligence Officer, pp. 128, 143.605 Resentment over promotions, including a department in England under the command of ColonelLinsigen, still provoked resentment, mainly at Horse-Guards and opposition MP’s. For continuingdebate over promotion of the Legion’s officers, see: Hansard, ‘Motion Concerning the King’s GermanLegion,’ vol. 12, December 10, 1812.606 Christian Ompteda. A Hanoverian-English Officer, p. 170.607 One Englishman from the Coldstream Guards (a regiment notorious for its ambitious officers)wrote, ‘the appointment of General Alten to the Light Division has given great disgust to the army; heis a German who has never done any one thing yet, and the command of that division is far the mostdesirous of any in this army.’ Such was the lingering resentment to similar promotions (more amongpoliticians than much of the army), that Lord Folkestone brought up this very issue several years
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In spite of these initial conflicts, the successes and widespread praise for theLegion paved the way for a great deal of legal integration as well, with the Duke ofCambridge bestowing on its officers permanent ranks in the British Army. ThisRoyal Proclamation was not only a show of support from the Royal Family, whichwas a constant, but an indication of their increased respect and appreciation fromthe Army at-large, who thought them worthy enough to be considered (evennominally) as British soldiers.608 When this proclamation was put to debate in thewinter of 1812, the MP and former divisional commander General William Stewart,showed his overwhelming support for the men of the Legion, many of whom hadpreviously served under his command. On the floor of the Commons, he proclaimedthe Germans had so eminently distinguished themselves in thepeninsula… that upon the continent there was but one feeling among theBritish army upon this subject, and as to the general merits of theGerman Legion… Such was, indeed, the impression they made, that if theBritish army could be canvassed… he had not the slightest doubt that thegrant of permanent rank to the officers of that Legion would have beenuniversally approved of…609Parliament’s acquiescence to this proclamation was a tacit acknowledgment of theLegion’s value, and was a departure from previous instances, which were done on acase-by-case basis, and predominantly for high-ranking men serving in theAmerican theatre, or more distantly, for Huguenot officers. The effects of thisproclamation were mainly ceremonial, but represented another significantalteration of the Act of Settlement, whereby these men were on the same terms withtheir British colleagues, with one provision – broken several times already – thatthey could not command independent forces in Britain. Though the real impact was
later, during his arguments against the Legions’s officers being given permanent ranks in the BritishArmy. John Mills, For king and Country, The Letters and Diaries of John Mills, Coldstream Guards, 1811-
1814 edited by Ian Fletcher (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1995), pp. 150-1.608 The Royal Proclamation, approved by Parliament five months later, in August of 1812, read: ‘Inconsideration of the King’s German Legion having so frequently distinguished themselves against theenemy… the officers who are now serving with temporary rank in several regiments of that corps,shall have permanent rank in the British army from the date of their respective commissions.’ InBeamish, History of the King’s German Legion, vol. 1, p. 86. For the debate in the Commons, whichpivoted on the legality of such a bestowment, see: Hansard, ‘Motion Concerning the King’s GermanLegion,’ vol. 12, esp. cc. 240-69.609 Hansard, ‘Motion Concerning the King’s German Legion,’ vol. 12, cc. 262-263
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nominal, the granting of permanent ranks was a major point of pride among therecipients, and would (despite the assurances of the Legion’s supporters) result inthem being permanently placed on half pay at the war’s conclusion. But long beforethis debate began Hanoverian officers would often command large portions ofBritain’s fighting forces, with a prime example being General Charles von Alten, whotowards the end of the Peninsular War commanded the famous ‘Light Division’, thejewel of Wellington’s Army, purported to have ‘the finest infantry in the world.’610The unprecedented unity between these foreign soldiers and the nativeBritish did not end at the conclusion of the war. In the decades after the cessation ofhostilities, honours and medals were steadily granted to particularly laudablecombatants, and the British government would support the Legion’s veteransthrough pensions.611 The British Army represented a great economic security forthose German soldiers who had become accustomed to its higher pay and betterprovisioning, and the prospect of being without this income led to a significantletter-writing campaign shortly before – and long after – the war’s conclusion.612Though entitled to such honours, given their status as British officers, the ephemeralnature of the Legion itself led critics to call for the suspension of such privileges withthe disbandment of the corps. Yet these dispensations persisted – again owing agreat deal to the influence of the royal family. At the time when Ministers werepondering reducing these payments, Prince Adolphus wrote to Secretary of WarBathhurst to plead their case, especially for his friends among the high-rankingofficers:I am assured that Your Lordships feelings of National Pride, would not bea little pained, at seeing, a Brave & distinguished Officer, still entitled towear the Uniform & to appear in the Character of a British General,
610 The placement of the Legion’s light infantry and 1st Hussars among this prestigious corps put themalong side the pantheon of more popular British regiments of the day (such as the 95th Rifles), a vividindication of the respect these soldiers had in the estimation of their commanders and peers. See Lt.Colonel Willoughby Verner, A British Rifle Man: The Journals and Correspondence of Major George
Simmons (London: A& C Black, 1899), esp. Introduction.; Frazer, Letters, p. 107.611 In all, 503 medals were awarded, never posthumously, to KGL soldiers in the two decadesfollowing the war. See, D.D. Vigors, The Hanoverian Guelphic Medal of 1815: a record of Hanoverian
Bravery during the Napoleonic Wars (Salisbury: D.D. Vigors, 1981).612 Gray, ‘The Services of the King’s German’ , p. 361. For letters written, see WO: 3/372 fol. 459, WO1/428 fols. 55-100, WO 1/659 fols. 241, 253, 267.
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unable, from the pittance granted, in remuneration for having shed hisBlood & passed his best Years in the service of the British Nation, toprovide Himself with those comforts, which advanced age and Infirmityrequire.613Thus, the main argument for the utilization, promotion, and support for the men ofthe King’s German Legion, was their status as ‘British’ soldiers – which indicates animpressive degree of assimilation, both in the bureaucracy of the War Office, and thesentiments of their fellow soldiers. This is not to say that the Legionaries were theonly German soldiers to receive such compensations, as those men from theHompesch regiments or the Brunswick forces also received similar stipends, yetHompesch’s men earned them through fighting in permanent British regiments, andin the case of the Brunswickers, theirs were given as a consequence of their closeassociation with the Legion and did not have the same longevity.The degree of emotional assimilation into the British Army was helped furtherby the successes of the Legion, and their status as capable and effective soldiers –which became more of a unifying element then any dynastic connection. The factthat portions of the Legion would be counted upon to perform various functions thatthe British soldiers were incapable of, had a salubrious effect on any lingeringtensions, and probably went a great way in reducing the types of conflicts overpromotion and rank that were present in the earliest days of the KGL’s founding.This favourable opinion would help the Legion stand out among the foreign corps,and would separate it, if not officially than unofficially, from the Black Brunswickerswho served along side them for several years during the Peninsular War.614
613 In the end, the proponents of the Legion won out, and the wounded veterans and officers wouldreceive pensions and half-pay, in some cases for decades after the secession of hostilities, with theWar Office going so far as to maintain agents in Hanover for the efficient distribution of these sums.WO 1/428 fols. 55-59, Adolphus Frederick to Earl Bathhurst, March 7th, 1816.; NAM MS 35694,Manfred Bresemann, ‘The King’s German Legion 1803-1816 and the British Traditions’, p. 15.; WO246/111 fols. 3-23.614 In the first days of Wellington’s invasion of Southern France, many foreign soldiers in the BritishArmy were reprimanded punished, and many hanged for marauding and acts of revenge towards theFrench citizenry. In the case of the Brunswick-Öls corps, a series of hangings were ordered in anattempt to restore order. Yet, as August Schaumann recalls, there was a deal of favouritism for theLegion, which could get a way with more than their fellow German soldiers. ‘Lord Wellington… cameupon the 1st German Hussars… and as he was standing talking to… [its] officers, one of the men of theregiment came riding up with a bleating sheep which he had stolen. The moment Lord Wellington
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In other ways, the KGL followed many of the trends common among allAnglo-German formations. The acceptance, and even the celebration, of the King’sGerman Legion sets it apart from the less remarked-upon battalions of the RoyalAmericans, Scheither’s unfortunate recruits, and even the various German corpsserving in the British Army contemporaneously. Nevertheless, as in other instances,it was increasingly reliant upon foreign-born officers for its creation andrecruitment, and owed a great deal to the Hanoverian Army and Dynasty for itsorigins, motivations and preservation. The royal influence was crucial forcontinuously endeavouring to keep the Legion afloat, when it encounteredinnumerable problems in maintaining its numbers, especially at a time whenvarious foreign corps had been depleted and disbanded. Similar to previousintegrated units, the Legion was reliant upon a closely connected group of officersand influential men (such as Decken) for their continued success and maintenance.Part of the successful integration of the corps, was the presence of a strongprofessional-minded officer class, who through this period were integrated bothmilitarily and socially with British officers – a factor that had a great deal of impacton the acceptance of the Legion, and what set it apart from other previous instancesof Germans within the British Army. This long-standing relationship betweencareer fighting men, foreign and native, would be the strongest bond uniting theLegion and the army at large.
**Anglo-German Interactions in the KGL**
As the King’s German Legion became more structurally integrated into the BritishArmy, the German soldiers that comprised the Legion’s majority were in continuouscontact with their British comrades in arms. In general, the relations between theBritish and German soldiers were amiable, and this cordiality lasted well after the
saw the man, however, he only smiled and turning his back on him, pretended not to have noticedanything, although the officers at his side were shuddering with fear.’ Schaumann, On the Road, p.395.
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Legion’s disbandment in 1815-6.615 This prolonged association allowed for variousforms of interaction and a heightened awareness of differences and commonalitiesbetween the soldiers of these respective polities, which is evident in the numerousdiaries and correspondences written during the wars, and the prolific quantity ofmemoirs composed after the cessation of hostilities. The increased enthusiasm forthe conception and consumption of these soldier-narratives has resulted in thepreservation of a sizeable collection of contemporary opinion, which makes thisperiod unique in comparison to previous generations, and which provides keyinsights into the multiethnic character of the ‘British’ Army in a broad array oftheatres.616 These personal writings have all the same benefits and drawbacks as inprevious generations, with the proviso that there was an increasing market for suchdiaries and journals, and the memoirs written after the conflict could be biased orgeared towards making an entertaining story along the lines of those accountsalready published. Yet within this prolific quantity of writings there is neverthelessvery little variation between that which was written contemporaneously and theaccounts written decades later: the sentiments – though not always the style – arevery much in concert. This means that inaccuracies rarely penetrate the authorsopinions of the cultural and social differences between Briton and German, and incases where exaggeration is evident, it is in the recounting of the battlefield exploitsof the Legion’s cavalrymen, who successfully captured the imaginations of thememoirists, and their audiences.Among this stockpile of narratives are many accounts of soldiers and officerswho, in some capacity, encountered the men of the King’s German Legion, thoughthey only represented a small percent of the men in the British Army. Not allwritings from the Peninsular War contain references to such interactions, since, asin previous conflicts, there were serious barriers that hindered frequent encounters.
615 Ludlow Beamish’s History owes its creation in part his friendships with soldiers of the Legion,some of whom he was in direct correspondence with. See: Beamish, History, esp: ‘Introduction’616 For other uses of these sources, see Ian Fletcher (ed.), Voices from the Peninsula: Eyewitness
Accounts by Soldiers of Wellington's army, 1808-1814. (London: Greenhill Books, 2001).; Brett-James,
Life in Wellington’s Army.
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Fortunately, the sheer scale of writing has helped to counteract these age-oldproblems, giving us a much clearer image of these interactions than for earlier wars.Despite the usual inhibitors born out of distance and language, interactionsbetween Briton and German were common within the Army, both in professionalactivities, and in private functions. Again there is little variance between the zonesand manners of interaction here and previous conflicts save for the frequency ofthese encounters, and the willingness of soldier-authors to comment upon them.617The battlefield, where we find most references to the KGL, fraternizing was – notsurprisingly – infrequent, and the resulting accounts are usually comprised ofcommendations or consternations based solely on the soldiers’ performance incombat. Collectively, there is little to be gleaned from these recollections, exceptthat the prevailing view amongst British soldiers of the abilities of the Legion incombat was positive. In a similar light, where in previous allied-armies, German andBritish soldiers would often march separately – sometimes at great distance fromone another – the integrated nature of the Legion often lead to encounters on thelong arduous routes that so characterized the Peninsular War. Though again not anideal zone of interaction, marching and campaigning did nevertheless createepisodes where soldiers would happen upon one another, or in the case of theLegion, their notoriously large baggage trains.618 While such episodes preventedconversation and fraternization, they did on occasion spark commentary regardingthe appearance, bearing and behaviour of soldiers.There are some mentions of the Legion in various military duties, but ingeneral, this discourse provides an incomplete picture, given that a discussion of thequotidian routines of the soldier was rare if those soldiers performed in the mannerrequired of them. Therefore, it is the social contacts in and around army camps thatpermits a better glimpse into the associations of these soldiers, as it was here thatcultural mannerisms and idiosyncrasies were prevalent. Certainly for the officers,
617 The journal of William Webber, an artilleryman, shows how important proximity was in dictatingthe frequency of discussions of the German forces within the Army. William Webber, With the Guns in
the Peninsula, the Peninsula War Journal of 2nd Captain William Webber, Royal Artillery, edited byRichard Henry Wollocombe (London: Greenhill Books, 1991), pp. 97-110.618 National Army Museum, 6807/71 Lieutenant John Ford, ‘Military Scraps from the Note Book ofLieutenant John Ford, 79th Regt. or Cameron Highlanders’, 1809-1814, fol. 43.
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there was a healthy social life to be had, especially during the lulls betweencampaigns. Ernst Poten recalled of his time in England, that he often took part in‘breakfasts, luncheons, dinners, suppers, balls, garden parties, walks, driving andriding, shooting, hunting, and fishing,’ often accompanied by British comrades.619Busy schedules such as this were less common once the Legion moved from thetranquillity of Kent to subsequent posts. While on campaign, especially in thePeninsula, it was bivouacking in the countryside or billeting in cities and townswhich provided an arena for interactions between these ‘brother-soldiers.’ Camps,or more specifically campfires, were certainly a popular place for comingling. Anofficer of the Brunswick-Öls cavalry fondly recalled a tradition whereby Britons,Hanoverians, and Brunswickers gathered around a roaring campfire, drinking andsinging songs with such enthusiasm that he claimed on one occasion even touchedthe cold heart of Lord Wellington who happened to pass nearby.620 Though thenature of these armies made travelling among the camps infrequent, there werenevertheless accounts of Germans and Britons visiting one another. Lieutenant JohnFord recalled that, ‘if Bread Fowls or Brandy were wanting they were to bepurchased on most occasions in the German Camps.’621 Certainly, such visits serveda specific function, but there were similar gatherings for purely social reasons.From bits of evidence and testimonies of various soldier-authors, we know thatLegionaries and British soldiers would often encounter one another in taverns, winehouses, and other habitués, though such interactions were only recounted inpersonal writings when they were particularly noteworthy or eventful.Another popular sphere of interaction was the officers’ mess, ‘an institutionwhich the English consider more important than any duty.’622 To thischaracteristically British tradition, the Hanoverians soon became quite fond. It washere, that officers of these diverse and disparate forces could eat, drink, and
619 Quoted in, G.E. Lanning, ‘The King’s German Legion in Dorset (1803-1805)’ Somerset Notes and
Queries vol. XXXII March 1989 Part 329, p. 754.620 German Cavalryman, Wider Napoleon, vol. II, p.37.; Brett-James, Life in Wellington’s , pp. 36-37.621 Ford then added, in regards to the Legion’s encampment: ‘I have often heard it jokingly called aCamp of Sutlers.’ NAM 6807/71 ‘Military Scraps from the Note Book of Lieutenant John Ford,’ fol. 43.622 Quoted in: North, ‘Raising and Organizing of the King’s German Legion’, p. 182.; Schwertfeger,
Geschichte, p.43.
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socialize.623 And for those gentlemen with less money to spend, an invitation to amess with a British battalion meant a welcome square meal as well.624 Formaldinner-parties were likewise common. After arriving in Sicily, one Hanoverian andhis fellow officers had received an invitation to dinner from English officers servingin a Sicilian regiment, within hours of their arrival.625Generally speaking, most social gatherings required less formality andconsisted of an impromptu gathering in tents or at an officer’s billet. From theletters of the artillery officer Augustus Frazer, we get a picture of how lively suchinformal events could be: ‘You would be dinned with the noise of the room in whichI write’ he wrote to his family, ‘German, Portuguese, Spanish and English, all talkingat once [and] a smoking and wine shop below.’626 Location was important, andseveral diarists made note of who had the best quarters in specific towns, as oftenthey became the gathering point during periods of leisure.The most remarked upon manner in which the Legionaries and Britishofficers interacted was at parties, dances and balls. Predominantly affairs for higherranking military men, the very nature of such events were special, as they were oneof the primary means through which the officers of the Legion could bond with theirBritish colleagues, especially those who would not have seen one another on aregular basis. In a manner most fitting for the international character of theprofession, these parties were usually polyethnic affairs. While stationed in Englandand Ireland, the officers of the Legion became quite popular for their refinedmanners, comical accents, and excellent dancing ability.627 In the Peninsula, the
623 Schaumann, like most Hanoverians, greatly enjoyed this English custom, though he was not fondof the rather bawdy stories told by the English officers. Schaumann, On the Road with Wellington, 360.624 In England, Christian Ompteda wrote that, ‘we dine in English style at a general mess, where weget an excellent dinner.’ Likewise, in the town of Athlone in Ireland, an anonymous Hanoverianofficer was ‘invited to join the mess of the English officers, but for which act of courtesy, on theirparts, our fare would have been indifferent. As it was, however, we did exceedingly well, especiallywith respect to wines, which they had procured of first-rate quality.’ Ompteda, A Hanoverian-EnglishSoldier, p. 174. Anon. Journal of an Officer in the King’s German Legion (London: Henry Colburn,1827), p. 64.625 Anon. Journal of an Officer, p. 267.626 Such was the scene at the billet of the Legion’s Artillery commander, Colonel Hartmann, who wasa good friend off Frazer, and the two worked alongside one another for the majority of the PeninsularWar. See, Frazer, Letters, pp. 104-105.627 G.E. Lanning, ‘The King’s German Legion in Dorset (1803-1805)’, p.755.
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better-known officers of the Legion usually frequented Wellington’s socialgatherings, and a veteran such as Frederick Arentschild could be described as aregular.628 The Germans could play host as well, as, for example, when ColonelStapleton visited an outpost and attended ‘a most gay Ball’ hosted by the 1stHussars.629 In many cases invitations were given as a matter of professionalpoliteness, and therefore not an accurate reflection of personal sentiment. Yetfrom many accounts of these festivities we have evidence that strong friendshipswere accrued and maintained through such gatherings. In the days before Waterloo,in 1815, Cavalie Mercer recalled his experiences of attending such a party, where oldfriends from the Peninsula had congregated. ‘It was my good fortune to sit betweenColonel Sir. F[rederick] Arentschild and another no less celebrated officer of theGerman Legion, Lieutenant Strenuwitz [sic]’, he wrote, recalling that later on he was‘pinned in the corner’ by the Duke of Wellington, and his ‘favourite old hussar’,Arentschild.630The integration of the Legion into the social life of the British Army’s officer classwas helped in no small part by the Legion’s bands, which became a feature in mostparties and social events from the early days in England, to the last campaigns adozen years later.631 One Hanoverian’s recollections from a sea voyage give us someindication as to the popularity and demand for these musicians:The captain of our convoy-ship planned… a little fete on board his vessel,for the celebration of which he requested the assistance of our band, at
628 At another party of Wellington’s, Augustus Frazer recalled that he ‘talked to Colonel Arentschildtill we were both ready to’ go to sleep, ‘and before we broke up, heat, good cheer, and champagne hadmade us all drowsy and stupid.’ Frazer, Letters, pp. 107-108.629 Page, Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula, p. 150.630 Mercer, Journal, pp. 120-122.631 When the majority of the Legion was still in England, they were very popular, among military menand the local populace. As Lanning explains: ‘Every evening during the summer the band of the 1stDragoons played on the esplanade for “the amusement of the royal family and the public.” The musicplayed by this band was of a particularly high standard because the trumpeters of the HanoverianLife Guards had transferred to it en masse… These bands were very popular with the local civiliansbecause they played not only at parades and on marches but also at dances, at open-air concerts andat the request of civic authorities. On one occasion, for instance, when the governor of Weymouthwas returning from a successful court action in London, he was met at the turnpike by his supportersand conducted back to the town in a huge procession, headed by the band of the 1st Light Dragoons.’Roger North concurs, stating that the members of the Legion’s ‘particular love of music… contributedlargely to the friendly feeling shown to the Legion by the public in England.’ See G.E. Lanning, ‘TheKGL in Dorset,’ p. 752.; Roger North, ‘Raising of the King’s German Legion’, p. 182.
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the same time inviting the officers of the legion, and specifying, by way oftemptation, that he had several ladies on board, who had consented tohonour the party by joining in the dance.632It is fairly evident then, that some social advantages were garnered frommaintaining such ‘beautiful’ and ‘fine’ bands: wherever the bands went, so too wentthe officers, as a quid-pro-quo. But it was not only in private functions to whichthese bands contributed. German musicians brought a certain atmosphere to camplife as well:The different bands, all good, continued playing until after dusk, whichwe enjoyed sitting in the willow hedge smoking our cigars. The scenewas remarkably pretty. Groups of men scattered about amongst the littletents, some preparing supper, etc.; the bands, with officers in picturesquecostumes hovering about them.633Just as the professionalism displayed by the soldiers of the Legion made themendearing and noteworthy, so did the proficiency of their musicians greatly add tothe notoriety of this foreign corps, and in doing so they provided a means by whichBriton and Teuton could interact.Singing, like regimental bands, was a source of frequent commentary, and thisvariance was one of the great continuities in the comments of British and Germansoldier-authors in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.634 As GeorgeGleig explains:There was another striking difference in the two brigades of cavalrywhich I remarked. The English rode on, many of them silent, somechatting of a thousand things, others whistling or humming thosetuneless airs in which the lower orders of our countrymen delight. TheGermans, on the contrary, sang, and sang beautifully, a wild chorus…[with] different persons taking different parts, and together producingthe most exquisite harmony. So great an impression did this make uponme, that I caught the air, and would note it down… were I sufficientlymaster of the art of notation.635
632 Anon. Journal of an Officer, p. 256.633 Mercer, Journal, pp. 209, 369.634 Brett-James, Life In Wellington’s Army, pp. 36-7. Lindau, Erinnerungen, p. 33.; Anon, Wider
Napoleon vol II, p. 37.635 Gleig, The Subaltern, p.188.
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This difference also provided chances for fraternizing. On one occasion, FriedrichLindau and his fellow Legionaries were accosted on the way back from the localtavern by English soldiers who appealed to them to sing some ‘German songs’offering them more and more alcohol until they were well over ‘the limit.’636 JohnMalcolm of the 42nd Regiment seemed to greatly appreciate the atmosphereprovided by the singing of their foreign troops. Indeed his account of camp life insouthern France in 1814 provides an idyllic view of these interactions inWellington’s Army:Our time [there] was unvaried, and unoccupied by any thing better thanmorning and evening parades, and short excursions to the rear. Themost picturesque scene that our camp exhibited, was the space occupiedby the German light troops, who, during the twilight, sate [sic] in groupsbefore the doors of their tents, canopied in clouds of tobacco smoke,chanting together their native airs and anthems. They seemed to bemore at home in the field than our soldiers, and had the art of making upa very palatable mess out of the simplest materials. During this period ofinaction, we formed frequent little convivial parties in our tents, thoughwe had then little else than our rations to subsist upon… At thesefestivals, the first course generally consisted of soup, made of beef boiledto rags – course second, beef roast – course third, beef stewed – coursefourth, beef steaks.637
Other means of entertainment and relief created memorable episodes ofassociation, but not on the scale of the formal parties. Gambling, horse races, andsport (many Hanoverians learned English games while encamped in Kent andDorset) allowed light-hearted settings for genial association.638 Yet not allinteractions and observations were cordial affairs. In a rare moment of intertwinednarratives, the vitriolic commissary August Schaumann and contemplative Englishcavalrymen Edward Cocks created a furore in their competition for the love of a
636 Friedrich Lindau, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten aus den Feldzugen der königlich-deutschen Legion(Hameln, 1846), p.33.637 John Malcolm. Reminiscences of a Campaign in the Pyrenees and South of France (Edinburgh:Constable’s Miscellany, vol. XXVII, 1828), p. 263.638 Norbert Lansheit, who was friends with Legionaries though he was never apart of the KGL,recalled a similar process at this same time within the 20th Dragoons, where the British soldierstaught the foreign troopers how to play English sports. NAM 35694 Bresemann, ‘The King’s GermanLegion 1803-1816’, Gleig, The Hussar, p. 87.
239
young Spanish girl – to the great disapprobation of the town’s inhabitants.639Though no accounts of duels between British and German officer have emerged –partly due to the secrecy around such actions – there were some who recalled menpreparing for such events.640Less ritualized manners of fighting and infighting remained, though they wereuncommon. One evening in 1808, Christian Ompteda, the colonel of the KGL 2ndInfantry Battalion, reported that in ‘a narrow street in front of a tavern’ there was ‘adrunken riot between the men of the 57th Regiment and ours’ and that ‘Bayonetsand side-arms were used on both sides, and half a dozen were wounded of bothcorps, but not dangerously.’641 A graver incident transpired in the early months of1804, where a dragoon was killed by an English sailor in one of the many ‘drunkenrevels’ near the KGL barracks in Dorset.642 Though such instances suggest therewere some serious disturbances between the two groups, it appears that in mostcases, fights that broke out between Briton and German were spurred by alcohol,not enmity.643 Yet, there is some indication of quarrels between ethnic groups asEdmund Wheatley’s diary begins with an interesting passage: ‘Mutiny between theGermans and the Irish. Sided with the Germans and seized the ringleaders.’644Be it drunken brawls or sophisticated dinner-parties, the evidence is clearfrom the writings and reminiscences, that although interactions between Germanand British soldiers were not universal to all members of the army, they werecommon enough to instigate a formidable amount of commentary. Likewise, itbecomes apparent from such recollections that the officers (and to some extent
639 Schaumann’s 1st Hussars and Cock’s 16th Dragoons were brigaded together, and coincidentally,these two men fought over this young Spanish girl, who, as if plucked from a Jane Austin story, was tomarry a man she did not love. See Page, Intelligence Officer, pp. 139-40.; Schaumann, On the Road
With Wellington, p. 319.640 Hathaway, Gentleman Soldier, p. 180.641 Ompteda was often at the middle of Anglo-German conflicts, on occasion serving in the capacity oftranslator for the Legion’s courts-martial. Ompteda, Hanoverian-English Officer, p. 199. WO 71/202Trial of Frederick Weber, July 1805.642 Anon. Journal of an Officer, p.52.643 One of the earlier courts-martial for the Legion was for a quartermaster, who had repeatedlymisapplied funds and for his drunkenness at a Portsmouth coffee house, where verbally abused bothfellow soldiers and citizen alike. Yet such events do not appear to be anything unique to the Legion’smen. WO 71/202, Trial of William Reusch, July 1805.644 Hibbert, The Wheatley Diary, p.1.
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soldiers) of the Legion had successfully inserted themselves into the social andcultural life of the British Army at-large. One of the most remarkable things aboutthese anecdotes is that they showed how careful authors were to note the presenceof men from the Legion, and likewise that many German accounts describe their firstor most memorable interactions with British fighting men. This was in part due tothe notoriety created by difference, and it is to those real and perceived differencesto which we now turn.
**National Character**
The impressions made from encounters between Briton and German, often initiateddiscussions on the inherent traits of these soldiers, which, as we have seen inChapter II, usually included some musings upon the national character of theparticipants. This epoch is invaluable, in that the opinions of the soldiersthemselves permit a testing of the predominant characterizations perpetuatedthroughout the course of the previous century. Infused in this discourse were thedeepening senses of nationalism in both Britain and Germany, and among manywould-be military theorists within the army: a growing interest in martial character.Just as in prior conflicts, the army was a symbol of national identity, and amanifestation of national character. This could be seen with the British Army in theIberian Peninsula, which was extremely cautious to act with civility and not to causeoffense, in part so that it would not reflect poorly on Great Britain. In this processesof adhering to and enforcing this policy, the concept of an ‘English’ officer implied abehaviour and a manner that was to be contrasted with both the French enemy, andmilitary men native to the Iberian Peninsula. As discussed in previous chapters, therelationship between national character and the ability and quality of the soldierwas something in vogue with military theorists in the late eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries. Before becoming the co-founder of the King’s German Legion,Johann Friedrich von der Decken wrote a short book, An Essay on the English
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National Character, in which he heaped praise upon England and the qualities of hersoldiers. Amongst other laudatory statements, Decken proclaimed ‘in regards tocourage’, that ‘the English warrior is surpassed by none’, and that they have ‘aboveall a stronger tendency towards personal valour.’645 Decken’s assertions differ littlefrom previous discourses by soldiers and theorists, yet his conclusions were nodoubt reinforced by his experiences fighting alongside the British soldiers in theLow Countries in the 1790’s. And just as his experiences amongst British soldiersinspired his Essay, interactions with the men within this foreign corps he helpedcreate, would lead others to formulate similar opinions.In the context of the relationship between the King’s German Legion and theBritish Army, most commentaries on national character begin with a discussion ofsoldiering itself. Once again professional and national distinctions blur, which was astrong trend among soldiers and officers arriving in the Peninsula in the latterstages of the war. One example, John Malcolm, focused on the German light infantrythat he fought alongside, and concluded that the skill and experience of thesewarriors was something unique to their character, not a result of training orphilosophy. ‘In this species of warfare, the German troops appeared to me to excelall others,’ he stated, as a preface to his musings on the inherent abilities andcharacters of the soldiers of various nations. And just in discussions of nationalcharacter, Malcolm places the British within two extremes: ‘the courage of Britishtroops… seems to be a happy combination of the impetuosity of the French, and thestubbornness of the Germans’.646The British soldiers who reflected on the martial qualities of their brother-soldiers in the Legion conveyed in their writings a great respect for the disciplinedisplayed by these men. ‘The German troops are superior to any I ever met with forstrict attention to duty’ and ‘are determined, brave, and cool in the hour of battle,’went one glowing recollection.647 As in the descriptions of Hessian soldiery, the
645 Decken, englischen National-Character, pp. 34-35.646 These German soldiers would advance undaunted in the face of ‘the most galling fire, neitherquickening nor relaxing their jog-trot pace. One cannot help wondering how such troops should everhave been beaten.’ Malcolm, Reminiscences, p. 272.647 Quoted in: Gray, ‘Service of the KGL’, p. 73.
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Legion’s Germanic soldiers benefited from an innate ‘stubbornness’ and ‘stern’demeanour, and ‘dogged and phlegmatic courage,’ which contrasted them fromBritish or French fighting men, yet were seen as great benefits to their profession.648Physical attributes, especially the height of soldiers, were often commented upon, aswere their strength and endurance. ‘The Germans bear excessive fatigueswonderfully well,’ remarked the Englishmen, Edmund Wheatley, having observedwhile serving within the Legion that ‘a German will march over six leagues [abouteighteen miles] while an Englishman pants and perspires beneath the labour oftwelve miles.’649 Strength and steadiness were common themes, and harkened backto previous conflicts, as did the German’s reputation for slowness, so prevalent inweighted descriptions of Hessians in the American War. Christian Omptedarecounts in a letter to his brother LouisThe English sometimes say in a good-humoured, half-reproachful, half-praising, jocular way, “The Germans are slow, but sure.” That we are theformer no national vanity can permit us to deny. May it prove that theEnglish have not overdone the praise in the latter quality – a thing which,judging by their character, is not likely to have been their intention.650Thus the stereotype of slowness, one that was reasonably justified in certaincontexts, was nevertheless perpetuated on into the nineteenth century. Though itdid not share the implicit connotations as for the Germans in the American War, itwas in any case still a prominent feature in descriptions of German nationalcharacter, as defined by contact with the men of the King’s German Legion. Thediscourse on the soldiering capabilities of these German soldiers often led to anexamination of their traits as officers, which receive less praise than the rank andfile. In a lengthy passage, where he describes the national skills and proclivities ofthe French, British, and Spanish, Edward Cocks approaches the issue of Germans,with a less than glowing conclusion:Germans have… a pride from the high consideration a soldier enjoys inGermany. Usually ill-educated, their minds are confined to theirprofession, they are not liable to false alarms, but they know too much
648 Malcolm, Reminiscences, p.272.649 Hibbert, Wheatley, p. 8.650 Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer, p. 254.
243
how to estimate the dangers of their situation and sometimes discoverdisheartening difficulties which might be concealed from other troops.They make capital subalterns and captains, but know too much for powerand their views are not sufficiently enlarged for high command.651This was perhaps not the typical impression of German soldiers, and though Cocksis reinforcing the prevailing stereotype of German dullness, he is neverthelesscondemning the idea of educating men in the ranks for fear of making them badsoldiers, an idea that would not sit well with other theorists in the army, likeDecken. The cautiousness of German soldiers however was indeed a long-heldtradition, contrasted by the impetuosity of English soldiers, which Decken wouldproclaim as one of their chief attributes.652 Furthermore, while most discussions ofnatural characteristics were regarding the rank & file, as opposed to the morehomogenized officer corps, Cocks’ statements suggest that natural characteristicswere not merely for the average soldier, and that officers, despite the transnationalcharacter of their profession, could likewise be susceptible to the apparentidiosyncrasies of their own ethnicity.Prolonged association with these soldiers also resulted in distinctionsbetween peoples from the various German-speaking states, and here the effects ofthe Dynastic Union were noticeable, and for once, quite positive. Hanoverians wereviewed differently in comparison to other Germans, thanks in a large part to thesedynastic ties, but more importantly, as a tribute to their laudatory behaviour incombat. Wellington did not hesitate to make clear his preferences, proclaiming tothe Duke of York that, ‘it is impossible to have better soldiers than the realHanoverians.’653 While this view towards Hanoverians is owed, in part, to contrastswith the deserters from the French Army that would surround them, many menfrom the Electorate in fact joined the British ranks through this latter course. TheFrench Hanoverian Legion, the counterpart to the British model, was notorious for
651 Cocks does make rather dramatic partitions between those who make up officers and the commonsoldiers, such as in the case of the English, whose ‘courage is more corporeal and results from a sortof prepossession that they are superior to every other nation. This feeling is more proper to thesoldier than the officer and hence I think our soldiers are proportionally braver than our officers.’Page, Intelligence Officer, p. 129.652 Decken, englischen National-Character, p. 35.653 Gray, ‘Services,’ p. 199.
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desertion, and by 1813, August Schaumann gloated that ‘almost the whole of thisLegion [had] ultimately deserted to our side.’654 This exodus of soldiers to the KGLin many ways increased the sense of foreignness, but also reinforced favourableimpressions of the Hanoverians within this foreign corps. Once again we turn tocavalryman Edward Cocks of the 16th Dragoons to summarize this division:Though I have not a very high opinion of the infantry belonging to theGerman Legion, yet I must bear the most unqualified testimony to thecourage, skill, zeal and marked good conduct of the cavalry – the fact is,the first are foreigners of all descriptions and exactly the same species oftroops except being finer men, as the French armies – the cavalry of theold Hussars, almost all Hanoverians, and many of them of greatrespectability… are perfectly to be depended on655Eventually, the British commanders in the Peninsula were given the task of siftingthrough the various regiments to collect what Hanoverian soldiers they could findfor service in the Legion’s battalions.656 This variance from the ‘Pragmatic Army’ ofthe 1740’s – where the British first served with the Hanoverians and suspectedthem of being cowards and thieves – could not be greater. In this last incarnation ofa British-Hanoverian force, men from the Electorate received widespread praise andwere seen as a better mould from which to make a soldier.657Regarding the German view of British national character, the overallsentiments remain remarkably constant with previous descriptions of Britishsoldiery, and so were the criticisms of their arrogance and overbearing nature thatso displeased their German allies. Yet the testimonies of men in the Legion show farmore contempt for naval officers and seamen than soldiers, and the majority of
654 This distinction between Hanoverians and other Germans grew greater once the British Armyreturned to Flanders, to fight alongside Prussians and other German corps – including the newlyformed Hanoverian levees. Quote from: Schaumann, On the Road, p. 304.655 Page, Charles Cocks, p. 63.656 Gray, ‘Services,’ p.199.657 Even in the early 1800’s, some of the old prejudices remained, mainly in Parliament and thepublic, but also among the ministry. In assigning a specific task to an officer of the Legion, J. Hinestried to assuage Lord Palmerston’s reluctance: ‘though your objections might apply to mostHanoverians, I do not think they would to’ Colonel Linsingen, ‘of whom I have a very high opinion.’ Inthe first decade of the nineteenth century, it was William Cobbett and his opposition members inParliament who were able to rouse old-fashioned anti-Hanoverianism through speeches andCobbett’s journal, the Political Register. WO 3/610 fol. 269-270 ‘J Hinens to Lord Palmerston, Paris,16th December 1815’; Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 1700-1837 (Suffolk: BoydellPress, 2007), pp. 116-132, 253-256.
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comments, if they embark on any critiques, are positive. In fact, some of the mostnegative critiques of English national character, came from the English themselves.As Moyle Sherer wrote of his countrymen in the Peninsular War,The English are admired… over all Europe, as a free, an enlightened, anda brave people, but they cannot make themselves beloved, they are notcontent with being great, they must be thought so, and told so. They willnot bend with good humour to the customs of other nations, nor will theycondescend to soothe (flatter they never do) the harmless self-love offriendly foreigners. No: wherever they march or travel, they bear withthem a haughty air of conscious superiority and expect that theircustoms, habits, and opinions should supersede or at least suspend,those of all other countries through which they pass. 658Here we see the virtue of interaction with foreigners abroad providing this oneEnglishmen a better impression of his own peoples’ idiosyncrasies – even if they didnot paint a rosy picture.As with the German forces, there were some distinctions to be made amongthe British in the minds of Legionaries. Where Englishmen received praise for theirspecific virtues, other opinions emerged for the Scots, Welsh and Irish – groups thatreceived more attention from the Legion’s authors than from previousgenerations.659 Common were negative opinions of the Irish (a ‘notoriouslybloodthirsty and predatory crowd’) perhaps due in part to religious reasons, but aswe have seen, there was a history of friction and infighting between the two groupsas well.660 Alternatively, the Welsh soldiers camped near the Legion’s 2nd Battalion,in the spring of 1805, received strong praise from its colonel, Christian Ompteda.Despite there having been ‘some inconvenience in making room for us, the friendlyrelations which had arisen between us have in no way suffered,’ and the Hanoveriannobleman declared,
658 Sherer, Recollections of the Peninsula, p. 36.659 These differences were of course commented upon by Englishman as well, such as WilliamTomkinson who said of his fellow Scots: ‘where great steadiness, coolness, and obedience to orders isrequired, I should select the Scotch. In… any service where quickness is required, and immediateadvantage to be taken of any sudden change, I do not think they are equal to others.’ Tomkinson, The
Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p. 280.660 Though many Legionaries enjoyed their time in Ireland, this was perhaps due to the friendship ofthe local gentry more than the populace at large. Schaumann, One the Road, pp. 23-24.; Anon. Journal
of an Officer, pp. 62-3.
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What I have seen of the natives of that part of England, in thus and otherneighbouring regiments from the same land [Wales], had confirmed andincreased my good opinion of this genuine old remnant of the originalBritons. They seem to possess the English magnanimity, candour, senseof honour, and hospitality to a marked degree.661
Though there are such distinctions between the various components of Britain’ssoldiers, the term ‘English’ remained a catchall, and could signify any combination ofIrish, Scots and Englishmen. All these declarations of real or supposed differencewere not exclusive to Englishman or German alone, and would often include theFrench, Spanish and Portuguese, and occasionally soldiers from other nations.Such commentaries were part of a long-standing discourse, clumsily probingfor differences and attributing nurture to nature. Yet there was some caution inmaking judgments regarding national character from interactions with theirsoldiery. Edmund Wheatley, an English officer serving in the Legion wrote:Respecting the Germans among whom I have now lived a twelthmonth, Ican only judge sparingly, for to presume giving an opinion on an entirenation from an experience gained by a few months’ intercourse with acompany of soldiers, would be judging by supposition and renderingdoubtful every assertion connected with national peculiarities or originalcharacteristics. What respectability I have found among my brothersoldiers, when supported by a good education and urbanity of manners, Icannot distinguish from that always natural to a British Gentlemen andwhich renders society so pleasing and acquaintance so valuable.662Here can be seen the effects of a transnational gentlemanly culture which united theofficer corps of these respective polities, and in the mind of this officer, made theseforeigners in many ways indiscernible from his own countrymen. Though Wheatleyoften uses his diary more as a platform to vent his own frustrations with both hiscommanding officer (the ‘bullying Captain Nöttig’) and his ‘brother soldiers’ (‘theseheavy, selfish Germans’), his statements here and elsewhere attest to an importantstruggle he and others shared: that of trying to find and articulate difference in the
661 Ompteda, A English-Hanoverian Officer, p. 173-174.662 Hibbert, The Wheatley Diary, p. 7.
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face of a demeanour and conduct so agreeably familiar.663 And while Wheatley washesitant in making such sweeping generalizations, others were not so reserved. Inthe end however, the similarities seem to have outweighed the differences, and aswe shall see, national character and identity could be blurred or shed, especially inthe face of so many years of cultural exchange and interaction.
**Identities**
The King’s German Legion, despite its position within the British Army, was in manyways a German institution, yet within it lay sentiments and behaviours that wereunquestionably English. The Legion was itself a dichotomy, as it was very much apart of the nascence of German national identity, and the adulthood of Germanintegration in the British Army. For many of the men from the defunct Holy RomanEmpire, entrance into the KGL was a means of fighting for the ‘Fatherland’ andentering into service in this foreign army ironically, an act of patriotism. For theHessen-born Heinrich Dehnel, the ‘English-German Legion’ offered ‘theextraordinary benefits of the British service’, but the main reason for his enlistingwas ‘patriotic considerations’.664 For many who wished to see Germany liberatedfrom the French yoke, their first choice was not necessarily with Austria or Prussia –the latter being called ‘Pseudo-Germans’ by one Hanoverian officer disgusted bytheir frequent pro-French policies.665 It was only the British who seemed trulydetermined to deter French hegemony, and therefore in 1809 when the Brunswick-Öls Hussars and the remnants of Major Ferdinand von Schill’s freikorps were tryingto determine the best army to join to continue to fight against France, they bothchose the British Army.666 Fighting for Britain was in many ways a means of
663 Hibbert, The Wheatley Diary, pp. 5, 7-8.664 Heinrich Dehnel, Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere in britischen Diensten aus den Kriegsjahren 1805
bis 1816 (Hannover: Carl Rümpler, 1864), p. 2.665 Schwertfeger, Der Königlich Hannoversche Generalleutnant, pp. 51-2.666 Lindau, Erinnerungen eines Soldat, pp. 14-5. For the motives of the men in Schills’ Regiment, see:Cavalryman, Wider Napoleon!, vol. I, p. 247-8.; Mustafa, Schill, p. 82.
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celebrating or preserving one’s Germanness by continuing to defy the French, andthe KGL became a magnet for like-minded men serving willingly or by force in theFrench Army, some of whom enlisted with the hopes of later joining the British inthe Iberian Peninsula. This patriotic fervour had a significant impact on how theLegion and its soldiers were considered and remembered. Absent fromcommentaries of the Legion were the mercenary stereotypes that plaguedgenerations of German soldiers serving within or alongside the British Army. Inspite of a mounting number of former prisoners of war and men of dubious loyaltieswho found their way into the ranks, collectively the Legion was seen as beingmotivated by professionalism and patriotism – not materialism. The effects of thison perceptions of the Legion, and its acceptance within the British Army, cannot beunderestimated.From the German perspective, even the name of this foreign corps wastreated as unifying agent. Though it was often referred to as the King’s GermanLegion in English, in the Legion, ‘German’ – not ‘King’s’ – was the operative word, asserving the monarch took a backseat to attachment to their homeland. In theirmother tongue, the corps was commonly referred to as the englische-deutsche
Legion – and therefore this multi-national force is particularly representative of thename ‘Anglo-German’ which has been used throughout this thesis. The naming ofthe Legion in this manner implies a hybridization of polities, and though it wasmainly a clarification with other German Legions in Europe, contemporaries andscholars in later generations utilized this title to reinforce a shared history andcommon cause.Once recruits into the Legion entered the British Army, they naturally beganto adopt the manners, and customs of their host army, in a manner that has itsparallels and precedents in the various other forms of British-German coalition orintegrated corps throughout this era. By 1815, and the last campaign againstNapoleon, the King’s German Legion had become something far different from theHanoverian Army from which it was founded. In many ways, they had become an‘English’ force, and the men of the KGL were seen and regarded as equal to Britishsoldiers. When campaigning along side other foreign corps this unity became even
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more pronounced, for most records, muster sheets, and casualty lists deem them‘British’ as opposed to the compartmentalized ‘foreign corps’ and allies.Alongside this bureaucratic assimilation, a great deal of cultural exchangeand blending transpired between the soldiers of the KGL and the Britons within thearmy as well. For the English side, those serving in or alongside the Legion adoptedmany mannerisms and customs, with the eschewing of the more popular cigars forpipes as one such change.667 However, the most glaring Teutonic influences were indress and appearance. The moustache, especially those of formidable size, long afeature in caricatures of Germans and German soldiery, slowly appeared (as facialhair is want to do) on the faces of British cavalrymen who brigaded with them. Thissometimes led to confusion and mistaken identities, as in one case where a Londonmob attacked a squadron of British hussars on account of their whiskers, a not-so-gentle reminder of the differing opinions between the public and military towardsthese foreign soldiers.668 The same was true abroad, where Cavalie Mercer wasmistaken to be a German soldier by equally hostile French citizens who feared thathe was dead-set on plundering their village: ‘As the English nowhere inspire terror,these people must have taken me for a Prussian hussar’ he recalled, attributing theirmistake to his ‘pelisse and enormous mustache.’669 In the commons debate on theLegion, so rich a source for the rhetoric of the day, Lord Folkestone was outraged bysuch trends, or so it was recorded: ‘When he had seen our young men and officersadopting German dresses, and Germanizing themselves as much as possible,undertaking every thing German, and so attached to the fashion of the day as indeference to it to cast off every thing English, he felt disgust at it.’ His friend Mr.Whitbread concurred and drew the House’s attention tothe affectation which so generally and ridiculously prevailed of imitatingthe dress of foreign soldiers. All characteristics of English regiments,especially in the cavalry, were completely obliterated. From the known
667 Hibbert, Wheatley Diary, p. 74.668 One German recruit in London, had to be taken to private room in an inn to keep him from hostilelocals. Anon. Erinnerungen eines Legionärs, oder Rachrichten von den Zügen der Deutschen Legion des
Königs von England (Hannover: Helwing’schen Hof-Buchladung, 1826).; Gareth Glover (ed.). From
Corunna to Waterloo: the Letters and Journals of Two Napoleonic Hussars (London: Greenhill, 2007),pp. 98-99.; Tomkinson, Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p. 286, footnote and editors comments.669 Mercer, Journal, p. 286.
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predilection for this dress in a certain quarter, our troops were soGermanised… in their appearance, that the most serious consequenceswere to be apprehended. In more than one instance, this mischievousapish imitation had proved fatal670Yet despite such protestations, the adoption of German appearances continued inboth uniforms and – if the Victorian Age is of any indication – in the profundity offacial hair adorned by British cavalrymen.While the ‘Germanization’ of British soldiers remained primarily superficial,the sense of Englishness among the German soldiers was deeper and moreprofound. From the beginning the Legionaries were indoctrinated into their new-found status by various formalities, beyond the mere swearing of oaths. One suchtradition, which had parallels in previous wars, was the serving of a typically Englishdinner when first joining the British, on land or at sea, and which in most casesincluded a large quantity of beef. On the journey to England, new Hanoverianrecruits aboard transport vessels were often treated to an Englishman’s repast: ‘inorder… that the meal might be characteristic of his country, the captain regaled uswith roast beef and its usual appurtenances: and as the recruits were nowconsidered in the light of English military, they received… the customary allowancesof bread butter and rum.’671 What was a novel fare to these soldiers at thecommencement of the war was by the end considered their right, for example whenregiments of the Legion demanded ‘English’ provisions on their return to Hanoverand subsequent disbandment, and in Italy in 1815, a commissary was flogged fortrying to pass off inferior bread to a KGL battalion.672Through the course of the Peninsular War, the Legionaries often sawthemselves in an English light. No better example of this can be found, than the caseof August Schaumann, who oscillated between being a commissary for KGL andEnglish regiments. Though extremely proud of his own Germanness, to localinhabitants and the French enemy he donned the mantle of ‘Englishman’, a means of
670 House of Commons, ‘Motion Concerning the King’s German Legion,’ December 10, 1812, cc. 266,270-1.671 Anon. Journal of an Officer, p. 18.672 Bresemann, ‘King’s German Legion’, p .12. Anon, Adventures of a Young Rifleman, p. 340.
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heightening the esteem of others, and contextualizing many of the mannerisms andhabits that he had adopted while a soldier in the British Army. Whenever he wantedto emphasize his more virtuous qualities (which were few), he reassured those indoubt that he was ‘a chivalrous English officer.’673 Other Legionaries acted in asimilar way, changing their manners and behaviour to such a degree, that uponreturning to Hanover, these veterans carried on in the manner of Englishmen formany years after, and the Hanoverian Army maintained several English militaryinstitutions, such as the officers’ mess.674Gestures of unity were particularly strong among the officers, who may haveserved alongside their British colleagues for years. Throughout the history of theLegion, there was a greater degree of social integration as well a structuralassimilation into the British Army – something which contrasts this formation withother foreign corps and a long line of auxiliary forces. Of course, both a militaryfraternity, as well as genteel society further aided this, and were both crucial inbreaking down boundaries created by cultural and linguistic barriers.Yet despite the assimilating nature of this relationship, the Legion did notbecome completely English. Some external factors played an important role. Therewas a continuous reminder of the German soldiers’ foreignness, which not onlyemerged from their own actions, but from encounters with the Germans servingwillingly or unwillingly in the French Army. This occasionally led to ‘volleys ofinsulting language, as well as shot’ to be exchanged between the co-nationals onboth sides, and though it certainly had its comical side, it was the bitterness andsadness of such events which stood out the most, and what persists in many of thememoirs.675
673 In one of many such instances of self-proclaimed Englishness, Schaumann recalls, ‘the fact that weEnglishmen ate so much meat, drank so much wine and so little water, were constantly on our legs,and never slept after the midday meal, and yet remained fresh and healthy withal, struck theSpaniards with horror and amazement, and was always a riddle to them.’, Schaumann, On the Road, p.206. For other examples, see Ibid, pp. 73, 181, 212, 301, 319, 326.674 Bresemann, ‘King’s German Legion,’ pp. 5-13.675 Joseph Donaldson, Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier (Staplehurst, 2000), pp. 122-123.Schaumann, One the Road, p. 250.; Hathaway, A True Gentleman Soldier, p. 204.
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For others, Englishness was not their aspiration, because they had nointention of shedding their own identity, and instead revelled in those actions andactivities – games, songs, foods, etc. – that reminded them of the lands from whichthey were now exiled.676 In the case of others, any predominant sense ofEnglishness withered away as the possibility of peace and the liberation of theirhomelands reawakened their Hanoverian or German identities. To these men, asthe Legionary officer Julius Hartmann later explained,the peace of 1814 marked a very special turning point. Up till then [theseHanoverians] had lived in complete isolation from their home countryand its special interests and completely within the interests of theEnglish Army and had to a certain degree felt themselves to be English.From this point on, all the ties which bind them to Hanover increase instrength once more and little by little alter the nature of theirrelationship with the English Army. However, all retain that deep feelingof camaraderie, of belonging to the English comrades in arms, thepreference for their institutions and customs and the eager readiness tojump to their defence against anyone who fails to hold them in thehighest esteem.677
Thus in spite of its ephemeral nature, a feeling of Englishness did prevail among thewarriors of the Legion – an affection that certainly owes a great deal to the closerelations with the native British. But Hartmann’s comment also belies an equallyimportant theme: an attachment to the ‘English Army,’ which did not necessarilyequate to the British nation. Although there was often respect and admiration forBritain and her institutions (the monarchy, the ‘free press’, etc.), it was the armywith which they identified themselves, and which fostered not a sense ofnationalism, but institutionalism.678 This difference was apparent at various times,with one striking case being London after the defeat of Napoleon, and their
676 This was perhaps more prevalent in the Brunswick Öls Corps, which served for less time, and didnot have the historical and dynastic bonds as the Hanoverians. See: Anon, Wider Napoleon, vol. II.chaps. 1-3.677 Wheatley claimed there was already some eagerness among the soldiers following the liberationof northern Germany in 1813: ‘The Legion appears anxious to return to Germany after nine years’tedious absence. Even the short period I have been absent from England appears treble the time.’Certainly the inconclusive nature of the war for the first decade added to these feelings, and that areturn to Germany was ‘so anxiously desired, and for a while so little expected.’ Bresemann ‘King’sGerman Legion, p.7.; Hibbert, Wheatley Diary, p. 29.; Anon. Journal of an Officer, p. 326.678 Ompteda, English-Hanoverian Officer, pp. 190, 254.
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realization, that though they could share victories with their comrades in the army,there was a sense of separation and isolation from the British public.679
**Imagining the King’s German Legion**
This close association and the unique character and function of the legion would inthe decades after its disbandment create a legacy that was celebrated, on occasion,to the point of hyperbole. Nick Harding has stated that ‘most histories of theHanoverian legion have been eulogic,’ and it is in many ways true, for when notoverlooked by the histories written after the wars, the Legion did receive favourablecommentary in both the memoirs of the participants and the histories written bysubsequent generations, and it does so here as well.680 As we have seen, thesuccesses by various contingents within the Legion did a great deal to increase thewhole corps’ reputation, where previous German auxiliaries or allies might bedragged down by the lowest common denominators within their ranks.681The particular abilities of the Legion’s cavalry greatly impacted theremembering, and the imagining, of the King’s German Legion. The cavalry chargeoutside Garcia Hernandez, where the Heavy Dragoons (‘huge men on huge horses’)made ‘a brilliant charge’ and broke through three French infantry regiments insquare formations, was repeatedly applauded, including being hyperbolized as ‘oneof the most gallant charges recorded in history.’682 That it deserved suchproclamations will not be disputed here, but certainly its treatment as anuncommon feat was part of a broader retrospective regarding the Legion’s cavalry,
679 ‘500,000 people were said to be present. And in all this crowd I felt that I stood alone, known tonobody, heeded by nobody – a feeling of pathos of which defies description!’ Schaumann, On the
Road, p. 414.680 Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, p. 253.681 The Legion itself received some public support. August v.d. Busche-Ippenburg recalled on oneoccasion, shortly after disembarking from foreign duty and making his way towards Hull, that ‘a lot ofpeople followed after us on the way to the inn, crying exultantly “King’s German Legion.”’Schwertfeger, Königlich Hannoversche Generalleutnant, p. 73682 B.A. Fitchett, (ed.), Wellingtons’ Men: Some Soldier Biographies (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1912),p. 74.
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especially the Light Hussars, who were sometimes given credit for acts they had nopart in.683Such was the praise and glorification of the light cavalry in particular, thatthey received compliments and were portrayed as tireless warriors, withunmatched perceptive skills, keen understanding of terrain, and empathic bondswith their animals – characterizations eerily similar to descriptions of nativeAmerican warriors. ‘The men of the 1st German Hussars would often observe withthe naked eye a body of the enemy which was scarcely discernible through atelescope, so practiced were they and watchful,’ wrote captain Harry Smith.684Similarly their relationship with their horses, received this same manner ofexaggerated acclamation. Looking back on his encounters with these horsemen,Harry Ross-Lewin wrote, ‘I have often seen these men lying on the ground, fastasleep, while their horses stood between their legs, and, though the animals weretormented by flies and constantly stamping, their masters never apprehended anaccident from them.’685 So impressed were Britons with these Hussars’relationships with their mounts, and the care that they showed for them, that it wasfar and away the most prevalent topic in their personal writings.686 Robert Gleig,writing after the war (with prose worthy of the weekly journal for it was initiallywritten) declared that ‘an Englishman, greatly as he piques himself on his skill infarriery, never acquires that attachment for his horse which a German trooperexperiences… and the noble animal seldom fails to return the affection of his master,whose voice he knows, and whom he will generally follow like a dog.’687Certainly these qualities and the reputation of the Legion’s cavalrymenearned them a great deal of respect, with one officer claiming that ‘if we saw aBritish dragoon at any time approach at full speed, it excited no curiosity among us,
683 Such was their fame, that some feats that were performed by the heavy dragoon regiments, suchas the one above, were attributed to them instead. See editors comments in: Michael Glover (ed.). A
Gentleman Volunteer: The letters of George Hennell From The Peninsular War 1812-1813 (Heinemann:London, 1979), p. 31.684 Smith dedicates a sub-chapter of his memoir to discussing the 1st Hussars. Smith, Autobiography
of Harry Smith, esp. p. 26.685 Ross-Lewin. With ‘The Thirty Second’, p. 304686 Mercer, Journal, p.44.687 Gleig, Subaltern, p. 138.
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but whenever we saw one of the first hussars coming on at a gallop it was high timeto gird our swords and bundle up.’688 Their skill at outpost duty leant to them amystique, and others saw them as the guardian angles of the army. Captain JohnPatterson memorialized them in saying that with the German hussars ‘entrustedwith outposts, the camp may sleep in safety, and in full assurance of being vigilantlywatched.’689 It is testimonies such as these that helped the Legion persist for sometime in popular memory as a special, if not supernatural force, a part of why it hadsuch a long impact in both military policy (as in the German Legion in 1855) and thememoirs of those who fought alongside these men. Throughout these discussions,national character – or more specifically martial character – was a key theme, and infact reached new levels, far surpassing discussions by previous generations ofBritish soldier-authors.The exaggerations prevalent in these accounts are owed, in part, to thenature of the commentary. Here, the focus on military duties and capabilitiescreated narratives that seem to have far more potential for hyperbole thandiscussions of cultural differences or social interactions. Yet another explanation forthis variance, or at least the attribution of such exceptionality, was that it was a wayof admiring these German soldiers favourably, without being overly harsh to theirfellow Englishmen. In such circumstances, it was easier to attribute such traits tonatural character than admitting that British soldiers were not equally desirous ofdoing their duties, especially, given that their memoirs and autobiographies weregeared towards a British audience.Conversely, in some many accounts, especially among those who were keenlyinterested in the soldiering profession, these contrasts were designed deliberatelyto impugn the abilities or the efforts of British soldiers. Just as the contrastsbetween the cultures and mores of these German soldiers helped inform concepts ofEnglishness and Britishness, so did these contrasts help determine areas in whichthe British soldiers excelled, or on the contrary, where they had ‘inefficiently
688 Brett-James, Life in Wellington’s Army, pp. 36-7.689 John Patterson, The Adventures of Captain John Patterson, With Notice of the Officers, etc. of the 50th
or Queen’s Own Regiment, from 1807-1821 London, 1837), p. 357. Gray, The Services of the King’sGerman Legion, p. 73.
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performed various important duties’ and ‘betrayed much ignorance of theprofession.’690 Whether the authors’ intentions were to throw condemnation uponBritish warriors, or to heap praise on their German comrades, the Legion was acontinuous beneficiary of both hyperbolic and well-deserved praise. Theirprofessionalism greatly increased their reception in the British Army, and thememory of the corps at large – even if the men responsible for such admiration onlymade up a fraction of the Legion as a whole.
**Conclusion**
The diaries, correspondence and memoirs from the Peninsular War offer a strikingcontrast to previous conflicts, not only for the sheer quantity, but because so manyof their authors went to great lengths to describe the environment around them,their activities beyond the battlefield, and crucially, their views towards thebehaviours and abilities of the foreigners within their own army. Discussions ofGerman national character were far more common in this particular conflict than forany other, and reveal many of the attitudes reflective of this brief era, but alsoindicative of the sentiments that had existed among British soldiers for the lastseventy-five years, or more.Scheither’s recruits were perhaps the best example of the structuralintegration of Germans within the British Army, however in terms of social andpsychological assimilation, the Legionaries were unsurpassed. This warm receptionand glowing recollections of the men in the KGL came from three sources. Firstly,these soldiers appealed to the professional sentiments within the army, wherecompetence in the duties of soldiers and ability in battle were stressed more thanany other characteristics. The effectiveness displayed by most KGL formationsearned them increasing respect from their brother-soldiers, as it appealed to the
690 Ross-Lewin, With ‘The Thirty Second’, p. 306.
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professional minded within the army, while at the same time, other foreign corpswere being condemned for their inabilities and indiscretions.Secondly, through the duration of this decade-long conflict the men of the Legionadopted many of the British customs and mannerisms, and the English language aswell, which served to make them more familiar and eased coordination andinteraction within the army at large. Furthermore, both British and German soldiersshared an equal care for the cause for which they fought, and though the British didnot view them purely motivated by the interests of Great Britain, there was anunderstanding that the better sorts within the Legion were fighting for theirHanoverian Elector, and more importantly, for the liberation of Germany. This jointcause was something rarely shared with other instances of Anglo-Germanassociations, such as the Hessians in the American War, whose motives werescrutinized even when they displayed an unquestionable zeal in fighting the rebels.As for the Legion’s soldiers, particularly the Hanoverian core from which it wasfounded, they maintained a patriotic and not mercenary comportment.Lastly, the various idiosyncrasies of the Legion on account of its foreign natureappealed to the more romantic side of soldiers’ opinions, and this image of achivalrous ‘other’ was both novel and endearing – especially in the age ofromanticism. Though the Black Brunswickers were the chief beneficiaries of anidyllic portrayal – in the form of the Millais painting – it was the Hanoverians whowould dominate the writings of the soldier diaries. The men of the Legion wereadopted into the army, and considered ‘British’ by their fellow soldiers, but only to acertain degree, for their most endearing aspect remained their foreignness and thedifferences in manners and methods when compared to British soldiers. Thesebehaviours were reinforced by the unique nature of the Legion, which wascompounded by discussions of national character within the army, as they becamean embodiment of Germans and Germanic soldiery from whom the British couldcontrast themselves.Collectively, these elements all contributed to the successful integration, andfond recollection of the King’s German Legion. No finer example of this can be found
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than a passage from the memoir of Lt. John Cooke, who fondly recalled an episode ofcamaraderie and friendship while at camp along the river Agueda in Spain in 1813:The German hussars rode up, smoking their pipes and singing somedelightful airs, their half squadrons joining in chorus at intervals. Weheard that the Hussar Brigade was going… to act with our Division, so thewhole of us left our canvas and lined the road to greet our old friends andcompanions of outpost duty. The hussars became so much affected byour cheering that tears rolled down many of their bronzed faces.‘Oh!’ said they, ‘we are always glad to see the old lighty division, who willever live in our hearts.’691Here, those elements of joint service, charismatic difference and social familiarity –one might say extreme fondness – combine in a scene the likes of which is not foundin previous episodes in the long history of Anglo-German military interaction, andreveal just how ‘brotherly’ these soldiers had become.
691 Hathaway, A True Gentlemen Soldier, p. 179. Brett-James, Life in Wellington’s Army, p. 37.
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CONCLUSIONS:
The capacious Royal Gallery in the Palace of Westminster contains two forty-fivefoot long paintings, both displaying a celebrated triumph of British arms, and eachstanding as a testament to the skill and exactness displayed by their creator, DanielMaclise. One wall bears the fresco entitled ‘The Death of Lord Nelson’, a celebrationof the British Navy at the Battle of Trafalgar and the passing – turned martyrdom –of Britain’s most famed admiral, Horatio Nelson. The centrepiece of the painting isthe dying admiral himself, surrounded by sailors representing all manners of menfrom the British Navy, from regions all across Great Britain and Ireland. It is asombre painting to be certain, but one revelling in a triumph of the British Navy –and the glory is theirs alone. The mural on the opposite wall tells a different story.Like the ‘Death of Nelson’, it is a commemoration of British forces: the men ofWellington’s Army after the Battle of Waterloo. Throughout the solemn landscapeportraying the aftermath of battle, are gathered men epitomizing soldiers from allacross the United Kingdom. But they are not alone. The centrepiece of this paintingis the handshake between Britain’s most celebrated general, Lord Wellesley, theDuke of Wellington, and Field Marshal Gebhard Liebrich von Blücher, thecommander of the Prussian forces, surrounded by an entourage of his mostimportant lieutenants. Whereas the triumph of Britain’s Navy was one unaided,victory by land was a joint-venture, and in the painting, the sign on the inn behindthese two generals, La Belle Alliance, provides a symbolism relevant not only to thisbattle, but to this one hundred and twenty five year period, where the British Army’ssalient victories on the continent and beyond were the result of a number of militarypartnerships, most notably with the German states of central Europe.692
692 When Charles de Gaulle visited Westminster Palace to give a speech in front of both Houses ofParliament in 1960, these two paintings were covered up. This is a strange reminder, that therelations between Britain and Germany one and a half centuries after Waterloo, were far differentfrom the one and a quarter centuries before. For the decline in Anglo-German relations in thenineteenth century, see: Paul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London:George Allen and Unwin, 1980).
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This thesis began with two key objectives: to highlight the importance andcharacteristics of Anglo-German armies in Britain’s struggles with France in the longeighteenth century, and to discuss the opinions and associations of British andGerman soldiers within these coalitions. As a conclusion to this work, we willexamine the evolution and key features of these relationships once more, as well asthe most common trends and important themes.From the wars against Louis XIV to those against Napoleon, the role thatGerman soldiers played in Britain’s anti-Gallic military endeavours remained aconstant, yet this thesis has shown that several key changes transpired. The firstsixty years of this relationship remained largely unchanged, with three wars eachcantered on a British Army operating alongside Dutch and Austrian forces in theLow Countries, aided by a large number of German auxiliaries. While the‘Diplomatic Revolution’ of 1756 saw a shift in these alliances, Britain’s reliance uponGerman allies and hired troops remained unaltered, if not augmented. Nevertheless,the Seven Years War saw a some important evolutions, as it was the first time thatGerman manpower was utilized in the American Colonies, and the only time aBritish-led coalition on the European continent was composed of an exclusivelyAnglo-German force. As discussed in Chapter V, from 1756 onwards German forcesbegan appearing in ever-greater numbers within the British Army (particularlywithin the colonial operations), although never matching the scale of allied orauxiliary forces. While the Seven Years War was the high-watermark for Britain’suse of subsidy troops, the American War of Independence was certainly the highestprofile, and represented the last prolonged usage of German auxiliaries. From thispoint onward, Britain began incorporating more and more foreign soldiers intovarious regiments on the British establishment, while maintaining a policy ofsubsidizing foreign armies to meet the requirements needed to challengeNapoleonic France on a pan-European scale.This survey of Anglo-German armies should not suggest that there was anexclusive relationship between Britain and the various states within Germany, asFrance maintained equally enduring relationships with several states within theEmpire. The Bourbons, and Napoleon especially, mobilized greater numbers of
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German soldiers within the French Army throughout the century, and unlike Britain,several German regiments remained permanent parts of her armed forces. In fact,wherever British soldiers were to encounter French forces, there was a likelihood ofencountering Germans within the French Army as well. Likewise, other EuropeanArmies, particularly the Dutch, came to rely upon German manpower, but similarly,each European nation would contain a large number of foreigners, not just fromcentral Europe, but from throughout the continent. These considerations are nothighlighted to undermine the importance of an Anglo-German military relationship,but rather to stress the multination, and at times transnational nature of these earlymodern armies. Such institutions, founded solely for the advancement of theirrespective state or prince, were not always reflective of the nationality ormotivations of the men who composed them. In such circumstances, the importanceof the soldiering profession in providing community and identity was vital.This leads us to the second question at hand: the relations between Britishand German soldiers, and their opinions of one another. Generally speaking, Britishsoldiers’ relations and perceptions of their German allies reflected the independentand usually disjointed nature of these coalitions, where infrequent interactions leadto an incomplete picture of how these forces related with one another. Frequentinfighting among the commanding generals certainly impacted the overall tenor ofthese associations in a way that was not replicated in other forms of Anglo-Germanmilitary cooperation. Yet, it should be remembered that these did not arise purelyfrom differences in national affiliation, as similar disputes were just as commonbetween men in the British Army and Navy.Relations with auxiliaries were much clearer, better documented, andgenerally more favourable. Yet the comportment within these hybridized forceswas very much dependent upon other dynamics, chiefly the dynastic or contractualrelationships that bound these forces together. For example, when George II tookcommand of the Pragmatic Army in 1743, British and Hanoverian forces squabbledlike angry siblings while their prince commanded the army, and these resentmentsdied down with his departure. Similarly, an overemphasis on the quality and abilityof Hessian soldiers in the American War was indicative of the mercenary origins of
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Britain’s ‘allies’ in the rebellion, and commentaries were geared towards addressingthis relationship more than in accounts involving other auxiliary forces.Integrated corps were the most variable in terms of their rapport withBritish soldiers, as those who were directly recruited into the army rarely appear inthe contemporary writings, and those instances we have of conflict often originatewith courts-martial documents, which we cannot assume provide us a balancedpicture. However, the sentiments between native Britons and the foreign corps inthe Napoleonic Wars reveal steadily improving relations, no doubt a product ofgreater cohesion between these forces, and a familiarity resulting from years ofcampaigning. Though these foreigners within the army became the embodiment ofa German ‘otherness’, one of the salient topics within soldiers’ diaries and memoirs,the tone was generally more positive than in observations of the more distant allies.Delving into the interactions of British and German soldiers, we can also findsome patterns. Firstly, unlike the evolutions in the structure and nature of thesemilitary relationships, there are minimal changes over time in how the soldiersinteracted, and the most dramatic variances owe more to the confines or the contextin which they transpired. In each campaign, the first encounters were usually themost problematic and susceptible to disturbances. This was certainly the case in themid-century wars, and the change that took place in how these soldiers related withone another is best exemplified in the case of the British and Hanoverian forces inthe War of Austrian Succession, as discussed in Chapter III. But not all change wasfor the good, and the generally more positive relations in the Anglo-German forcesin the American and French Revolutionary Wars, show a gradual cooling of relationsover the course of several years, owing primarily to the lack of success thatcharacterized these conflicts. The foreign corps serving in the Peninsular War,especially the King’s German Legion, would stand as the pinnacle of Anglo-Germanrelations, yet in each conflict there are hints and anecdotes of a cordial relationsbetween Britons and their German counterparts. To be certain, conflicts andinfighting were ever-present, yet, if we are to exempt 1743-44, the enmity betweenthese forces never matched the rhetoric that was a recurring theme in the publicdebates prevalent during each war, and which increased in volume with every
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foreign subsidy. Overall, the relations between British and German soldiers leanedtowards cordiality rather than contempt. Certainly a number of negativeimpressions have been provided within this thesis, but as discussed in Chapter III,the most universally derogatory comments, were reserved for their Dutch allies.True to the professional fraternity that separated armed forces and non-combatants, the greatest rifts existed between soldiers and civilians. It was in theseinteractions where the clearest acts of religious disdain can be found – whereasthere are no substantive references of such sectarianism between Britons andAustrians, or for another example, with the Catholic auxiliaries who joined theBritish Army fighting in the Colonies in the 1770’s. While there were tensions oversupplies and rations, they never matched the bloody riots that broke out betweenBritish soldiers and Flemish traders in the early days of the Pragmatic Army in1742-3.693 The difficulties overcoming the language barrier within the army rarelymatched the frustration shown by soldiers trying to communicate with non-combatants.694 Finally, those writers who questioned the loyalties and motivationsof their German auxiliaries would find their comments pale in comparison to thecondemnations of Dutch, Flemish, Spanish, Portuguese, or even German civilians,who only rarely seemed in the eyes of these soldier-authors, to warrant theprotection they were being granted, or to contribute in a way that thesecommentators found adequate.695
As for British soldiers’ opinions of German soldiery, the two case studiesprovide a contrast between how these men would describe their German brother-soldiers from one generation to another. From focusing primarily on professionalability, and couching these assertions in reference to Hessian martial ability,accounts emerging from the Peninsular War described the German redcoats verymuch in terms of their national character and natural ability. Beyond the uniquecontexts of each episode, there were several reasons for this shift, and the growth in
693 BL Add MS 36252 Diary of Joseph Yorke fol. 12.; CKS Amherst Papers U1350 01/1 fol. 20.694 Campbell, Memoirs, pp. 52-3.; Gomm, Letters and Journals, pp. 71-2.; Schaumann, On the Road, p.73.695 Schaumann, On the Road, pp. 72-3.; Hamilton, Hamilton’s Campaign, p. 36.
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nationalism and an increasing focus on differences in national character werecertainly at the forefront. That the soldiers of the KGL represented men fromthroughout Germany was certainly another explanation. Yet, the institutionaldivision (or lack thereof) was a fundamental cause for this change in thecontextualization. In the American War, when Hessian soldiers acted in a certainmanner, British soldiers could ascribe these acts in reference to the foreign army inwhich they served. Yet, once these foreigners donned the trappings of Britishsoldiers, the barrier that had divided these groups was worn away, leading todescriptions being attributed to their national character. Put succinctly, where adifference in institution was not provided, the discussion turned towards national orethnic dissimilarity. This reveals the durability of national or ethnic division withinthese armies, something that service in the same army could not always overcome.If one considers the interactions between English, Scottish and Irish soldiers in theBritish Army, this should come as no surprise.Throughout this era, national character was present, even if not explicitlyaddressed in soldiers’ writings, and not just for foreigners serving within the BritishArmy. There was a continuous interplay between popular stereotypes and theimpressions that emerged from prolonged interaction with these foreigncontingents: from stereotypes regarding German pace, demeanour, and reliability,to assertions that they were naturally better light infantrymen, were preferable fortasks such as outpost duty, or even that they were naturally less susceptible tovarious faults among British soldiers, such as excessive drinking. Furthermore, thisconflict between national character and professionalism was not confined just to thewritings or sentiments of soldiers, but manifested in the relations between thesepolities. No better example of an implicit conflict can be seen than with thePragmatic Army, which was marked by divisions and rancour between Hanoveriansand Britons in 1743. Over the course of the next two years these points ofcontention faded and a professional respect emerged, largely contributed to byshared experiences, on and off the battlefield – and certainly the Battle of Fontenoyappears to be the watershed moment in the creating of a solidarity between theseparticular forces.
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As revealed throughout this thesis, professionalism impacted the attitudes ofsoldiers and regularly pushed other themes predominant to discussions of nationalcharacter to the background. There were those within the army, who didspecifically address issues of national character, such as Charles Cocks, the‘intelligence officer’ serving in the Peninsular War. Cocks filled his letters anddiaries with discussions of these themes, no doubt influenced by his readings ofHenry Lloyd’s History of the Late War in Germany that he read while on campaign,and which provided the template regarding martial character that he contextualizedwith his own experiences.696 Similarly, there were a number of British soldiers inthe American War who portrayed the Hessians in a manner that reflected thelanguage found in the press, particularly in regards to their value as ‘mercenaries’.However, these were exceptions to the rule, as most impressions were influencedprimarily by soldier’s own experiences. In fact the primary stereotype, that ofHessian plundering, did not emerge in London, but from the colonies, where theirfrequent marauding led to exaggerated characterizations that were the product of adiscourse within the British Army. In discussing martial or national character, someviews of soldiers borrowed from popular norms, but the majority diverged greatly,if they followed them at all, both in the subjects they chose to focus upon and intheir conclusions: dwelling less on what was British and what was not, and focusingmore on what was soldierly and what was not.Much of this thesis has sought to highlight this divide between popular andsoldierly opinion, especially as our understanding of the subject is reflective more ofthe former, to the neglect of the opinions of those within these armies. With much ofthe current scholarly attention being placed on the press and popular attitudes, it isimportant not to lose sight of the experiences of those who actually participated inthese military enterprises. For example, after 1744, and for the remainder of theWar of Austrian Succession, Hanoverian soldiers remained a bugaboo in the presslong after relations between the respective armies had improved. A decade later,when the Hanoverian and Hessians forces were encamped in England in what was
696 Page, Intelligence Officer, p. 131.
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portrayed by a vociferous opposition as a second Saxon invasion, aspiring youngofficers like James Wolfe were flocking to their camps to learn their techniques andsocialize with their officers. While the German commanders of ‘His BritannicMajesty’s Army in Germany’ were accused of dithering away British blood andfortune, there was amongst the British Army an unflinching faith in theircommander, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and cordial relations with all membersof the predominantly German army.697 These are some examples of a host of similardivergences, and yet the public attitudes regarding these issues are well known,while the opinions of the participating soldiers have been largely forgotten orignored. While the writings of soldiers are by no means neglected, we cannot saythe same for their opinions on these well-documented issues. Hopefully futurescholarship can reveal more about what these men had to say about their allies,enemies, and the foreign civilian populations with which they so often interacted.
This thesis began with a discussion of the self-reflection of British officersand soldiers, initialized by their interaction with foreigners, both civilian andmilitary. Indeed, one of the most compelling aspects of the diaries, correspondenceand memoirs of soldiers were these moments of introspection. While German alliesand auxiliaries were a common subject, quite often these descriptions would lead todiscussions of British national and martial character. In most conclusions, theBritish fared quite favourable – which should come as no surprise. Yet othersrevealed certain criticisms, most of which were in fact couched in terms of British,or more commonly ‘English’ traits. Certainly in a period of growing nationalidentities, these discussions reveal the degree to which soldiers underwent thisprocess in their own unique manner. Obvious were the esprit de corps and feelingsof patriotism that reinforced this self-identification, but there were others, like Lord
697 Such was this confidence, that when the German Prince publicly humiliated their owncommander, George Sackville, for his failings at the Battle of Minden, no one among the British forcesseemed to bat an eye. Lord Holdernesse made this point clear to Sackville, warning him not to faultFerdinand, stating that: ‘The Prince stands so high in reputation both with the King & the People thatany degree of charge against him would be ill received.’ Anon. 'Battle of Minden, 1 August 1759'.
JSAHR, 7 (1927), pp. 127-8.; BL Egerton Papers Eg MS 3443 fols. 247-8, Holderness to Sackville,August 14th 1759.
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Wallingford, who also gained an appreciation of their own identity through pensivereflection, and perhaps even in the act of writing their letters or journals.From interactions with German soldiers, the British realized several keythemes, not only regarding their martial ability, where they were particularlycelebratory of their courage and ability in battle, but also other aspects of soldiering,from which they could make even greater contrasts. The primary area of differencewas in their ‘benevolence.’ As the eighteenth century progressed, Britons within thearmy became aware that their treatment of civilians, either in Europe, or in ColonialAmerica, was far superior to the manner in which German forces treated these samenon-combatants. Though there were admissions to their lack of discipline orshortcomings in certain military matters, from the 1770’s onwards, the Britishsoldier, for all his numerous vices of drinking and cursing, was far more reticent toinflict bodily or financial harm upon civilian populations, even hostile ones. Thiswas the key point of contrast with other contemporary armies, and those Germanswho became redcoats themselves, were often careful to highlight their conversion toan ‘English’ manner of conducting warfare.698 This was indeed a laudable trait, andone that echoes the winning of hearts and minds by armed forces in the twentiethand twenty-first centuries. While this was a point of pride and unity for Britishsoldiers, it created rifts between them and foreign armies, revealing that aprofessional solidarity had its limits, when sympathy towards civilians contrastedthe more empathetic Britons with apathetic Germans, especially when the latterwere the chief perpetrators. Interactions with German soldiery may have providedBritish soldiers a better perspective and appreciation of their German allies, butthey were also given a new insight into their own identities. Perhaps it is nosurprise, that they were quite happy to be Britons.
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